Details
ECLI
Source
Decision form
Issue date
Last update
File mark
Court
Jurisdiction
Žiadne známe citácie.
62025CC0601_en.html
HTML · 87.11 KB
No categories available
62025CC0601
Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
SPIELMANN
delivered on 12 November 2026 (1)
Case C‑601/25
Stowarzyszenie Artystów Wykonawców SAWP
v
E. spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Gdańsku (Regional Court, Gdańsk, Poland))
Introduction
1 There are more than 250 collective management organisations that manage copyright and related rights (‘CMOs’) in the European Union. (2) The economic and cultural role they play as collective managers of intellectual property rights is an essential one. Their importance is clear, inter alia, from Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, (3) by which rules common to the Member States were adopted to provide a framework for the tasks and functioning of CMOs. In addition, Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (4) requires the Member States to allow CMOs that are regularly recognised as having a right to represent holders of intellectual property rights to seek application of the measures, procedures and remedies adopted by the Member States on the basis of that directive. (5)
2 In that context, the present request for a preliminary ruling offers the Court an opportunity not only to clarify the scope of the rights to information set out in Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 and Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, of which a CMO is liable to avail itself in the course of its functions, but also to examine, to a certain degree, the option given to the Member States, where appropriate, to establish a right to information that is more favourable to CMOs.
3 The request was made in proceedings between a CMO and a cable television operator concerning a request – made outside the context of any infringement proceedings – seeking to obtain information from that operator concerning uses that potentially infringed intellectual property rights and concerning uses that could give rise to performers’ and other rightholders’ entitlements to statutory remuneration.
Legal framework
European Union law
Directive 2004/48
4 Article 2 of Directive 2004/48, entitled ‘Scope’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof, that, ‘without prejudice to the means which are or may be provided for in Community or national legislation, in so far as those means may be more favourable for rightholders, the measures, procedures and remedies provided for by this directive shall apply, in accordance with Article 3, to any infringement of intellectual property rights as provided for by Community law and/or by the national law of the Member State concerned.’
5 Article 3 of that directive, entitled ‘General obligation’, provides:
‘1. Member States shall provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays.
2. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.’
6 Article 8 of the directive, entitled ‘Right of information’, provides:
‘1. Member States shall ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right and in response to a justified and proportionate request of the claimant, the competent judicial authorities may order that information on the origin and distribution networks of the goods or services which infringe an intellectual property right be provided by the infringer and/or any other person who:
(a) was found in possession of the infringing goods on a commercial scale;
(b) was found to be using the infringing services on a commercial scale;
(c) was found to be providing on a commercial scale services used in infringing activities; or
(d) was indicated by the person referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) as being involved in the production, manufacture or distribution of the goods or the provision of the services.
2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall, as appropriate, comprise:
(a) the names and addresses of the producers, manufacturers, distributors, suppliers and other previous holders of the goods or services, as well as the intended wholesalers and retailers;
(b) information on the quantities produced, manufactured, delivered, received or ordered, as well as the price obtained for the goods or services in question.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply without prejudice to other statutory provisions which:
(a) grant the rightholder rights to receive fuller information;
…’
Directive 2014/26
7 Recital 33 of Directive 2014/26 states that, ‘in order to ensure that collective management organisations can comply with the obligations set out in this directive, users should provide those organisations with relevant information on the use of the rights represented by the collective management organisations. This obligation should not apply to natural persons acting for purposes outside their trade, business, craft or profession, who therefore fall outside the definition of user as laid down in this directive. Moreover, the information required by collective management organisations should be limited to what is reasonable, necessary and at the users’ disposal in order to enable such organisations to perform their functions, taking into account the specific situation of small and medium-sized enterprises. That obligation could be included in an agreement between a collective management organisation and a user; this does not preclude national statutory rights to information. The deadlines applicable to the provision of information by users should be such as to allow collective management organisations to meet the deadlines set for the distribution of amounts due to rightholders. This directive should be without prejudice to the possibility for Member States to require collective management organisations established in their territory to issue joint invoices.’
8 Article 17 of that directive, entitled ‘Users’ obligations’, provides that ‘Member States shall adopt provisions to ensure that users provide a collective management organisation, within an agreed or pre-established time and in an agreed or pre-established format, with such relevant information at their disposal on the use of the rights represented by the collective management organisation as is necessary for the collection of rights revenue and for the distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders. When deciding on the format for the provision of such information, collective management organisations and users shall take into account, as far as possible, voluntary industry standards.’
Polish law
The Code of Civil Procedure
9 Article 479113 of the Ustawa – Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Law establishing the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended) of 17 November 1964 (‘the Code of Civil Procedure’) (6) provides:
‘§1. Upon application by the rightholder, where he or she plausibly demonstrates the existence of circumstances characterising an infringement of an intellectual property right, the court may, before the commencement of proceedings relating to that infringement of the intellectual property right, or while such proceedings are pending, up to the close of the hearing at first instance, request the infringer to provide information on the origin and the distribution networks of the goods or services, where that is necessary for the requirements of the rightholder’s action.
§2. Where the court’s request for information precedes the proceedings relating to the infringement of the intellectual property right, those proceedings must be brought no later than one month from the date of enforcement of the order relating to the request for information.
§3. The obliged person shall have a claim for compensation for the damage caused by performance of the obligation to provide information if the rightholder has not filed the application initiating the proceedings against the infringer within the time limit set by the court or the application initiating the proceedings has been withdrawn, as well as if it has been returned or rejected as inadmissible or rejected on the merits or if the proceedings have been discontinued.
§4. The claim referred to in paragraph 3 shall lapse if it is not asserted within one year from the date on which it arose. The provisions of Article 746(11) to (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
§5. The obliged person shall have a claim for compensation for damage caused by performance of the obligation to provide information where the information referred to in paragraph 1 is used by the rightholder for purposes other than the assertion by the rightholder of the claim.
…’
10 Article 479116 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
‘The request for information shall comply with the requirements which apply to the procedural document and shall further contain:
(1) a plausible demonstration of the existence of circumstances characterising an infringement of an intellectual property right;
(2) an indication of the information sought by the request;
(3) the identity of the person under the obligation and an indication of the circumstances indicating that he or she is in possession of the information requested;
(4) an explanation of why the information is needed in order to establish the source or the extent of the infringement of the right.’
