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62025CJ0557

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Tenth Chamber)

12 November 2026 (*)

In Case C‑557/25 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 20 August 2025,

EO, represented initially by P. Baudoux and L. Levi, avocates, and subsequently by L. Levi, avocate,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Parliament, represented by I. Lázaro Betancor, R. Schiano and S. Seyr, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún (Rapporteur), President of the Fifth Chamber, acting as President of the Tenth Chamber, E. Regan and J. Passer, Judges,

Advocate General: A. Rantos,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his appeal, EO asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 11 June 2025, EO v Parliament (T‑368/24, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2025:583), by which the General Court dismissed his action seeking, first, annulment of the decision of 15 September 2023 by which the European Parliament terminated his contract as a member of the temporary staff (‘the decision at issue’) and, second, compensation for the material and non-material harm he claims to have suffered as a result of that decision.

Background to the dispute

2 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 23 of the judgment under appeal, which, for the purposes of the present proceedings, can be summarised as follows.

3 The appellant was a member of the temporary staff, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’), within the political group Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (‘the S&D Group’).

4 In the performance of his duties as a political adviser to the S&D Group, the appellant was involved, inter alia, in the drafting of the European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (OJ 2023 C 167, p. 99).

5 In the days following the adoption of that resolution, an accredited parliamentary assistant to a Member of the S&D Group offered the appellant two tickets to see a World Cup match of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in Qatar, namely the quarter-final match between Argentina and the Netherlands, as well as travel and accommodation expenses for two people.

6 The appellant travelled to Qatar with his partner from 8 to 11 December 2022.

7 On 9 December 2022, the Belgian authorities opened an investigation into possible illicit lobbying activities by Qatar. In particular, those authorities searched the offices of the Parliament and arrested several individuals, including the accredited parliamentary assistant referred to in paragraph 5 of the present judgment.

8 On 16 December 2022, the appellant informed his head of unit of his trip to Qatar. Together, they informed the Secretary General of the S&D Group.

9 On 20 December 2022, after hearing the appellant, the President of the S&D Group, in her capacity as the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (‘the AECE’), suspended him for an indefinite period and withheld his remuneration pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).

10 On the same day, the Bureau of the S&D Group published a press release entitled ‘Zero tolerance for corruption’ in which it stated that that group ‘fully supports the suspension of [its] staff member following serious misconduct related to the ongoing judicial investigation’.

11 On 4 January 2023, the AECE informed the appellant that it had decided to open an administrative investigation concerning him to determine whether he had failed to comply with the obligations set out in Article 11 of the Staff Regulations.

12 On 30 January 2023, an administrative investigation report was sent to the AECE and to the Secretary General of the S&D Group with the recommendation that the appellant should be invited to a hearing in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (‘the administrative investigation report’).

13 On 6 March 2023, the appellant was heard by the AECE in the presence of the Secretary General of the S&D Group, a member of the Parliament’s Legal Service and members of staff who had drafted the administrative investigation report.

14 By letter of 31 May 2023 (‘the letter of 31 May 2023’), the AECE informed the appellant of its intention to terminate his contract in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS and to dispense him from service for the duration of his 10-month notice period, citing a breakdown in the relationship of trust between him and the S&D Group. The AECE invited him to an interview scheduled for 7 June 2023 so that he could be heard before any decision was taken. The appellant was invited to submit his observations in writing if he did not wish to attend the interview.

15 On 20 July 2023, the appellant submitted his written observations on the AECE’s intention to terminate his contract.

16 By letter of 7 September 2023 (‘the letter of 7 September 2023’), the AECE lifted the appellant’s suspension and informed him that a decision pursuant to Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations had not yet been made owing to the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation, the overall complexity of the situation and its duty to consider all elements relevant to his file.

17 On 15 September 2023, the AECE adopted the decision at issue on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS on account of the breakdown in the relationship of trust between the S&D Group and the appellant.

18 On 8 December 2023, the appellant lodged a complaint against that decision pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.

19 By letter of 15 March 2024, concerning the ‘follow up to the administrative investigation and the hearing of March 2023’ and the ‘intention to address a warning pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations’ (‘the letter of 15 March 2024’), the AECE informed the appellant that it had ultimately decided to suspend the adoption of a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and that a final decision would be taken only after the decision of the national court hearing the case had become final in order to be able to take account of the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities.

