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62024CJ0897

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Sixth Chamber)

12 November 2026 (*)

In Case C‑897/24 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 21 December 2024,

Council of the European Union, represented initially by A. Boggio-Tomasaz and P. Mahnič, acting as Agents, and subsequently by A. Boggio-Tomasaz, acting as Agent, and by E. Raoult, avocat,

appellant,

supported by:

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented by M.A. De Almeida Veiga, L. Havas and F. Hoffmeister, acting as Agents,

intervener in the appeal,

the other party to the proceedings being:

Vladimir Gheorghe Plahotniuc, residing in Chisinau (Moldova), represented by J. Pobjoy, Barrister-at-Law, C. Enderby Smith and G. Martin, Solicitors,

applicant at first instance,

THE COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of T. von Danwitz (Rapporteur), Vice-President of the Court, acting as President of the Sixth Chamber, I. Ziemele and M. Bošnjak, Judges,

Advocate General: A. Biondi,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its appeal, the Council of the European Union seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 23 October 2024, Plahotniuc v Council (T‑480/23, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:722), by which the General Court annulled Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1047 of 30 May 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ 2023 L 140 I, p. 9) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1045 of 30 May 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/888 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ 2023 L 140 I, p. 1), in so far as those acts concern Mr Vladimir Gheorghe Plahotniuc (together, ‘the acts at issue’).

Legal context and background to the dispute

2 The factual and legal context of the present case, as set out in paragraphs 2 to 14 of the judgment under appeal, may be summarised as follows.

3 On 28 April 2023, the Council adopted, pursuant to Article 29 TEU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 of 28 April 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ 2023 L 114, p. 15) and, pursuant to Article 215 TFEU, Council Regulation (EU) 2023/888 of 28 April 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ 2023 L 114, p. 1).

Decision 2023/891

4 According to recital 4 of Decision 2023/891, the Moldovan government has been increasingly faced with direct threats to its stability coming from both internal groups with vested interests and from the Russian Federation, which often collude to derail the Republic of Moldova from its reform path.

5 Article 1(1) of that decision provides:

‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:

(a) natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, or democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Republic of Moldova through any of the following actions:

(i) obstructing or undermining the democratic political process, including by obstructing or seriously undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;

(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations or other acts of violence; or

(iii) serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital;

…

as listed in the Annex.’

6 Under Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2023/891, all funds and economic resources belonging to or owned, held or controlled by natural persons, entities or bodies meeting criteria which are essentially identical to those set out in Article 1(1)(a) of that decision, as listed in the annex thereto, are to be frozen.

7 The third paragraph of Article 8 of Decision 2023/891 provides:

‘In reviewing restrictive measures taken pursuant to Articles 1(1)(a)(iii) and 2(1)(a)(iii), the Council shall take into account as appropriate whether the persons in question are subject to judicial proceedings or not in respect of the conduct for which they were listed.’

Regulation 2023/888

8 Article 2(3)(a) of Regulation 2023/888 provides that Annex I to that regulation is to include, inter alia, natural or legal persons, entities or bodies meeting criteria which are essentially identical to those set out in Article 1(1)(a) of Decision 2023/891.

9 According to Article 2(1) of that regulation, all funds and economic resources belonging to or owned, held or controlled by any natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I thereto are to be frozen.

10 Article 2(2) of Regulation 2023/888 provides that no funds or economic resources are to be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I to that regulation.

11 The Annex to Decision 2023/891 and Annex I to Regulation 2023/888 contain, respectively, the ‘list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 1 and 2’ and the ‘list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2’.

Decision 2023/1047

12 On 30 May 2023, by Decision 2023/1047, the Council added five persons, including Mr Plahotniuc – a politician and businessman holding Moldovan, Romanian and Russian nationality – to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision 2023/891 and in Annex I to Regulation 2023/888 (together, ‘the lists at issue’).

13 In Decision 2023/1047, the Council justified the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning Mr Plahotniuc by reference to the following grounds (‘the grounds for the listing at issue’):

‘Vladimir Plahotniuc is subject to numerous criminal proceedings in the Republic of Moldova related to crimes in connection with the embezzlement of State funds of the Republic of Moldova and their illegal transfer outside the Republic of Moldova. He was accused in the Republic of Moldova in the “Bank Fraud” case, the economic effects of which are still affecting the country. He is also being investigated for bribing the former president of the Republic of Moldova with a bag of cash in exchange for political favours.

