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62024CJ0683

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

19 November 2026 (*)

In Case C‑683/24,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria), made by decision of 16 October 2024, received at the Court on 16 October 2024, in the proceedings

Spielerschutz Sigma Prozessfinanzierungs GmbH

v

Geissler Heilbock Hopf Ferox Legal Partnerschaft von Rechtsanwälten mbB,

THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of I. Jarukaitis, President of the Chamber, R. Frendo, N. Jääskinen (Rapporteur), M. Condinanzi and A. Kornezov, Judges,

Advocate General: N. Emiliou,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

– Spielerschutz Sigma Prozessfinanzierungs GmbH, by K. Weber, Rechtsanwalt,

– Geissler Heilbock Hopf Ferox Legal Partnerschaft von Rechtsanwälten mbB, by U. Salburg, Rechtsanwalt,

– the Austrian Government, by A. Posch, J. Schmoll and F. Koppensteiner, acting as Agents,

– the Belgian Government, by L. Jans and M. Van Regemorter, acting as Agents, and by V. Ramognino, avocat, and R. Verbeke and P. Vlaemminck, advocaten,

– the Czech Government, by A. Pagáčová, M. Smolek and J. Vláčil, acting as Agents,

– the German Government, by J. Möller, M. Hellmann and A. Sahner, acting as Agents,

– the Greek Government, by I. Kotsoni, T. Papadopoulou and S. Papaioannou, acting as Agents,

– the Maltese Government, by A. Buhagiar, acting as Agent, and by D. Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero, abogado,

– the European Commission, by B. Ernst and S. Noë, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 23 April 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1, Article 45(1)(a) and Articles 46, 48 and 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between Sigma Prozessfinanzierungs GmbH (‘Spielerschutz Sigma’) and Geissler Heilbock Hopf Ferox Legal Partnerschaft von Rechtsanwälten mbB (‘the legal adviser’) concerning the reimbursement of fees paid by Spielerschutz Sigma for a legal opinion provided by the legal adviser and compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by that company as a result of that opinion.

Legal context

European Union law

3 Section 2, entitled ‘Enforcement’, of Chapter III of Regulation No 1215/2012, entitled ‘Recognition and enforcement’, contains Article 39 of that regulation, which provides:

‘A judgment given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in the other Member States without any declaration of enforceability being required.’

4 Subsection 2, entitled ‘Refusal of enforcement’, of Section 3, entitled ‘Refusal of recognition and enforcement’, also in Chapter III, includes Article 48 of that regulation, which provides:

‘The court shall decide on the application for refusal of enforcement without delay.’

Austrian law

5 Paragraph 1299 of the Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austrian Civil Code), in the version applicable to the main proceedings (‘the Civil Code’), provides:

‘Anyone who publicly performs a function, art, trade or craft, or who voluntarily assumes a task requiring artistic knowledge or an unusual level of diligence, thereby demonstrates that he or she believes himself or herself to be capable of the necessary diligence and as having the requisite specialised knowledge; he or she must therefore be answerable where such diligence or knowledge is lacking. …’

6 Under Paragraph 1300 of the Civil Code:

‘An expert shall be liable also where he or she inadvertently provides, in exchange for remuneration, detrimental advice in matters relating to his or her art or science. In any other situation, an adviser shall be liable only for damage which he or she knowingly caused to another person by giving the advice.’

7 It is apparent from the referring court’s reply to a request for information from the Court, inter alia, that Austrian law does not provide for liability rules specific to lawyers. That reply states that, according to national case-law, lawyers are experts within the meaning of Paragraphs 1299 and 1300 of the Civil Code, so that their liability is governed by those provisions.

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

8 Spielerschutz Sigma is a litigation funding company established in Vienna (Austria). It funds, inter alia, proceedings brought by consumers of online gambling services (‘the players’) residing in Austria against operators holding Maltese licences which provide online gambling services that are accessible, inter alia, from Austria, without holding a valid licence issued under the law of that Member State.

9 The referring court states that, in those circumstances, the players may claim reimbursement of their losses before the Austrian courts on the basis of the national provisions on unjust enrichment and civil liability, on the ground that those services were offered without such a licence. That court also points out that Spielerschutz Sigma has, through its clients, obtained numerous judgments ordering operators holding Maltese licences to reimburse the losses of those clients and is seeking to have those judgments enforced in Malta, in accordance with Article 39 of Regulation No 1215/2012.

10 On 12 June 2023, the Maltese legislature inserted Article 56A into the Att dwar il-Logħob (Gaming Act) (Suppliment tal-Gazzetta tal-Gvern ta’ Malta, No 19 991, of 15 May 2018 – Taqsima A, p. 509) (‘the Maltese Gaming Act’), under which, first, any action brought against gaming operators holding a Maltese licence is prohibited as contrary to public policy and, second, Maltese courts are to refuse recognition and/or enforcement in that Member State of any foreign judgment and/or decision given on foot of such an action.