20 In the absence of a reply to the complaint of 8 December 2023 within the four-month period provided for in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, that complaint was first rejected by implied decision on 8 April 2024. However, by decision of 17 April 2024, the Bureau of the S&D Group rejected that complaint by express decision within the three-month period referred to in the second indent of Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations.

The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

21 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 19 July 2024, the appellant brought an action seeking, first, annulment of the decision at issue and, if appropriate, of the decision referred to in the preceding paragraph and, second, compensation for the material and non-material harm he claims to have suffered.

22 In support of that action, he raised six pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and misuse of powers or abuse of process, second, manifest errors of assessment, third, breach of the principle of proportionality, fourth, infringement of the rights of the defence, fifth, breach of the obligation to state reasons and, sixth, breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

23 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected all of those pleas.

Forms of order sought

24 By his appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should:

– set aside the judgment under appeal and, consequently,

– annul the decision at issue and, if necessary, the decision referred to in paragraph 20 of the present judgment,

– order the Parliament to pay him compensation for the harm suffered, and

– order the Parliament to pay the costs.

25 The Parliament contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal and

– order the appellant to pay the costs.

The appeal

26 In support of his appeal, the appellant raises two grounds of appeal, alleging, first, infringement of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, distortion of the evidence and breach of the obligation to state reasons and, second, breach of the obligation to state reasons and distortion of certain items of evidence.

The first ground of appeal

27 The first ground of appeal is divided into three complaints.

The first complaint of the first ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations

– Arguments of the parties

28 According to the appellant, the AECE infringed Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations in that, despite having heard him, first of all, in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him, it subsequently decided to terminate his contract, in accordance with Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS. Consequently, the General Court erred in law by interpreting, in paragraphs 38 to 48 of the judgment under appeal, Article 3 of Annex IX as not preventing the AECE from terminating that contract on account of the breakdown in the relationship of trust with the appellant.

29 The erroneous nature of that interpretation by the General Court is apparent, first, from Article 49 of the CEOS, according to which, after the disciplinary procedure provided for in Annex IX to the Staff Regulations has been followed, the employment of the staff member concerned may be terminated without notice on disciplinary grounds in serious cases of failure of that staff member to comply with his or her obligations. Even though the content of the letter of 31 May 2023 shows that the reasons for the termination fell within the scope of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, the AECE used the procedure provided for in Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS.

30 Second, it is apparent from the judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑587/21 P, EU:C:2024:1017), that Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations requires the AECE, once it has decided to invoke and apply Article 2 and Article 3(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, to take one of the three measures provided for in that provision.

31 Third, the application by analogy of Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations by the General Court is incorrect, since no decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings was taken by the AECE.

32 Fourth, the case-law cited by the General Court in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the judgment under appeal is not relevant in the present case, since no hearing was held under Article 3(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations in the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 7 July 2011, Longinidis v Cedefop (T‑283/08 P, EU:T:2011:338), and of 8 May 2024, UF v Commission (T‑24/23, EU:T:2024:293).

33 The same applies to the case which gave rise to the judgment of 26 April 2017, OU v Commission (T‑569/16, EU:T:2017:285), in which the General Court was not called upon to examine whether the AECE was entitled to issue a reprimand in respect of the staff member concerned, whose contract had been terminated, or whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, when the AECE decided to dismiss a staff member, would affect the legality of the issuance of a reprimand.

34 In addition, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court does not explain which sanction can be issued against the appellant whose employment ended even though no decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings had been taken in respect of the facts for which the appellant had been heard pursuant to Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. Moreover, the choice provided for in that article is not limited to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings.

35 Consequently, the General Court erred in law in holding that the approach adopted by the AECE did not deprive that article of its effectiveness, whereas that article requires that authority to take one of the decisions listed therein.

