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62025CJ0254

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)

12 November 2026 (*)

In Case C‑254/25,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Gliwicach (Provincial Administrative Court, Gliwice, Poland), made by decision of 2 April 2025, received at the Court on 4 April 2025, in the proceedings

A.A.

v

Wojewoda Śląski,

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, B. Smulders, E. Regan, J. Passer (Rapporteur) and D. Gratsias, Judges,

Advocate General: D. Spielmann,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

– the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna and D. Lutostańska, acting as Agents,

– the European Commission, by J. Hottiaux and A. Katsimerou, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 16 April 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 2, Article 4(3) and Article 6(1) and (3) TEU, Articles 10 and 18 and Article 67(4) TFEU, Article 20, Article 21(1) and (2), Article 41(1) to (4), Article 47, Article 51(1) and Article 52(1) to (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 34(1) and (3) of Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (OJ 2016 L 132, p. 21).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between A.A., a third-country national, and Wojewoda Śląski (the Provincial Governor, Silesia, Poland) (‘the Provincial Governor’), concerning an application for the grant of a temporary residence permit for purposes of studies.

Legal context

European Union law

Directive 2016/801

3 Recitals 3 and 14 of Directive 2016/801 state:

‘(3) This Directive should contribute to the Stockholm Programme’s aim of approximating national legislation on the conditions for entry and residence of third-country nationals. Immigration from outside the [European] Union is one source of highly skilled people, and students and researchers are in particular increasingly sought after. They play an important role in forming the Union’s key asset, human capital, and in ensuring smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, and therefore contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

…

(14) In order to promote Europe as a whole as a world centre of excellence for studies and training, the conditions for entry and residence of those who wish to come to the Union for these purposes should be improved and simplified. This is in line with the objectives of the agenda for the modernisation of Europe's higher education systems, in particular within the context of the internationalisation of European higher education. …’

4 Article 5 of Directive 2016/801, entitled ‘Principles’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 3 thereof:

‘1. The admission of a third-country national under this Directive shall be subject to the verification of documentary evidence attesting that the third-country national meets:

(a) the general conditions laid down in Article 7; and

(b) the relevant specific conditions in Article[s] 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 or 16.

…

3. Where all the general conditions and relevant specific conditions are fulfilled, the third-country national shall be entitled to an authorisation.

Where a Member State issues residence permits only on its territory and all the admission conditions laid down in this Directive are fulfilled, the Member State concerned shall issue the third-country national with the requisite visa.’

5 Article 34 of that directive, headed ‘Procedural guarantees and transparency’, provides:

‘1. The competent authorities of the Member State concerned shall adopt a decision on the application for an authorisation or a renewal of it and notify the decision to the applicant in writing, in accordance with the notification procedures under national law, as soon as possible but not later than 90 days from the date on which the complete application was submitted.

…

3. Where the information or documentation supplied in support of the application is incomplete, the competent authorities shall notify the applicant within a reasonable period of the additional information that is required and set a reasonable deadline for providing it. The period referred to in paragraph 1 […] shall be suspended until the competent authorities have received the additional information required. If additional information or documents have not been provided within the deadline, the application may be rejected.

…’

Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382

6 Recitals 3, 6, 7 and 11 of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC and having the effect of introducing temporary protection (OJ 2022 L 71, p. 1), state:

‘(3) Following the invasion, which seeks to undermine European and global security and stability, the European Council, in its conclusions of 24 February 2022, condemned Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms, underlining the gross violation of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. …

…

(6) … Depending on how the conflict evolves, based on current estimations, the Union is likely to be faced with a very large number of displaced persons, potentially between 2.5 million and 6.5 million as a consequence of the armed conflict, of whom it is anticipated that between 1.2 and 3.2 million would be persons seeking international protection. …

(7) Those figures show that the Union is likely to be faced with a situation that is characterised by a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine who are unable to return to their country or region of origin because of Russian military aggression. The scale of the influx would likely be such that there is also a clear risk that the Member States' asylum systems will be unable to process the arrivals without adverse effects on their efficient operation and on the interests of the persons concerned and on those of other persons requesting protection.

