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62025CJ0476

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Seventh Chamber)

12 November 2026 (*)

In Case C‑476/25 [Seruel], (i)

REQUEST for a preliminary under Article 267 TFEU from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia no1 de Fuenlabrada (Court of First Instance No 1, Fuenlabrada, Spain), made by decision of 17 July 2025, received at the Court on 17 July 2025, in the proceedings

Investcapital Ltd

v

F.C.T.,

THE COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of Z. Csehi, President of the Chamber, M. Gavalec and F. Schalin (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: J. Kokott,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

– Investcapital Ltd, by C. Sarmiento Cuenca, procuradora, and B. Tortosa Bañuls, abogada,

– the Spanish Government, by S. Núñez Silva, acting as Agent,

– the Italian Government, by S. Fiorentino, acting as Agent, and by C. De Nicola, procuratore dello Stato,

– the European Commission, by A. Manzaneque Valverde and D. Triantafyllou, acting as Agents,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 10(1) of Directive (EU) 2021/2167 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2021 on credit servicers and credit purchasers and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU (OJ 2021 L 438, p 1).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between Investcapital Ltd, a Maltese company, and F.C.T., a consumer residing in Spain, concerning the payment of sums due under a loan contract.

Legal context

European Union law

Directive 2005/29/EC

3 Article 7 of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22), entitled ‘Misleading omissions’, states, in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.’

4 Article 8 of Directive 2005/29, entitled ‘Aggressive commercial practices’, provides:

‘A commercial practice shall be regarded as aggressive if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances, by harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, or undue influence, it significantly impairs or is likely to significantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct with regard to the product and thereby causes him or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.’

5 Article 9 of that directive, entitled ‘Use of harassment, coercion and undue influence’, provides:

‘In determining whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, or undue influence, account shall be taken of:

…

(e) any threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken.’

Directive 2021/2167

6 Recitals 20, 21, 52 and 61 of Directive 2021/2167 state:

‘(20) Credit servicers and credit purchasers should always act in good faith, treat borrowers fairly and respect their privacy. They should not harass nor give misleading information to borrowers. In advance of the first debt collection and whenever requested by borrowers, they should provide information to borrowers on, among others, the transfer that took place, the identification and contact details of the credit purchaser and of the credit servicer, where one is appointed, as well as information on the amounts due by the borrower and a statement to the effect that all relevant Union and national law continues to apply.

(21) In addition, this Directive does not reduce the scope of application of Union consumer protection rules and, to the extent that credit purchasers qualify as creditors under Directives 2008/48/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66)] and 2014/17/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 60, p. 34)], they should be subject to the specific obligations set out in Article 20 of Directive [2008/48] and Article 35 of Directive [2014/17], respectively. Moreover, this Directive is without prejudice to the protection of consumers guaranteed by Directive [2005/29], which prohibits unfair commercial practices including those carried out during the enforcement of a contract where a consumer is misled as to the consumer’s rights or obligations, or is subject to harassment, coercion or undue influence including in terms of the timing, location, nature or persistence of the enforcement actions, in terms of the use of threatening or abusive language or behaviour, or in terms of threats to take any action that cannot legally be taken.

…

(52) In order to ensure a high level of consumer protection, Union and national law provide for a number of rights and safeguards related to credit agreements granted to a consumer. Those rights and safeguards apply in particular to the negotiation and conclusion of the credit agreement, to the use of unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices as laid down in Directive [2005/29] and to the performance or default of the credit agreement. … As a general principle, it should be ensured that borrowers are not worse off following the transfer of their credit agreement from a credit institution to a credit purchaser. This Directive should not prevent Member States from applying stricter provisions in order to protect borrowers.

…

(61) Since the objectives of this Directive, namely, to enhance the development of secondary markets for [non-performing loans] in the [European] Union while ensuring further strengthened protection of borrowers, in particular of consumers, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the [TEU]. …’

7 Article 1 of Directive 2021/2167, entitled ‘Subject matter’, is worded as follows:

‘This Directive lays down a common framework and requirements for:

(a) credit servicers of a creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement, or of the non-performing credit agreement itself, issued by a credit institution established in the Union, who act on behalf of a credit purchaser;

(b) credit purchasers of a creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement, or of the non-performing credit agreement itself, issued by a credit institution established in the Union.’

