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62025CJ0007

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber)

12 November 2026 (*)

Joined Cases C‑7/25 [Ramodi] and C‑8/25 [Karkik], (i)

REQUESTS for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Roermond, Netherlands), made by decisions of 7 January 2025, received at the Court on 7 January 2025, in the proceedings

K (C‑7/25),

P (C‑8/25)

v

Minister van Asiel en Migratie,

THE COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of K. Jürimäe, President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as Judge of the Second Chamber, Z. Csehi, M. Gavalec (Rapporteur) and F. Schalin, Judges,

Advocate General: T. Ćapeta,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

– K, by G.J. van der Graaf, advocaat,

– P, by K.S. Kort, advocate,

– the Netherlands Government, by M.H.S. Gijzen, A. Hanje and J. Langer, acting as Agents,

– the European Commission, by A. Azema, M. Debieuvre and F. van Schaik, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 19 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 These requests for a preliminary ruling concern, first, the interpretation of Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9), read in the light of Article 4(1) to (4) of that directive, of Article 10(3)(b) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60), and Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and, secondly, the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Articles 4, 18 and 47 of the Charter.

2 The requests have been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, respectively, K and P, Iraqi citizens, and, on the other, the Minister van Asiel en Migratie (the Minister for Asylum and Migration, Netherlands) (‘the Minister’) concerning decisions by which the Minister (i) rejected as unfounded K and P’s applications for international protection, (ii) stated that they would not obtain a residence permit on other grounds, (iii) imposed on them an obligation to return, designating Iraq as the country of destination, and (iv) set a time limit of four weeks for voluntary departure.

Legal context

European Union law

The Charter

3 Article 4 of the Charter, entitled ‘Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, provides:

‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’

4 Article 18 of the Charter is worded as follows:

‘The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the [Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, which entered into force on 22 April 1954 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 137, No 2545 (1954)) (‘the Geneva Convention’)] and the Protocol [relating to the Status of Refugees, concluded in New York on 31 January 1967, which entered into force on 4 October 1967] and in accordance with the [EU Treaty] and the [FEU Treaty] ….’

5 Article 19 of the Charter, entitled ‘Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition’, provides, in paragraph 2:

‘No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’

6 Article 47 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’, states:

‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.

Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.

Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.’

Directive 2008/115/EC

7 Article 3 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98), entitled ‘Definitions’, provides, in point 4:

‘“return decision” means an administrative or judicial decision or act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country national to be illegal and imposing or stating an obligation to return’.

8 Under Article 9(1)(a) of that directive:

‘Member States shall postpone removal:

(a) when it would violate the principle of non-refoulement …’

9 Article 13(1) and (2) of that directive provides:

‘1. The third-country national concerned shall be afforded an effective remedy to appeal against or seek review of decisions related to return, as referred to in Article 12(1), before a competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent body composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence.

2. The authority or body mentioned in paragraph 1 shall have the power to review decisions related to return, as referred to in Article 12(1), including the possibility of temporarily suspending their enforcement, unless a temporary suspension is already applicable under national legislation.’

Directive 2011/95

10 Recital 12 of Directive 2011/95 is worded as follows:

‘The main objective of this Directive is, on the one hand, to ensure that Member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure that a minimum level of benefits is available for those persons in all Member States.’

11 Article 1 of that directive states:

‘The purpose of this Directive is to lay down standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection-granted.’

12 Article 4 of that directive, entitled ‘Assessment of facts and circumstances’, provides:

‘1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all the elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant, it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application.

2. The elements referred to in paragraph 1 consist of the applicant’s statements and all the documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the applicant’s age, background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, travel documents and the reasons for applying for international protection.

3. The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an individual basis and includes taking into account:

(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied;

(b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm;

(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm;

(d) whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether those activities would expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country;

(e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself or herself of the protection of another country where he or she could assert citizenship.

4. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.

5. Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate the application for international protection and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation when the following conditions are met:

(a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application;

(b) all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation has been given regarding any lack of other relevant elements;

(c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case;

(d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and

(e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.’

13 Article 13 of that directive, entitled ‘Granting of refugee status’, provides:

‘Member States shall grant refugee status to a third-country national or a stateless person who qualifies as a refugee in accordance with Chapters II and III.’

Directive 2013/32

14 Recital 10 of Directive 2013/32 is worded as follows:

‘When implementing this Directive, Member States should take into account relevant guidelines developed by [the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which was replaced in 2022 by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)].’