…

(11) The object of this Decision is to introduce temporary protection for Ukrainian nationals residing in Ukraine who have been displaced on or after 24 February 2022 as a result of the military invasion by Russian armed forces that began on that date. Temporary protection should also be introduced for nationals of third countries other than Ukraine, who have been displaced from Ukraine on or after 24 February 2022, and who were benefiting in Ukraine from refugee status or equivalent protection before 24 February 2022. In addition, it is important to preserve the unity of families and to avoid diverging statuses among members of the same family. Therefore, it is necessary to also introduce temporary protection for family members of those persons, where their families were already in, and residing in, Ukraine at the time of the circumstances surrounding the mass influx of displaced persons.’

Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1836

7 Recitals 7 and 8 of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1836 of 25 June 2024 extending temporary protection as introduced by Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 (OJ L 2024/1836) state:

‘(7) Moreover, further arrivals on a large scale cannot be excluded, due to the difficult humanitarian conditions, broader volatility and the uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s war of aggression, including intensified repeated air attacks against civilians across the country. The risk of escalation persists. At the same time, a risk to the efficient operation of the national asylum systems also persists; that if temporary protection were soon to cease, all the beneficiaries would apply for international protection at the same time.

(8) Since the high number of displaced persons in the Union benefitting from temporary protection is not likely to decrease while the war against Ukraine continues, extending temporary protection is necessary to address the situation of persons currently benefitting from temporary protection in the Union, or who will need such protection as from 5 March 2025. Temporary protection provides for immediate protection and for access to a harmonised set of rights, while reducing formalities to a minimum in a situation of mass influx to the Union. Extending temporary protection will also help to ensure that the asylum systems of the Member States are not overwhelmed by the significant increase in the number of applications for international protection that could be lodged by persons benefitting from temporary protection until 4 March 2025, if temporary protection were to cease by then, or by persons fleeing the war in Ukraine and arriving in the Union after that date and on or before 4 March 2026.’

Polish law

The Law on assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with armed conflict in the territory of that country

8 The ustawa o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa (Law on assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with armed conflict in the territory of that country) of 12 March 2022 (Dz. U. de 2022, position 583) lays down the specific rules governing the regularisation of the residence of the Ukrainian nationals who have arrived in Poland. Article 100d of that law, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides:

‘1. Until 30 September 2025, the time limits for handling matters relating to:

(1) the grant to foreign nationals of:

(a) a temporary residence permit,

(b) a permanent residence permit,

(c) a long-term resident’s EU residence permit,

(2) the amendment of:

(a) a temporary residence permit and work permit,

(b) a temporary residence permit to take up highly qualified employment,

(3) the withdrawal from foreign nationals of:

(a) a temporary residence permit,

(b) a permanent residence permit,

(c) a long-term resident’s EU residence permit,

– shall not start to run, and time limits that have started to run shall be suspended, for that period in procedures conducted by the Provincial Governor.

2. Acts performed during the period referred to in paragraph 1, in the context of the procedures referred to in paragraph 1, shall be effective.

3. During the period referred to in paragraph 1:

(1) the provisions relating to the failure to act of the authority responsible for the procedure in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 and to its duty to inform the party to or participant in the procedure that the matter has not been handled within the time limits shall not apply;

(2) the authority responsible for the procedure in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be liable to a fine, nor shall any monetary sums be awarded against it in favour of applicants, for failure to adopt a decision within the time limits prescribed by law.

4. The cessation of actions by the authority responsible for the procedure in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, or the performance of such actions with delay, during the period referred to in paragraph 1, shall not constitute grounds for pursuing legal remedies against a failure to act, the excessive length of the procedure, or infringement of a party’s right to have his or her case examined without undue delay.’

