Details
ECLI
Source
Decision form
Issue date
Last update
File mark
Court
Jurisdiction
Žiadne známe citácie.
62025CC0298_en.html
HTML · 62.42 KB
No categories available
62025CC0298
Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
NORKUS
delivered on 5 November 2026 (1)
Case C‑298/25
Ofsets Limited
v
Sabena Technics Helicopters,
Stoltd Partner Limited
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France))
Introduction
1 The question of how to distinguish between a legal action based on a contractual obligation and one based on a non-contractual obligation is often a matter of concern for national courts and the Court. That distinction is important for the purposes of the legal classification of such an action. In cross-border disputes, it is also decisive in determining which State’s courts have jurisdiction to hear the case and which State’s law applies to that case.
2 In the present case, the Court is being asked whether an action for damages brought on the grounds of the abrupt termination of an established business relationship without reasonable notice having been provided – a requirement imposed not by the contract but by statutory provisions relating to restrictive business practices – should be classified as contractual or non-contractual for the purposes of determining whether it falls, in substantive terms, within the scope of the Rome Convention (2) or the Rome II Regulation. (3)
3 The Rome Convention and the Rome II Regulation form part of a wider system for the harmonisation of the rules of private international law. It will therefore be necessary, as far as possible, to ensure a consistent interpretation of the various instruments in this field.
4 In the present Opinion, having first set out the case-law of the Court on the ‘test’ to be applied in order to determine whether an action should be classified as ‘contractual’ or ‘non-contractual’, I will explain the reasons why I consider that an action, such as the one at issue, is of a contractual nature.
Legal framework
European Union law
5 For the purposes of the present Opinion, the preamble, Article 1(1) and Article 10(1) of the Rome Convention are of particular relevance, as are recitals 6, 7 and 11, Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Rome II Regulation.
French law
6 Under Article L. 442-1(II) of the Commercial Code:
‘Any person engaged in production, distribution or the provision of services shall be liable for, and obliged to compensate for the harm resulting from, any act which abruptly terminates an established business relationship wholly or in part without prior written notice that takes account, in particular, of the duration of the business relationship, with regard to trade practices or inter-industry agreements, and, for the purpose of determining the price applicable during that period, of the economic conditions of the market on which the parties operate.
…
In the event of a dispute between the parties as to the notice period, the party terminating the contract cannot be held to have given insufficient notice as long as the notice provided was of 18 months.
The provisions of this paragraph II shall not affect the right to terminate without notice in the event of the other party’s failure to perform his or her obligations or in the event of force majeure.’
Facts giving rise to the dispute, national proceedings and the question referred
7 In 1995, Ofsets Limited, a limited liability company incorporated under Cypriot law, and Héli-union SA, a public limited company now known as Sabena Technics Helicopters incorporated under French law, concluded a contract for the supply of helicopter pilots and mechanical engineers. Under that contract, Héli-union entrusted Ofsets with the recruitment and employment of that personnel. That contract, which did not specify any minimum notice period, included a choice of law clause in favour of the laws of Jersey (Bailiwick of Jersey).
8 In June 2019, Héli-union contacted Stoltd Partner Limited, a company based in the United Kingdom with a subsidiary in Ireland. It wished to entrust that company with the services associated with the supply of personnel, in particular pilots and mechanics.
9 In March 2020, Héli-union terminated its business relationship with Ofsets, following which the latter brought an action before the French courts for the abrupt termination of an established business relationship, invoking the provisions of French law relating to the liability of a company that abruptly terminates a business relationship without sufficient notice, pursuant to Article L. 442-1(II) of the Commercial Code. Ofsets also claimed compensation for unfair competition arising from Héli-union’s conduct.
10 The cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris, France) ruled that those provisions were not applicable, but did not rule on whether the provision in question was a mandatory rule, and held that, under the Rome I Regulation, the law of Jersey, chosen by the parties, should take precedence. (4)
11 Ofsets brought an appeal before the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France), which is the referring court.
12 The referring court is seeking clarification as to whether an action for damages based on the abrupt termination of an established business relationship falls within the scope of tort law, as the judgment of 24 November 2020, Wikingerhof (C‑59/19, EU:C:2020:950) (5) would appear to suggest, or within the scope of contract law, as the judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo (C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559) (6) might indicate.