15 Article 10 of that directive, entitled ‘Requirements for the examination of applications’, provides, in paragraph 3:

‘Member States shall ensure that decisions by the determining authority on applications for international protection are taken after an appropriate examination. To that end, Member States shall ensure that:

(a) applications are examined and decisions are taken individually, objectively and impartially;

(b) precise and up-to-date information is obtained from various sources, such as EASO and [the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] and relevant international human rights organisations, as to the general situation prevailing in the countries of origin of applicants and, where necessary, in countries through which they have transited, and that such information is made available to the personnel responsible for examining applications and taking decisions;

(c) the personnel examining applications and taking decisions know the relevant standards applicable in the field of asylum and refugee law;

(d) the personnel examining applications and taking decisions have the possibility to seek advice, whenever necessary, from experts on particular issues, such as medical, cultural, religious, child-related or gender issues.’

16 Article 46(1) and (3) of that directive states:

‘1. Member States shall ensure that applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following:

(a) a decision taken on their application for international protection, including a decision:

(i) considering an application to be unfounded in relation to refugee status and/or subsidiary protection status;

…

3. In order to comply with paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive [2011/95], at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance.’

Netherlands law

17 Article 8:69 of the wet houdende algemene regels van bestuursrecht (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) (Law laying down general rules of administrative law) (General Law on Administrative Law) of 4 June 1992 (Stb. 1992, No 315), in the version applicable to the disputes in the main proceedings, provides:

‘1. The court or tribunal before which proceedings were brought shall give its ruling on the basis of the application, the documents submitted, the preliminary investigation and the examination of the case at the hearing.

2. The court shall supplement the pleas in law of its own motion.

3. The court may supplement the facts of its own motion.’

18 Article 31 of the Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (2000 Law on Foreign Nationals) of 23 November 2000 (Stb. 2000, No 495), in the version applicable to the disputes in the main proceedings (‘the Vw’), provides:

‘1. An application for a fixed-term residence permit as referred to in Article 28 shall be rejected as unfounded within the meaning of Article 32(1) of Directive [2013/32], if the foreign national has not sufficiently demonstrated that his or her application is based on circumstances which, either in themselves or in connection with other facts, constitute a legal basis for granting such a permit.

2. The foreign national shall submit, as soon as possible, all the elements needed to substantiate his or her application. The Minister shall assess the relevant elements in cooperation with the foreign national.

3. The elements referred to in paragraph 2 shall include the foreign national’s statements and all relevant documents in his or her possession.

4. The assessment of the application shall include taking into account:

(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, including the laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied;

(b) the statements and documents provided by the foreign national, as well as information indicating whether the foreign national has been or could be subjected to persecution within the meaning of the [Geneva Convention] or serious harm within the meaning of Article 29(1)(b);

(c) the individual situation and personal circumstances of the foreign national, including factors such as background, gender and age, in order to assess whether, on the basis of the foreign national’s personal circumstances, the acts to which he or she has been or could be exposed, amount to persecution within the meaning of the [Geneva Convention] or serious harm within the meaning of Article 29(1)(b);

(d) whether, since leaving his or her country of origin or a country of previous residence, the foreign national’s activities were aimed solely at creating the necessary conditions for being able to apply for international protection in order to ascertain whether, if returned to that country, those activities would expose the foreign national to persecution within the meaning of the [Geneva Convention] or serious harm within the meaning of Article 29(1)(b);

(e) whether the foreign national can reasonably be expected to seek the protection of another country in which he or she may rely on his or her nationality.

5. The fact that the foreign national has previously been persecuted within the meaning of the [Geneva Convention] or that he or she has suffered serious harm within the meaning of Article 29(1)(b) in the past, or has been directly threatened with such persecution or harm, is a serious indication of the foreign national’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.

6. If the foreign national is unable to produce documents in support of his or her statements or parts thereof, those statements shall be deemed to be credible and the benefit of the doubt shall be given to the foreign national where the following conditions are met:

(a) the foreign national has made a genuine effort to substantiate his or her application;

(b) all relevant elements at the foreign national’s disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation has been given regarding any lack of other relevant elements;

(c) the foreign national’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case;

(d) the foreign national has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so, and

(e) the general credibility of the foreign national has been established.

…’

19 Under Paragraph C1/4.2.3. of the Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 (2000 Circular on foreign nationals) of 2 March 2001 (Stcrt. 2001, No 64), as amended on 13 June 2024:

‘A ground for asylum is a topic or narrative in a foreign national’s asylum account which is connected to, or relevant to the assessment of whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm.