Law on the collective management of copyright and related rights
11 Article 48 of the Ustawa o zbiorowym zarządzaniu prawami autorskimi i prawami pokrewnymi (Law on the collective management of copyright and related rights, consolidated text) of 15 June 2018 (‘the Law on Collective Management’) (7) provides that, ‘within the scope of its activity, a collective management organisation may demand information and access to documents necessary to determine the amount of remuneration and fees claimed by it.’
The facts, the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court
12 E. spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością (‘E.’) is a cable television operator which, as part of its activities, rebroadcasts audiovisual works, among other things.
13 Stowarzyszenie Artystów Wykonawców SAWP (‘SAWP’) is a CMO. Pursuant to a ministerial authorisation, it has the right to collectively manage related rights, in particular, rights to performances of musical works with or without words. That authorisation covers the collective management of those related rights in various areas, including rebroadcasting. On the basis of its representation both of performers who have concluded with it an agreement for the collective management of their rights in their artistic performances and of performers who have not concluded such an agreement, and on the basis of Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management, SAWP brought proceedings before the Sąd Okręgowy w Gdańsku (Regional Court, Gdańsk, Poland), the referring court, seeking an order requiring E. to provide it with information concerning radio and television programmes containing musical works with and without words, including those forming part of audiovisual works, which E. had rebroadcast during a specific period, as well as information about the revenue it had collected in connection with such rebroadcasts and the number of subscribers it had. E. and SAWP have not concluded an agreement concerning the rebroadcasting of performances of musical works with and without words.
14 SAWP argues that that information will enable it to determine whether the performers it collectively represents have claims for payment against E., such as claims for damages in respect of the infringement of rights in artistic performances, as well as claims for the payment of so called ‘statutory’ remuneration in respect of rebroadcasting by means of copies placed on the market or in respect of the use of artistic performances within an audiovisual work. It does not disclose, in that connection, any data regarding the performers on whose behalf it acts and has not adduced any evidence to show that the performers it collectively represents actually have such claims for payment. It claims that its right to obtain the information requested is not subject to any such evidentiary obligations and that it need only state the possible legal bases of the potential claims.
15 For its part, E. denies that the performers represented by SAWP have any claims for payment against it. It argues that it merely rebroadcasts audiovisual works and that, under national law, the rights to use the artistic works contained in those audiovisual works belong to the producers of those audiovisual works. SAWP’s request for information does not, therefore, relate to any entitlement to statutory or contractual remuneration and should not be granted. E. adds that requests for information as provided for by Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management do not relate to any right to damages arising from the infringement of intellectual property rights. Such a request must be made on the basis of Article 479113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which implements Directive 2004/48, and requires a plausible demonstration of the existence of circumstances characterising such an infringement.
16 The referring court entertains doubts as to the legal basis of SAWP’s application for an order requiring E. to provide certain information. In that regard, it states that, in Polish law, a request for information made by a CMO may be based on Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management or on Article 479113 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure.
17 In the first place, Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management, which implements Directive 2014/26, provides that, within the scope of its activity, a CMO may demand information and access to documents necessary to determine the amount of remuneration and fees claimed by it. That provision reproduces the content of Article 105(2) of the Ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych (Law on copyright and related rights) of 4 February 1994, in the version of 28 October 2022, (8) which has been repealed. According to the referring court, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) has interpreted that provision as creating a substantive legal right for CMOs to obtain information, one that does not necessarily have to be associated with a claim for payment and does not require the CMO to prove or to establish prima facie the existence of a legal relationship pursuant to which a user is under an obligation to pay remuneration to a holder of copyright or related rights. In addition, that provision, now repealed, was intended to apply to requests for information relating both to entitlement to statutory or contractual remuneration and to the infringement of copyright and related rights. The referring court adds that some legal theorists take the view that that interpretation remains valid with regard to Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management.
18 In the second place, Article 479113 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure govern requests for information which implement the right of information provided for in Article 8 of Directive 2004/48. Under those provisions, a national court may order an entity which is in possession of the information sought to provide it only in so far as the rightholder or CMO plausibly demonstrates the existence of circumstances characterising an infringement of an intellectual property right and the information is needed to determine the source or the extent of that infringement. Such requests for information therefore constitute a procedural right associated with an action relating to the infringement of an intellectual property right.
19 According to the referring court, those provisions of national law must be interpreted in a manner consistent with EU law and, in particular, Directives 2014/26 and 2004/48, which, given their respective objectives, appear to create for CMOs two distinct rights of information.
20 The first of those rights to information is set out in Article 17 of Directive 2014/26 and requires the Member States to adopt provisions to ensure that users provide CMOs with the relevant information at their disposal concerning the use of the rights represented by the CMOs, to the extent that it is necessary for the collection of the contractual or statutory remuneration due to rightholders. According to the referring court, that right is granted to CMOs only and requires it to be proven, or at the very least to establish prima facie, that the holders of the rights represented by the CMOs are entitled to certain remuneration or fees to which the information sought relates. By contrast, it does not apply to infringements of copyright or related rights or to actions for damages or for injunctions or for the recovery of sums unduly paid that arise from such infringements.
21 The second of those rights to information is provided for in Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48. It is a remedy in proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right and it is available where there is prima facie evidence of such an infringement. According to the referring court, it follows from the judgment of 18 January 2017, NEW WAVE CZ, (9) from the principle of proportionality expressed in Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48 and from the need to safeguard against abusive requests for information that such a request for information must be conditional on prior, simultaneous or subsequent proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right. That measure does not, however, apply to contractual or statutory debts owed to holders of intellectual property rights.
22 In those circumstances, the Sąd Okręgowy w Gdańsku (Regional Court, Gdańsk) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Must Article 17 of [Directive 2014/26] read in conjunction with recital 33 thereof, and Article 8(1) of [Directive 2004/48], read in conjunction with Article 3(2) thereof, be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of national law that [would enable] collective management organisations to demand that users be ordered to provide information concerning unlawful [use of copyright or related rights (that is to say, constituting an infringement), outside] the context of any court proceedings or any claim arising from the infringement of intellectual property rights?
