Prehliadač alebo jeho nastavenia nie sú podporované.

Praktik.ai používa moderné webové technológie kvôli bezpečnosti, rýchlosti a spoľahlivému prihlasovaniu. Tento prehliadač ich nepodporuje alebo blokuje JavaScript, preto sa aplikácia nemusí správne načítať.

Aktualizujte prosím Chrome, Edge, Firefox alebo Safari na najnovšiu verziu a stránku potom obnovte.

Ak používate Windows 7, Windows 8 alebo Windows 8.1, Chrome a Edge už nemusia ponúkať novú verziu. V takom prípade použite novšie zariadenie alebo kontaktujte podporu Praktik.ai.

Prohlížeč nebo jeho nastavení nejsou podporované.

Praktik.ai používá moderní webové technologie kvůli bezpečnosti, rychlosti a spolehlivému přihlašování. Tento prohlížeč je nepodporuje nebo blokuje JavaScript, proto se aplikace nemusí správně načíst.

Aktualizujte prosím Chrome, Edge, Firefox nebo Safari na nejnovější verzi a stránku potom obnovte.

Pokud používáte Windows 7, Windows 8 nebo Windows 8.1, Chrome a Edge už nemusí nabízet novou verzi. V takovém případě použijte novější zařízení nebo kontaktujte podporu Praktik.ai.

Your browser or its settings are not supported.

Praktik.ai uses modern web technologies for security, speed, and reliable sign-in. This browser does not support them, or JavaScript is blocked, so the app may not load correctly.

Please update Chrome, Edge, Firefox, or Safari to the latest version and then reload this page.

If you use Windows 7, Windows 8, or Windows 8.1, Chrome and Edge may no longer offer a newer version. In that case, use a newer device or contact Praktik.ai support.

62025CC0362

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

ĆAPETA

delivered on 12 November 2026 (1)

Case C‑362/25 P

Rems Kargins

v

European Commission

I. Introduction

1 By his appeal, Mr Rems Kargins (‘the appellant’) requests that the Court of Justice set aside the judgment of 19 March 2025, Kargins v Commission (T‑350/23, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2025:312). Therein, the General Court dismissed the appellant’s action seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by the European Commission’s submission of written observations in national proceedings before the Augstākā tiesa (Supreme Court, Latvia).

2 The appellant considers that the Commission exceeded its powers when it provided observations pursuant to Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (2) (‘the State Aid Procedural Regulation’) in national proceedings relating to the application of Article 107(1) and Article 108 TFEU. The present case therefore invites the Court to interpret, for the first time, the cooperation mechanism laid down in that regulation.

II. Background to the present appeal

A. Factual background

3 The background to the present appeal is set out in paragraphs 2 to 16 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present analysis, what requires retelling is the following.

4 AS Parex banka was a bank in Latvia. It had two major shareholders. (3) The appellant is the successor in title to one of those shareholders. (4)

5 In 2008, AS Parex banka faced liquidity difficulties when the financial environment began to deteriorate, (5) in response to which the Republic of Latvia notified the Commission of a package of State aid measures. (6) Those measures included the restructuring of AS Parex banka. (7) That restructuring plan, as approved by the Commission, envisaged a split of AS Parex banka into a newly established ‘good’ bank, named AS Citadele banka, and a ‘bad’ bank, named Reverta, which kept the remaining non-core and non-performing assets of the former bank. (8)

6 The appellant’s deposit was among those assigned to Reverta and was thus subject to the burden-sharing requirements under the commitments entered into by the Republic of Latvia. Those commitments included the prevention of cash outflow to holders of legacy subordinated loans until all aid granted by that Member State was repaid in full. (9)

7 In 2012, the appellant brought proceedings before the Latvian courts seeking repayment of his deposit. The Rīgas apgabaltiesas Civillietu tiesu kolēģija (Regional Court, Riga (Division of Civil Cases), Latvia) ruled in his favour, a decision which was upheld on appeal by the Augstākās tiesas Civillietu tiesu palāta (Supreme Court (Civil Division), Latvia). (10)

8 By means of a letter dated 19 September 2016, the Finanšu ministrija (Ministry of Finance, Latvia) (‘the Latvian Ministry of Finance’) subsequently informed the Commission of the judgment of the Augstākās tiesas Civillietu tiesu palāta (Supreme Court (Civil Division)). It considered that those judgments potentially contradicted the Commission’s decisions approving the aid measures granted to AS Parex banka. In that letter, the Latvian Ministry of Finance also invited the Commission to intervene in the national proceedings under Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation. (11)

9 On 26 January 2017, the Commission submitted observations to the Augstākā tiesa (Supreme Court) in the context of the national proceedings in question. (12)

10 By judgment of 28 June 2018, that court set aside the judgment of the Augstākās tiesas Civillietu tiesu palāta (Supreme Court (Civil Division)) on the basis that that judgment, inter alia, failed to have regard to the commitments undertaken by the Republic of Latvia in the context of the restructuring of AS Parex banka. (13)

B. The judgment under appeal

11 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 26 June 2023, the appellant brought an action for damages against the Commission.

