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62025CC0539
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
CAMPOS SÁNCHEZ-BORDONA
delivered on 12 November 2026 (1)
Case C‑539/25 P
Aquind Ltd
v
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)
1 By this appeal, Aquind Ltd is challenging the judgment of the General Court of 11 June 2025, Aquind v ACER. (2)
2 In the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action for compensation brought by Aquind against the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).
3 Before the General Court, Aquind sought compensation for the (alleged) damage suffered as a result of acts and omissions on the part of ACER in connection with the financing of an interconnection project (3) that would link the electricity transmission grids of the United Kingdom and France.
4 At the Court of Justice’s request, I shall confine my Opinion to the fifth of the seven grounds of appeal relied on in the appeal. That ground concerns the ‘level of risk attached to the investment’, referred to in Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. (4)
5 An examination of that ground of appeal will determine the conditions under which the national regulatory authorities (‘the NRAs’) or ACER may grant or refuse an exemption allowing a proposed trans-European electricity interconnector of common interest in the European Union to be financed under an exceptional financing regime rather than under the general regime provided for in Regulation (EU) No 347/2013. (5)
I. Legal framework
A. Regulation No 714/2009
6 Article 17 (‘New interconnectors’) provides:
‘1. New direct current interconnectors may, upon request, be exempted, for a limited period of time, from the provisions of Article 16(6) of this Regulation and Articles 9, 32 and Article 37(6) and (10) of Directive 2009/72/EC [ (6)] under the following conditions:
(a) the investment must enhance competition in electricity supply;
(b) the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment would not take place unless an exemption is granted;
…
4. The decision on the exemption under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be taken on a case-by-case basis by the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned. An exemption may cover all or part of the capacity of the new interconnector, or of the existing interconnector with significantly increased capacity.
…
Where all the regulatory authorities concerned have reached agreement on the exemption decision within six months, they shall inform the Agency of that decision.
…
5. The decision referred to in paragraph 4 shall be taken by the Agency:
(a) where all the regulatory authorities concerned have not been able to reach an agreement within six months from the date the exemption was requested before the last of those regulatory authorities; or
(b) upon a joint request from the regulatory authorities concerned.
Before taking such a decision, the Agency shall consult the regulatory authorities concerned and the applicants.
…’
B. The TEN-E Regulation
7 Article 12 (‘Enabling investments with cross-border impacts’) reads:
‘1. The efficiently incurred investment costs, which excludes maintenance costs, related to a project of common interest falling under the categories set out in Annex II.1(a), (b) and (d) and Annex II.2 shall be borne by the relevant transmission system operator [TSO] or the project promoters of the transmission infrastructure of the Member States to which the project provides a net positive impact, and, to the extent not covered by congestion rents or other charges, be paid for by network users through tariffs for network access in that or those Member States.
2. For a project of common interest falling under the categories set out in Annex II.1(a), (b) and (d) and Annex II.2, paragraph 1 shall apply only if at least one project promoter requests the relevant national authorities to apply this Article for all or parts of the costs of the project. For a project of common interest falling under the categories set out in Annex II.2, paragraph 1 shall apply only where an assessment of market demand has already been carried out and indicated that the efficiently incurred investment costs cannot be expected to be covered by the tariffs.
…
3. For a project of common interest to which paragraph 1 applies, the project promoters shall keep all concerned national regulatory authorities regularly informed, at least once per year, and until the project is commissioned, of the progress of that project and the identification of costs and impacts associated with it.
As soon as such a project has reached sufficient maturity, the project promoters, after having consulted the TSOs from the Member States to which the project provides a significant net positive impact, shall submit an investment request. That investment request shall include a request for a cross-border cost allocation and shall be submitted to all the national regulatory authorities concerned, accompanied by the following:
(a) a project-specific cost-benefit analysis consistent with the methodology drawn up pursuant to Article 11 and taking into account benefits beyond the borders of the Member State concerned;
(b) a business plan evaluating the financial viability of the project, including the chosen financing solution, and, for a project of common interest falling under the category referred to in Annex II.2, the results of market testing; and
(c) if the project promoters agree, a substantiated proposal for a cross-border cost allocation.