(2) Must Article 17 of [Directive 2014/26], read in conjunction with recital 33 thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a collective management organisation, which is seeking in court proceedings against a user an order that the user provide specified information concerning the use of copyright and related rights, must prove, or render plausible, that the rightholders it represents have a claim to the payment of statutory or contractual remuneration, or that that information is necessary for the distribution and payment to the rightholders of the amounts due to them?’
23 Written observations have been submitted by SAWP, E., the Polish Government and the European Commission.
Analysis
Preliminary remarks
24 By its questions, the referring court asks, in substance, about the scope of the rights to information which a CMO enjoys under Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48, read in conjunction with Article 3(2) of that directive, and under Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, read in conjunction with recital 33 of that directive. In particular, since the dispute in the main proceedings is characterised by a situation linked to possible infringements of intellectual property rights or possible debts of statutory remuneration, it is necessary to determine the context, and the manner, in which those provisions confer on CMOs the right to obtain information concerning the use of works that are protected by copyright or related rights.
25 As I understand it, the crux of the issue encountered by the referring court is that Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management, on the basis of which the CMO in question made its request for information, could be interpreted as creating a substantive legal right for CMOs to obtain information from any person – and not merely persons committing an infringement – that does not necessarily have to be associated with proceedings concerning infringement of an intellectual property right and does not require the CMO to prove or establish prima facie the existence of a claim of a rightholder whom the CMO represents against a user or the infringement of an intellectual property right.
26 I must, at the outset, mention the doubts expressed by the Polish Government as to the applicability of the provisions in question of Directives 2004/48 and 2014/26, and dispel those doubts.
27 First, the Polish Government stated that Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management is not intended to transpose Article 8 of Directive 2004/48 into national law, that being the aim of Article 479113 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. While that assertion is supported by information contained in the request for a preliminary ruling, it is nevertheless clear from that request that the referring court also questions whether it is necessary for a CMO to base a request for information concerning a use that infringes an intellectual property right on those latter provisions, rather than on Article 48 of that law.
28 Secondly, the Polish Government submits that Article 17 of Directive 2014/26 is transposed into national law by Article 49 of the Law on Collective Management. (10) I would observe, however, that, although the wording of Article 49(1) of that law does appear to correspond in substance to the wording of Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, it contains an additional point, which provides that the manner in which the information and documents necessary for the collection of revenue by the CMO are to be made available must be set out in the agreement between it and the user concerned. By contrast, Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management does not limit in such fashion the right to information which a CMO may invoke against a user for the purpose of determining the amount of remuneration or fees owed.
29 In any event, I would point out that, in a situation where opinions appear to differ as regards the applicable national legislation, it is settled case-law that, in preliminary ruling proceedings brought under Article 267 TFEU, it is not for the Court to specify the relevant provisions of national law applicable to the main proceedings. That is the prerogative of the referring court which, while setting out the domestic legal framework, leaves it open to the Court to provide all the criteria for interpreting EU law so as to permit the court making the reference to assess the compatibility of national legislation with EU rules. (11)
30 I would add that the Polish Government argues that Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management, while it does not transpose Article 8 of Directive 2004/48, reflects the option, laid down in Article 8(3)(a) of that directive, to enable holders of intellectual property rights to receive fuller information, and is part of the broader principle of the more favourable provision set out in Article 2(1) of that directive. It also submits that that provision of national law, while it does not transpose Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, corresponds to the ‘national statutory rights to information’ referred to in recital 33 of that latter directive.
31 In those circumstances, and in order to provide the referring court with an answer that will be of use to it, (12) I will, in the first place, analyse the first question, which concerns requests for information in the context of an infringement of intellectual property rights. I will break that question down into three main parts, addressing, first, the framework laid down by Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 and, secondly, the option given, where appropriate, to the Member States under Article 2(1) of that directive to introduce a right to information relating to such an infringement that is more favourable to CMOs. The third part will allow me to clarify the question of the applicability of Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, read in conjunction with recital 33 of that directive, in the context of an infringement of an intellectual property right. Lastly, I shall propose to the Court an answer to that first question in the light of all the matters I shall set out. In the second place, I shall go on to address the interpretation of Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, read in conjunction with recital 33 of that directive, having regard to the question of the evidence that a CMO must adduce in order to rely on the obligation for users to provide information about the use of intellectual property rights that will make it possible to determine the amount of remuneration owed to such rightholders.
The first question
Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48
32 I would recall that Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 provides, in substance, that the Member States are to ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right and in response to a justified and proportionate request of the claimant, the competent judicial authorities may order that information on the origin and distribution networks of the goods or services which infringe an intellectual property right be provided by the infringer and/or any other person who, inter alia, was found to be using or providing, on a commercial scale, infringing services or services used in infringing activities, or who was indicated by such a person as being involved in the provision of the services. (13)
33 I must point out that the Court has already held that the right to information established by Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 is not an autonomous right that individuals may exercise directly against the infringer or the persons covered by Article 8(1)(a) to (d) of that directive, because Article 8(1) imposes on the Member States an obligation to ensure that that information can be obtained by means of measures of enquiry ordered by a court. (14)
34 Moreover, according to the Court, to ensure a high level of protection of intellectual property, Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 cannot be interpreted as recognising a right of information solely in proceedings seeking a finding of an infringement of an intellectual property right. If such a level of protection is to be ensured, it must be possible for that right of information also to be exercised in the context of separate proceedings brought after the final termination of an action in which a finding was made of a breach of an intellectual property right, (15) as well as in the context of separate proceedings which precede an action for damages, with a view, specifically, to being able usefully to bring legal proceedings against the alleged infringers. (16) The procedure for requesting information provided for in Article 8(1) is thus regarded as a separate procedure, distinct from legal proceedings seeking a finding that there has been an infringement of an intellectual property right. (17)
35 While the exercise of the right of information provided for in Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 is therefore not limited to proceedings seeking a finding of an infringement of an intellectual property right, in the sense that that right may also be exercised prior to or after such proceedings, the fact remains that, in accordance with the wording of that provision, a request for information must be made ‘in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right’. Such a request must, therefore, satisfy the criterion laid down in that provision, namely that it be linked to ‘proceedings concerning an intellectual property right’. (18)
36 It follows that a request for information may be made prior and as a preliminary to, simultaneously with, or subsequently to, the bringing of an action for damages for infringement of an intellectual property right, but it must have a link with such an action. In my view, that requirement also follows from Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48, which provides that the request for information must be ‘justified and proportionate’, which implies that it should set out sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations of infringement of an intellectual property right. (19)
37 I would point out that, in the present case, although the referring court appears to doubt whether SAWP intends to bring proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right, it must consider whether the request for information at issue is a preliminary to the bringing of such proceedings and whether it is justified and proportionate. The mere fact that that request was made at a pre-litigation stage cannot render it inadmissible, as is clear from point 34 of the present Opinion.