8 Article 2 of that directive, entitled ‘Scope’, states in paragraph 2 thereof:

‘With regard to credit agreements falling within its scope, this Directive shall not affect contract law principles nor civil law principles under national law with regard to the transfer of a creditor’s rights under a credit agreement, or of the credit agreement itself, nor the protection granted to consumers or borrowers pursuant in particular to Regulations (EC) No 593/2008 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6)] and (EU) No 1215/2012 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1)], and [Council] Directives 93/13/EEC [of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29)], [2008/48], [2014/17] and the national provisions transposing those Directives or other relevant provisions of Union and national law relating to consumer protection and borrowers’ rights.’

9 Article 10 of Directive 2021/2167, entitled ‘Relationship with the borrower, communication of the transfer and subsequent communications’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘Member States shall require that credit purchasers and credit servicers, in their relationships with borrowers:

(a) act in good faith, fairly and professionally;

(b) provide information to borrowers that is not misleading, unclear or false;

(c) respect and protect the personal information and privacy of borrowers;

(d) communicate with borrowers in a way that does not constitute harassment, coercion or undue influence.’

Spanish law

The Civil Code

10 Article 1961 of the Código Civil (Civil Code), published by Real Decreto por el que se publica el Código Civil (Royal Decree publishing the Civil Code) of 24 July 1889 (Gaceta de Madrid No 206 of 25 July 1889, p. 249), provides:

‘Actions shall be time-barred by the mere lapse of the period of time set by law.’

11 Article 1964(2) of that code provides:

‘Personal actions not subject to a particular limitation period shall become time-barred after five years from the date on which performance of the obligation becomes enforceable. …’

Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure

12 Article 812(1) of Ley 1/2000 de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure) of 7 January 2000 (BOE No 7 of 8 January 2000, p. 575) states:

‘Any person claiming from another the payment of a certain, due and payable pecuniary debt of any specific amount may use the order for payment procedure …’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

13 On 25 November 2015, F.C.T., the defendant in the main proceedings, and I.C.G. concluded a loan contract with Nuevo Micro Bank SAU. The loan had a principal amount of EUR 3 450 and an annual percentage rate of 16.47%. It had to be repaid from 1 December 2015 in 36 monthly instalments. Accordingly, the deadline set for the repayment of the loan was 1 December 2018.

14 On 1 July 2016, the deadline for the repayment of the debt was declared to fall early, in accordance with the terms of the contract, on account of the borrowers’ failure to comply with the obligation to repay.

15 On 23 July 2024, Nuevo Micro Bank transferred certain debts to Investcapital, including the debt corresponding to the loan of F.C.T.

16 On 7 February 2025, Investcapital applied for an order for payment against F.C.T. before the Juzgado de Primera Instancia no1 de Fuenlabrada (Court of First Instance No 1, Fuenlabrada, Spain), which is the referring court. In the course of the main proceedings, that court asked Investcapital to demonstrate that the limitation period for the debt had been interrupted. In its first written pleading, that company submitted that the limitation period had been interrupted on several occasions, without providing documentation in that regard. In its second written pleading, it produced a claim letter dated 7 August 2024 and addressed to the joint borrower, namely I.C.G. However, according to the referring court, it was not proved that that letter had been sent by Investcapital or received by I.C.G. The referring court notified F.C.T. that Investcapital had submitted that the claim was not time-barred, but F.C.T. did not submit a defence.

17 According to the referring court, the limitation period of five years, applicable to the debt at issue before it, began to run from the date on which the loan became due for early repayment, that is, from 2016. Therefore, without evidence that that period was interrupted, the referring court considers that the debt has been time-barred since 2021.

18 In that context, the referring court notes that the action for the recovery of time-barred debts, initiated by credit purchasers against consumers, where consumers have not invoked the fact that those debts are time-barred before the court, could be contrary to Article 10(1)(a), (b) and (d) of Directive 2021/2167. That provision requires credit purchasers and credit servicers to act in good faith, to provide information to borrowers that is not misleading, unclear or false, and to communicate with them in a way that does not constitute harassment, coercion or undue influence.

19 The referring court considers that the protection of the borrower-consumer conferred by that provision would risk becoming ineffective if the court could not examine of its own motion whether the limitation period has expired for the debt in respect of which recovery is sought, where it possesses the necessary legal and factual elements. In that regard, the referring court notes that the Spanish order for payment procedure renders the admissibility of the application for recovery conditional upon whether the debt is payable. Furthermore, there would be a risk that the consumer, by failing to appear before the court or through lack of awareness, will not oppose the action or will not invoke the fact that the debt is time-barred. The referring court also states that credit purchasers often make a financial calculation by purchasing time-barred debts and relying on the recovery, in certain cases, of those claims in respect of which the limitation period is not invoked.