…
4. Within six months of the date on which the last investment request was received by the national regulatory authorities concerned, the national regulatory authorities shall, after consulting the project promoters concerned, take coordinated decisions on the allocation of investment costs to be borne by each system operator for the project, as well as their inclusion in tariffs. The national regulatory authorities may decide to allocate only part of the costs, or may decide to allocate costs among a package of several projects of common interest.
…
5. National regulatory authorities shall, based on the cross-border cost allocation as referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, take into account actual costs incurred by a TSO or other project promoter as a result of the investments when fixing or approving tariffs in accordance with Article 37(1)(a) of Directive [2009/72] and Article 41(1)(a) of Directive 2009/73/EC, [(7)] in so far as these costs correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable operator.
The cost allocation decision shall be notified, without delay, by the national regulatory authorities to the Agency, together with all the relevant information with respect to the decision. …
…
The cost allocation decision shall be published.
6. Where the national regulatory authorities concerned have not reached an agreement on the investment request within six months of the date on which the request was received by the last of the national regulatory authorities concerned, they shall inform the Agency without delay.
In this case or upon a joint request from the national regulatory authorities concerned, the decision on the investment request including cross-border cost allocation referred to in paragraph 3 as well as the way the cost of the investments are reflected in the tariffs shall be taken by the Agency within three months of the date of referral to the Agency.
…’
II. Background to the dispute
8 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 29 of the judgment under appeal. It is as follows:
– Aquind, a private limited company incorporated in the United Kingdom, promoted the Aquind interconnector project to connect the electricity transmission grids of the United Kingdom and France.
– On 17 May 2017, Aquind submitted a request for an exemption for the project to the French and United Kingdom NRAs under Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009. Those two NRAs, having failed to reach agreement, forwarded the exemption request to ACER for a decision on the matter.
– On 23 November 2017, the Aquind interconnector project became an EU project of common interest.
– On 19 June 2018, ACER, by Decision No 05/2018, rejected the request for an exemption because the condition that the level of risk attached to the investment must be such that the investment would not take place without an exemption (Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009) had not been fulfilled.
– On 17 August 2018, Aquind brought an appeal against ACER’s Decision No 05/2018 of 19 June 2018 before the Board of Appeal of ACER itself.
– On 17 October 2018, the Board of Appeal, by Decision A-001-2018, dismissed Aquind’s appeal and upheld ACER’s Decision No 05/2018 of 19 June 2018.
– On 14 December 2018, Aquind brought an action for annulment (T‑735/18) before the General Court against the Board of Appeal’s decision of 17 October 2018.
– On 23 August 2019 and 4 September 2019, Aquind submitted an investment request to the United Kingdom and French NRAs, together with a request for cross-border cost allocation.
– On 31 October 2019, the European Commission adopted Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/389, (8) the list of EU projects of common interest contained in which no longer included the Aquind interconnection.
– On 25 December 2019, Aquind requested, for the first time, that the General Court annul Delegated Regulation 2020/389 (Case T‑885/19). (9)
– On 15 April 2020, the French and United Kingdom NRAs informed Aquind that its request for cross-border cost allocation had been suspended owing to the entry into force of Delegated Regulation 2020/389.
– On 11 May 2020, Aquind asked ACER whether it would be able to reconsider its Decision No 05/2018 in the light of the fact that the Aquind interconnector project had ceased to be an EU project of common interest.
– On 21 May 2020, Aquind brought before the General Court a second action for annulment of Delegated Regulation 2020/389 (Case T‑295/20). (10)
– On 29 May 2020, the ACER departments stated that they could not see how they could review the decision of 19 June 2018 and replace it with a decision approving the exemption.
– On 29 May and 2 June 2020 respectively, Aquind submitted new requests for an exemption for the Aquind interconnector to the French and United Kingdom NRAs. (11)
– By judgment of 18 November 2020, Aquind v ACER, (12) the General Court annulled the Board of Appeal’s decision of 17 October 2018.
– On 27 January 2021, ACER lodged an appeal against the judgment of the General Court of 18 November 2020, Aquind v ACER (T‑735/18, EU:T:2020:542).
– On 4 June 2021, the Board of Appeal concluded the procedure reopened following the annulment of its decision of 17 October 2018. (13)
– The Board of Appeal’s action for annulment of 4 June 2021 was dismissed by the judgment of the General Court of 15 February 2023, Aquind and Others v ACER, (14) against which no appeal was lodged.