9 Article 100d, in its original version, entered into force on 1 January 2023 and has been amended on multiple occasions, with the end date of the suspension of the time limits having been set, respectively, as 24 August 2023, 4 March 2024, 30 June 2024 and 30 September 2025. Article 100d reproduces the wording of Article 100c of the same law, which was applicable until 31 December 2022.

Law on the procedure before the administrative courts

10 Article 53(2b) of the ustawa Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (Law on the procedure before the administrative courts) of 30 August 2002 (Dz. U. of 2024, position 935), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, states:

‘An action for failure to act or to challenge the excessive duration of the procedure may be brought at any time after a reminder has been submitted to the competent authority.’

11 Article 149 of that law provides:

‘§ 1. Where the court upholds an action for failure to act or challenging the excessive duration of the procedure conducted by the authorities in the cases referred to in points 1 to 4 of Article 3(2), or an action challenging the excessive duration of the procedure in the cases referred to in point 4a of Article 3(2), it shall:

(1) order the authority to issue an act or an individual interpretation or to perform an action within a specified time limit;

(2) order the authority to determine or recognise a right or obligation arising from provisions of law;

(3) declare that the authority has failed to act or was responsible for the excessive duration of the procedure.

§ 1a. The court shall determine whether the authority’s failure to act or the excessive duration of the procedure conducted by the authority constitutes a flagrant breach of law.

§ 1b. In the case referred to in points 1 and 2 of paragraph 1 above, the court may also determine whether or not a right or obligation exists, where the nature of the case so permits and the points of fact and of law are beyond reasonable doubt.

§ 2. In the case referred to in paragraph 1 above, the court may also, of its own motion or at the request of a party, impose a fine on the authority in the amount stipulated in Article 154(6), or order that authority to pay a sum of money not exceeding one half of the amount stipulated in Article 154(6).’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

12 On 17 April 2024, the applicant in the main proceedings submitted to the Provincial Governor an application for a temporary residence permit in order to undertake university studies in Poland.

13 On 22 November 2024, in the absence of a response to that application, despite the fact that a reminder was sent to the Provincial Governor on 25 October 2024, the applicant in the main proceedings brought an action for a declaration of failure to act against that authority before the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Gliwicach (Provincial Administrative Court, Gliwice, Poland), which is the referring court. In his action, the applicant argued that the Provincial Governor had manifestly exceeded the time limit for handling the application for a temporary residence permit and claimed that the competent administrative authority should be ordered to issue that permit within 14 days and pay him compensation or, in the alternative, a fine.

14 The Provincial Governor contended that the action should be dismissed, relying, inter alia, on Article 100d of the Law on assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with armed conflict in the territory of that country, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings. In accordance with Article 100d, the time limits for handling matters relating to the grant to foreign nationals, inter alia, of that permit start to run only from 30 September 2025 or are suspended until that date, as justified by the successive increases in the number of applications for a residence permit following the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The Provincial Governor also noted that Article 100d provides that, until 30 September 2025, the provisions relating to the authority’s failure to act and to its duty to inform the party concerned that the matter will not be dealt with within the time limit specified are not applicable, and that a fine may not be imposed and compensation may not be awarded in favour of applicants where there has been a failure to comply with the time limits prescribed by law.

15 The referring court has doubts regarding the compatibility with EU law of a national provision, such as Article 100d of the Law on assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with armed conflict in the territory of that country, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, which provides for the deferral of the start, or the suspension, of the time limits for handling cases relating to, inter alia, the grant of a temporary residence permit and provides no possibility for third-country nationals to bring, during those periods where those time limits are not running or are suspended, an action for failure to act against the competent administrative authority in case of delayed action or failure to act by that authority. Those doubts concern, inter alia, the compatibility of such a national provision with the general principle of EU law of good administration, the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of proportionality.