It includes the facts and circumstances on which the foreign national’s application for protection is based. The [Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Netherlands) (‘the IND’)] shall assess only the facts and circumstances relating to the alleged persecution by authorities or third persons, or the facts and circumstances of the account which are such as to demonstrate serious harm. For that reason, the IND shall take into account only the related statements and documents (both favourable and unfavourable).

The facts and circumstances may consist of events and conduct. The facts and circumstances relied on may have occurred in the country of origin prior to departure, but also after the foreign national’s departure therefrom. Alleged events also include the foreign national’s assumptions. The IND considers assumptions to mean the foreign national’s hypotheses which form part of the alleged past events.

An application for asylum may be based on several grounds for asylum which are independent of one another. However, those grounds for asylum may also, to a certain extent, interact or be interlinked.

…’

20 Paragraph C1/4.3 of that circular provides:

‘Assessment of credibility

…

Grounds for asylum

After deciding on the ground for asylum, the IND shall assess the credibility of that ground for asylum. In that regard, the examination shall be based on facts and circumstances.

In order to determine the credibility of the facts and circumstances underlying the ground for asylum, the IND must always assess whether the ground for asylum:

is sufficiently substantiated by evidence; or

may be deemed to be credible under the credibility review ensuing from Article 31(6) of the Vw.

…

4.3.1. Examination of the documents

The IND shall first examine whether the foreign national has sufficiently substantiated the grounds for asylum with evidence. Such evidence shall be constituted by objective documents which are authentic and the truthfulness of which can be established, and which corroborate the foreign national’s statements. It may also include objective and publicly available sources corroborating statements made by the foreign national.

…

4.3.2. Lack or insufficient justification of the grounds for asylum.

If the foreign national has not or has not sufficiently substantiated the grounds for his or her asylum with evidence, the IND may (ultimately) consider the facts and circumstances underlying the ground for asylum to be credible if the foreign national satisfies the following five cumulative conditions of Article 31(6) of the Vw:

…

4.3.2.6. Final conclusion of the credibility assessment

At the end of its assessment of the various facts and circumstances, the IND shall reach a conclusion on the credibility of the ground for asylum. If the ground for asylum is not sufficiently substantiated by evidence and the foreign national does not satisfy all of the conditions listed in Article 31(6) [of the] Vw, the ground for asylum is not credible. The IND shall state the reasons why the ground for asylum is not deemed to be credible.

…’

21 The Werkinstructie WI 2024/6 Geloofwaardigheidsbeoordeling (asiel) of 10 October 2024 (Work Instruction WI 2024/6 – Assessment of credibility (asylum)) (‘Work Instruction 2024/6’), provides that, in assessing the credibility of the grounds for asylum, it shall be assessed whether ‘the account presented in support of the asylum application is sufficiently substantiated by objective evidence or whether the account presented in support of the asylum application may be deemed to be credible on the basis of the review under Article 31(6) of the Vw’.

22 That work instruction also states that ‘if the foreign national is unable, for whatever reason, to substantiate a ground for asylum by means of objective evidence, or is unable to do so sufficiently, the IND shall apply the credibility review in order to reach a conclusion on credibility’ and that, in such a case, ‘the ground for asylum may be deemed to be credible if the foreign national satisfies five conditions, stipulated cumulatively’.

The disputes in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

23 K and P, two Iraqi nationals, born in 1958 and 1985 respectively, lodged applications for international protection in the Netherlands on 1 February 2022 and 6 July 2023 respectively.

24 The Minister rejected K and P’s requests for international protection as unfounded by decisions of 15 and 5 July 2024 respectively. The Minister also decided that K and P would not be granted a residence permit on other grounds. Each of those rejection decisions includes also a return decision designating Iraq as the country of destination and set a four-week time limit for voluntary departure.

25 K and P each appealed against those decisions before the rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Roermond, Netherlands), which is the referring court.

26 That court states that, from 1 July 2024, the Minister amended her policy on the assessment of credibility of the facts and circumstances of applications for international protection and set out the detailed rules for implementing that policy in Work Instruction 2024/6. That new policy was applied in the assessment of K and P’s applications for international protection.

27 K and P claim before that court that the manner in which the credibility of the grounds for their applications was assessed is not compliant with Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95. In their view, that provision is a minimum standard with the result that statements not substantiated by documents may also be deemed to be credible.

28 As a result, that court is uncertain of the manner in which the Minister examined and assessed K and P’s need for protection, and whether, more broadly, Work Instruction 2024/6 is compliant with EU law.

29 The referring court adds that, notwithstanding Article 8:69 of the General Law on Administrative Law, in the version applicable to the disputes in the main proceedings, it must, in order to assess the legality of decisions rejecting applications for international protection, confine itself to the arguments and grounds expressly raised by the applicant for international protection. Consequently, the parameters of the dispute are dictated by the grounds of the appeal and not by the subject matter of the proceedings, namely the assessment of that applicant’s international protection needs.