Through his serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital, Vladimir Plahotniuc is responsible for actions and implementing policies which undermine and threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Republic of Moldova through undermining the democratic political process in the Republic of Moldova and serious financial misconduct concerning public funds.’

14 On 31 May 2023, the Council published in the Official Journal of the European Union a Notice for the attention of the data subjects to whom the restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/891, as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1047 and in Council Regulation (EU) 2023/888, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1045 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova apply (OJ 2023 C 190, p. 3).

The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

15 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 9 August 2023, Mr Plahotniuc brought an action for annulment of the acts at issue, in so far as they concern him, in which he raised two pleas in law, the first alleging manifest error of assessment and the second alleging breach of his rights under Article 6 TEU, read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 TEU, and Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

16 As a preliminary point, the General Court stated, in paragraph 27 of the judgment under appeal, that it was not possible, in the light of the wording of the grounds for the listing at issue, to determine with certainty whether Mr Plahotniuc’s listing was based solely on the criterion of serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital, referred to in Article 2(3)(a)(iii) of Regulation 2023/888 and Article 1(1)(a)(iii) of Decision 2023/891, or also on the criterion of undermining the democratic political process in Moldova, referred to in Article 2(3)(a)(i) of Regulation 2023/888 and Article 1(1)(a)(i) of Decision 2023/891.

17 Given the ambiguous nature of those grounds, the General Court took the view, in paragraph 33 of the judgment under appeal, that Mr Plahotniuc’s inclusion on the lists at issue had to be regarded as based solely on the criterion of serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital.

18 In its examination of the second plea in law, the General Court found, in paragraph 44 of the judgment under appeal, that the statement of reasons for the acts at issue showed that Mr Plahotniuc’s inclusion on the lists at issue was based exclusively on decisions of the Moldovan authorities to conduct criminal investigations and initiate criminal proceedings against him.

19 Relying on the line of authority devolving from the judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031), the General Court held, in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment under appeal, that it was for the Council to verify beforehand whether those decisions had been adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection. In paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that, in the grounds for the listing at issue, the Council had failed to show that it had carried out such a verification and that that failure had not been disputed by the Council.

20 Consequently, after raising of its own motion the ground for annulment based on breach of the Council’s obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, the General Court held, in paragraphs 52 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had not complied with that obligation and, on that ground, annulled the acts at issue.

Procedure before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought

21 By order of the President of the Court of 11 June 2025, Council v Plahotniuc (C‑897/24 P, EU:C:2025:475), the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Council.

22 The Council claims that the Court should:

– set aside the judgment under appeal;

– give final judgment in the matters that are the subject of the appeal and dismiss the action brought by Mr Plahotniuc; and

– order Mr Plahotniuc to pay the costs.

23 Mr Plahotniuc contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal; and

– order the Council to pay the costs.

24 The High Representative claims that the Court should set aside the judgment under appeal and give final judgment in the matters that are the subject of the appeal.

The appeal

25 In support of its appeal, the Council raises two grounds of appeal alleging, in essence, first, an error of law resulting from the General Court’s misinterpretation of the grounds for the listing at issue and, secondly, an error of law resulting from the General Court’s erroneous reliance on the obligation to state reasons and on the obligation to verify observance of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection in accordance with the line of authority devolving from the judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031).

26 The second ground of appeal should be examined first.

The second ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

27 By its second ground of appeal, the Council complains that, in paragraphs 52 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law by annulling the acts at issue on the ground that the Council had failed to show, in those acts, that it had verified that the criminal investigations and criminal proceedings against Mr Plahotniuc in Moldova – relied on in order to establish that the criterion of serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital had been satisfied – had been initiated in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection.

28 In that regard, the Council claims that the General Court erred in law in finding, first, that the inclusion of Mr Plahotniuc on the lists at issue was based exclusively on the existence of criminal investigations or criminal proceedings concerning offences of embezzlement of State funds, secondly, that the onus was on the Council to verify whether the decisions to initiate such investigations or proceedings had been adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection, and, thirdly, that the Council was under an obligation to state the reasons for its decision by explaining why it had considered that the decisions of the third State on which it intended to rely had been adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection.