20 Moreover, the referring court takes the view that misleading a debtor as to the enforceability of the debt could be considered to be a misleading omission, falling under the concept of an unfair commercial practice within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2005/29. It could also be an aggressive commercial practice, within the meaning of Articles 8 and 9 of that directive, consisting in undue influence or a threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken.

21 The obligation for the court to examine of its own motion whether there has been compliance with certain provisions of EU law stems from the case-law of the Court of Justice relating, in particular, to Directive 2008/48. Thus, according to the referring court, it follows from paragraph 23 of the judgment of 5 March 2020, OPR-Finance (C‑679/18, EU:C:2020:167), that the national court is required to examine of its own motion whether there has been compliance with certain provisions relating to consumer protection where, in the absence of such an examination, effective consumer protection could not be ensured.

22 The referring court notes that, on the date of the order for reference, Directive 2021/2167 had not yet been transposed into Spanish law. However, in accordance with Article 32(2) of that directive, the provisions implementing it should have been applied from 30 December 2023 and, according to Article 2(5)(d) of that directive, those provisions should have applied to the debt at issue given that it was assigned to Investcapital after that date.

23 Accordingly, the referring court takes the view that it must interpret its national law in a manner consistent with Directive 2021/2167. In that regard, referring to the case-law of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain), the referring court observes that, before the courts of that State, the limitation period must be invoked by the debtor in court proceedings in order for the action to be dismissed on that ground. The limitation period does not extinguish the right, but constitutes a defence that enables the debtor to refuse to perform the obligation.

24 In those circumstances, the Juzgado de Primera Instancia no1 de Fuenlabrada (Court of First Instance No 1, Fuenlabrada) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Should Article 10(1) of Directive [2021/2167] be interpreted as meaning that it allows a national court to determine of its own motion whether the limitation period has expired for a debt that the credit servicer or purchaser is claiming in court from a [borrower-consumer]?’

Consideration of the question referred

Admissibility

25 The Spanish Government submits that the question referred for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible. It considers that Article 10 of Directive 2021/2167, which has not been transposed into Spanish law, does not appear to have direct effect and cannot be applied in the context of the dispute in the main proceedings, which is exclusively between individuals. Furthermore, it submits that inasmuch as the referring court’s examination of its own motion of whether the limitation period has expired constitutes an interpretation of Spanish law that is contra legem, that court should not interpret national law in the light of EU law.

26 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law of the Court, in a dispute between individuals such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the national court is required, where appropriate, to interpret national law, as soon as the time limit for transposing an untransposed directive expires, so as to render the situation at issue immediately compatible with the provisions of that directive, without, however, interpreting national law contra legem (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).

27 It must also be noted that the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of provisions of EU law irrespective of whether or not they have direct effect between the parties to the underlying dispute (judgment of 8 May 2025, L.T. and Others (Social allowances in respect of fixed-term agricultural workers), C‑212/24, C‑226/24 and C‑227/24, EU:C:2025:341, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

28 Moreover, it must be observed that, as is apparent from paragraph 23 above, the referring court notes that the requirement that the limitation period for a debt must be invoked by the debtor in court proceedings in order for the action to be dismissed stems from the case-law of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court), and not from a provision of Spanish law.

29 In that context, it must be borne in mind that the requirement to interpret national law in conformity with EU law entails, in particular, the obligation for national courts to change established case-law, where necessary, if it is based on an interpretation of national law that is incompatible with the objectives of a directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2024, Skarb Państwa (Payment not significantly delayed or small claim), C‑279/23, EU:C:2024:605, paragraph 30, and of 8 May 2025, L.T. and Others (Social allowances in respect of fixed-term agricultural workers), C‑212/24, C‑226/24 and C‑227/24, EU:C:2025:341, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

30 It follows that the question referred is admissible.

Substance

31 By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 10(1) of Directive 2021/2167 must be interpreted as not precluding a national court from examining of its own motion whether the limitation period has expired for a debt where a credit purchaser is claiming the debt in court from a consumer.