13 In those circumstances, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Must Article 1(1) of the [Rome Convention] and the [Rome II Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that an action for damages for the abrupt termination of an established business relationship, assessed on the basis of legislative provisions governing practices regarded as restrictive of competition, and thus of a legal obligation to refrain from a certain type of conduct, falls within the ambit of matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, irrespective of any contractual relationship that may have been established between the parties?’
14 The order for reference, dated 2 April 2025, was received at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 22 April 2025. Written observations were lodged by the respondents in the main proceedings, by the European Commission, and by the German, French, Italian and Czech Governments. Pursuant to Article 76(2) of its Rules of Procedure, the Court decided not to hold a hearing.
Analysis
Preliminary observations
15 It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it and that, to that end, the Court may have to reformulate the question referred to it. (7)
16 In the present case, the referring court is seeking clarification as to whether the action for damages at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope of contract law or of tort, delict or quasi-delict. It is asking the Court to interpret those concepts in the light of Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention and Article 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation. On this point, it should be observed that the legal instruments to be interpreted use the terms ‘contractual obligation’ and ‘non-contractual obligation’. It should therefore be held that, by its question, the referring court is asking the Court to interpret those concepts within the meaning of the Rome Convention and the Rome II Regulation, respectively, with a view to classifying the action for damages at issue in the main proceedings and, consequently, determining which of those legal instruments is applicable to that action.
17 Having said that, it should first be recalled that, as the contract at issue in the main proceedings was concluded in 1995, it remains governed by the Rome Convention. (8) It follows, as the referring court has also considered, that if the action for damages at issue in the main proceedings is classified as contractual, that convention would be applicable ratione temporis to the dispute in the main proceedings.
18 On that basis, it should be noted that the Rome Convention is not an act of EU law. However, the Court has jurisdiction, in principle, to rule on the interpretation of the provisions of that convention pursuant to the First Protocol, which entered into force on 1 August 2004, (9) and, in relation to the present case, in accordance with Article 2(a) of that Protocol.
19 Next, since the respondent in the main proceedings terminated the business relationship in March 2020, if the action for damages at issue is classified as non-contractual, that action would be governed – as the referring court has, moreover, held – by the Rome II Regulation, which applies ratione temporis to the events giving rise to the damage which occurred on or after 11 January 2009.
20 Finally, to my knowledge, the Court has not yet had the opportunity to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, a contractual obligation within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention and, on the other hand, a non-contractual obligation within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation. However, the determination of the applicable law in the main proceedings depends precisely on the distinction between those two concepts.
21 However, this question of a distinction is not new. Various elements of the response can be identified in the case-law of the Court, developed in the context of legal instruments governing private international law; I consider it essential to review that case-law before proceeding to examine the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling in the present case.
Review of the relevant case-law for the purposes of distinguishing between the concepts of ‘contractual obligation’ and ‘non-contractual obligation’
22 It should be recalled that it is settled case-law that the provisions relating to the rules for determining the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations must be interpreted independently, by reference to the scheme and purpose of those rules. (10) Those concepts cannot therefore be taken to refer to how the legal relationship at issue before the national court is classified by the relevant national law. (11) It should also be borne in mind that, for the purposes of this interpretation, account should be taken not only of the aim of consistency in the reciprocal application of the legal instruments governing the determination of the law applicable to these categories of obligations, but also of the legal instruments governing the determination of the court having jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning those categories. (12)
23 As regards, in the first place, the interpretation of the concept of ‘contractual obligation’ within the framework of the Rome I Regulation, the Court has already had occasion to rule, in the light of the concept of ‘matters relating to contract’ – as developed when interpreting that latter concept in the context of the Brussels I Regulation, (13) and in accordance with the aim of consistency between the Rome I Regulation, the Rome II Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation – that the concept of ‘contractual obligation’ designates a legal obligation freely consented to by one person towards another. (14)
24 Given that the Rome I Regulation has replaced the Rome Convention between Member States, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of one of those legal instruments also applies to those of the other, whenever those provisions may be regarded as equivalent. (15) Such an equivalence is apparent between, on the one hand, Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention and, on the other hand, Article 1(1) of the Rome I Regulation, in so far as both provisions provide, in essence, that these two acts apply to contractual obligations in situations involving a conflict of laws. (16)