38 The foregoing analysis is not, it seems to me, called into question by the fact that, under Article 8(3)(a) of Directive 2004/48, Member States have the option of granting holders of intellectual property rights the right to receive fuller information than that specifically referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of that article. (20) Indeed, contrary to what the Polish Government appears to argue, that option cannot, in my view, escape the condition that the right to information, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the directive, must be exercised ‘in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right’ and that the request for information must be ‘justified and proportionate’.
39 I would add that, although the first question refers to Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48, that provision is not, in my view, relevant for the purposes of answering that question, which relates, in substance, to the procedural framework within which a request for information concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right, under Article 8 of the directive, must be made. Article 3(2) of the directive requires the Member States and, ultimately, the national courts, to ensure that the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights covered by that directive, including the right of information referred to in Article 8 thereof, are, inter alia, proportionate and applied in such a manner as to provide for safeguards against their abuse, which falls entirely within the scope of the assessment of the facts in the main proceedings. (21)
40 Therefore, I consider that Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 precludes an interpretation of national law that would enable a CMO to demand that users provide information concerning a use that infringes an intellectual property right outside the context of proceedings concerning such an infringement.
The option given to the Member States under Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/48 to introduce a right to information, relating to infringements of intellectual property rights, that is more favourable to CMOs
41 In accordance with settled case-law, the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires account to be taken not only of its wording, but also of the context in which it occurs, as well as the objectives and purpose pursued by the act of which it forms part. (22)
42 In accordance with Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/48, the measures, the procedures and the remedies provided for by that directive are to apply to ‘any infringement of intellectual property rights’ provided for by EU law or national law, which, as the Court has clarified, covers, inter alia, infringements resulting from the breach of a contractual term relating to the exploitation of an intellectual property right. (23) Moreover, such measures, procedures and remedies are to apply ‘without prejudice to the means which are or may be provided for in [EU] or national legislation, in so far as those means may be more favourable for rightholders’, the Court having already held that it is clear from recital 7 of that directive that the term ‘means’ is general in nature. (24)
43 In so far as context is concerned, the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for Directive 2004/48 states, in regard to the means that might thus exist at national level, in accordance with Article 2 of the proposed directive, which corresponds to Article 2 of the directive as adopted, that ‘the Member States may lay down that the competent authorities may order other measures adapted to the circumstances such as to put an end to the infringement of the intellectual property right or to prevent further infringements, as well as any other appropriate measures’. (25)
44 As regards the general objective of Directive 2004/48, it is to approximate the legislative systems of the Member States so as to ensure a high, equivalent and homogenous level of protection in the internal market, (26) the EU legislature having chosen to provide for minimal harmonisation concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights in general. (27)
45 It follows that Directive 2004/48 is not intended to govern all aspects of intellectual property rights, but only those aspects inherent, first, in the enforcement of those rights and, secondly, in the infringement of them, by requiring that there must be effective legal remedies designed to prevent, terminate or rectify any infringement of an existing intellectual property right. (28) Moreover, that directive lays down a minimum standard concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights and does not prevent the Member States from laying down measures that are more protective. (29)
46 Nevertheless, it cannot automatically be inferred from this that a provision of national law which lays down a right to information that is more favourable to CMOs, and accordingly to the rightholders they represent, but which falls outside the scope of Directive 2004/48, is not covered by EU law at all.
47 Indeed, I would point out that, in the context of minimum harmonisation, while the Member States may maintain or adopt provisions that are more favourable in the area in question, such provisions must not, inter alia, be capable of infringing other provisions of the directive concerned or adversely affecting its coherence or the objectives which it pursues. (30)
48 In the present case, the dispute in the main proceedings appears to be characterised by a situation in which there is, inter alia, a connection with possible infringements of intellectual property rights. As mentioned in point 25 of the present Opinion, Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management could be interpreted as enabling a CMO to demand of any person, and not merely persons owing a debt or committing an infringement, information concerning a use that, inter alia, infringes an intellectual property right, even outside the context of proceedings concerning such an infringement, without the CMO in question having to prove or establish prima facie the existence of such an infringement.
49 However, if the national provision at issue in the main proceedings were to be interpreted in the manner described in points 25 and 48 of the present Opinion, it could be relied upon in the same circumstances as those covered by Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 applies, namely, in the event of an infringement of an intellectual property right, while de facto relieving CMOs of the procedural and evidentiary requirements, described in points 33 to 36 of the present Opinion, which that provision of EU law imposes. The balance which Article 8(1) of that directive seeks to establish between, on the one hand, the right to information of holders of intellectual property rights, which is intended, in the field concerned, to apply and implement the fundamental right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and thereby to ensure the effective exercise of the fundamental right to property, and, on the other hand, the right to the protection of personal data of users would thus be upset. (31)
50 Moreover, in so far as the provision of national law at issue may be interpreted in that way, it appears such as to authorise the exercise of a right to information that is practically absolute and unconditional, in that such a right could enable CMOs to make requests of an exploratory nature (a ‘fishing expedition’), the aim of which would be uncertain, even in the absence of any infringement of an intellectual property right.
51 I would point out, however, that the right to intellectual property is not inviolable and protection of that right need not be guaranteed absolutely. (32) The option given to the Member States by Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/48 to enact national legislation and provide for means more favourable to rightholders cannot therefore grant them such latitude as to enable them to introduce a right of information that is autonomous and separate and which would have the effect of circumventing the conditions to which the right of information established by Article 8(1) of that directive is subject, of upsetting the equilibrium between rights sought by the EU legislature in that regard and accordingly of undermining the objectives pursued by that directive.
52 Therefore, I consider that Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/48 cannot be interpreted as authorising the Member States to introduce a right to information concerning a use that infringes an intellectual property right that would undermine Article 8(1) of that directive and adversely affect the coherence or the objectives which that directive pursues.