36 The Parliament disputes the merits of the first complaint of the first ground of appeal.

– Findings of the Court

37 The appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in holding that the lawfulness of a decision terminating a contract of a member of the temporary staff adopted on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS was not subject to compliance with the rules relating to disciplinary proceedings laid down in Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, particularly in a case such as the present one, in which the appellant had been heard in the context of disciplinary proceedings initiated against him, pursuant to Article 3(1) of that annex.

38 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS, the employment of temporary staff is to end, where the contract is for an indefinite period, at the end of the period of notice stipulated in the contract. That period is not to be less than one month for each completed year of service, subject to a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 10 months.

39 In the judgment under appeal, in order to reject the appellant’s argument that the AECE was required to adopt a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations before considering the termination of his contract under the conditions laid down in Article 47 of the CEOS, the General Court held that, even where there is wrongful conduct capable of justifying the dismissal of a member of the temporary staff on disciplinary grounds, there is no obligation on the AECE to initiate disciplinary proceedings against that person rather than using the option of unilaterally terminating the contract provided for in Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS. By rejecting the appellant’s arguments that Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations would be rendered ineffective if the administration were authorised to terminate his contract without following up on the administrative investigation opened in his regard and on the hearing before the AECE provided for in that article, the General Court then implicitly, but necessarily, inferred that the same applied where an administrative investigation had been opened and a hearing had been held pursuant to Article 3(1) of that annex.

40 In so ruling, the General Court did not err in law. First, where a member of the temporary staff is responsible for wrongful conduct capable of justifying the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, none of the provisions of the CEOS or of the Staff Regulations requires the AECE to terminate that staff member’s contract solely pursuant to the procedure provided for in Article 49 of the CEOS. The AECE therefore remains free to terminate that staff member’s contract on another legal basis and at the end of a separate procedure, such as that provided for in Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS, if the conditions laid down for that purpose are met.

41 Second, the fact that the AECE has already opened the administrative investigation provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations against a member of the temporary staff recruited on the basis of Article 2(c) of the CEOS does not preclude the AECE from using another procedure to terminate that staff member’s contract, provided that it has reasons justifying the application of that other procedure.

42 It is true that, according to settled case-law, a decision must be annulled if it appears on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence that the decision was adopted with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 September 2006, Spain v Council, C‑310/04, EU:C:2006:521, paragraph 69, and of 9 September 2015, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, C‑506/13 P, EU:C:2015:562, paragraph 94).

43 However, it must be held that the appellant has failed to establish that the decision at issue was adopted with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that pursued by the procedure provided for in Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 1996, United Kingdom v Council, C‑84/94, EU:C:1996:431, paragraph 70).

44 Indeed, for staff recruited on the basis of Article 2(c) of the CEOS, the loss of the relationship of trust is sufficient, in principle, to justify the termination of their contract at the end of the procedure provided for in Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2022, CE v Comittee of the Regions, C‑539/21 P, EU:C:2022:840, paragraph 110).

45 Consequently, the General Court did not err in law when it held, in paragraph 43 of the judgment under appeal, that the termination of the appellant’s contract on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS had not been carried out in breach of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.

46 That finding cannot be called into question by the various arguments relied on by the appellant.

47 In the first place, it is not apparent from the wording of Article 49 of the CEOS that once the AECE has opened an administrative investigation against a staff member, that authority may no longer terminate that staff member’s contract on another ground.

48 In the second place, as regards the solution adopted in the judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑587/21 P, EU:C:2024:1017), it is true that, in paragraph 40 of that judgment, the Court held that the discretion of the appointing authority concerned did not allow it, in the context of the implementation of an annulment judgment, to depart from the three possibilities exhaustively laid down in Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, with the result that, by deciding to abandon the disciplinary proceedings initiated in respect of the appellant concerned by removing from the appellant’s personal file all the earlier acts relating to the administrative investigation, that authority had infringed that article and exceeded the limits of its discretion.

49 However, since, as recalled in paragraph 41 of the present judgment, the AECE may terminate the contract of a member of the temporary staff who is the subject of an administrative investigation by using a procedure other than disciplinary proceedings, provided that such other termination is based on a ground consistent with the purposes pursued by that other procedure, the fact that the AECE will be required, at the end of that investigation, to adopt one of the three decisions referred to in Article 3(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations must be regarded as having no effect on the validity of the decision to dismiss that person at the end of that other procedure.