16 The referring court notes, in that regard, that by suspending the right of foreign nationals to exercise legal remedies, the purpose of which is to challenge the slowness by the public authorities in acting, or even a failure by those authorities to act, the legislature has made that right illusory and ineffective. Furthermore, the grounds relied on by the Provincial Governor which are, according to the latter, such as to justify that suspension, are based on general and unsubstantiated statements regarding the workload resulting from the mass influx of people from Ukraine. Lastly, that suspension appears to be a disproportionate measure given that less restrictive measures were available to resolve the problems arising from the sudden influx of Ukrainian nationals into Polish territory.

17 In those circumstances, the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Gliwicach (Provincial Administrative Court, Gliwice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘1. Do the Treaty principles of:

(a) the rule of law and respect for human rights ([Article] 2 and [Article] 6(3) [TEU]);

(b) proportionality (Article 52(1) of the [Charter], in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof, and in conjunction with Article 6(1) TEU);

(c) the primacy of EU law and its effectiveness (Article 4(3) TEU); and

(d) the “right to good administration” (regarded as a principle of the European Union – Article 41(1) to (4) of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof, Article 6(1) TEU and stemming from the case-law of the Court of Justice)

preclude the prolonged and repeatedly extended exclusion under national law, on organisation or economic grounds, of the right of foreign nationals (third-country nationals) to seek an effective remedy against the failure of public authorities to act (reminders, actions for a declaration of failure to act or undue delay), inter alia in the context of the requirements laid down in Article 34(1) and (3) of [Directive 2016/801]?

2. Must the prolonged and repeatedly extended exclusion under national law of the possibility for foreign nationals – third-country nationals – to seek an effective remedy against the failure of public authorities to act, as outlined in paragraph 1, and the exclusion of the possibility for a national administrative court to award an adequate sum of money as compensation for the infringement of the right to action by the authorities without undue delay and the exclusion of the possibility of ordering the adoption of an administrative act within a time limit set by the court, where Polish nationals are not deprived of those rights in the context of their administrative procedures, be interpreted as:

(a) not meeting the requirements of the general interest and unduly restricting the sphere of fundamental rights of the European Union (Article 2 and Article 6(1) and (3) TEU, in conjunction with Article 52(1) to (3) of the Charter);

(b) discriminating against foreign nationals – third-country nationals (Article 2 TEU, Articles 10 and 18 TFEU and [Article] 20 and [Article] 21(1) and (2) of the Charter);

(c) contrary to the principle of justice (Article 2 TEU);

(d) hindering genuine, effective access to justice (Article 2 TEU, Article 67(4) TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof)?’

Consideration of the questions referred

18 At the outset, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the procedure established by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. Thus, if necessary, the Court may have to reformulate the question referred to it. To that end, the Court may extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of 16 February 2023, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Unborn child at the time of the asylum application), C‑745/21, EU:C:2023:113, paragraph 43).

19 In the present case, although the request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 2, Article 4(3) and Article 6(1) and (3) TEU, Articles 10 and 18 and Article 67(4) TFEU, Article 20, Article 21(1) and (2), Article 41(1) to (4), Article 47, Article 51(1) and Article 52(1) to (3) of the Charter and Article 34(1) and (3) of Directive 2016/801, it is apparent from that request that the referring court’s doubts concern, more specifically, the compatibility with EU law of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as it defers the starting point for, or suspends, the time limits for handling applications for a temporary residence permit and prevents third-country nationals from being able to bring effectively, during those periods when those time limits are not running or are suspended, an action for failure to act against the administrative authority responsible for handling those applications in the event of delayed action or failure to act by that authority.

20 Accordingly, it must be held that, by its two questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 34(1) and (3) of Directive 2016/801, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that defers the point from which the time limit for handling applications for a residence permit, referred to in Article 34(1) thereof, starts to run, or suspends it for an extended period, and therefore excludes the possibility, provided for under national law, for a third-country national to bring a legal action for failure or delay by the competent administrative authority to process those applications, so that that authority may not be subject, pursuant to the national law transposing that directive, to a penalty or payment of compensation because of that failure or delay.