The applicability of Article 17 Directive 2014/26 in the context of an infringement of an intellectual property right
53 In accordance with the wording of Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, the right of information of CMOs is founded on the obligation for users to provide them, within an agreed or pre-established time and in an agreed or pre-established format, with such relevant information at their disposal on the use of the rights represented by the CMO as is ‘necessary for the collection of rights revenue and for the distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders’.
54 ‘Rights revenue’ is defined in Article 3(h) of the directive as meaning income collected by a CMO on behalf of rightholders, whether deriving from an exclusive right, a right to remuneration or a right to compensation.
55 The ‘revenue’ to which Article 17 of the directive thus refers therefore covers, in my view, sums derived from contractual or statutory rights, which arise from the lawful use of intellectual property rights, but not any damages which rightholders might claim in the event of the infringement of their rights.
56 That reading of Article 17 of Directive 2014/26 seems to me to be confirmed by the context in which that provision occurs, as well as the objectives pursued by that directive.
57 Indeed, from a contextual perspective, first, it is clear from recitals 13 and 37 of the directive that the concept of ‘compensation’ referred to in Article 3(h) thereof covers the compensation which Member States have the option of determining for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right provided for in Directive 2001/29/EC (33) and rightholders’ remuneration for derogations from the exclusive right in respect of public lending provided for in Directive 2006/115/EC, (34) as well as exclusive rights of reproduction, communication, making available and distribution provided for in Directive 2001/29. By contrast, Directive 2014/26 does not make any mention of any indemnity that might be payable by way of damages for the infringement of intellectual property rights.
58 Secondly, it is clear from recital 33 of Directive 2014/26 that, in order to ensure that CMOs can comply with the obligations set out in the directive, users should provide those organisations with relevant information on the use of the rights represented by them. That recital states that the information required by CMOs should be limited to what is reasonable, necessary and at the users’ disposal in order to enable such organisations to perform their functions. While that obligation may be included in an agreement between a CMO and a user, this does not preclude national statutory rights to information. Recital 33 adds that deadlines applicable to the provision of information by users should be such as to allow CMOs to meet the deadlines set for the distribution of amounts due to rightholders.
59 Admittedly, it must be noted that recital 33 of Directive 2014/26 makes a general reference to ‘the obligations set out in this directive’ and to information that should be reasonable, necessary and at the users’ disposal in order to enable CMOs to perform their ‘functions’. In addition, recital 2 of that directive clearly states that the functions of a CMO include, inter alia, ‘monitoring of the use of rights [and] enforcement of copyright and related rights’.
60 Nevertheless, it cannot, in my view, be inferred from this that Article 17 of Directive 2014/26 is intended to establish an all-encompassing right to information for CMOs, one that would extend to information relating to infringements of rights. Indeed, that provision did not create a general obligation for users to provide CMOs with ‘all necessary information for the management of intellectual property rights’, but expressly limited the functions of a CMO in connection with which the production of information is necessary, that is to say, the collection of rights revenue and the distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders, as mentioned in points 53 to 55 of the present Opinion.
61 That restriction of the information that must be produced by reference to certain tasks of revenue management (35) which CMOs carry out may also be understood, I believe, from the indication that the obligation for users to provide the information in question must, in accordance with the wording of Article 17 of the directive, be performed within ‘an agreed or pre-established time’, which, upon reading recital 33 of that directive, referred to in point 58 above, may be understood as being such period of time as will enable CMOs to meet the deadlines set for the distribution of amounts due to rightholders.
62 In so far as concerns the objectives of Directive 2014/26, the Proposal for a directive stated the aim of putting in place an appropriate legal framework for the collective management of rights that are administered by collecting societies on behalf of rightholders by providing for rules ensuring the better governance and greater transparency of all collecting societies. (36)
63 It is also apparent from recitals 7, 8 and 55 of Directive 2014/26 that its aim is to coordinate national rules concerning access to the activity of managing copyright and related rights by CMOs, the modalities for their governance, their supervisory framework and the requirements for the multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use, with a view to protecting the interests of the members of CMOs, rightholders and third parties, by ensuring that they have equivalent safeguards throughout the European Union. To that end, Article 1 of the directive, read in the light of recital 9 thereof, provides that the directive lays down, in particular, requirements applicable to CMOs in order to ensure the proper functioning of their management of copyright and related rights and a high standard of governance, financial management, transparency and reporting. (37) Accordingly, Directive 2014/26 harmonised the activities of CMOs within the European Union, (38) but does not specify the role of CMOs as regards infringements of intellectual property rights.
64 Within that framework, Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, read in the light of recital 33 thereto, requires the Member States to adopt provisions to determine the manner in which users are to fulfil their obligation to provide CMOs with the information needed for the collection of rights revenue and the distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders. While, under that provision, it is for the Member States to determine the specific technical and procedural rules for the performance of the obligation for users to provide information, I am of the view that it cannot be considered that its purpose is to govern the issue of the obligation for users to provide all types of information, including in the event of an infringement of an intellectual property right.
65 It follows therefrom that Article 17 of Directive 2014/26 is not intended to govern the right to information of CMOs in the event of an infringement of an intellectual property right.
Conclusion on the first question
66 In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the first question to the effect that Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 precludes an interpretation of national law which would enable a CMO to demand that users provide information concerning a use that infringes an intellectual property right outside the context of any court proceedings concerning such an infringement.
The second question
67 The question arises of the evidence which a CMO should adduce when making a request for information about the use of intellectual property rights in order to determine the amount of the sums due to holders of those rights by way of remuneration, in the light of Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, read in conjunction with recital 33 of that directive.
68 In accordance with the wording of Article 17 of that directive, recalled in point 53 of the present Opinion, first, users are required to provide relevant information at their disposal on the use of the ‘rights represented by the collective management organisation’. That provision is therefore not, to my mind, intended to authorise CMOs to demand information relating to holders of intellectual property rights they do not represent, whether such rightholders represent themselves or are represented by another CMO.