30 Thus, in the present case, that court states that although it must confine its assessment to assessing the legality of those decisions on the basis of the facts and circumstances expressly raised in the grounds of the appeals, it is not in a position to review the decisions issued to K and P, or to carry out a full and ex nunc examination of both the international protection needs and the risk of refoulement.

31 In addition, that court emphasises that the Court has not yet expressly stated whether the obligation to find, if necessary of its own motion, a possible breach of the principle of non-refoulement also applies when reviewing the legality of a decision rejecting an application for international protection as unfounded.

32 In those circumstances, the rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Roermond) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions, which are worded identically in joined Cases C‑7/25 and C‑8/25, to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Is a national practice whereby Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95 is applied in such a way that the statements underlying an application for international protection are not deemed credible if the applicant cannot fully substantiate those statements by means of authentic and/or objectively verifiable documents and/or objective sources and does not meet all the conditions set out in the fifth paragraph compatible with EU law, or must Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95, read in conjunction with Article 4(1) to (4) of Directive 2011/95, Article 10(3)(b) of Directive 2013/32 and Articles 4 and 18 of the [Charter], be interpreted as requiring the determining authority, when assessing the facts and circumstances underlying the application for international protection, to cooperate with the applicant and to take into account every piece of evidence and element in support of that application when examining and assessing the need for protection and, if the applicant is able to support his or her statements sufficiently with evidence or if the applicant fulfils the aforementioned conditions, his or her statements do not require further corroboration and are therefore credible?

(2) Is Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Articles 4, 18 and 47 of the [Charter], to be interpreted as meaning that a national court of first instance called upon to review the lawfulness of declaring an application for international protection unfounded is obliged to carry out of its own motion, if necessary, a full and ex nunc examination of both the factual and legal grounds, including an examination of the need for international protection in accordance with Directive 2011/95 on the basis of the elements of the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings?’

Consideration of the questions referred

The first question in Case C‑7/25 and the first question in Case C‑8/25

33 By its first question in Case C‑7/25 and its first question in Case C‑8/25, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted as applying where the statements made in the context of an application for international protection are not deemed to be credible because the applicant is unable to substantiate them with authentic and objectively verifiable documents or by objective sources and he or she does not satisfy all the conditions set out in that provision, or whether that provision must be interpreted as meaning, first, that the authority responsible for assessing an application for international protection must cooperate with the applicant and consider, in the assessment of the need for protection, all the evidence and elements submitted in support of the application and, secondly, where the applicant sufficiently substantiates his or her statements with evidence or meets the conditions set out in that provision, the applicant’s statements do not require further confirmation and are deemed to be credible.

34 At the outset, it must be noted that, according to the referring court, the Minister examined K and P’s asylum applications by applying Work Instruction 2024/6. It follows from that work instruction that the Minister adopts the grounds for asylum before assessing whether those grounds are fully supported by authentic and objectively verifiable documents or by objective publicly available sources. Where that is not the case, the Minister verifies whether the asylum seeker satisfies all the conditions set out in Article 31(6) of the Vw, which correspond to the conditions set out in Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95 and, if not, the account presented in support of the application may not be deemed to be credible.

35 Without disputing the admissibility of those questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the Netherlands Government submits, however, that the referring court does not correctly set out the decision-making practice regarding the assessment of the credibility of asylum applications.

36 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, the national court alone has jurisdiction to interpret and apply national law (judgments of 4 May 1999, Sürül, C‑262/96, EU:C:1999:228, paragraph 95, and of 9 April 2024, Profi Credit Polska (Reopening of proceedings concluded with a final judicial decision), C‑582/21, EU:C:2024:282, paragraphs 31 and 54).

37 Moreover, and in any event, the first question referred in Case C‑7/25 and the first question referred in Case C‑8/25 concern the interpretation of Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95, and such an interpretation is independent of the question of the correct interpretation of national law and practice.

38 For the purposes of interpreting that provision, it is appropriate, according to settled case-law, to consider its wording, the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 91).

39 As regards, in the first place, the wording of Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95, that provision stipulates that, where Member States apply the principle that it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate his or her application, and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects do not need confirmation when certain conditions are met. Those cumulative conditions relate to the fact, that the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time; that he or she has made a genuine effort to substantiate his or her application; that he or she has submitted all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal; that he or she has given a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements; that the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible; that those statements do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case; and that the general credibility of the applicant has been established.