12 On 19 March 2025, the General Court handed down the judgment under appeal, dismissing the appellant’s action and ordering him to bear his own costs as well as to pay those incurred by the Commission.

C. Proceedings before the Court of Justice

13 By means of an appeal lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 29 May 2025, the appellant claims that the Court should annul the judgment under appeal; declare the Commission liable for the damage caused to him as a result of its interference in national judicial proceedings; order that institution to compensate him for such damage; determine ‘that the material damage is at least EUR 15 028 841.93 plus 12% interest per annum payable from 23 June 2016 until payment in full’; and order the Commission to pay his costs and the costs arising from the present appeal. Alternatively, should the Court not be in a position to rule on the substance, the appellant requests that it refer the case back to the General Court.

14 The Commission contends that the Court of Justice should dismiss the appeal in its entirety and order the appellant to pay the costs.

15 It is supported in that contention by the Council of the European Union.

16 No hearing was held.

III. Analysis

17 Pursuant to Article 108(1) TFEU, the Commission is under an obligation, in cooperation with the Member States, to keep all systems of existing aid under constant review. By virtue of the principle of sincere cooperation, the Commission and the national courts are required to actively (14) assist one another in order to ensure, inter alia, the implementation of that control system. (15)

18 That assistance may take various forms. (16)

19 One of those forms is reflected in Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation. (17) In the relevant part, that provision establishes a cooperation mechanism between the Commission and national courts pursuant to which, ‘where the coherent application of Article 107(1) or Article 108 TFEU so requires, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, may submit written observations to the courts of the Member States that are responsible for applying the State aid rules.’ (18)

20 The present appeal concerns the scope of that cooperation mechanism. The appellant, in essence, contends that the Commission acted outside the scope of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation – and, in doing so, engaged in a sufficiently serious infringement of EU law – when it provided observations in the national proceedings initiated by the appellant. (19) Those observations, the appellant claims, led to an unfavourable outcome for him, which caused him damage as a result.

21 The General Court dismissed that claim, finding, inter alia, that the Commission did not exceed the scope of its powers under Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation. The appellant’s appeal is based on two grounds.

22 The Court of Justice has asked me to provide my Opinion in relation to only the first and fourth parts of the appellant’s first ground of appeal. I shall address them in turn. (20)

A. The first part of the first ground of appeal

23 In the judgment under appeal, the General Court took the position that the Commission ‘acted on its own initiative’, within the meaning of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, when that institution provided observations in the proceedings before the Augstākā tiesa (Supreme Court). According to the General Court, the fact that the Latvian Ministry of Finance had informed the Commission of those proceedings and had invited that institution to intervene therein did not mean that the Commission was obliged to accept that invitation. (21)

24 By the first part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant challenges that finding. (22) It considers that the General Court misinterpreted the concept of ‘acting on its own initiative’, as set out in Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, since such an ex officio action excludes the possibility of prior inducement by a third party, even where said inducement is not of a binding nature. (23) Since the Latvian Ministry of Finance’s invitation constituted such an inducement, the Commission could not have acted within the scope of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation when it provided observations in the proceedings before the Augstākā tiesa (Supreme Court).

25 The Commission contests that interpretation. (24)

26 I agree that the appellant’s arguments cannot hold.

27 As I have explained, the principle of sincere cooperation, deriving from Article 4(3) TEU, requires that national courts work alongside the Commission to achieve its task of ensuring that State aid is granted and administered in accordance with the rules laid down in Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. (25)

28 It flows from that primary law obligation that it is incumbent on both the Commission, on the one hand, as the institution tasked with the exclusive competence to review the compatibility of aid with the internal market, and the national courts, on the other hand, as the judicial authorities of the Member States responsible for ensuring that EU law ‘is applied and respected in the national legal system’, (26) to take all the necessary measures to ensure the achievement of that Treaty objective.