69 Secondly, the relevant information, at the disposal of users, concerning the use of the rights represented by the CMO must be ‘necessary’ for the collection of rights revenue and for the distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders. Since Article 17 of Directive 2014/26 does not define the meaning of those terms or the extent of the reasoning that must be given in support of a request made under that provision, and since no reference is made to the laws of the Member States for that purpose, those terms must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation, taking into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question. (39)
70 As regards context, in so far as concerns, first, representation by a CMO, recital 2 of Directive 2014/26 states that it is normally for the holders of intellectual property rights to choose between individual and collective management of their rights, unless the Member States provide otherwise. (40) Recital 12 of the directive, for its part, acknowledges the variety of collective management models that exist in the Member States and with which that directive is not intended to interfere. (41) The collective management models existing in the Member States have therefore not been harmonised, and so CMOs may, depending on the case, have recourse to contractual representation of rightholders with whom they have concluded a contract, or to a legal provision extending or designating a particular CMO as entitled to represent a category of rightholders, or to a legal presumption of representation for a given category of rightholders, including non-members, in relation to certain specific uses. (42)
71 In addition, Article 5(2) and (4) of Directive 2014/26 provides that holders of intellectual property rights must have the right to choose which CMO will represent them and, inter alia, the rights and categories of rights that a CMO is authorised to manage, irrespective of the Member State of nationality, residence or establishment of the CMO or the rightholder, and that they must also have the right to terminate such management authorisation. (43)
72 It follows that a CMO cannot purport to act on behalf of holders of intellectual property rights it does not represent.
73 Secondly, as regard the fact that the information must be ‘necessary’ for the collection of rights revenue and for the distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders, as I mentioned in point 58 of the present Opinion, recital 33 of Directive 2014/26 states that this should be relevant information on the use of the rights represented by the CMO and that the information required by CMOs should be limited to what is reasonable, necessary and at the users’ disposal, without, however, being any more specific in that regard.
74 It is important to note that the terminology used to establish that obligation to provide information incumbent on users is different from that used in other provisions of Directive 2014/26 which provide for obligations for CMOs to provide information in response to a ‘duly justified’ request. By way of example, Article 20 of the directive, read in conjunction with recital 35 thereof, requires Member States to ensure that, in response to a duly justified request, a CMO will make available to rightholders, to CMOs on whose behalf it manages rights under a representation agreement, as well as to users, information about the scope of its activity and about the works or other subject matter it represents. Article 25 of the directive provides for a similar obligation for CMOs that grant multi-territorial licences for online rights in musical works.
75 Similarly, the right of information in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right, provided for in Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48, may be exercised in response to a ‘justified and proportionate’ request, which, according to the Court, means that it should set out sufficient evidence to substantiate the claims of infringement of an intellectual property right, as is clear from point 36 of the present Opinion.
76 It follows, in my view, that requests for information that might be made under Article 17 Directive 2014/26 are not subject to the same requirements regarding the statement of reasons supporting them as requests made under Articles 20 and 25 of that directive or under Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48.
77 Lastly, as I already mentioned in point 63 of the present Opinion, the objectives of Directive 2014/26 are to ensure the proper functioning of the management by CMOs of copyright and related rights, and a high standard of governance, financial management, transparency and reporting. The confidence and transparency among the various participants in collective management which the mechanism established by Directive 2014/26 seeks to introduce are exemplified, inter alia, by the institution of a procedure for the exchange of information, on request of CMOs, such as will enable them to discharge their obligations with regard to the management of rights revenue. If a CMO were unable to obtain the information it needs to perform that function from various users, including recalcitrant users, it would be unable to determine the proper amount of revenue to collect, to collect that revenue and to distribute and pay it diligently and accurately, (44) with the result that the right to remuneration which rightholders can claim would be restricted.
78 While CMOs have a certain expertise in assessing the need, depending on the particular circumstances of each case, for the information requested, they cannot however be allowed to overstep the bounds of their duties and demand of a user information that is in no way necessary for the collection of rights revenue or impose an excessive burden on that user. The obligation for users to provide information cannot, therefore, be extended beyond what is reasonable and necessary for the purposes of collecting and distributing rights revenue.
79 Therefore, I consider that Article 17 of Directive 2014/26 must be understood as allowing CMOs to request and obtain from users all the information pertaining to rightholders they represent which they may reasonably consider will prove to be relevant for the purposes of determining the amount of revenue to be collected and subsequently distributing and paying that revenue.
80 Admittedly, as the Polish Government has emphasised, a CMO may, in practice, be confronted with a situation in which it is not automatically in a position to determine whether, and to what extent, the rights of rightholders it represents have been used. A request for information might therefore be made at the preliminary stage of determining the amount of remuneration due and the purpose of such a request will then be to gather information of which the CMO does not, ex hypothesi, have full and precise knowledge. An interpretation of the criterion that the information must be necessary which would amount to prohibiting any request for information that does not contain evidence that the rightholders represented by the CMO have a claim to remuneration could thus deprive the cooperation mechanism – which the request for information constitutes – of its usefulness.
81 Having regard to the foregoing, it seems to me that an indication that the CMO contractually represents one or more rightholders or has a legal mandate to represent a category of rightholders that are liable to be concerned by a specific use of rights or categories of rights in a given area of exploitation, and an indication of the type of revenue that might be due, is one of the elements that a request for information must necessarily set out. Such an element is such as to enable the national court seised to establish that the information requested is not unnecessary, having regard to the functions of the CMO in question and, accordingly, to trigger the obligation on the part of the user to act on that request.
82 In the present case, SAWP states that it has an authorisation issued by the Ministra Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego (Minister for Culture and National Heritage, Poland) and is therefore legally presumed to be entitled to carry out collective management within the framework of that authorisation and to have the right to act in that area. It adds that a CMO which makes a request for information on the basis of Article 48 of the Law on Collective Management must specify its claims. The referring court, for its part, states that the authorisation issued to SAWP by the competent minister enables it to collectively manage related rights pertaining to the performance of musical works with or without words in various areas of exploitation, including rebroadcasting.