11 Following that amendment to Maltese legislation and in order to be able to assess the risks to which that legislation might expose its business model, in particular with regard to the recognition and enforcement in Malta of judgments obtained in Austria in proceedings funded by it, Spielerschutz Sigma instructed the legal adviser to prepare a legal opinion on the compatibility of Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act with EU law and on the possibility of that provision being applied by the Maltese courts.

12 The legal adviser issued its opinion on 5 July 2023 (‘the legal opinion’). It is apparent from the information available to the Court that in that opinion, the legal adviser reached two conclusions, namely, first, that Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act is clearly and undoubtedly contrary to EU law, with the result that it would be inconceivable for that article to apply in enforcement proceedings in Malta and, secondly, that, in accordance with Article 48 of Regulation No 1215/2012, enforcement proceedings before the Maltese courts of first instance are concluded within six months.

13 The referring court notes that, in reliance on that opinion, Spielerschutz Sigma continued to fund legal proceedings in Austria on behalf of players, and for substantial amounts.

14 It is apparent from the order for reference that, on 19 July 2023, the Prim’Awla tal-Qorti Ċivili (First Hall of the Civil Court, Malta), by decision notified to Spielerschutz Sigma on 1 August 2023, rejected a request for recognition and enforcement brought on the basis of Regulation No 1215/2012, in proceedings funded by Spielerschutz Sigma, specifically invoking Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act.

15 Following that decision, Spielerschutz Sigma brought an action before the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria), which is the referring court, seeking, first, the reimbursement of the fees in the amount of EUR 5 000 paid to the legal adviser for the legal opinion, on the ground that the opinion was incorrect. Secondly, that action sought a declaration that the legal adviser would be liable for all future damage suffered by Spielerschutz Sigma as a result of the funding provided between 5 July 2023, the date on which that opinion was drawn up, and 1 August 2023, the date on which Spielerschutz Sigma became aware of the decision of the Prim’Awla tal-Qorti Ċivili (First Hall of the Civil Court), referred to in the preceding paragraph, of court proceedings introduced in Austria by Austrian players against Maltese online gambling operators which operated without a valid licence in Austria.

16 The legal adviser, for its part, maintains that the conclusions set out in the legal opinion were correct and that it was reasonable to expect the Maltese courts to comply with the EU law currently in force and the primacy thereof, so that it cannot be held liable on account of national case-law which is contrary to EU law the emergence of which was unforeseeable at the time that opinion was provided.

17 The referring court states that, contrary to the conclusions set out in the legal opinion, first, the Maltese courts, applying Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act, rejected the requests for recognition and enforcement of decisions rendered by Austrian courts and tribunals in favour of players and to the detriment of operators holding Maltese licences in proceedings funded by the applicant in the main proceedings and brought on the basis of Regulation No 1215/2012. Secondly, the proceedings brought before the Maltese courts of first instance on the basis of that regulation are not concluded within six months.

18 The referring court also points out that there is no decision of a Maltese court in which doubt is cast on the validity of Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act or in which its compatibility with EU law is called into question.

19 The referring court explains that the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings depends on whether the legal adviser, in the legal opinion, incorrectly assessed the conformity of the Maltese legislation in question with EU law by misinterpreting Regulation No 1215/2012. According to that court, the only legal question remaining to be resolved is whether that assessment was correct or, at the very least, defensible. While stating that it fully subscribes to the considerations set out by the legal adviser on the issue of conformity, that court takes the view that, in the light of the decisions taken by the Maltese courts pursuant to that legislation – which may reflect a manifestly different assessment with regard to that issue of conformity by those courts – there is no acte clair and the referring court is of the view, concurring with the convergent positions of the parties to the main proceedings in that regard, that a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice should be made.

20 In those circumstances, the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Must Article 1(1) and (2) of Regulation [No 1215/2012], in conjunction with [Article 45(1)(a) and Articles ]46 and 52 of that regulation, be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which, on the basis of a corresponding principle of public policy enshrined in national law, precludes the recognition and enforcement of judgments given by the courts or tribunals of other Member States in respect of all proceedings against licence holders and current and former officers and key persons of a licence holder for matters relating to the provision of a gaming service if such legal action conflicts with or undermines the legality of the provision of gaming services in or from Malta by virtue of a licence issued by the [competent] authority, or the legality of any legal or natural obligation resulting from the provision of such gaming services, and relates to an authorised activity which is lawful in terms of that national law and other applicable national regulatory instruments?