– By judgment of 9 March 2023, ACER v Aquind, (15) the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal lodged by ACER against the judgment of the General Court of 18 November 2020, Aquind v ACER (T‑735/18, EU:T:2020:542).
III. Action before the General Court
9 On 16 June 2023, Aquind brought before the General Court an action, based on Article 268 TFEU, seeking compensation for the damage which it claimed to have suffered as a consequence of a number of unlawful acts and omissions on the part of ACER. In particular, it claimed that the General Court should order ACER to pay it:
– 1 258 614.29 British pounds (GBP) (EUR 1 453 220) and EUR 19 850 by way of compensation for the wasted costs alleged to have been incurred in connection with the unlawful rejection of the request for exemption submitted on 17 May 2017 and the procedure leading to the Board of Appeal’s decision, including the irrecoverable costs of the procedures before the General Court and the Court of Justice;
– GBP 220 711.83 (EUR 245 896) by way of compensation for the wasted costs alleged to have been incurred as a result of the reopening of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, including the irrecoverable costs of the procedures before the General Court and the Court of Justice;
– GBP 1 069 968.66 (EUR 1 236 027) and EUR 133 875 by way of compensation for the wasted costs connected with the request for cross-border cost allocation;
– GBP 861 525.62 (EUR 994 889) and EUR 149 175 by way of compensation for the wasted costs connected with the request for exemption submitted on 29 May and 2 June 2020 and with the request for application of the ‘cap and floor’ regime submitted on 5 June 2020;
– GBP 771 897.57 (EUR 891 378) and EUR 241 750.03 by way of the costs of regulatory engagement;
– GBP 130 431 000 (EUR 150 634 761) per year by way of loss of profit from transmission services resulting from the delay in obtaining an exemption;
– GBP 65 295 000 (EUR 75 390 912) per year by way of loss of profit from capacity markets and up to GBP 30 447 000 (EUR 35 148 016) per year by way of loss of profit from ancillary services and fibre optic leasing.
IV. The judgment under appeal
10 In the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed Aquind’s action because that company had failed to show that ACER had taken any action capable of giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union.
11 In paragraphs 85 to 97 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court considered ‘[Aquind’s] complaint alleging the erroneous application of Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 owing to the failure to take into account the restrictions under French law’.
12 The General Court’s reasoning in that regard was, in essence, as follows:
– A possible restriction under national law does not amount to a risk such as that referred to in Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 which the Board of Appeal should have taken into account when examining the exemption request.
– Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 refers only to risks related to the application of Article 16(6) of Regulation No 714/2009, and Articles 9 and 32 and Article 37(6) and (10) of Directive 2009/72.
– The only risks to be taken into account are those necessarily related to the constraints associated with the application of the obligations laid down in the provisions of the regulated regime, namely: the obligation (Article 16(6) of Regulation No 714/2009) to use the revenues resulting from congestion management for interconnection purposes; the obligation to separate network management from generation and supply activities in accordance with Article 9 of Directive 2009/72; and the obligation to establish a system of third-party access to networks and the tariff transparency obligations laid down in Articles 32 and 37 of Directive 2009/72.
– As the Board of Appeal held in its decision of 17 October 2018, an interpretation of the concept of ‘risk attached to the investment’ as referring also to any restrictions under national law would lead to situations in which exemptions from the regulated regime would be granted merely as a result of situations created by the Member States themselves.
– There could not, therefore, be said to be a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law such as to require ACER to pay compensation.
13 On 8 August 2025, Aquind brought the present appeal.
V. Appeal. Forms of order sought
14 Aquind claims that the Court of Justice should:
– Examine the grounds Aquind has raised against the judgment under appeal;
– Set aside the judgment under appeal;
– Refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;
– Order ACER to pay the costs.
15 ACER contends that the Court of Justice should:
– Dismiss the appeal in its entirety;
– Order Aquind to pay the costs.
VI. Fifth ground of appeal: ‘risk attached to the investment’ under Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009
A. Preliminary considerations
16 The legal debate prompted by the fifth ground of appeal can be traced back to the judgment of the General Court of 18 November 2020, Aquind v ACER, (16) which examined the fourth plea in law in support of annulment raised by Aquind against the decision of the ACER Board of Appeal of 17 October 2018.