40 In that regard, it must be noted, first of all, that the wording of that provision merely refers to documentary or other evidence without in any way requiring that the applicant’s statements be supported by authentic and objectively verifiable documents or other objective sources.

41 Next, that provision does not state that the Member State authorities may deem that the applicant’s statements are not credible and reject his or her application for international protection on the sole ground that the conditions laid down in that provision are not satisfied.

42 On the contrary, it follows from that provision that, when certain aspects of the statements of an applicant for international protection are not substantiated by documentary or other evidence, those aspects may be taken into account only if the cumulative conditions laid down in Article 4(5)(a) to (e) of Directive 2011/95 are met (judgment of 4 October 2018, Fathi, C‑56/17, EU:C:2018:803, paragraph 86).

43 Lastly, the Court has already held that, where the cumulative conditions set out in Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95 are not met and the applicant’s statements require confirmation, it may be for the Member State concerned to cooperate with that applicant in order to enable all the elements capable of substantiating the application for asylum to be assembled (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 29 June 2023, International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others (Attack in Pakistan), C‑756/21, EU:C:2023:523, paragraph 94).

44 As regards, in the second place, the context of Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95, first, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 4(1) of that directive, Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In such a situation, it is the duty of the Member State authorities to assess, in cooperation with the applicant, the relevant elements of the application.

45 The Court has already defined the scope of cooperation between Member State authorities and applicants for international protection.

46 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the assessment of the facts and circumstances under Article 4 of Directive 2011/95 takes place in two separate stages. The first stage concerns the establishment of factual circumstances which may constitute evidence that supports the application, while the second stage relates to the legal appraisal of that evidence, which entails deciding whether, in the light of the specific facts of a given case, the substantive conditions for the grant of international protection are satisfied. It is at the stage of determining the relevant elements that the Member State concerned must cooperate with the applicant, in accordance with Article 4(1) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraphs 64 and 65, and of 2 December 2014, A. and Others, C‑148/13 to C‑150/13, EU:C:2014:2406, paragraphs 55 and 56).

47 It thus follows from the case-law that, if, for any reason whatsoever, the elements provided by an applicant for international protection are not complete, up to date or relevant, it is necessary for those authorities to cooperate actively with the applicant, at that stage of the procedure, so that all the elements needed to substantiate the application may be assembled (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraphs 65 and 66). The objective of that cooperation therefore is to determine and supplement the relevant elements of the application (judgment of 11 June 2024, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Women identifying with the value of gender equality), C‑646/21, EU:C:2024:487, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

48 The Court has also ruled that the statements made by an applicant for international protection are merely the starting point in the process of assessment of the facts and circumstances carried out by the competent authorities, which are often better placed than the applicant to gain access to certain types of documents (judgment of 11 June 2024, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Women identifying with the value of gender equality), C‑646/21, EU:C:2024:487, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). Indeed, applicants for international protection may find themselves in a difficult situation as regards evidence and may be unable to provide certain elements capable of substantiating their applications for international protection.

49 As a result, it would be contrary to Article 4 of Directive 2011/95 to take the view that it is necessarily for the applicant alone to submit all the elements substantiating the reasons for his or her application for international protection (judgment of 11 June 2024, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Women identifying with the value of gender equality), C‑646/21, EU:C:2024:487, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

50 Secondly, it should be emphasised that Article 4(2) of Directive 2011/95, which lists the elements and documents which an applicant may provide in order to substantiate his or her application for international protection, does not restrict the nature of those documents solely to authentic documents or those capable of objectively verifying the truthfulness of the elements put forward by such an applicant.

51 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, according to recital 10 of Directive 2013/32, Member States should, when implementing that directive, take into account the relevant guidelines drawn up by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which was replaced in 2022 by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA).

52 On page 69 of the document entitled ‘Evidence and credibility assessment in the context of the Common European Asylum System’ drawn up by the EUAA and dated 17 February 2023, that agency states that an applicant may provide every form of evidence capable of asserting, confirming, supporting or bearing on relevant facts. That evidence thus may be verbal or documentary, including written, graphic, digital and visual materials, and may also encompass exhibits such as physical objects and bodily scarring, as well as audio and visual recordings.

53 In that context, the Court has already held that any document submitted by the applicant in support of his or her application for international protection must be regarded as an element of that application to be taken into account, in accordance with Article 4(1) of that directive, and that, consequently, the inability to authenticate that document or the absence of any objectively verifiable source cannot, in itself, justify the exclusion of such a document from the examination which the determining authority is required to carry out in order to examine an application for international protection (judgment of 10 June 2021, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (New elements or findings), C‑921/19, EU:C:2021:478, paragraph 44). On the contrary, it follows from the case-law that, in so far as a document constitutes evidence produced in support of the application, even if its authenticity cannot be established or its source cannot be objectively verified, the Member State concerned is required, in accordance with that provision, to assess that document in cooperation with the applicant (judgment of 10 June 2021, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (New elements or findings), C‑921/19, EU:C:2021:478, paragraph 61).