50 In the third place, as regards the allegation that the General Court erred in applying Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations by analogy, it is sufficient to note, in order to reject that allegation, that it has no factual basis since none of the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal to which that allegation relates mentions that provision.

51 In the fourth place, as regards the judgments to which the General Court referred in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the judgment under appeal, since the General Court did not err in law in rejecting, in paragraphs 38 to 48 of that judgment, the first plea at first instance, the appellant’s allegation, if it is considered to be established, that some of those judgments did not support the General Court’s reasoning must be regarded as ineffective.

52 Lastly, in so far as the appellant intended to raise other complaints independently, the Court of Justice considers, having regard to the way in which the appeal is worded, that such complaints do not satisfy the requirements arising from the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of its Rules of Procedure, under which an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment or order under appeal and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which it may be inadmissible (judgment of 8 October 2026, Global 8 Airlines v Commission, C‑482/24 P, EU:C:2026:833, paragraph 31). Consequently, those complaints must be rejected as inadmissible.

53 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the first complaint of the first ground of appeal must be rejected.

The second and third complaints of the first ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the evidence and breach of the obligation to state reasons

– Arguments of the parties

54 By the second complaint of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court distorted certain elements in the file by inferring, in the second sentence of paragraph 41 of the judgment under appeal, from the letters of 7 September 2023 and 15 March 2024 that the AECE did indeed intend to follow up on the administrative investigation report, in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, when the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities became final.

55 It is apparent from the letter of 7 September 2023 that that authority merely informed the appellant that his suspension was terminated and that he could again receive his full remuneration.

56 Similarly, by the letter of 15 March 2024, the AECE exclusively informed the appellant that, because of the ongoing national investigations, it could not take a final decision and therefore decided to suspend the procedure provided for in Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations until a final judgment had been delivered by the national court hearing the case.

57 In any event, the General Court, incorrectly, failed to distinguish between the reasons relied on by that authority in the letter of 7 September 2023 and those it relied on in the letter of 15 March 2024. Whereas, in the letter of 7 September 2023, the AECE maintained that it could not take a decision on account of the ongoing police investigation, in the letter of 15 March 2024, that authority claimed that it could not take a decision because it was awaiting ‘[the delivery of] a final judgment … by the [national courts]’. In the judgment under appeal, the General Court did not, however, point to such a difference and referred in general terms ‘[to the time] when the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities [became] final’.

58 By the third complaint of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court acted in breach of its obligation to state reasons by failing to respond to a complaint which he had raised, in his application, that the conditions of Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations were not met.

59 The Parliament disputes the merits of the second and third complaints of the first ground of appeal.

– Findings of the Court

60 As regards, in the first place, the second complaint of the first ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the evidence by the General Court, it should be borne in mind, first, that, in the second sentence of paragraph 41 of the judgment under appeal, that court inferred from the AECE’s letters of 7 September 2023 and 15 March 2024 that that authority did indeed intend to follow up on the administrative investigation report, in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, when the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities became final.

61 That said, since, as is apparent from paragraph 41 of the present judgment, the General Court rejected the appellant’s first plea on the ground that the opening by the AECE of the administrative investigation provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations against a member of the temporary staff recruited on the basis of Article 2(c) of the CEOS did not deprive that authority of the possibility of using another procedure to terminate the appellant’s contract, it must be held that the factual considerations set out in the second sentence of paragraph 41 of the judgment under appeal concerning the AECE’s intention to follow up on the administrative investigation report in the context of the disciplinary proceedings do not constitute the necessary support for the operative part of that judgment.

62 It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, pleas in an appeal directed against grounds which do not provide the necessary basis for the operative part of the judgment or order under appeal are inoperative, and must therefore be rejected (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2018, Ori Martin v Court of Justice of the European Union, C‑463/17 P, EU:C:2018:411, paragraph 32).

63 In any event, in accordance with settled case-law, there is distortion of the evidence where the General Court has manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of that evidence. That distortion must be obvious from the file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 12 March 2026, VP v Cedefop, C‑209/24 P, EU:C:2026:186, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

64 In the present case, it must be stated that it is not obvious from the content of those letters, contrary to the General Court’s finding, that the AECE expressed its intention not to follow up on the administrative investigation report. On the contrary, the same letters may be read as meaning that the AECE envisaged the adoption in the future of a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.