29 In addition, the Council states that the present case differs from that which gave rise to the judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031), and argues that the listing criteria laid down in Decision 2023/891 do not require a person’s misconduct to be the subject of a decision by the Moldovan authorities to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, if the Council were to rely on such a decision, the obligation to verify that it had been taken in accordance with those rights would not apply.

30 The Council submits that, since it does not have powers of investigation in third States in order to verify whether the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection were actually observed, the imposition of such an obligation on it would considerably curtail its ability to implement the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) through the adoption of restrictive measures, contrary to the line of authority devolving, inter alia, from the judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), according to which the Council has a broad discretion to determine the persons and entities to be subject to restrictive measures.

31 That obligation is also, it is claimed, likely to lead certain third States or persons to take action to prevent their inclusion on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures. For example, a third State with an uncooperative authoritarian regime would simply have to initiate fictitious criminal proceedings against important figures of the regime in order to prevent the Council from including such persons on that list, as it would be impossible to verify whether the proceedings had been conducted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection, let alone prove that that was indeed the case. In the current geopolitical context, such a limitation would seriously hamper the action of the European Union in the field of the CFSP as well as its ability to uphold and promote its fundamental values and interests as set out in Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU.

32 Likewise, the paradoxical consequence of that obligation would be that the burden of proof would differ depending on whether or not the third State had initiated criminal proceedings and, in particular, it would be much easier to discharge the burden of proving wrongdoing in the case of minor acts falling short of the threshold for the initiation of criminal proceedings or in States with criminal impunity.

33 The Council submits that, in any event, the General Court was incorrect to rely on the line of authority devolving from the judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031), since that judgment was delivered in the context of a system of restrictive measures under which the listing criteria require the person in question to be ‘subject to investigation’ by the national authorities and the main purpose of which is to assist the third State concerned in administering justice there in accordance with the procedural rights of the persons subject to investigation. That is not the case with the system of restrictive measures established by Decision 2023/891 and Regulation 2023/888.

34 First, although the Court did indeed find, in that judgment, that the Council must, before acting on the basis of a decision of an authority of a third State to initiate criminal proceedings, verify whether that decision was adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection, the guidance drawn from that judgment was applied in the context of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/143 of 29 January 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015 L 24, p. 16), under which the designation criteria require the person concerned to be subject to investigation by the Ukrainian authorities.

35 Secondly, the main objective of the systems of restrictive measures relating to the embezzlement of funds, such as the system concerning Ukraine, is to assist the authorities of the third State in question in administering justice in accordance with the procedural rights of the persons subject to investigation. Thus, in such systems, the objective of the action of the European Union under the CFSP overlaps, at least in part, with the objective of the criminal proceedings initiated in the third State. By contrast, a system of restrictive measures such as that established by Decision 2023/891, designed to combat actions destabilising the country, is not intended to support criminal proceedings, so that the mere fact that some of the targeted activities are also the subject of criminal investigations is immaterial.

36 Furthermore, the Council complains that the General Court erred in law by relying on the third paragraph of Article 8 of Decision 2023/891 in order to justify applying the line of authority deriving from the judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031), to the present case. Apart from the fact that that provision applies only to the review of restrictive measures and not, as in the present case, to their initial adoption, it does not require the Council to rely on the existence of judicial proceedings; it merely provides that the Council is to take account of such proceedings, as appropriate.

37 Similarly, the Council argues that the General Court incorrectly held, in paragraphs 45 and 46 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council cannot be released from the verification obligation and the obligation to state reasons, even though it did not rely solely on decisions of the Moldovan authorities to conduct criminal investigations or initiate criminal proceedings, but essentially on press articles or open sources of information. In that connection, the Council reiterates that, in the present case, the inclusion of Mr Plahotniuc on the lists at issue is not based exclusively on the existence of criminal proceedings, but rests on a body of evidence such as official sources, articles, press releases and journalistic sources which are recognised as tangible by the relevant case-law.

38 Lastly, the Council submits that, in any event, Mr Plahotniuc has not demonstrated any serious breach of his procedural rights.

39 The High Representative essentially supports the arguments advanced by the Council.

40 According to the High Representative, it does not follow from a textual, contextual or teleological interpretation of Article 1(1)(a) of Decision 2023/891 and Article 2(3)(a) of Regulation 2023/888 that the Council is required, when making reference to the existence of a decision initiating criminal proceedings or conducting an investigation, to verify beforehand whether that decision was adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection, since the listing criteria set out in those provisions do not make the adoption of a decision of that nature a necessary and sufficient condition for the purposes of listing.