54 Thirdly, it should be borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 13 of Directive 2011/95, Member States are to grant refugee status to a third-country national or a stateless person who qualifies as a refugee in accordance with Chapters II and III of that directive, and they do not have any discretion in that respect (judgment of 18 June 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Effect of a decision granting refugee status), C‑753/22, EU:C:2024:524, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

55 In order to determine whether those requirements are satisfied, Member States must, in accordance with Article 4(3) of Directive 2011/95, undertake an individual assessment of each application for international protection, taking into account, inter alia, all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin of the applicant at the time of taking a decision on the application, the relevant statements and documentation presented by him or her as well as his or her individual position and personal circumstances (judgment of 18 June 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Effect of a decision granting refugee status), C‑753/22, EU:C:2024:524, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

56 Similarly, it follows, in essence, from Article 10(3) of Directive 2013/32 that applications for international protection must be examined individually, objectively and impartially in the light of precise and up-to-date information.

57 To interpret and apply Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95 as meaning that an application for international protection is rejected where the applicant’s statements are not substantiated by authentic and objectively verifiable documents or by objectives sources, and where not all of the conditions set out in that provision are met, precludes the individual examination of applications required by paragraph 3 of that provision and Article 10(3) of Directive 2013/32 from being carried out.

58 As regards, in the third place, the objectives of Directive 2011/95, it should be borne in mind that, as follows from recital 12 and Article 1 of that directive, the objective of that directive is, inter alia, to ensure that Member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection.

59 It is precisely by cooperating with applicants and by including in the assessment of the need for protection all the evidence and elements submitted in support of applications for international protection that Member State authorities are able to identify the persons genuinely in need of international protection.

60 In the light of all the foregoing reasons, the answer to the first question in Case C‑7/25 and the first question in Case C‑8/25 is that Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted as meaning that, first, the authority responsible for assessing an application for international protection must cooperate with the applicant and include in the assessment of the need for protection all the evidence and elements submitted in support of the application and, secondly, where the applicant sufficiently substantiates his or her statements with evidence or meets the conditions set out in that provision, that applicant’s statements do not require further confirmation and are deemed to be credible.

The second question in Case C‑7/25 and the second question in Case C‑8/25

61 By the second question in Case C‑7/25 and the second question in Case C‑8/25, the referring court asks whether Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a national court of first instance called upon to review the lawfulness of a decision rejecting an application for international protection is obliged to carry out of its own motion, if necessary, a full and ex nunc examination of both the factual and legal grounds, including an examination of the need for international protection in accordance with Directive 2011/95, on the basis of the elements of the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings.

62 According to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgments of 29 November 1978, Redmond, 83/78, EU:C:1978:214, paragraph 26; of 28 November 2000, Roquette Frères, C‑88/99, EU:C:2000:652, paragraph 18; and of 23 April 2026, Laboratoires Eurogenerics and Theramex France, C‑118/24, EU:C:2026:330, paragraph 39). For that purpose, the Court may also find it necessary to consider provisions of EU law which the national court has not referred to in its questions (judgments of 20 March 1986, Tissier, 35/85, EU:C:1986:143, paragraph 9, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 44).

63 In the present case, it should be noted that, in the orders for reference, the referring court expressly stated that, by those questions, it seeks to determine whether a national court of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection must, in its assessment of the legality of such a decision, review, if necessary of its own motion, compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, the referring court has stated that if it were to restrict its assessment of the legality of the Minister’s decisions issued to K and P to the facts and circumstances expressly relied on in the grounds of their respective appeals, it would be unable to review those decisions or to carry out a full and ex nunc assessment of the risk of refoulement.

64 In that regard, it should also be noted that Article 19(2) of the Charter prohibits, in particular, removal to a State where there is a serious risk that the person concerned would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

65 In those circumstances, it must be held that, by the second question in Case C‑7/25 and the second question in Case C‑8/25, the referring court seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, and Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted, respectively, as meaning that a national court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is required to carry out, if necessary of its own motion, first, a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive 2011/95, and secondly, a review of any breach of the principle of non-refoulement, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings.