65 Second, the appellant notes that, in the letter of 7 September 2023, the AECE stated that it could not take a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations because of the ongoing police investigation, whereas, in the letter of 15 March 2024, that authority claimed that it could not take a decision because it was awaiting ‘[the delivery of] a final judgment … by the [national courts]’. Consequently, according to the appellant, the General Court distorted the content of those letters when it did not distinguish between the reason relating to the ongoing investigation and that relating to the delivery of a final judgment by the national courts.

66 That said, it must be stated that, by describing in the letters of 7 September 2023 and 15 March 2024 what it refers to as the ‘[final] findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities’, the General Court, at most, merely described those reasons in a general manner, without, however, distorting them, since both the police and the national courts may be classified as ‘authorities’.

67 It follows that the second complaint of the first ground of appeal is not well founded.

68 As regards, in the second place, the third complaint of the first ground of appeal, it should be noted at the outset that only three paragraphs of the application at first instance refer to Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, and solely for the purpose of emphasising that that provision did not require the appointing authority to suspend its work and thus of responding in advance to a justification that the appointing authority could have relied on to explain why it had not concluded the disciplinary proceedings and not of formulating an independent argument or complaint.

69 Given that it was therefore not clear from the application that the appellant intended to rely on the infringement, by the decision at issue, of the conditions for the application of Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, the appellant is not justified in claiming, at the appeal stage, that the General Court left such a complaint unanswered.

70 In any event, it should be pointed out that, in his appeal, the appellant presents that third complaint of the first ground of appeal as alleging a breach of the obligation to state reasons, in that the General Court left unanswered the appellant’s line of argument that the conditions laid down in Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations were not met in the present case.

71 In that regard, it should be noted that the duty to state the reasons on which judgments are based does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the reasoning articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition, however, that it enables the persons concerned to know the grounds on which the judgment under appeal is based and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment of 27 February 2025, OA v Parliament, C‑32/24 P, EU:C:2025:118, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

72 In paragraphs 39 to 43 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted, in essence, that the existence of a decision to be taken under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations did not prevent the AECE from terminating the staff member’s contract of indefinite duration with notice, in accordance with Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS, where it found that the information brought to its attention demonstrated a breakdown in the relationship of trust. Such a finding necessarily implies that the General Court considered that Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations had no effect on the validity of the decision at issue. That article, contained in Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, which deals with disciplinary proceedings, concerns the impact of the existence of criminal proceedings in respect of the same facts on the disciplinary proceedings alone.

73 Consequently, it must be held that, even if the appellant had raised a separate complaint alleging infringement of Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, he was in a position to understand the reasons why that complaint had to be rejected.

74 It follows that the third complaint of the first ground of appeal must also be rejected as unfounded.

75 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the second and third complaints of the first ground of appeal must be rejected and, accordingly, the first ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.

The second ground of appeal, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons, distortion of the evidence and an error of law

76 The second ground of appeal is divided into two complaints.

The first complaint of the second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

– Arguments of the parties

77 By the first complaint of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons when examining the pleas alleging manifest errors of assessment by the AECE.

78 The appellant observes that the General Court found that the AECE had not committed a manifest error of assessment in considering that the relationship of trust with him had been affected by the fact that he had delayed in informing his superiors of the facts in question.

79 According to the appellant, it is not apparent from the judgment under appeal that the General Court duly took into consideration the explanations which he had provided in his written and oral pleadings in order to respond to the AECE’s criticism concerning the appellant’s delay in informing his superiors of his trip to Qatar.

80 The Parliament disputes the merits of the first complaint of the second ground of appeal.

– Findings of the Court

81 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 71 of the present judgment, the appellant’s line of argument that, by failing expressly to take into consideration his explanations concerning the fact that he had been late in informing his superiors of the facts in question, the General Court failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons, cannot be accepted.