83 It will therefore be for the referring court, before which the request in question has been made, to determine whether it is well founded, in the sense that the CMO in question is actually seeking to obtain information relating to the category of rightholders it legally represents, and that the information requested appears to be reasonable and necessary for the collection of rights revenue. Such an assessment may require the referring court to decide the question of whether the user concerned does actually owe a debt of statutory remuneration to the rightholders represented by the CMO. (45)
84 I would add that, contrary to the Polish Government’s argument, the expression ‘national statutory rights to information’, appearing in recital 33 of Directive 2014/26, cannot, in my view, be understood as enabling the Member States to grant CMOs a right to information that could be exercised without the CMO having to adduce any evidence at all to show that they represent rightholders that might potentially have a claim against a user. That expression must be read in relation to the rest of the sentence and the rest of the recital in which it appears, according to which the obligation to provide relevant information about the use of rights represented by a CMO may either be included in an agreement between the CMO in question and the user concerned, or be determined by a provision of national law. (46)
85 I therefore propose that the Court’s answer to the second question should be that Article 17 of Directive 2014/26, read in conjunction with recital 33 of that directive, is to be interpreted as meaning that, when, in the context of legal proceedings against a user, a CMO demands that that user provide it with relevant information at its disposal concerning the use of intellectual property rights, that CMO must establish that it represents one or more rightholders or a category of rightholders that are liable to be concerned by a specific use of rights or categories of rights in a given area of exploitation, and by the type of revenue that might be due, so that the national court is in a position to assess whether it can reasonably be considered that the information will be relevant for the purposes of the collection of rights revenue and the distribution and payment of any sums due to the holders of those rights.
Conclusion
86 Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the Sąd Okręgowy w Gdańsku (Regional Court, Gdańsk, Poland) as follows:
1. Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights
must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes an interpretation of national law which would enable a collective management organisation to demand that users provide information concerning a use that infringes an intellectual property right outside the context of any court proceedings concerning such an infringement.
2. Article 17 of Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, read in conjunction with recital 33 of that directive,
must be interpreted as meaning that, when, in the context of legal proceedings against a user, a collective management organisation demands that that user provide it with relevant information at its disposal concerning the use of intellectual property rights, that collective management organisation must establish that it represents one or more rightholders or a category of rightholders that are liable to be concerned by a specific use of rights or categories of rights in a given area of exploitation, and by the type of revenue that might be due, so that the national court is in a position to assess whether it can reasonably be considered that the information will be relevant for the purposes of the collection of rights revenue and the distribution and payment of any sums due to the holders of those rights.
1 Original language: French.
2 See the European Commission’s website, ‘Directive on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing – frequently asked questions’, 4 February 2014, available at the following address:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_14_79.
3 OJ 2014 L 84, p. 72.
4 OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45.
5 See Article 4(c) of Directive 2004/48.
6 Dz. U. of 2024, item 1568.
7 Dz. U. of 2024, item 1665.
8 Dz. U. of 2022, item 2509.
9 C‑427/15, EU:C:2017:18 (‘the judgment in NEW WAVE CZ’).
10 Pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Law on Collective Management, the contract governing the use of works or subject matter protected by related rights, or governing the collection of remuneration for such use, is to set out the manner in which the user is to provide, at a pre-established time and in a pre-established format, the information and documents necessary for the collection of rights revenue and for the distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders, including information on the use of the rights. Article 49(2) of the Law on Collective Management provides that, in the event of a serious breach of the obligation to make available the information and documents referred to in paragraph 1, the CMO may, after putting the user on notice to meet that obligation within a prescribed period, terminate, with immediate effect, the contract governing the use of works or subject matter protected by related rights or governing the collection of remuneration for such use.
11 See, inter alia, judgment of 19 June 2019, Meca (C‑41/18, EU:C:2019:507, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
12 According to settle case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. In that connection, it may extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings (see judgment of 28 April 2022, NovaText, C‑531/20, ‘the judgment in NovaText’, EU:C:2022:316, paragraphs 21 and 22 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, the Court may decide to take into consideration rules of EU law to which the national court has made no reference in the wording of its question (see judgment of 17 November 2022, Harman International Industries, C‑175/21, EU:C:2022:895, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
13 Article 8(1)(b) to (d) of Directive 2004/48.
14 See, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany (C‑580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraph 36).
15 See the judgment in NEW WAVE CZ (paragraphs 24, 27 and 28).
16 See judgment of 17 June 2021, M.I.C.M. (C‑597/19, ‘the judgment in M.I.C.M.’, EU:C:2021:492, paragraphs 82 and 84).
17 See, to that effect, judgment of 27 April 2023, Castorama Polska and Knor (C‑628/21, ‘the judgment in Castorama Polska and Knor’, EU:C:2023:342, paragraphs 40 and 44).
18 See, to that effect, the judgments in NEW WAVE CZ (paragraphs 24, 27 and 28); in M.I.C.M. (paragraphs 82 and 84); and the judgment of 28 April 2022, Koch Media (C‑559/20, EU:C:2022:317, paragraph 34). Emphasis added.
19 See, to that effect, the judgment in Castorama Polska and Knor (paragraphs 45, 46 and 51).
20 By way of example, the Court has held that, under Article 8(3)(a) of Directive 2004/48, the Member States may provide that the competent judicial authorities have the option of ordering disclosure of the email address, telephone number or IP address of the persons referred to in Article 8 in proceedings concerning an infringement of an intellectual property right, even though such information does not fall within the scope of Article 8(2)(a) of that directive, provided, however, that a fair balance is struck between the various fundamental rights involved and there is compliance with the other general principles of EU law, such as the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2020, Constantin Film Verleih, C‑264/19, ‘the judgment in Constantin Film Verleih’, EU:C:2020:542, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
21 See, to that effect, the judgments in M.I.C.M. (paragraphs 94 and 95); in Castorama Polska and Knor (paragraph 52 and the case-law cited); and of 23 April 2026, M.M. Ristorazione (C‑132/25, EU:C:2026:340, paragraphs 37 and 38).
22 See judgment of 23 April 2026, M.M. Ristorazione (C‑132/25, EU:C:2026:340, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
23 See judgment of 18 December 2019, IT Development (C‑666/18, EU:C:2019:1099, paragraph 36).
24 See judgments of 25 January 2017, Stowarzyszenie Oławska Telewizja Kablowa (C‑367/15, EU:C:2017:36, paragraph 22), and of 13 October 2022, Perfumesco.pl (C‑355/21, EU:C:2022:791, paragraph 47), in which the Court held that the term ‘means’, used in Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/48, encompasses the calculation of damages and measures enabling the cessation of infringements of intellectual property rights.