21 In the first place, it should be borne in mind that, according to the wording of Article 34(1) of that directive, the competent authorities of the Member State concerned are to adopt a decision on the application for an authorisation as soon as possible, not later than 90 days from the date on which the completed application was submitted.

22 As the Advocate General noted in point 24 of his Opinion, the reference to handling the application ‘as soon as possible’, combined with the specification of a maximum of 90 days, conveys the very scheme of Directive 2016/801, which seeks to improve and simplify the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes, inter alia, of studies and training (judgment of 29 July 2024, Perle, C‑14/23, EU:C:2024:647, paragraph 45) in order, inter alia, to allow interested parties to start the academic year in question on time and to organise their study plans effectively, in such a way that they can benefit from the full effectiveness of the rights which he or she derives from that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2025, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone de Belgique and Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés et Étrangers, C‑299/23, EU:C:2025:461, paragraphs 35, 40, 44 and 46 and the case-law cited). The speed of the decision on the application for a residence permit for study purposes is thus an essential component of the scheme established by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2025, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone de Belgique and Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés et Étrangers, C‑299/23, EU:C:2025:461, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

23 Directive 2016/801 does not, however, address the consequences of the national competent authorities exceeding the time limit set out in Article 34(1). Furthermore, that directive does not contain any provision relating to any failure to act by those authorities or to the excessive length of the procedures conducted by those authorities.

24 Where there are no EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of every Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding the rights which individuals derive from EU law. However, the Member States are to ensure compliance in every case with the right to effective judicial protection of those rights as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2025, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone de Belgique and Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés et Étrangers, C‑299/23, EU:C:2025:461, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

25 Thus, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, EU law, including the provisions of the Charter, does not have the effect of requiring Member States to establish remedies other than those established by national law, unless, however, it is apparent from the overall scheme of the national legal system in question that no legal remedy exists that would make it possible to ensure, even indirectly, observance of the rights that individuals derive from EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2025, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone de Belgique and Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés et Étrangers, C‑299/23, EU:C:2025:461, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

26 In the present case, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that, prior to the entry into force of Articles 100c and 100d of the Law on assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with armed conflict in the territory of that country, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, a third country national seeking a residence permit pursuant to Directive 2016/801 could, in accordance with Articles 53 and 149 of the Law on the procedure before the administrative courts, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, bring an action for failure to act before the Polish administrative courts and those courts could declare a failure to act and order the authority to pay a fine or to pay that person compensation.

27 In the second place, it must be noted that, although the maximum period of 90 days referred to in Article 34(1) of Directive 2016/801 is a mandatory time limit, it may exceptionally be suspended.

28 In accordance with Article 34(3) of Directive 2016/801, where the information or documentation supplied in support of the application is incomplete, the competent authorities are to notify the applicant within a reasonable period of the additional information that is required and set a reasonable deadline for providing it, which has the effect of suspending the time limit laid down in Article 34(1) until the competent authorities have received the additional information required.

29 In addition, compliance with the maximum period of 90 days laid down in Article 34(1) of Directive 2016/801 must not be at the expense of the obligations incumbent on each Member State, laid down in Article 5(1) and (3) of that directive, first, to duly verify the documentary evidence attesting that the third-country national meets the general conditions laid down in Article 7 of that directive and the specific conditions for students, laid down in Article 11 of that directive for applications for admission for study purposes and, second, to issue a residence permit for study purposes to an applicant who has satisfied those conditions (judgment of 19 June 2025, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone de Belgique and Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés et Étrangers, C‑299/23, EU:C:2025:461, paragraph 25).