25 Consequently, in order to ensure continuity of interpretation (17) and, moreover, legal certainty, the concept of ‘contractual obligation’, as laid down in Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention, must be recognised as having the same scope as the same concept laid down in Article 1(1) of the Rome I Regulation, as follows from the case-law of the Court cited above, namely a legal obligation freely consented to by one person towards another. (18)
26 Second, with regard to the concept of ‘non-contractual obligation’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation, the Court has held, again in the light of the Brussels I Regulation and in accordance with the aim of consistency in the application of the Rome I, Rome II and Brussels I Regulations, that that concept refers to an obligation which could form the basis for establishing the liability of a defendant and that is not connected to a contractual matter, arising from one of the events listed under Article 2 of the Rome II Regulation. (19)
The relationship between the case-law positions arising from the judgments in Granarolo and in Wikingerhof
27 In line with the aim of consistency referred to in point 22 of the present Opinion, and in so far as the legal instruments of private international law relating to the determination of the applicable law, on the one hand, and those relating to the determination of the court having jurisdiction, on the other, use similar or equivalent terminology, it is necessary to interpret in parallel the concepts used to define their respective scopes, which are intended to identify which State’s law is applicable and which State’s courts have jurisdiction. (20)
28 As most of the judgments concerning the parallel interpretation of these analogous concepts have been described on numerous occasions by my colleagues, (21) I will focus in particular on the most recent case-law, paying particular attention to those cases the application of which in the main proceedings raises questions for the referring court.
29 In that regard, I would point out that the Court has already been asked to rule on the classification, within the meaning of the Brussels I Regulation, of an action for damages based on the abrupt termination of a long-standing business relationship, as provided for by a rule of French law analogous to that at issue in the main proceedings. (22) The distinctive feature of that ruling was that no written contract had been entered into between the applicant and the defendant in the main proceedings. On that occasion, in the judgment in Granarolo, the Court held that such an action is not a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict if a tacit contractual relationship existed between the parties, and specified the elements on which the proof of such a relationship must be based. (23)
30 In the more recent judgment in Wikingerhof, the Court held that an action seeking to put an end to certain conduct carried out in the context of the contractual relationship between the applicant and the defendant, and based on an allegation that the latter had abused its dominant position in breach of competition law, fell within the scope of matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict within the meaning of the Brussels I bis Regulation. (24) In particular, according to the Court, the criteria which mattered for the purposes of that classification were as follows: (i) if the interpretation of the contract appears indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of, which is in particular the case of an action based on the terms of a contract or on rules of law that are applicable by reason of that contract, (25) or (ii) if it does not appear indispensable to examine the content of the contract in order to assess whether the conduct is lawful or unlawful, since that obligation applies independently of that contract. (26) These criteria thus make it possible to determine whether the obligation forming the basis of the action brought before the national court is connected to matters relating to contract or to matters relating to tort or delict. (27) This interpretation has subsequently become settled and confirmed. (28)
31 Against the background of that case-law, the referring court is seeking to ascertain whether the action at issue in the main proceedings is connected to a matter relating to contract, as the case-law cited above in point 29 of the present Opinion would appear to indicate, or not, as the case-law of the Court recalled in point 30 of the present Opinion would suggest. That court draws the Court’s attention to French legal literature, which supports the view that the Court has abandoned its initial case-law in favour of the latter.
32 The positions of the governments, the Commission and the respondent in the main proceedings, which have submitted written observations in this case, differ on this point. The Commission and the German Government consider that the two cases cited above are not contradictory. Specifically, according to the Commission, they are simply intended to clarify the various aspects of the interpretation of the concepts of ‘contractual’ and ‘non-contractual matters’. The Italian Government appears to share this view, considering that the judgment in Wikingerhof is more a logical extension of the judgment in Granarolo. The French Government considers that the judgment in Granarolo cannot be transposed to the present case, since the judgment in Wikingerhof subsequently clarified the criteria for classifying civil liability actions brought between contracting parties, and all the more so since, in the first of those judgments, the Court did not rule on the cause of the alleged breach. The respondent in the main proceedings considers that the judgment in Wikingerhof in no way calls into question the judgment in Granarolo, and the solution in the latter could be transposed to the present case. It should also be noted that the Czech Government has not taken an express position on the interpretation of this case-law.