25 See the Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures and procedures to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights, presented by the Common on 30 January 2003 (COM(2003) 46 final), p. 19.
26 See recital 10 of Directive 2004/48. See also the judgment in NovaText (paragraph 38).
27 See, to that effect, the judgments in Constantin Film Verleih (paragraph 36 and the case-law cited) and in Castorama Polska and Knor (paragraphs 31 and 39 and the case-law cited).
28 See, to that effect, the judgments in NovaText (paragraph 33 and the case-law cited); of 28 April 2022, Phoenix Contact (C‑44/21, EU:C:2022:309, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited); in Castorama Polska and Knor (paragraph 39 and the case-law cited); and of 18 December 2025, SACD and Others (C‑182/24, EU:C:2025:979, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
29 See judgment of 25 January 2017, Stowarzyszenie Oławska Telewizja Kablowa (C‑367/15, EU:C:2017:36, paragraphs 23 and 24 and the case-law cited), in which the Court added that, in accordance with recitals 5 and 6 and Article 2(3)(b) of Directive 2004/48, it is necessary, for the purpose of interpreting the directive’s provisions, to take account of obligations on the Member States resulting from international agreements, including the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 15 April 1994 (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 214), the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act of 24 July 1971, in the version arising from the amendment of 28 September 1979; ‘the Berne Convention’) and the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, concluded in Rome on 26 October 1961 (‘the Rome Convention’). Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement as well as Article 19 of the Berne Convention and Article 2 of the Rome Convention permit Contracting States to grant the holders of the rights concerned wider protection than that respectively laid down by those instruments. See also judgment of 13 October 2022, Perfumesco.pl (C‑355/21, EU:C:2022:791, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
30 See, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 19 November 2019, TSN and AKT (C‑609/17 and C‑610/17, EU:C:2019:981, paragraph 51), and of 8 June 2023, Fastweb and Others (Time frame for billing) (C‑468/20, EU:C:2023:447, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
31 See, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany (C‑580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraphs 28 and 29), and in Constantin Film Verleih (paragraphs 35, 37 and 38 and the case-law cited).
32 See judgment of 28 October 2020, BY (Photographic evidence) (C‑637/19, EU:C:2020:863, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
33 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).
34 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28).
35 The obligations upon CMOs concerning the collection of rights revenue and the distribution and payment of the amounts due to rightholders are set out in Chapter 2 of Title II of Directive 2014/26, entitled ‘Management of rights revenue’.
36 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market, presented by the Commission on 11 July 2012 (COM(2012) 372 final), p. 2.
37 See, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2024, LEA (C‑10/22, EU:C:2024:254, paragraphs 43 and 44).
38 See the judgment in M.I.C.M. (paragraph 66).
39 See, to that effect, judgment of 2 June 2022, T.N. and N.N. (Declaration concerning the waiver of succession) (C‑617/20, EU:C:2022:426, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
40 Recital 2 adds that Member States must do so ‘in compliance with Union law and the international obligations of the Union and its Member States’.
41 Recital 12 of Directive 2014/26 states, inter alia, that the directive ‘does not interfere with arrangements concerning the management of rights in the Member States such as individual management, the extended effect of an agreement between a representative collective management organisation and a user, i.e. extended collective licensing, mandatory collective management, legal presumptions of representation and transfer of rights to collective management organisations’. See also Lesburguères, P.-O., ‘Adoption de la directive sur la gestion collective du droit d’auteur: un pas de plus vers une harmonisation à l’échelle européenne?’, Les Cahiers de propriété intellectuelle, Vol. 27, No 1, 2015, pp. 295 to 315, especially pp. 302 to 303.
42 See, to that effect, the Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Telia Finland (C‑201/22, EU:C:2023:400, point 61 and footnote 33), in which the Advocate General states that, in Poland, the standing of CMOs enjoying a legal presumption of representation to bring proceedings has been enshrined in Article 5(1) of the Law on the collective management of copyright and related rights. See also Lesburguères, P.-O., ‘Adoption de la directive sur la gestion collective du droit d’auteur: un pas de plus vers une harmonisation à l’échelle européenne?’, op. cit., p. 303.
43 See, in that regard, Mendis, D., ‘Chapter 10: Directive 2014/26/EU on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market’, in Lodder, R., and Murray, A. (eds.), EU Regulation of E-Commerce. A Commentary, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2017, pp. 290 to 312, especially pp. 308 to 309, who adds that the option for holders of intellectual property rights to choose individual management of their rights is also apparent from Article 5(6) of Directive 2014/26, pursuant to which ‘a [CMO] shall not restrict the exercise of rights provided for under paragraphs 4 and 5 by requiring, as a condition for the exercise of those rights, that the management of rights or categories of rights or types of works and other subject matter which are subject to the termination or the withdrawal be entrusted to another [CMO]’, as well as from Article 31 of that directive, which provides that ‘rightholders who have authorised that [CMO] to represent their online rights in musical works can withdraw from that [CMO] the online rights in musical works for the purposes of multi-territorial licensing in respect of all territories without having to withdraw the online rights in musical works for the purposes of mono-territorial licensing, so as to grant multi-territorial licences for their online rights in musical works themselves or through any other party they authorise or through any [CMO] complying with the provisions of this Title’. Emphasis added.
44 As provided for, in substance, in Articles 11, 13 and 15 of Directive 2014/26.
45 In the present case, the question of whether the performers represented by SAWP have claims for payment against E. is discussed in the main proceedings, E. arguing that it merely rebroadcasts audiovisual works, and not musical works with or without words or performances thereof, and that, under national law, the rights to use artistic performances contained in an audiovisual work belong to the producer of the audiovisual work, and not to the performers represented by a CMO. It will therefore be necessary for the referring court to settle that question, in order to determine whether or not E. actually owes a debt of remuneration to the performers legally represented by SAWP.
46 As I mentioned in point 28 of the present Opinion, Article 49 of the Law on Collective Management covers situations in which the manner in which the information and documents needed by the CMO are to be made available have been set out in the agreement between it and the user concerned. In my view, therefore, Article 48 of that law is intended to apply in other cases. However, it is common ground that SAWP and E. have not concluded an agreement relating to the rebroadcasting of performances of musical works with and without words.