29 It is in that context that the Court of Justice has long since recognised that such cooperation between the Commission and the national courts may require the former to provide information and observations to the latter relating, inter alia, to the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. (27)

30 The EU legislature nonetheless considered it opportune to lay down specific ‘arrangements’ to that effect. (28)

31 Those arrangements are reflected in Article 29 of the State Aid Procedural Regulation. Firstly, that provision enables national courts to request information or observations on the application of State aid rules from the Commission (Article 29(1)). Secondly, it empowers the Commission to decide, on its own initiative, to provide national courts with such information or observations in cases relating to the application of Article 107(1) TFEU and Article 108 TFEU (Article 29(2)).

32 Since the latter possibility constitutes an expression of the prerogative which the Treaties assign to the Commission in the area of State aid, it is clear that the Commission acts on its ‘own initiative’, within the meaning of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, whenever it decides that it is in the interest of the coherent application of Article 107(1) and Article 108 TFEU to assist national courts by means of written observations.

33 As the General Court, in essence, observed in the judgment under appeal, that conclusion is not affected by a third party requesting or inviting the Commission to intervene in national proceedings where that third party has no authority to direct or to induce the Commission to exercise its prerogative to provide observations to the national court. (29)

34 That is because, in the context of the State aid discipline, such requests or invitations are not binding on the Commission; they cannot compel that institution to provide observations in national proceedings within the meaning of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation.

35 The converse would mean that an unsolicited request or an invitation from a third party would have the effect of overriding the Commission’s discretion to decide whether it is necessary, as part of the duty of sincere cooperation, to assist national courts in the implementation of the State aid control system.

36 The fact that the Commission is made aware of national proceedings relating to the coherent application of Article 107(1) or Article 108 TFEU by a Member State’s competent authorities does not negate my earlier conclusion. After all, the necessity of submitting written observations to a national court may be brought to the Commission’s attention in different ways and by different sources. If the Commission is deemed not to have acted ‘on its own initiative’ whenever such information is received from a source outside of that institution, it would deprive that concept of all practical meaning.

37 I therefore consider that the General Court did not err in concluding that the Commission acted ‘on its own initiative’, within the meaning of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, when it decided, following the letter from the Latvian Ministry of Finance, to provide observations in the proceedings before the Augstākā tiesa (Supreme Court).

38 The Court of Justice should thus, in my view, reject the first part of the first ground of appeal as unfounded.

B. The fourth part of the first ground of appeal

39 In the judgment under appeal, the General Court took the view that ‘the observations submitted by the Commission as amicus curiae in the national proceedings in question, relating solely to factual and legal elements relevant to the present case, cannot be regarded as interfering with the independence of the national courts’. (30)

40 By the fourth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant challenges that finding by arguing that the General Court erred in its interpretation of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, since that provision merely enables the Commission to provide written observations related to elements of law. Observations relating to elements of fact would, accordingly, fall outside the scope of that cooperation framework.

41 The Commission contests that argument. (31)

42 I too am unconvinced by the appellant’s claims.

43 As explained, Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation enables the Commission to provide written observations to a national court in the spirit of sincere cooperation to achieve the objective of the State aid control system, ‘where the coherent application of Article 107(1) or Article 108 TFEU so requires’.

44 That is the sole condition arising from the wording of that provision, which must be interpreted broadly since a risk to the coherent application of the State aid rules may be present in a variety of situations. (32)

45 Accordingly, and contrary to what the appellant argues, the Commission may also be required to provide observations on elements of a factual nature as part of its cooperation under Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation where it is necessary to ensure the coherent application of the State aid rules. (33)

46 That is because such factual elements may, for example, inform an economic or legal analysis relating to the application of the State aid rules.

47 As the General Court found in the judgment under appeal, (34) and as the Commission explains, a factual description of the decisions taken in the context of the restructuring of AS Parex banka was necessary to explain the legal consequences to be drawn from a failure to comply with the commitments provided for by the Republic of Latvia relating to cash outflows to holders of legacy subordinated loans. To my mind, it is clear that a possible breach of such commitments – and the related effects on the continued compatibility of the aid measures in question – were relevant for the national judge to consider.

48 In view of those considerations, it is irrelevant whether or not the national proceedings – in which the Commission provides observations – are limited (35) to questions of law. Indeed, appeals on a point of law may also turn on a lower court’s treatment of certain elements of fact. (36)

49 It follows that the General Court cannot be faulted for rejecting the appellant’s restrictive reading of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation and for concluding that observations provided by the Commission pursuant to that provision may also refer to those factual and legal elements that are linked to the application of Article 107(1) and Article 108 TFEU.