32 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that EU law does not, in principle, require a national court to examine of its own motion a plea alleging infringement of provisions of EU law where the examination of such a plea would oblige it to go beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves. That limitation on the power of a national court is justified by the principle that, in a civil suit, it is for the parties to take the initiative. However, such an examination by the national court of its own motion is justified in exceptional cases where the public interest requires its intervention, in particular under certain consumer protection provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2023, Tuk Tuk Travel, C‑83/22, EU:C:2023:664, paragraphs 45 and 46 and the case-law cited).

33 As regards the interpretation of Article 10(1) of Directive 2021/2167, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 18 June 2026, Vodovody a kanalizace Přerov, C‑575/24, EU:C:2026:499, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

34 The wording of Article 10(1) of Directive 2021/2167 provides that, in their relationships with borrowers, credit purchasers are to act in accordance with the rules laid down in that provision. In that regard, it is stated, inter alia, that those purchasers are to act in good faith, fairly and professionally, and that they are to provide information to borrowers that is not misleading, unclear or false. In addition, they must communicate with borrowers in a way that does not constitute harassment, coercion or undue influence.

35 It must therefore be held that it may be inferred from the wording of that provision that it does not, in itself, govern the issue of the limitation period of a claim, even less so the possibility of the court examining of its own motion whether that limitation period has expired. Moreover, the limitation period or the examination of that limitation by that court are not governed by any other provision of Directive 2021/2167.

36 That interpretation is supported by the context of Article 10(1) of Directive 2021/2167 and by the objectives pursued by that directive. In accordance with recital 61 of that directive, the objectives of that directive are to enhance the development of secondary markets for non-performing loans in the European Union while ensuring further strengthened protection of borrowers, in particular of consumers. There is nothing in Directive 2021/2167 to suggest that, in order to ensure such strengthening, it would establish, for the benefit of consumer borrowers, protective provisions covering the limitation period of a debt arising from such a loan or the legal proceedings initiated by credit purchasers.

37 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the question whether a national court may examine of its own motion whether the limitation period has expired for a debt is not governed by Directive 2021/2167.

38 Furthermore, although Article 10(1) of Directive 2021/2167 refers to ‘information … that is not misleading’, it is Directive 2005/29 that, in Article 7(1) thereof, sets out the circumstances in which a commercial practice is to be regarded as misleading. It is apparent from that provision that such a practice is to be regarded as misleading if, in essence, it omits material information that the average consumer needs to take an informed transactional decision. Moreover, that practice must, consequently, cause or be likely to cause that average consumer to take a transactional decision that he or she would not have taken otherwise.

39 In that regard, the Court has already held, in the judgment of 20 July 2017, Gelvora (C‑357/16, EU:C:2017:573, paragraphs 21, 25 and 31), that the recovery of debts by a debt collection agency falls under the concept of ‘commercial practice’. However, the fact that an action for recovery is brought on the basis of a debt which may be time-barred cannot, in itself, be classified as a misleading commercial practice. In the context of legal proceedings, the parties are free to put forward any pleas in law on which they wish to rely. Moreover, a debt cannot be regarded as not payable merely because it is time-barred, since the limitation period extinguishes the right to that claim only if the defendant invokes it during the legal proceedings (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 8 November 2012, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, C‑469/11 P, EU:C:2012:705, paragraph 54). It follows that the bringing of an action for recovery of a debt which might be time-barred cannot be regarded, in itself, as a misleading action within the meaning of Directive 2005/29.

40 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that, according to the case-law, in the absence of harmonisation of national mechanisms for recovery of uncontested claims, the rules implementing national order for payment procedures are a matter for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. That is the case, however, on condition that they are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and do not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred on consumers by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 October 2006, Mostaza Claro, C‑168/05, EU:C:2006:675, paragraph 24, and of 14 June 2012, Banco Español de Crédito, C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 46).

41 Member States are therefore competent to decide, in their national law, whether a national court may examine of its own motion whether the limitation period has expired for a debt, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. In the present case, the Court has no information from the referring court enabling it to assess whether the national case-law which prohibits a court from raising of its own motion the fact that a debt is time-barred complies with those principles.

42 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question raised is that Article 10(1) of Directive 2021/2167 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not govern whether the national court, before which a credit purchaser has brought an action for recovery of a debt against a consumer, may examine of its own motion whether the limitation period has expired for that debt.

Costs

43 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 10(1) of Directive (EU) 2021/2167 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2021 on credit servicers and credit purchasers and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU

must be interpreted as meaning that it does not govern whether the national court, before which a credit purchaser has brought an action for recovery of a debt against a consumer, may examine of its own motion whether the limitation period has expired for that debt.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: Spanish.

i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.