(2) Must [Article 45(1) and Article ]46 of Regulation [No 1215/2012] be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which, irrespective of whether a relevant application is submitted to the court or tribunal before which recognition or enforcement is sought and of whether the person bearing the obligation has exhausted all legal remedies in the Member State of the court of first instance, and without review by the court or tribunal before which recognition or enforcement is sought, precludes the recognition (Article 45 of Regulation [No 1215/2012]) and enforcement (Article 46 of Regulation [No 1215/2012]) of judgments given by the courts or tribunals of other Member States in respect of all proceedings against licence holders and current and former officers and key persons of a licence holder for matters relating to the provision of a gaming service if such legal action conflicts with or undermines the legality of the provision of gaming services in or from Malta by virtue of a licence issued by the [competent] authority, or the legality of any legal or natural obligation resulting from the provision of such gaming services, and relates to an authorised activity which is lawful in terms of that national law and other applicable national regulatory instruments?

(3) (a) Must [Article 45(1)(a) and Article ]46 of Regulation [No 1215/2012] be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which declares the recognition and enforcement of judgments to be contrary to public policy for the sole purpose, in the context of encouragement of the private sector by the State as provided for in the national constitution, of protecting holders of online gaming licences from the recognition and enforcement of judgments finding against them that are given by courts or tribunals of other Member States?

(b) Must [Article 45(1)(a) and Article ]46 of Regulation [No 1215/2012] be interpreted as precluding refusal on grounds of public policy of recognition and enforcement by the court or tribunal seised in the State in which enforcement is sought where that refusal is based solely on the premiss that recognising such a judgment would be contrary to the economic and financial interests of the Member State addressed because gaming providers make a significant contribution to the national economy and the revenue of that Member State?

(4) Must Article 52 of Regulation [No 1215/2012] be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which precludes recognition and/or enforcement of a judgment given by a court or tribunal of another Member State in proceedings against licence holders and current and former officers and key persons of a licence holder for matters relating to the provision of a gaming service because the gaming provider’s activity, assessed under Maltese law, would be permissible?

(5) Must Article 48 of Regulation [No 1215/2012] be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to decide without delay enshrined therein is breached if no decision on the application for recognition has been given at first instance within six months and that delay is not due to circumstances or delays on the part of the parties or of third parties in the individual recognition proceedings?’

The application to reopen the oral part of the procedure

21 By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 8 May 2026, the Maltese Government requested the Court to order the reopening of the oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

22 In support of its request, that government submits, in essence, that should the Court find the present request for a preliminary reference admissible and, consequently, decide to reply to the questions put by the referring court, as proposed in the alternative by the Advocate General in his Opinion, it should be allowed to respond to the written observations submitted by the other parties during a hearing before the Court. That government relies in that regard, inter alia, on the right to an effective remedy, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

23 In that regard, it should be noted that, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require his or her involvement. The Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s Opinion or by the reasoning which led to that Opinion (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 December 2025, Storstockholms Lokaltrafik, C‑422/24, EU:C:2025:980, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited, and of 29 January 2026, Keladis I and Keladis II, C‑72/24 and C‑73/24, EU:C:2026:51, paragraph 63).

24 In accordance with Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may at any time, after hearing the Advocate General, order the reopening of the oral part of the procedure, in particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or where a party has, after the close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court, or where the case must be decided on the basis of an argument which has not yet been debated.

25 However, in the present case, the Court considers that it has at its disposal, at the close of the written and oral parts of the procedure, all the elements necessary to rule on the request for a preliminary ruling. In addition, the Maltese Government has not put forward, in support of its request that the oral part of the procedure be reopened, any new fact that is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision which the Court is called upon to give in the present case.

26 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not impose an absolute obligation to hold a public hearing in all proceedings and does not require a hearing to be held in all proceedings. That is true, inter alia, where the case does not raise questions of fact or law which cannot be resolved adequately on the basis of the file and the written observations of the parties. Article 76(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides specifically that the Court may decide not to hold a hearing if it considers, on reading the written pleadings or observations lodged during the written part of the procedure, that it has sufficient information to make a ruling (judgment of 11 September 2025, Duca di Salaparuta, C‑341/24, EU:C:2025:693, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

27 Accordingly, there are no grounds to grant the request that the oral part of the procedure be reopened.

Admissibility

28 The German and Maltese Governments argue that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible on the ground that the Court’s reply is not necessary for the referring court to rule on the case in the main proceedings.

29 Furthermore, according to the Maltese Government, the dispute in the main proceedings is fictitious, since the parties in the main proceedings appear to have created an ‘artificial fabrication’ with the sole aim of obtaining an advisory opinion from the Court.

30 In addition, both the German and Maltese Governments emphasise the consequences that would arise if the present request for a preliminary ruling were to be considered to be admissible, which would extend beyond the reach of the present case. In essence, those Governments submit that, if an individual could instruct a professional to draw up a legal opinion with a view to claiming reimbursement of the agreed fees on the ground that that opinion is incorrect, those parties could then, by mere agreement between themselves, arbitrarily transform any question on the interpretation of EU law – which is by its nature abstract – into a question referred for a preliminary ruling relevant for the resolution of the dispute in question.