66 In the first place, Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 guarantees applicants for international protection a right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against decisions taken on their application for international protection. Article 46(3) of that directive defines the scope of that right by specifying that Member States bound by that directive must ensure that the court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested carries out ‘a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive [2011/95]’ (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 106, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 76).

67 As regards the scope of that right, the Court has held that the words ‘shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law’, which are used in that provision, must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are required, by virtue of that provision, to order their national law in such a way that the processing of the actions referred to includes an examination, by the court or tribunal, of all the facts and points of law necessary in order to make an up-to-date assessment of the case at hand (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 110, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 81).

68 In that regard, the Court has explained that the expression ‘ex nunc’ points to the court or tribunal’s obligation to make an assessment that takes into account, should the need arise, new evidence that has come to light after the adoption of the decision which is being challenged (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 111, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 82).

69 Such an assessment makes it possible to deal with the application for international protection exhaustively without there being any need to refer the case back to the determining authority (judgment of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 112).

70 Furthermore, the Court has stated that the adjective ‘full’ used in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 confirms that the court or tribunal is required to examine both the evidence which the determining authority took into account, or should have taken into account, and that which has arisen following the adoption of the decision by that authority (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 113, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 83).

71 Lastly, it follows from the Court’s case-law that, in order to ensure the effectiveness of an appeal against a decision concerning an application for international protection, the national court or tribunal must, in addition to the arguments expressly relied upon by the applicant for international protection, carry out that full and ex nunc review on the basis of the material in the file and that brought to its attention in the course of the proceedings before it (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraphs 94 and 98, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 66).

72 Thus, it follows from Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 that applicants for international protection must have the right to an effective remedy against decisions rejecting applications for international protection, with the result that those decisions are not subject to judicial review unless the applicants bring an appeal to challenge those decisions.

73 However, if an applicant for international protection brings an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection, the effectiveness of such a remedy is subject to compliance with the requirements set out in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32.

74 Accordingly, where an appeal is brought before a national court or tribunal of first instance against a decision rejecting an application for international protection, it is required, regardless of the arguments and grounds expressly put forward in support of that appeal, to carry out the full and ex nunc examination dictated by that provision and, where appropriate, to assess the applicant’s international protection needs.

75 Consequently, as follows from the Court’s case-law referred to in paragraphs 67 to 71 above, in order to carry out such a full and ex nunc examination of both the facts and points of law, including an examination of the international protection needs under Directive 2011/95, a national court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection must not confine itself to the arguments and grounds expressly relied upon by the applicant for international protection.

76 Rather, in order to carry out an up-to-date assessment of the individual case and of the applicant’s international protection needs, taking into account, where appropriate, both the elements which the determining authority took into account or should have taken into account and the elements which have arisen since that authority adopted its decision, that national court or tribunal must necessarily rule on the basis of the material in the file which was brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings, and identify, on the basis of all that information, the elements of fact or points of law needed for its assessment.

77 In the second place, as regards the referring court’s doubts in relation to the review of compliance with the principle of non-refoulement, it must be emphasised that, by the decisions issued to K and to P, the legality of which that court is required to assess, the Minister rejects their applications for international protection as unfounded and, furthermore, imposes on them an obligation to return.

78 Although EU law does not preclude that a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of Directive 2008/115 is adopted at the same time as the decision rejecting the application for international protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2018, Gnandi, C‑181/16, EU:C:2018:465, paragraph 60), the fact remains that they are two separate decisions which are governed by different legal rules.

79 Consequently, the rejection of the application for international protection cannot be regarded as implying the adoption of a position on the separate question of whether that applicant for international protection may be removed to his or her country of origin. In addition, the consequences, for that applicant, a third-country national, or for the community of the Member State in which that third-country national is present, of that national’s potential return to his or her country of origin are to be taken into account not when the decision to reject the application for international protection is adopted but when a return decision is issued against that third-country national (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 July 2023, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl (Refugee who has committed a serious crime), C‑663/21, EU:C:2023:540, paragraphs 41 and 42 and the case-law cited).

80 In order to determine whether a national court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is required to carry out, if necessary of its own motion, a review of any breach of the principle of non-refoulement, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings, it should be noted that the effective remedy provided for in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 relates exclusively to decisions concerning applications for international protection, decisions refusing to reopen the examination of an application after that examination has been concluded, and decisions withdrawing international protection, and not decisions imposing an obligation to return.