17 As I stated previously in my Opinion in the appeal in Case C‑46/21 P, (17) there was no need for the General Court to analyse the fourth plea in law in support of annulment, once it had upheld the first plea, which rendered the decision of the Board of Appeal of 17 October 2018 invalid.
18 Thus, the General Court did not stop at the latter finding of invalidity but set out further considerations which, in my view, were more than a mere obiter dictum and were not in accordance with the law on the relationship between Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009 and the general financing regime contained in Article 12 of the TEN-E Regulation. (18)
19 For its part, the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 9 March 2023, ACER v Aquind (C‑46/21 P, EU:C:2023:182), confined itself to confirming the judgment of the General Court with regard to the latter’s finding on the intensity of the review undertaken by the ACER Board of Appeal.
20 The dismissal of the appeal in Case C‑46/21 P had the consequence of confirming the annulment of the ACER Board of Appeal’s decision of 17 October 2018, which the General Court had annulled by judgment of 18 November 2020, Aquind v ACER (T‑735/18, EU:T:2020:542).
21 The fifth ground in the present appeal derives specifically from the interpretation given by the General Court of Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009, which was not ‘neutralised’ by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 9 March 2023.
22 The judgment under appeal states, in essence, that the alleged infringement of Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009 could not be classified as a sufficiently serious infringement of a provision of EU law. (19)
B. Financing of electricity interconnections
23 In order to determine whether the General Court’s interpretation of Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 contains any error of law, it is first necessary to look at the relationship between that provision and Article 12 of the TEN-E Regulation. (20)
24 Electricity interconnectors are an essential component of the infrastructure needed to develop the European electricity market, (21) since they link national grids, thereby enhancing the security of electricity supply and preventing the isolation of individual markets. They are large-scale, technologically complex projects that require significant investment and take several years to complete.
25 During the planning phase of the Aquind interconnector project, financing for the project could be arranged:
– Through the general regime applicable to EU projects of common interest (including the Aquind interconnector);
– Through the exemption regime under Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009.
26 In principle, promotors of an electricity interconnector project classified as being an EU project of common interest were required, in order to make the project financially viable, to proceed under the general regime laid down in the TEN-E Regulation, principally in Article 12 thereof.
27 If they were unable to obtain support through cost-border cost allocation, promotors could seek to demonstrate that their project involved a level of risk such as to justify the exemption provided for in Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009.
28 Promotors therefore had no right to choose under which of the two regimes to progress their project: they were required to proceed first under the general regime and then, if significant risks linked to the investment remained, under the exemption regime laid down in Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009.
29 The priority status enjoyed by the general regime for the financing of interconnectors is explained by the fact that that regime is based on a cross-border allocation of investment costs. Such costs are borne by the transmission system operators participating in the project and by electricity consumers through the tariffs they pay. The general regime does not provide for any exemptions from the application of the rules governing competition on the internal electricity market.
30 The exemption regime under Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009, on the other hand, entails a temporary derogation from the principles governing the use of revenues, the unbundling of transmission networks and transmission system operators, and third-party access to transmission and distribution systems, all of which factors are key to the liberalisation of the EU electricity market.
31 ACER analysed (22) whether the developer of the Aquind interconnection might have obtained financial support through the general regime as a factor in assessing the risk and deciding whether to grant or refuse the exemption. (23) The ACER Board of Appeal confirmed (rightly, in my view) that that analysis was in accordance with Article 17(1) of Regulation No 714/2009.
32 For its part, the General Court, in the judgment of 18 November 2020, took the view (wrongly and unnecessarily, to my mind) that ACER had added a new condition to those laid down in Article 17(1) of Regulation No 714/2009 for granting the exemption. (24)
33 Its analysis of the ‘level of risk attached to the investment’ under Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 compelled ACER to assess whether the risk attached to the project could have been reduced by recourse to other means of financing available generally and in preference to the grant of an exemption. Exemption is a solution of ‘last resort’, given its adverse impact on the liberalisation of the common market in electricity.
C. Arguments of the parties on appeal
34 In its fifth ground of appeal, Aquind submits that the General Court erred in law in adopting an unduly restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘risk’ as referred to in Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009.