33 In that connection, I share the view that the case-law arising from the judgments in Granarolo and in Wikingerhof is not contradictory.
34 It is true that, in the judgment in Wikingerhof, the Court clarified its case-law, as Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe invited it to do, in relation to potential coincidences of liability in order to define clear and foreseeable criteria, such as to avoid any legal uncertainty for the parties, (29) in particular by imposing the requirement that the source of the obligation which constitutes the cause of action must be identified. (30)
35 I would recall that the factual circumstances at issue in those judgments were different. Indeed, in the judgment in Wikingerhof, while the parties were bound by a contract, the alleged breach concerned anti-competitive conduct, which was punishable by law irrespective of the existence of that contract. Unlike the case at issue in the judgment in Granarolo, this concerned an obligation relating to conduct as a whole, which by its very nature is severable from the contract, and not a requirement for the ‘correct’ implementation of the termination of a contract, as in the judgment in Granarolo and, moreover, as is the situation in the present case.
36 In particular, in the judgment in Wikingerhof, the Court held that the applicant in the main proceedings was relying, in its application, on an infringement of German competition law, which laid down a general prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position, independently of any contract or other voluntary commitment. (31) It can therefore be inferred, conversely, that if a prohibition on a particular course of conduct applies solely by virtue of the contract, it must be classified as contractual.
37 It follows that the judgments in Granarolo and in Wikingerhof, which were handed down in different circumstances, thus called for different solutions, although the lessons to be drawn from them should not be regarded as irreconcilable.
Intermediate conclusion on classification criteria
38 It follows from the case-law cited in points 22 to 37 of the present Opinion – which case-law is, moreover, now well-established – that the decisive factor in determining whether an obligation is of a contractual or non-contractual nature lies in identifying the source of that obligation. The existence of a contractual relationship between the parties is not, in itself, decisive, as there is a need to identify the actual cause of action, without limiting these considerations to the identity of the parties.
39 In particular, it is necessary to examine whether the obligation that the applicant is alleging has been breached arises from a legal commitment freely consented to by one person towards another, or from a general legal or regulatory duty that is severable from any relationship that might result from that freely assumed legal obligation. (32)
40 In that connection, the case-law cited above teaches us that a legal obligation – and a legal action brought on the grounds of a breach of that obligation – must be regarded as falling within the scope of matters relating to contract if they are based on rules of law that are applicable by reason of that contract (33) and if the reason for that action is itself linked to the existence of that contract. (34) It seems to me that it can be inferred that determining the source of an obligation should not be understood as referring, in the strict sense, to the legal basis on which it is founded, (35) but rather to the act by reason of which that obligation arises.
41 Furthermore, it is thus necessary to examine what determines whether the conduct is lawful or unlawful and, in fine, the existence and extent of compensation, namely whether the contract or the rules applicable by reason of that contract need to be interpreted, or whether the contract serves only to establish the facts of the case and any assessment of the lawfulness or otherwise of the conduct, and of the existence and extent of such compensation, require that assessments be made which are foreign to the contractual relationship. (36)
42 Furthermore, in accordance with the case-law, (37) the concept of a ‘non-contractual obligation’ is a residual concept in comparison to that of a ‘contractual obligation’. This appears to be all the more true in the case of the concept of ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’. (38)
43 That being said, it is now necessary to classify the action for damages at issue in the main proceedings by identifying the underlying cause of action, in order to determine whether the obligation on which the appellant relies against the respondent is a ‘contractual’ obligation.
Classification of the action for damages brought on the grounds of the abrupt termination of a business relationship
44 In the main proceedings, the appellant has based its claims on a provision of French law that provides for the liability of any person engaged in production, distribution or the provision of services who abruptly terminates an established business relationship without prior written notice that takes into account, in particular, the duration of the business relationship, with regard to trade practices or inter-industry agreements. As the referring court explains in its request for a preliminary ruling, the abrupt termination of an established business relationship, as laid down by that rule, constitutes a practice that is regarded as ‘restrictive of competition’, which is classified as a tort under national law and subject to specific penalties.