41 More specifically, the High Representative states that, in systems such as that established by Decision 2023/891 and Regulation 2023/888, the Council’s intention is not to designate persons based on their individual criminal conduct, but rather to penalise certain conduct which has or could have effects contrary to the values or interests of the European Union in the context of its external relations.

42 Thus, according to the High Representative, the fact that the Council chose to refer, in the grounds for the listing at issue, to criminal proceedings initiated in Moldova for alleged corruption offences merely indicates that those proceedings were taken into account when assessing whether the inclusion of Mr Plahotniuc on the lists at issue was well founded. Moreover, had the Council not included any reference to those proceedings, the listing would have been valid, as it was supported by evidence such as press articles, press releases and reports by consultancy firms and non-governmental organisations.

43 In the response, Mr Plahotniuc disputes those arguments and contends that the second ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.

Findings of the Court

44 It is settled case-law that, in a review of restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Treaties, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the EU legal order (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 97; of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 58; and of 29 November 2018, Bank Tejarat v Council, C‑248/17 P, EU:C:2018:967, paragraph 38).

45 Those fundamental rights include, inter alia, respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection (judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited, and of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council, C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 21).

46 In that connection, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include or to maintain a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the statement of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of the information or evidence provided and by assessing the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 119 and 124; of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council, C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 38; and of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council, C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245, paragraph 327 and the case-law cited).

47 As regards, in particular, the inclusion of persons on the lists of restrictive measures on grounds based exclusively on decisions of the authorities of third States, which were competent to take those decisions, to conduct criminal investigations or initiate criminal proceedings concerning offences of embezzlement of State funds, as the General Court correctly pointed out in paragraphs 41 and 42 of the judgment under appeal, it is for the Council to verify whether those decisions were adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council, C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraphs 25, 26 and 29 and the case-law cited).

48 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraph 44 of the judgment under appeal, the statement of reasons for the acts at issue showed that Mr Plahotniuc’s inclusion on the lists at issue was based exclusively on decisions of the Moldovan authorities to conduct criminal investigations and initiate criminal proceedings against him.

49 The General Court nevertheless made clear, in paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council did not rely directly on decisions of the Moldovan authorities, which were competent to take those decisions, to conduct criminal investigations or initiate criminal proceedings concerning offences of embezzlement of State funds; rather, it essentially relied on press articles and press releases issued by the prosecutorial or investigating authorities of Moldova, on official announcements by State bodies of third countries or on reports, all of which refer to such criminal investigations and criminal proceedings.

50 In those circumstances, relying on the line of authority devolving from the judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031), the General Court was correct to hold, in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment under appeal, that it was for the Council to verify beforehand whether those decisions had been adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection. In that connection, the General Court pointed out that the fact that the evidence on which the Council had relied in order to justify the inclusion of Mr Plahotniuc on the lists at issue was essentially indirect evidence of investigation measures and criminal prosecutions against him could not release that institution from its verification obligation.

51 The Council has not demonstrated that that assessment is vitiated by an error of law.

52 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, as in the proceedings before the General Court, the Council does not dispute, in its appeal against the judgment under appeal, that it did not verify that the criminal investigations and criminal proceedings against Mr Plahotniuc in Moldova – relied on in order to establish that the criterion of serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital had been satisfied – had been initiated in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection. The Council nevertheless denies that it was bound by such a verification obligation, arguing, inter alia, that the listing criteria laid down in Decision 2023/891 do not require a person’s misconduct to be the subject of a decision by the Moldovan authorities to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, if the Council were to rely on such a decision, the obligation to verify that it had been taken in accordance with those rights would, it is claimed, not apply.

53 However, according to the settled case-law deriving from the judgment of 26 July 2017, Council v LTTE (C‑599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583), subsequently recalled in particular in the judgments of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031), of 11 July 2019, Azarov v Council (C‑416/18 P, EU:C:2019:602), of 26 September 2019, Klymenko v Council (C‑11/18 P, EU:C:2019:786), and of 3 December 2020, Saleh Thabet and Others v Council (C‑72/19 P and C‑145/19 P, EU:C:2020:992), and in the order of 22 October 2019, Azarov v Council (C‑58/19 P, EU:C:2019:890), where persons are included on lists of restrictive measures on grounds based on the decision of an authority of a third State, which was competent to take that decision, to initiate criminal proceedings, it is for the Council to carry out such a verification.