82 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, although the judgment under appeal does not expressly mention those explanations, the General Court held, in paragraphs 84 and 85 of that judgment, that, in the light of the duties performed by the appellant within the S&D Group, his conduct was likely to create a perception, in the mind of the public, of a lack of independence from the influence of sources outside that group and, therefore, to harm the reputation of that group. The General Court also stated that certain press articles mentioning the appellant’s name in connection with the ‘Qatargate’ scandal were published before he informed his superiors of his trip to Qatar and of the circumstances in which he had travelled to that country, with the result that, in addition, the AECE had not committed a manifest error of assessment by considering that the relationship of trust with the appellant had been affected by his delay in informing his superiors of the facts in question.

83 It follows, implicitly but necessarily, that, according to the General Court, those explanations did not allow a different conclusion to be reached concerning the absence of a manifest error on the part of the AECE as regards the fact that the relationship of trust between that group and the appellant had been affected by the latter’s delay in informing his superiors of the facts in question.

84 It follows that the General Court’s reasoning is such as to enable the appellant to know the grounds on which the judgment under appeal is based and to provide the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review, with the result that it is not vitiated by a failure to state reasons.

85 It should also be borne in mind that the fact that the General Court reached a different conclusion on the merits from the appellant cannot, in itself, vitiate the judgment under appeal by a failure to state reasons (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2024, Slovenia v Commission, C‑447/22 P, EU:C:2024:678, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).

86 Consequently, the first complaint of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

The second complaint of the second ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the evidence and an error of law

– Arguments of the parties

87 By the second complaint of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by a distortion of the decision at issue, in so far as the General Court found that the AECE had not based the termination decision on Article 11 of the Staff Regulations. Such distortion is also apparent from the letter of 31 May 2023 and from the minutes of the meeting of 19 December 2022.

88 According to the appellant, even though that authority had not expressly referred to Article 11 of the Staff Regulations in the termination decision, it is implicitly apparent from that decision, as well as from the letter of 31 May 2023 and the minutes of the meeting of 19 December 2022, that that article in fact constituted the basis for that decision. That appointing authority criticised the appellant for having accepted a gift of significant value from a member of the parliamentary staff, maintaining that that gift did not originate from the institution itself and that accepting it therefore gave rise to a conflict of interests, which could only fall within the scope of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations. In so doing, the General Court also infringed that article, in so far as that article refers to conflicts of interests only where a gift originates from a source external to the institution, thus depriving that article of its effectiveness.

89 The Parliament disputes the merits of the second complaint of the second ground of appeal.

– Findings of the Court

90 As regards the appellant’s line of argument that the General Court distorted the decision at issue when it found that that decision was not based on Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, it should be noted that that line of argument is based on the incorrect premiss that the decision at issue is based on that article.

91 As the General Court found in paragraph 38 of the judgment under appeal, the decision at issue had been adopted on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS, and not on that of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations.

92 Such a finding cannot be invalidated by the appellant’s reference to the letter of 31 May 2023, without any indication showing that the General Court distorted the content of the decision at issue. The appellant merely reproduces in part the content of that letter.

93 Nor can that finding be called into question by the reading proposed by the appellant of the minutes of the meeting of 19 December 2020. As the Parliament observes, any reference in those minutes to a possible failure by the appellant to comply with his obligations, including those provided for in Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, must be read in conjunction with the requirements set out in Article 23 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and therefore falls within the scope of the disciplinary proceedings provided for in that annex.

94 Lastly, the appellant’s line of argument that the General Court infringed Article 11 of the Staff Regulations cannot be accepted either in so far as it is based on the premiss that that article had been applied in the present case by the AECE.

95 As is apparent from paragraphs 40 and 45 of the present judgment, the power to terminate with notice under Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS is not subject to a finding that the staff member concerned has failed to fulfil his or her obligations under the Staff Regulations, including those referred to in Article 11 thereof.

96 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the second complaint of the second ground of appeal must also be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the second ground of appeal as a whole must be rejected. The appeal is therefore dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

97 In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.

98 Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

99 Since the Parliament has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the appellant must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Parliament.

On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders EO to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament.

Arastey Sahún

Regan

Passer

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 November 2026.

V. Di Bucci

M.L. Arastey Sahún

Registrar

Acting President of the Chamber

* Language of the case: English.