35 Aquind devotes five paragraphs of its appeal (paragraphs 47 to 51) to setting out in detail the arguments in support of its position. It argues, in turn, that:
– The interpretation adopted by the General Court in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal (25) is illogical. The monopoly rights held by the French transmission system operator (RTE) ‘self-evidently’ restrict the free use of revenues (paragraph 47 of the appeal).
– The assertion contained in paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal (26) is patently wrong: the special monopoly status of RTE under French law, or the obligation to operate an interconnector together with RTE flowing from the relevant provisions in the French Energy Code, ‘self-evidently’ relates to ownership restrictions that are the subject of Article 9 (27) (paragraph 48 of the appeal).
– ‘There does not appear to be any reasoning’ by the General Court as to why restrictions on third-party access and tariff transparency are unrelated to the French legal restrictions, simply a statement to that effect. In fact, the third-party-access exemption and the condition of the tariff transparency are essential parts of the requested exemption that would enable the development of the project, while ensuring that the project operates in a transparent manner (paragraph 49 of the appeal).
– Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 refers to ‘the level of risk attached to the investment’, not ‘the risk that compliance with the obligations and conditions from which exemption is granted would create’. The General Court ‘is reading into that provision words that are not there and ignoring the words that are there’ (paragraph 50 of the appeal).
– If the General Court’s approach were correct, all the other conditions of Article 17(1) would have to be read as relating to the conditions and obligations from which exemption is sought. Those other provisions will often be unrelated to matters such as the French legal restrictions and that would make exemptions impossible to secure in practice (paragraph 51 of the appeal).
36 ACER is of the view that this ground of appeal should be rejected.
D. Assessment
37 The analysis of this ground of appeal must take into account the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
38 In accordance with those provisions, the appeal must indicate precisely the contested paragraphs of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. Failing this, the appeal in its entirety or the ground of appeal concerned will be inadmissible.
39 A ground of appeal supported by an argument that is not sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court of Justice to exercise its powers of judicial review does not satisfy that requirement (and must be declared inadmissible). This will be the case if the essential elements on which the ground of appeal relies are not indicated sufficiently coherently and intelligibly, but are worded in a vague and ambiguous manner. (28)
40 Some of the arguments under the fifth ground of appeal, which I have just presented, are couched in ambiguous terms and do not meet the standard of intelligibility required to support an appeal. They do not therefore pass the admissibility test as articulated in the case-law referred to in the preceding point.
41 This is true in particular of paragraphs 49, 50 and 51 of the appeal. Aquind does not indicate precisely the error of law which the General Court is said to have committed or identify the provision it is alleged to have infringed. The content of those paragraphs, moreover, is predicated on premisses which are described as ‘self-evident’ without actually being so.
42 As regards paragraphs 47 and 48 of the appeal (which do specify the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which are being challenged), Aquind accuses the General Court of misinterpreting Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009.
43 The General Court states, as I have already indicated, that a possible restriction under national law does not amount to a risk such as that referred to in Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 which the Board of Appeal should have taken into account when examining the exemption request.
44 Notwithstanding that initial finding, the General Court then goes on to analyse whether the RTE regime under French law is linked to the investment-related risks provided for in Article 16(6) of Regulation No 714/2009 and in Articles 9 and 32 and Article 37(6) and (10) of Directive 2009/72. On the basis of its analysis, it reaches a negative conclusion, inasmuch as, in its view:
– The legal restrictions laid down in French law (which would prevent the promotor from having access to the development of interconnectors because of the monopoly held by RTE) do not concern the situation in which the promotor would be prevented from using as it sees fit the congestion-management revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection. (29)
– Those legal restrictions are unrelated to the risk which might result from the mandatory obligations attached to the separation of company assets, as resulting from Article 9 of Directive 2009/72. (30) The exemption provided for in Article 17(1) of Regulation No 714/2009 would therefore be necessary in order not to compromise the undertaking’s investment strategy.
45 In the view of the General Court (paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal), the risks to be taken into account when granting an exemption under Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009 are those necessarily related to the constraints associated with the application of the obligations laid down in the provisions of the regulated regime (in Article 16(6) of Regulation No 714/2009 and in Articles 9 and 32 and Article 37(6) and (10) of Directive 2009/72).