54 In that regard, the Council’s argument that that case-law applies only in the context of systems of restrictive measures under which the listing criteria require the person in question to be subject to investigation by the national authorities and the main purpose of which is to assist the third State concerned in administering justice there in accordance with the procedural rights of the persons concerned, which is not the case with the system of restrictive measures established by Decision 2023/891 and Regulation 2023/888, cannot succeed.

55 As the General Court correctly pointed out in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of Justice has ruled that it is irrelevant that the existence of decisions of the authorities of a third State, which were competent to take those decisions, to initiate and conduct a criminal investigation concerning an offence of embezzlement of public funds constitutes not the listing criterion at issue, but rather the factual basis for the contested restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council, C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 25, and of 11 July 2019, Azarov v Council, C‑416/18 P, EU:C:2019:602, paragraph 26).

56 Furthermore, while it is true that the Council has a broad discretion to determine the persons and entities which will be subject to the restrictive measures that the European Union adopts in the field of the CFSP (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 88), the fact remains that that institution is always required to have a sufficiently solid factual basis for the adoption of such measures and to verify that the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection were observed at the time of the adoption of the decision of the third State concerned on which it intends to base the restrictive measures, in order to protect the persons concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council, C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 34; of 11 July 2019, Azarov v Council, C‑416/18 P, EU:C:2019:602, paragraphs 27 and 29; of 26 September 2019, Klymenko v Council, C‑11/18 P, EU:C:2019:786, paragraph 29; and of 3 December 2020, Saleh Thabet and Others v Council, C‑72/19 P and C‑145/19 P, EU:C:2020:992, paragraphs 37 and 39).

57 In that regard, as the General Court correctly pointed out in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, the case-law cited in paragraph 53 above had to be applied, in the present case, all the more strictly to the Council, since the evidence on which that institution relied was essentially indirect evidence of the investigation measures and prosecutions justifying the inclusion of Mr Plahotniuc on the lists at issue.

58 Moreover, the General Court noted that, in order to maintain a person’s name on those lists, the third paragraph of Article 8 of Decision 2023/891 required the Council to take account of the existence of judicial proceedings in respect of the conduct for which that person had initially been listed.

59 In so far as the Council complains that the General Court also erred in its interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 8 of Decision 2023/891, suffice it to note that it is clear from the wording used by the General Court and, in particular, from the use of ‘in addition’ at the beginning of the sentence concerned that this was a ground included purely for the sake of completeness on which the General Court did not rely in order to find that the verification obligation had been infringed.

60 As regards the obligation to state the reasons underpinning the grounds for the listing at issue referred to in paragraph 62 of the appeal, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, it is for the Council, in order to fulfil that obligation, to show, in the decision imposing restrictive measures, that it has verified that the decision of the third State on which those measures are based was adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council, C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

61 It follows from that case-law that the statement of reasons must disclose, in a clear and unequivocal fashion, the reasoning followed by the EU institution which adopted the act in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure for the purpose of assessing whether it is well founded and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review, and that the Council must base measures maintaining a name on a fund-freezing list on sufficiently detailed and specific reasons (judgment of 10 September 2020, Hamas v Council, C‑122/19 P, EU:C:2020:690, paragraphs 53 and 54 and the case-law cited).

62 The question whether the statement of reasons for an act is sufficient must be assessed with regard to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question, such that the reasons given for an act adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that act was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables the latter to understand the scope of the act concerning that person (judgment of 3 July 2025, Grodno Azot and Khimvolokno Plant v Council, C‑326/24 P, EU:C:2025:522, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

63 In the present case, as the General Court found in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment under appeal, it is neither disputed nor open to dispute that the Council failed to show, in the grounds for the listing at issue, that it had verified that the prosecutions referred to in those grounds had been conducted in accordance with Mr Plahotniuc’s rights of the defence and right to effective judicial protection, and, a fortiori, that it had failed to disclose the outcome of those verifications in the acts at issue.