45 It should be noted, first of all, that, in accordance with the case-law cited in point 22 of the present Opinion, the classification under national law of the abrupt termination of a business relationship as a practice that restricts competition and as a tort has no bearing on its classification for the purposes of applying the conflict-of-law rules under private international law.
46 Furthermore, as I will explain below, the obligation in question arises from the existence of a contract, which gives concrete form to the mutual voluntary commitment of the parties in the main proceedings, and is therefore of a contractual nature.
47 I would point out that the life of a contract is marked by two specific legal stages – its beginning and its end. The first stage takes the form of a consensus reached on the very principle of voluntary commitment. The second, on the other hand, can take several forms. The end of a contract can be described as ‘early’ where it results from a breach of contract or its cancellation, or as ‘natural’ where it is the result of the expiry of a fixed term, the performance of the obligations for which that contract provides, or a unilateral termination in the case of a contract of indefinite duration.
48 In terms of the latter way to end the contract – unilateral termination – this embodies respect for the parties’ freedom of contract, thereby preventing perpetual commitments. (39) In the present case, it is common ground that the parties to the main proceedings were bound by a contract and that the appellant alleges that the respondent terminated that contract abruptly. As a stage in the ‘life cycle’ of a contract, termination seems to me to be difficult to sever from the rest of the contract and from the law governing it. (40) Consequently, it must belong to the same legal order as that applied to the obligations arising from that contract, in order to ensure legal certainty and the predictability of the rules.
49 That said, as to the classification of the obligation at issue in the main proceedings, the referring court, like the Commission in its observations, appears to attach importance to the fact that it is the law – and not the contract – which provides for the giving of sufficient written notice in the event of the termination of an established business relationship. Nevertheless, that circumstance cannot be decisive in determining the nature of the obligation in question.
50 Indeed, this obligation not to terminate established business relationships abruptly – which is, admittedly, laid down by law – would be meaningless if the parties were not bound by a contract. It is clear that a natural or legal person other than that with whom the applicant had a contractual relationship cannot be held liable for the abrupt termination, (41) since such a basis for liability does not exist independently of the contract. Consequently, the requirement to give sufficient written notice in the event of the termination of an established business relationship arises specifically on account of the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties. In other words, this respect is based on rules of law that are applicable by virtue of the very existence of the contract between these parties.
51 Let us imagine a dispute concerning a similar situation in which the parties have decided to include, in their contract, a clause requiring compliance with a notice period, or even a specific time frame, in the event of unilateral termination of the contract. Should the obligation therefore be classified as contractual, whereas, in the absence of such a clause in the contract, that same obligation would be classified as non-contractual?
52 I do not believe that such a distinction, based on the act which envisages compliance with a notice period – namely, the law or the contract – is satisfactory from the point of view of legal certainty and the foreseeability of the applicable law in cross-border situations, as it could lead to different outcomes for similar legal situations. Indeed, in both these situations, the obligation not to terminate the contract abruptly arises and, consequently, stems from the existence of the contract and the application of the rules under that contract. In other words, the obligation not to terminate established business relationships abruptly applies specifically on account of that contract, which is being terminated abruptly. That rule, and the obligation arising from it, are therefore directly linked to the existence of a commitment freely consented to between the appellant and the respondent in the main proceedings.
53 Furthermore, subject to verification by the referring court, it appears to follow from the rule of French law, on which the appellant in the main proceedings relies, that that rule punishes not the termination itself, but the nature of that termination, namely the abrupt termination. This circumstance strikes me as particularly important in the present case.
54 In that connection, I note that it is not the termination itself that entitles the appellant to establish liability, on the part of the other party to the contract, for compensation for the damage caused, but rather its abrupt nature – failing to give sufficient notice and without notice being provided in writing – that causes this damage and gives rise to compensation. In other words, it is a failure to comply with the requirement to implement the termination ‘correctly’, in accordance with these terms, that is liable to result in penalties. As such, I do not think that such a failure is severable from the existence of the contract. Indeed, the rule under French law appears to permit a procedure for terminating a contract, which clearly cannot take place (and cannot be sanctioned) without the existence of that contract.