30 Thus, although the maximum period of 90 days laid down in Article 34(1) of Directive 2016/801 must, in principle, be regarded as sufficient to fulfil those obligations and must be interpreted strictly in order to ensure both the effectiveness of that provision and the achievement of the objective of that directive, it must be accepted, as the Polish Government states in its written observations submitted to the Court, that the occurrence of a case of force majeure may prevent the national authorities from duly carrying out those checks and adopting a decision within that period. In such a case of force majeure, it must also be possible to suspend the maximum period of 90 days laid down in Article 34(1) of that directive until those authorities have been able to take the necessary measures in order to be able to duly carry out those checks and adopt a decision.

31 In that regard, it must be borne in mind, as is apparent from settled case-law, that, since the concept of ‘force majeure’ does not have the same scope in the various spheres of application of EU law, its meaning must be determined by reference to the legal context in which it is to operate (judgment of 8 June 2023, UFC – Que choisir and CLCV, C‑407/21, EU:C:2023:449, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

32 That said, that concept refers only to abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances which were outside the control of the party by whom it is pleaded and the consequences of which could not have been avoided in spite of the exercise of all due care (judgment of 28 April 2022, C and CD (Legal obstacles to the execution of a decision on surrender), C‑804/21 PPU, EU:C:2022:307, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

33 Lastly, a Member State which encounters temporarily insuperable difficulties preventing it from complying with its obligations under EU law may plead force majeure only for the period necessary in order to resolve those difficulties (judgment of 25 January 2024, Commission v Ireland (Trihalomethanes in drinking water), C‑481/22, EU:C:2024:85, paragraph 92).

34 Consequently, if, as a result of force majeure, the authorities of a Member State are not in a position to comply with the maximum period of 90 days laid down in Article 34(1) of Directive 2016/801 to carry out the checks required by that directive in order to grant or refuse the applications of third-country nationals, that Member State cannot be criticised for failing to comply with that period. Furthermore, in such circumstances, the fact that, under national law, a legal remedy for a failure or delay by those authorities to handle those applications must be declared unfounded, so that those authorities cannot be ordered to pay a sum by way of penalty or compensation to those nationals, does not infringe the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.

35 It is true that where a Member State relies on a situation of force majeure to justify its failure to comply with the maximum period of 90 days in Article 34(1) of Directive 2016/801, it is necessary to provide, in the national legal system, a remedy in order that a court in that Member State may verify whether the conditions necessary for classifying the situation in question as such are met. However, if that is the case, Article 47 of the Charter does not impose an obligation on that court to order payment of a sum by way of a penalty or compensation for failure to comply with that time limit.

36 In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the Republic of Poland not only precluded, during the period referred to in Articles 100c and 100d of the Law on assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with armed conflict in the territory of that country, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, the time limits for handling matters relating to the grant of a temporary residence permit from running or starting to run, but also precluded the application of the provisions relating to a failure to act by the authority responsible for the procedure. In addition, that law states that, during that period, any action seeking an order that that authority pay sums of money because of a failure to comply with the time limits laid down by the national legislation for the adoption of a decision must be declared unfounded.

37 The Polish Government justified the adoption of those provisions by the fact that the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine led to a mass influx of displaced persons after 24 February 2022, which constitutes a case of force majeure allowing for the adoption of exceptional and interim national measures in order to adapt the functioning of the administrative machinery to the risks associated with that situation.

38 It is for the referring to court assess whether, in the light of the circumstances of the present case, the mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine after 24 February 2022 constitutes such a case of force majeure justifying the adoption of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings and, as the case may be, whether the Republic of Poland limited the adoption of that legislation to the period necessary to resolve the difficulties preventing it from complying with the obligations arising from Directive 2016/801.

39 However, it must be borne in mind that the Court, when called on to provide answers that are of use to the national court in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, may offer clarification intended to provide the national court with guidance and indicate to it which interpretation of national law would fulfil its obligation to interpret that law in conformity with EU law (judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

40 In that regard, as the Polish Government submits, recitals 3 and 7 of Implementing Decision 2022/382 described the Russian military aggression as unforeseeable, unprovoked and unjustified.