64 In those circumstances, the General Court did not err in law in finding, in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons as regards the two elements which could be taken into consideration in order to assess whether the acts at issue were well founded, namely the existence, first, of criminal proceedings in Moldova for crimes in connection with the embezzlement of State funds and their illegal export and, secondly, of criminal investigations and prosecutions in the ‘Bank Fraud’ case and for ‘bribing the former president of the Republic of Moldova’.

65 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the General Court observed the principles, stemming from the case-law cited in paragraphs 46 and 53 above, relating to the review of the legality of the grounds on which the acts at issue are based. Accordingly, the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraphs 52 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had not fulfilled its obligation to state the reasons underpinning the grounds for the listing at issue and did not err in law in annulling the acts at issue.

66 It follows that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

The first ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

67 By its first ground of appeal, the Council submits that the General Court distorted the acts at issue by finding that Mr Plahotniuc’s listing was based solely on the criterion of serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital. It is apparent from the wording of the grounds for the listing at issue, in particular the reference in the first paragraph of those grounds to the fact that Mr Plahotniuc was ‘being investigated for bribing the former president of the Republic of Moldova with a bag of cash in exchange for political favours’, that the acts at issue were also based on the criterion of undermining the democratic political process.

68 Moreover, the Council states that at no point during the proceedings before the General Court did Mr Plahotniuc challenge the Council’s position that he had been listed on the basis of those two criteria, so that the General Court should have accepted that uncontested fact and should not have decided of its own motion that the ground for the listing at issue concerned only one of those two criteria.

69 The Council adds that the General Court’s distortion of the acts at issue caused it to disregard the elements of fact set out in those acts concerning the criterion of undermining the democratic political process.

70 The High Representative supports the Council’s arguments. Whilst conceding that the wording of the grounds for the listing at issue could have been improved, the High Representative maintains that the reference to Mr Plahotniuc ‘being investigated for bribing the former president of the Republic of Moldova with a bag of cash in exchange for political favours’ implicitly but necessarily relates to the criterion of undermining the democratic political process, and adds that, moreover, the Council expressly stated in the second paragraph of those grounds that, by his actions, Mr Plahotniuc was ‘undermining the democratic political process in the Republic of Moldova’.

71 In the response, Mr Plahotniuc contends that the first ground of appeal must be rejected. He recalls the need for the Council to be clear in the statement of reasons for restrictive measures given the significant consequences they entail and states that, as the General Court indeed held, the statement of reasons for the acts at issue was imprecise and ambiguous. In addition, Mr Plahotniuc argues that the first ground of appeal is academic since, irrespective of the statement of reasons, the Council did not adequately verify whether his procedural rights had been observed in any investigations or proceedings in Moldova.

Findings of the Court

72 It is settled case-law that, where one of the grounds adopted by the General Court is sufficient to sustain the operative part of its judgment, any defects that might vitiate other grounds given in the judgment concerned in any event have no bearing on that operative part and, accordingly, a plea relying on such defects is ineffective and must be dismissed (see, inter alia, judgments of 14 June 2018, Makhlouf v Council, C‑458/17 P, EU:C:2018:441, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited, and of 8 May 2025, Gutseriev v Council, C‑681/23 P, EU:C:2025:327, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

73 In the present case, even if the Council had also relied, in order to adopt the acts at issue, on the criterion of undermining the democratic political process, and to that end had taken as its factual basis the existence of an ‘[investigation] for bribing the former president of the Republic of Moldova with a bag of cash in exchange for political favours’, the onus would have been on the Council, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 46 and 53 above, to verify whether the decision of the Moldovan authorities to initiate that investigation into Mr Plahotniuc had been taken in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection.

74 However, as Mr Plahotniuc argued in his action before the General Court, it is not apparent from the grounds for the listing at issue that the Council carried out such a verification.

75 In those circumstances, the General Court’s distortion of the acts at issue, even if proven, would not be such as to invalidate point 1 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal, by which the General Court annulled those acts.

76 Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.

77 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that, since none of the grounds of appeal has been upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

78 Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.

79 In accordance with Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

80 In the present case, since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Mr Plahotniuc, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.

81 Under Article 140(3) of those rules, the High Representative is also to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Mr Vladimir Gheorghe Plahotniuc;

3. Orders the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to bear its own costs.

von Danwitz

Ziemele

Bošnjak

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 November 2026.

V. Di Bucci

T. von Danwitz

Registrar

Vice-President, acting as President of the Chamber

* Language of the case: English.