55 The interpretation that the action at issue in the main proceedings should be classified as contractual also seems to me to be consistent with the purposes and scheme of the Rome Convention. On the one hand, the high level of legal certainty, which strengthens confidence in the stability of the relationship between the contracting parties, (42) argues in favour of classifying the obligation not to terminate a business relationship abruptly as a contractual obligation, so as to ensure foreseeability regarding the law applicable at a stage marking the end of that relationship between the contracting parties. In other words, this argues in favour of applying the same law at every stage in the life cycle of the contract.
56 Furthermore, classifying the obligation at issue in the main proceedings as contractual would ensure compliance with the crucial importance attached by the Rome Convention to the parties’ freedom of contract in choosing the law applicable to contractual obligations, (43) in a manner that applies indivisibly to the contract as a whole. Indeed, as is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling, the contract between the parties contained a choice of law clause designating the laws of the Island of Jersey as the applicable law. (44)
57 Finally, the conclusion that the action in question should be classified as contractual is, in my view, inevitable, in accordance with the aim of ensuring consistency between the legal instruments forming part of the single system for the harmonisation of the rules of private international law. As a reminder, in order to classify an action as contractual or non-contractual, that system requires the identification of the underlying obligation, which must be regarded as being of a contractual nature if it arises from the application of rules by reason of the existence of a contract. As I have shown above, this is precisely the case with regard to the action at issue in the main proceedings.
58 In that regard, subject to verification by the referring court, and contrary to the French Government’s position, it seems to me that the interpretation of the contract is essential in assessing the abruptness of the termination. Indeed, criteria such as the duration of the business relationship, the price applicable throughout its duration and even the market in which the parties operate – which are expressly set out in Article L. 442-1(II)(1) of the Commercial Code for the purpose of assessing whether the written notice period is sufficient – cannot be established without an in-depth analysis of the contract between the parties.
59 Accordingly, in line with the Czech, German and Italian Governments, which have submitted written observations, I am of the view that the point of reference for assessing the lawfulness of the conduct alleged against the respondent lies in the interpretation of the contract and the rules applicable by reason of its existence between the parties, such that that action must itself be regarded as linked to the existence of that contract.
60 The French Government has drawn the Court’s attention to the fact that legal proceedings based on the abrupt termination of an established business relationship may be brought by the Minister for the Economy, irrespective of the parties to that relationship. However, this fact does not invalidate the conclusion that the cause of action is based on rules of law that are applicable solely by reason of the existence of a contract. Indeed, determining whether the conduct at issue in the main proceedings is lawful or unlawful requires an analysis of the contract and the rules applicable by reason of that contract. Consequently, the action in the main proceedings arises from a contractual obligation. Furthermore, in the judgment in Granarolo, when dealing with a similar provision under French law, the Court was already aware of the public policy nature of that provision, (45) but did not, however, consider that it was devoid of a contractual nature for that reason.
61 Furthermore, the fact that an obligation is linked to the rules on practices that restrict competition also cannot lead to that obligation being automatically classified as contractual or non-contractual. Indeed, the ambit of those practices is broad, ranging from the unlawful disclosure of trade secrets to false allegations or statements that, if used, could mislead the public. It is therefore clear that a person who engages in misleading advertising or makes false allegations likely to discredit a competitor does not necessarily have a contractual relationship with that competitor, unlike traders involved in an established business relationship. Consequently, the classification of such obligations, like that of others, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the case-law criteria set out in points 38 to 43 of the present Opinion. (46)
Proposed answer
62 I therefore propose that the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling in the present case be answered to the effect that Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention and of the Rome II Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the law applicable to an action for damages for the abrupt termination of an established business relationship is to be determined in accordance with that convention.
Conclusion
63 Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, I suggest that the Court answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) as follows:
Article 1(1) of the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980, and Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)
must be interpreted as meaning that the law applicable to actions for damages arising from the abrupt termination of an established business relationship is to be determined in accordance with that convention.
1 Original language: French.
2 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 (OJ 1980 L 266, p. 1; ‘the Rome Convention’).