46 I concur with the line of reasoning thus followed by the General Court and do not consider the judgment under appeal to contain any error of law.
47 According to Aquind, the General Court recognised that ACER had not given adequate reasons for its refusal to take into consideration the fact that, under French law, a private interconnection could operate only on the basis of an exemption, on account of the monopoly held by RTE.
48 That assertion, however, is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal. The General Court argued (paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal) that, even assuming that ACER could be criticised for failing to set out, to the requisite legal standard, the reasons for its decision on the restrictions laid down in French law, such a defect could not amount, as such, to a fault so as to incur ACER’s liability. A breach of the obligation to state reasons is not, in itself, sufficient for the European Union to incur liability.
49 As to the substance of the case, I agree with the General Court that the restrictions laid down in French law cannot give rise to a ‘risk attached to the investment’ as provided for in Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009. There are several reasons for this.
50 In the first place, there must be a clear and direct link between the relevant risks under Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 and the exemptions from the specific obligations laid down in the regulated regime. If that were not the case, Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 would give rise to the grant of an exemption based on obligations bearing no relevance to the risks warranting that exemption, as the General Court rightly held. (31)
51 In the second place, the objective of Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 is not to remove legal barriers and restrictions affecting the generation, transmission and supply of electricity, but to address the market-related or financial risks that may arise in connection with a project to construct an interconnector.
52 Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009 must be interpreted in its context and in the light of its ratio legis. The fact that the French legislation prevents Aquind from accessing the French market is not one of the issues connected with the exemption mechanism.
53 Using the exemption mechanism to circumvent those national restrictions would distort the EU legislature’s intention and the purpose of that mechanism. Furthermore, it would undermine the ‘risk’ criterion and replace it with a system different from that laid down in Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009.
54 In the third place, an interpretation of the concept of ‘risk attached to the investment’ as referring to any restriction laid down in national law, would mean that exemptions from the regulated regime would be contingent upon situations created by the Member States themselves. The uniform application of the exemption regime provided for in Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009 would thus be compromised, inasmuch as Member States would have control over the risk-generating situations justifying recourse to the exceptional financing regime.
55 As the Board of Appeal noted, (32) a barrier arising from national law can hardly be equated with a ‘risk’, that is to say, with the probability that an event will happen. Rather, national law constitutes a certainty which determines whether an event will or will not happen. In adopting the exemption mechanism under Article 17 of Regulation No 714/2009, the EU legislature did not, as I have already said, intend it to be used in order to circumvent the restrictions laid down in the national rules.
56 In short, it is my view that the fifth ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
VII. Costs
57 As my Opinion is confined to the fifth ground of appeal, there is no need for me to comment on the costs of the appeal.
VIII. Conclusion
58 In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court reject the fifth ground of appeal as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
1 Original language: Spanish.
2 T‑342/23, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2025:581.
3 ‘The Aquind interconnector’ or ‘the Aquind interconnection’.
4 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 15).
5 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 (OJ 2013 L 115, p. 39). ‘The TEN-E Regulation’.
6 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55).
7 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 94).
8 Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the Union list of projects of common interest (OJ 2020 L 74, p. 1).
9 By order of 5 March 2021, Aquind and Others v Commission (T‑885/19, EU:T:2021:118), the General Court held that first action to be inadmissible. That order would be confirmed on appeal by judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 August 2022, Aquind and Others v Commission (C‑310/21 P, EU:C:2022:615).
10 In the judgment of 8 February 2023, Aquind and Others v Commission (T‑295/20, EU:T:2023:52), the General Court dismissed the second action against Delegated Regulation 2020/389. No appeal having been lodged against it, that judgment became final.
11 On 28 January 2021, the French and United Kingdom NRAs announced that they were closing the public consultation on Aquind’s request for an exemption on account of the departure of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union.
12 Judgment in Case T‑735/18, EU:T:2020:542. The General Court held that the Board of Appeal had erred in law in finding that, as regards the technical or complex assessments, it could carry out only a limited review and thus confine itself to ascertaining whether ACER had committed a manifest error of assessment. It made other findings, to which I shall refer later.
13 The Board of Appeal stated that it was not competent to decide on the appeal against ACER’s decision of 19 June 2018 and therefore dismissed it as inadmissible. It also maintained that, following the end of the transition period, EU law does not apply to future interconnections between the United Kingdom and a Member State.