50 On the basis of the foregoing, I propose that the Court of Justice also reject the fourth part of the first ground of appeal as unfounded.

IV. Conclusion

51 In the light of the above, I propose that the Court dismiss the first and fourth parts of the first ground of appeal as unfounded.

1 Original language: English.

2 Council Regulation of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 [TFEU] (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).

3 See Commission Decision of 15 September 2010 on the State aid C 26/09 (ex N 289/09) which Latvia is planning to implement for the restructuring of AS Parex banka (OJ 2011 L 163, p. 28; ‘Decision C 26/2009’), recital 4.

4 See the judgment under appeal, paragraph 2.

5 See Decision C 26/2009, recital 14.

6 See the judgment under appeal, paragraph 5. Additional measures were granted at a later point in time; see, generally, Commission Decision (EU) 2015/162 of 9 July 2014 on the State aid SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) implemented by Latvia for Parex (OJ 2015 L 27, p. 12).

7 See, to that effect, the judgment under appeal, paragraphs 6 and 7, and Decision C 26/2009, recital 13 et seq.

8 See, to that effect, the judgment under appeal, paragraph 7.

9 See, to that effect, the judgment under appeal, paragraphs 8 and 9.

10 See the judgment under appeal, paragraphs 11 and 12.

11 See the judgment under appeal, paragraph 13.

12 See, to that effect, the judgment under appeal, paragraphs 14 and 15.

13 See, to that effect, the judgment under appeal, paragraph 16.

14 See, in that regard, order of 13 July 1990, Zwartveld and Others (C‑2/88‑IMM, EU:C:1990:315, paragraph 22) (explaining that it is incumbent ‘upon every [EU] institution to give its active assistance to … national legal proceedings’ in which a national court hears proceedings on the infringement of EU law).

15 See, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 1996, SFEI and Others (C‑39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 41); of 21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa (C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited); and of 12 January 2023, DOBELES HES (C‑702/20 and C‑17/21, EU:C:2023:1, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited) (explaining that, by virtue of the principle of sincere cooperation, the implementation of the State aid control system is a duty of both the Commission and the national courts, each of which fulfil complementary and separate roles). On the complementary and separate roles of the Commission and the national courts, see also judgment of 21 November 1991, Féderation nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires and Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon (C‑354/90, EU:C:1991:440, paragraphs 9 to 11).

16 Extensively on that topic, see Communication from the Commission – Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid rules by national courts (OJ 2021 C 305, p. 1, paragraphs 100 to 133). As the Council observed in its intervention before the General Court in the underlying proceedings, that notice builds on the 1995 and 2009 notices on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in the State aid field (see OJ 1995 C 312, p. 8 and OJ 2009 C 85, p. 1), the first of which the Commission adopted following the judgment of 21 November 1991, Féderation nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires and Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon (C‑354/90, EU:C:1991:440).

17 See, by analogy, arising in the context of the similarly worded Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), judgment of 11 June 2009, X BV (C‑429/07, EU:C:2009:359, paragraphs 20 to 22). See also, as regards the same type of cooperation mechanism, Article 39 of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ 2022 L 265, p. 1).

18 Emphasis added. For completeness, the second and third subparagraphs of that provision lay down that ‘the Commission shall inform the Member State concerned of its intention to submit observations before formally doing so’ (subparagraph 2) and that ‘for the exclusive purpose of preparing its observations, the Commission may request the relevant court of the Member State to transmit documents at the disposal of the court, necessary for the Commission's assessment of the matter’ (subparagraph 3). Neither of those subparagraphs are addressed in the judgment under appeal or in the appeal itself.

19 In that respect, I wonder whether, in the light of the principle of the independence of the judiciary in relation to the executive (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited), a decision by the Commission to provide observations in pending national court proceedings can ever satisfy the requirement that the damage alleged was actually caused by that decision and not rather by the ensuing judgment, to which those observations may have contributed (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 March 2010, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

20 The other parts of the first ground of appeal allege that the General Court distorted the facts relating to national procedural rules (second part) (see, however, in that regard, footnote 35 to the present Opinion); that it erred by taking a ‘purely formal view’ of the concept of judicial independence (third part); that it mischaracterised the nature of the Commission’s written observations (fifth part); and that it erred by ‘failing to accept any reasonable limitations on the Commission … [to] act impartially and respect the integrity of the judicial process on a national level’ (sixth part). The second ground of appeal relates to the General Court’s rejection of the appellant’s plea of illegality against Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, alleging that the General Court erred, first, by failing to identify an appropriate legal basis for the Commission’s power to provide written observations, and, second, by finding that the ‘amicus curiae’ mechanism is compatible with the preliminary ruling procedure.