81 As regards the latter decisions, it must be borne in mind that Article 19(2) of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 4 thereof, prohibits in absolute terms, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned, removal, expulsion or extradition to a State where there is a serious risk of that person being subjected to the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Therefore, Member States may not remove, expel or extradite a foreign national where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she will face a genuine risk, in the country of destination, of being subjected to treatment prohibited by those two provisions of the Charter. That prohibition reflects one of the fundamental values of the European Union and its Member States, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and its absolute nature is closely linked to respect for human dignity referred to in Article 2 TEU and Article 1 of the Charter (judgment of 17 October 2024, Ararat, C‑156/23, EU:C:2024:892, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

82 The Court has already held, with regard to Directive 2008/115, that, where there are substantial grounds for believing that an illegally staying third-country national will face a genuine risk, in the country of destination, of being subjected to treatment prohibited by those provisions of the Charter, that national cannot be the subject of a return decision while such a risk persists (judgment of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal –Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 58). Similarly, that national cannot be removed during that period, as is expressly provided for in Article 9(1)(a) of that directive (judgments of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 59, and of 4 September 2025, Adrar, C‑313/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:647, paragraphs 62 and 63).

83 The Court has also stated, in the context of that directive, that a national court which is requested to review the legality of an act whereby the competent national authority has rejected an application for a residence permit provided for by national law, and, in so doing, has brought to an end the suspension of the enforcement of a return decision previously adopted in the context of a procedure for international protection, must raise of its own motion any infringement of the principle of non-refoulement resulting from the enforcement of the latter decision, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings (judgment of 17 October 2024, Ararat, C‑156/23, EU:C:2024:892, paragraph 52).

84 The effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter and, as regards decisions relating to return, given specific expression in Article 13(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115, would be neither effective nor complete if the national court were not required to raise, in view of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings, and if necessary of its own motion, the failure to comply with the principle of non-refoulement which, as follows from paragraph 81 above, is of an absolute nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2024, Ararat, C‑156/23, EU:C:2024:892, paragraphs 49 and 50).

85 Lastly, the existence of that obligation on the national court to ensure, where necessary of its own motion, compliance with the principle of non-refoulement applies regardless of whether the decision imposing an obligation to return was adopted whilst the third-country national subject to that obligation had applied for international protection or had lodged an application for a residence permit provided for by national law alone (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2024, Ararat, C‑156/23, EU:C:2024:892, paragraph 51).

86 Given the absolute nature of the principle of non-refoulement and in order to ensure effective judicial protection, a national court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection, coupled with a decision imposing an obligation on the applicant to return, must verify of its own motion, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings, that the principle of non-refoulement does not preclude the applicant’s return.

87 Such a court or tribunal must carry out that verification of its own motion whenever there is a risk of a breach of the principle of non-refoulement should the applicant be returned.

88 It is true that Article 19(2) of the Charter prohibits the removal, expulsion or extradition of a person to a State only if there is a serious risk that that person would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment there. However, in order to ensure effective protection of the principle of non-refoulement, it is sufficient that the material in the file indicates a risk of a breach of that principle for the national court or tribunal hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection coupled with a decision imposing an obligation to return to be required to verify of its own motion whether there is a serious risk that that person will, if returned to that State, be subjected to the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

89 In the light of all the foregoing reasons, the answer to the second question in Case C‑7/25 and the second question in Case C‑8/25 is that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, and Article 4 and Article 19(2) thereof, must be interpreted, respectively, as meaning, first, that a national court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is required to carry out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including an examination of the international protection needs under Directive 2011/95, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented and clarified following adversarial proceedings, and to identify, on the basis of all that information, the elements of fact or points of law needed for its assessment and, secondly, where such a rejection decision is coupled with a decision imposing an obligation to return, such a court or tribunal is required to verify of its own motion, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented and clarified following adversarial proceedings, that the principle of non-refoulement does not preclude the return of the applicant for international protection.

Costs

90 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:

1. Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted,

must be interpreted as meaning that, first, the authority responsible for assessing an application for international protection must cooperate with the applicant and include in the assessment of the need for protection all the evidence and elements submitted in support of the application and, secondly, where the applicant sufficiently substantiates his or her statements with evidence or meets the conditions set out in that provision, that applicant’s statements do not require further confirmation and are deemed to be credible.

2. Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 4 and Article 19(2) thereof

must be interpreted as meaning, first, that a national court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is required to carry out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including an examination of the international protection needs under Directive 2011/95, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented and clarified following adversarial proceedings, and to identify, on the basis of all that information, the elements of fact or points of law needed for its assessment and, secondly, where such a rejection decision is coupled with a decision imposing an obligation to return, such a court or tribunal is required to verify of its own motion, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented and clarified following adversarial proceedings, that the principle of non-refoulement does not preclude the return of the applicant for international protection.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: Dutch.

i The names of the present cases are fictitious names. They do not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.