31 It should be borne in mind that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them and that the justification for a reference for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered, but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute. As is apparent from the very wording of Article 267 TFEU, the preliminary ruling sought must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it (judgments of 9 January 2024, G. and Others (Appointment of judges to the ordinary courts in Poland), C‑181/21 and C‑269/21, EU:C:2024:1, paragraphs 62 and 63 and the case-law cited, and of 2 October 2025, Nolgers, C‑391/24, EU:C:2025:748, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

32 In such proceedings, there must accordingly be a connecting factor between that dispute and the provisions of EU law whose interpretation is sought, by virtue of which that interpretation is objectively required for the decision to be taken by the referring court (judgments of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited, and of 9 January 2024, G. and Others (Appointment of judges to the ordinary courts in Poland), C‑181/21 and C‑269/21, EU:C:2024:1, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited), so that that interpretation is necessary for the resolution of that dispute, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU.

33 It follows from the foregoing that, as observed by the Advocate General, in essence, in paragraph 55 of his Opinion, questions referred for a preliminary ruling are admissible where the referring court is required to draw legally binding consequences, whether of a substantive or procedural nature, from the interpretation of EU law which it sought from the Court of Justice in order to resolve the case before it. The connecting factor between that interpretation and the resolution of the dispute must thus be real and concrete, and not purely hypothetical, theoretical or simply speculative. Consequently, a request for a preliminary ruling seeking points of interpretation of EU law which does not meet an objective need for the resolution of the dispute must be declared inadmissible.

34 In the present case, the referring court states that the dispute in the main proceedings concerns the correct or at least defensible nature of the legal opinion on the compatibility of Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act with EU law. In that context, the referring court, by its questions, seeks an interpretation of several provisions of EU law, namely Articles 1, 45, 46, 48 and 52 of Regulation No 1215/2012, in order, in essence, to ascertain whether that interpretation is similar to that set out in the opinion.

35 It is therefore necessary to determine whether there is a connecting factor, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 32 above, between those provisions and the dispute pending before the referring court.

36 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in response to the request for information sent to it by the Court, the referring court stated that, in accordance with the provisions of national law governing the conditions under which an expert may be held liable, which apply also to lawyers, if the assessment set out in an opinion provided by the expert is incorrect, the latter is liable for the resulting damage only in the event of fault. Furthermore, according to the case-law of the national courts, the expert is however not liable in the event of an incorrect legal interpretation, as long as that interpretation is defensible, as the question of whether that interpretation is applied by the relevant authorities and courts is not decisive in assessing its defensible nature. The referring court also stated, in that context, that a legal opinion of an expert is defensible, inter alia, if it is consistent with at least some of the case-law or legal doctrine existing at the time that opinion was provided.

37 Thus, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that, for the purposes of assessing the alleged lack of diligence on the part of the legal adviser in drafting the legal opinion on the compatibility of Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act with EU law, it is necessary to determine, in accordance with the applicable national law as set out by that court, whether that opinion is at the very least reasonably defensible in the light of the legal framework and the information available at the time it was provided.

38 In the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, it is for the Court to rule on the interpretation of the Treaties and on the validity and interpretation of acts adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, and not on the application of national law.

39 The lawfulness and proper performance of the reciprocal obligations of the parties to the legal consultation at issue in the main proceedings are therefore independent of the issue of the compatibility of Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act with EU law (see, by analogy, order of 24 July 2003, Horn, C‑44/03, EU:C:2003:419, paragraph 15).

40 Furthermore, according to the criteria set out by the referring court and reiterated in paragraph 36 above, the defensible nature of an expert opinion must be assessed, in the context of an action for damages, in the light of the information existing at the time that opinion was provided. In the present case, the preliminary ruling, ultimately rendered, on the compatibility of Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act with EU law would be delivered after the legal opinion at issue in the main proceedings was provided.

41 Accordingly, the interpretation of EU law which the Court would need to adopt in answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling would not meet an objective need for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings and, consequently, is not necessary for that resolution (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 January 2024, G. and Others (Appointment of judges to the ordinary courts in Poland), C‑181/21 and C‑269/21, EU:C:2024:1, paragraph 72).

42 Thus, in the present case, there is no connecting factor, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 32 above, between the provisions of EU law whose interpretation is sought by the referring court and the dispute in the main proceedings.

43 Consequently, the request for a preliminary ruling in the present case must be regarded as seeking advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 31 above. That request is therefore inadmissible.

Costs

44 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria), made by decision of 16 October 2024, is inadmissible.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: German.