21 See, to that effect, the judgment under appeal, paragraph 64.

22 Specifically, the appellant’s critique is directed against paragraphs 64 to 66 of the judgment under appeal.

23 Within the context of that explanation, the appellant also alleges a distortion of the facts in paragraphs 13, 62 to 64 and 83 of the judgment under appeal. However, pursuant to Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, a party pleading a distortion of the facts must indicate precisely what is alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and demonstrate the errors in the analysis which, in its view, resulted in the General Court making that distortion in order to discharge its burden of proof (see, ex multis, judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited). Since the appellant merely criticises the General Court for making certain factual statements without, however, challenging in any way the presentation of the material content of the facts or indicating how the alleged distortion is obvious from the Court’s analysis, this aspect of the first part of the first ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.

24 I should observe that since the Council only intervened to support the legality of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, it did not provide observations on the first part of the first ground of appeal.

25 See point 17 of the present Opinion. See also, to that effect, judgments of 12 January 2023, DOBELES HES (C‑702/20 and C‑17/21, EU:C:2023:1, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited), and of 1 August 2025, Tiberis Holding (C‑514/23, EU:C:2025:597, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

26 See order of 13 July 1990, Zwartveld and Others (C‑2/88‑IMM, EU:C:1990:315, paragraph 18).

27 See, in the area of State aid, judgment of 11 July 1996, SFEI and Others (C‑39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 50), and, in the area of competition law, judgments of 28 February 1991, Delimitis (C‑234/89, EU:C:1991:91, paragraph 53), and of 12 December 1995, Dijkstra and Others (C‑319/93, C‑40/94 and C‑224/94, EU:C:1995:433, paragraph 36). See also judgment of 18 September 1996, Postbank v Commission (T‑353/94, EU:T:1996:119, paragraphs 94 and 95 and the case-law cited).

28 See recital 18 of Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 2013 L 204, p. 15). According to that recital, which explains the background to the introduction of what is now the cooperation framework set out in Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, such arrangements were necessary to ensure ‘consistency in the application of the State aid rules’. Interestingly, the original Commission proposal introducing what is now Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation still spoke of a ‘right for the Commission to make submissions to national courts’ (emphasis added) so as ‘to draw the attention of [those] courts to issues of considerable importance for the consistent application of EU State aid law’. See Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (COM(2012) 725 final, p. 6).

29 See, to that effect, the judgment under appeal, paragraph 64.

30 See the judgment under appeal, paragraph 78. Emphasis added.

31 The Council did not provide observations in relation to this part of the appeal.

32 See, by analogy, judgment of 11 June 2009, X BV (C‑429/07, EU:C:2009:359, paragraph 30), which interpreted Article 15(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, the wording of which is similar in many respects to that of Article 29(2) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation, as extending to precisely those cases in which the rules of competition law are not directly at issue but instead arise during the resolution of a question of national law (in that case, the tax-deductible nature of penalties imposed by means of a Commission decision taken pursuant to (what are now) Article 101 and/or Article 102 TFEU).

33 Along the same lines, see, also, Holzwarth, J., ‘Cooperation between the Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States’, in Rousseva, E. (ed.), EU Antitrust Procedure, point 20.35, and Dohms, R., ‘Article 15 Cooperation with national courts’, in Dekeyser, K. et al. (eds), Regulation 1/2003 and EU Antitrust Enforcement – A Systematic Guide, Wolters Kluwer, 2023, p. 378.

34 See paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal.

35 I should observe that the General Court did not make any finding relating to the scope of the Latvian procedural rules. In that regard, it has not yet been established whether or not the appellant is indeed correct in his assertion that those rules address the content of the Commission’s submission in the context of an appeal on a point of law. In any event, it is clear that the requirement set out in recital 38 of the State Aid Procedural Regulation that the Commission’s observations be submitted ‘within the framework of national procedural rules’ merely addresses the form that such observations must take, and cannot be understood as allowing such rules to override a power deriving from EU law.

36 See, by analogy, ex multis, judgment of 4 April 2017, Ombudsman v Staelen (C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited) (relating to the ‘legal characterisation’ of facts and the ‘legal conclusions [the General Court] has drawn from them’).