41 It should also be borne in mind that the Council of the European Union adopted several implementing decisions seeking to grant and extend the temporary protection to certain displaced persons from Ukraine in order to ensure, as is apparent from recitals 6, 7 and 11 of Implementing Decision 2022/382 and recital 8 of Implementing Decision 2024/1836, that the asylum systems of the Member States are not overwhelmed by the significant increase in the number of applications for international protection. Subject to verification by the referring court, such implementing decisions may have alleviated, at least in part, the problems relating to the capacity of the competent national authorities to process applications for residence permits within the legal time limits.

42 Accordingly, although the influx of displaced persons from Ukraine following the Russian Federation’s military aggression against that country may fall within circumstances beyond the control of the Republic of Poland, which are abnormal and unforeseeable, the fact remains that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 31 to 33 above, it is for the Republic of Poland to demonstrate, before the referring court (i) that it acted with all due diligence to resolve the difficulties preventing it from complying with the obligations arising from EU law, and (ii) that those circumstances were pleaded only for the period necessary in order to resolve those difficulties (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 April 2024, Commission v Poland (Whistleblowers directive), C‑147/23, EU:C:2024:346, paragraph 36).

43 In the present case, as regards, first of all, the existence of temporarily insuperable difficulties preventing that Member State from complying with its obligations under EU law, it must be noted that, admittedly, in the event of a significant increase, established on the basis of a comparative analysis of numerical data, within a short period of time, in applications for residence permits submitted to the competent national authorities compared to the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, those authorities are likely to encounter problems in terms of capacity to process those applications appropriately and within the legal time limits. By contrast, if the number of those applications increases gradually over an extended period, that Member State must take measures to adapt its capacity to process those applications (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraphs 38, 41, 42 and 55).

44 Next, having regard to the Member State’s obligation to act with all due diligence to resolve those difficulties, it is for the referring court to verify, inter alia, whether the national authorities envisaged adopting a less general measure, such as a targeted adjustment of the time limits, the prioritisation of certain files, or even a phased implementation over time of the measure at issue in the main proceedings, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 53 of his Opinion.

45 Lastly, as regards the duration of the period needed by the Member State concerned to resolve those difficulties, while further arrivals on a large scale from Ukraine cannot be excluded and a risk to the proper functioning of the authorisation systems referred to in Directive 2016/801 persists, it must be stated that that duration cannot, in principle, exceed the time needed for the Member State to increase the means made available to the competent immigration authorities and to return to having sufficient capacity to process those applications in accordance with EU law (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 48).

46 Subject to verification by the referring court, it does not appear that, beyond 31 December 2022, a mass influx of displaced persons as a result of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine may be regarded as unforeseeable and it does not appear to be established that the extension of the suspension of the provisions relating to the failure to act in Article 100d of the Law on assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with armed conflict in the territory of that country, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, until 30 September 2025 forms part of the diligence required of a Member State to resolve the difficulties preventing it from complying with its obligations under EU law.

47 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 34(1) and (3) of Directive 2016/801, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that, in the absence of force majeure, defers the point from which the time limit for handling applications for a residence permit, referred to in Article 34(1) of that directive, starts to run, or suspends it, and therefore excludes the possibility, provided for under national law, for a third-country national to bring a legal action for failure or delay by the competent administrative authority to process those applications, so that that authority may not be subject, pursuant to the national law transposing that directive, to a penalty or payment of compensation because of that failure or delay.

Costs

48 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 34(1) and (3) of Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that, in the absence of force majeure, defers the point from which the time limit for handling applications for a residence permit, referred to in Article 34(1) of that directive, starts to run, or suspends it, and therefore excludes the possibility, provided for under national law, for a third-country national to bring a legal action for failure or delay by the competent administrative authority to process those applications, so that that authority may not be subject, pursuant to the national law transposing that directive, to a penalty or payment of compensation because of that failure or delay.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: Polish.