14 T‑492/21, EU:T:2023:67.
15 C‑46/21 P, EU:C:2023:182.
16 In that judgment (T‑735/18, EU:T:2020:542, paragraph 91), the General Court held: ‘… for reasons related to the sound administration of justice, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the fourth plea, alleging misinterpretation of the relationship between Article 17(1) of Regulation No 714/2009 and Article 12 of [the TEN-E] Regulation …’. Emphasis added. The General Court found that, in having required the applicant to submit a cross-border cost allocation request in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation No 347/2013, the Board of Appeal had wrongly established an additional condition not laid down in Article 17(1) of Regulation No 714/2009.
17 Opinion in ACER v Aquind (C‑46/21 P, EU:C:2022:695).
18 Opinion in ACER v Aquind (C‑46/21 P, EU:C:2022:695), points 22 to 26.
19 The judgment under appeal, paragraphs 60 to 74.
20 I conducted a more exhaustive analysis of this issue, to which I refer, in my Opinion in ACER v Aquind (C‑46/21 P, EU:C:2022:695), points 92 to 106.
21 Judgment of 11 March 2020, Baltic Cable (C‑454/18, EU:C:2020:189, paragraph 57): ‘As is apparent from Article 1(a) of Regulation No 714/2009, that allocation of interconnection capacities is the subject of harmonised principles which must allow fair rules to be set for cross-border exchanges in electricity in order to enhance competition within the internal market for electricity. …’
22 ACER enjoys some discretion in this regard, as was recognised, in connection with equivalent exemptions relating to the gas market, in the judgment of 4 December 2019, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo v Commission (C‑342/18 P, EU:C:2019:1043, paragraph 48).
23 The Commission followed a similar line of reasoning in its Decision C(2011) 4509 of 27 June 2011 on the exemption of an underground gas storage facility in Dambořice, Czech Republic, from the internal market rules on third-party access, available at https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/8f5f9424-a7ef-4dbf-b914-1af1d12ff5d2/library/0e2819e8-c34c-4666-a9c5-172bbee92f41/details?open=true. That exemption was based on Article 36(1) of Directive 2009/73, applicable to the gas sector, which is similar to the exemption under Article 17(1)(b) of Regulation No 714/2009.
24 Judgment, Aquind v ACER (T‑735/18, EU:T:2020:542, paragraphs 101 and 102).
25 According to paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, ‘… the legal restrictions laid down in French law which would prevent the promotor from having access to the development of interconnectors because of the monopoly held by RTE do not concern the situation in which the promotor would be prevented from using the revenues as it sees fit’.
26 According to paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal, ‘the question of legal restrictions laid down in French law is unrelated to the risk which might result from the mandatory obligations attached to the separation of company assets.’
27 The appeal does not specify which Article 9 is meant. From the context, it must be Article 9 of Directive 2009/72.
28 Judgments of 16 July 2026, Timchenko v Council (C‑399/25 P, EU:C:2026:599, paragraph 44); of 18 December 2025, Hamoudi v Frontex, (C‑136/24 P, EU:C:2025:977, paragraphs 54 and 55); and of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraphs 99 and 100).
29 Any congestion-management revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection under Article 16(6) of Regulation No 714/2009 must be used in order to ensure the actual availability of the allocated capacity or to maintain or increase interconnection capacities through network investments, in particular in new interconnectors. Under that provision, interconnection operators must comply with obligations on the use of revenues in a specific manner and cannot therefore make free use of them.
30 Under Article 9 of Directive 2009/72, (i) each undertaking which owns a transmission system is to act as a transmission system operator, and (ii) the same person or persons are entitled neither: directly or indirectly to exercise control over an undertaking performing any of the functions of generation or supply; nor directly or indirectly to exercise control over a transmission system operator or over a transmission system, and must, inter alia, comply with the rules on voting rights, on the appointment of members of the supervisory board, the administrative board or bodies legally representing the undertaking, or on the holding of a majority share. Under that article, promotors must comply with all obligations connected with the separation of company assets likely to dissuade investors.
31 The judgment under appeal, paragraph 91.
32 Decision of 17 October 2018, paragraph 83.