3 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199 p. 40; ‘the Rome II Regulation’).
4 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6) (‘the Rome I Regulation’).
5 ‘The judgment in Wikingerhof’.
6 ‘The judgment in Granarolo’.
7 See judgment of 5 March 2020, X (Exemption of VAT for telephone consultations) (C‑48/19, EU:C:2020:169, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
8 It is clear from the case-law of the Court that, in accordance with Article 28 of the Rome I Regulation, the application thereof depends on the date of conclusion of the contract concerned (see judgment of 25 March 2021, Obala i lučice, C‑307/19, EU:C:2021:236, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). Consequently, the provisions of the Rome I Regulation, which succeeded the Rome Convention, apply exclusively to contracts concluded on or after 17 December 2009, and not to the future effects of contracts concluded before that date.
9 First Protocol (89/128/EEC) on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 (OJ 1989 L 48, p. 1), as well as the Accession Conventions of 10 April 1984, 18 May 1992 and 29 November 1996, and Second Protocol (89/129/EEC) conferring on the Court of Justice of the European Communities certain powers to interpret the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 (OJ 1989 L 48, p. 17), and the Accession Conventions of 10 April 1984, 18 May 1992 and 29 November 1996.
10 See, to that effect, judgments of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch (C‑29/10, EU:C:2011:151, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited); of 28 July 2016, Verein für Konsumenteninformation (C‑191/15, EU:C:2016:612, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited); and of 15 January 2026, Wunner (C‑77/24, EU:C:2026:1, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
11 The judgment in Granarolo, paragraph 19.
12 Judgment of 21 January 2016, ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic (C‑359/14 and C‑475/14, ‘the judgment in ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic’, EU:C:2016:40, paragraph 43).
13 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1) (‘the Brussels I Regulation’).
14 See the judgment in ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited, which, to my knowledge, is the first judgment in which the Court clarified this concept in the context of the legal instrument governing the determination of the applicable law.
15 See, by analogy, judgment of 20 June 2022, London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association (C‑700/20, EU:C:2022:488, paragraph 42).
16 The Rome I Regulation specifies that this refers to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.
17 As is clear from Article 24 of the Rome I Regulation, ‘this Regulation shall replace the Rome Convention in the Member States, except as regards the territories of the Member States which fall within the territorial scope of that Convention and to which this Regulation does not apply pursuant to Article 299 of the Treaty’ (paragraph 1) and ‘in so far as this Regulation replaces the provisions of the Rome Convention, any reference to that Convention shall be understood as a reference to this Regulation’ (paragraph 2).
See also Magnus, U. and Mankowski, P., Rome I Regulation – Commentary, Vol. 2, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Cologne, 2017, p. 32, https://doi.org/10.9785/9783504384814.
18 Furthermore, in the case giving rise to the judgment of 3 October 2019, Verein für Konsumenteninformation (C‑272/18, EU:C:2019:827, paragraphs 37, 40 and 41), in which the Court was called upon to rule on exclusion from the respective scopes of the Rome Convention and the Rome I Regulation, in particular within the meaning of Article 1(2) of those legal instruments, it held that the contractual obligations covered by those instruments were, in essence, the subject of a continuous approach in their interpretation.
19 The judgment in ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic is, to my knowledge, the first judgment in which the Court clarified this concept in the context of the legal instrument governing the determination of the applicable law. Furthermore, it is clear from that judgment that the concept of ‘non-contractual obligation’ is broader than its counterpart, ‘matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict’. Indeed, a ‘non-contractual obligation’, within the meaning of the Rome II Regulation, is an obligation arising from tort/delict, unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo (see paragraphs 45 and 46 of that judgment).
20 I would emphasise that this conclusion applies to the concepts that determine the scope of these instruments, namely ‘contractual obligation’ and ‘non-contractual obligation’, on the one hand, and ‘matters relating to contract’ and ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, on the other. It goes without saying that this conclusion cannot automatically be applied to all the concepts laid down in these acts. Nor, therefore, does it imply an automatic transposition of the solutions adopted when interpreting the former acts to the latter (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2025, Locatrans, C‑485/24, EU:C:2025:955, paragraphs 49 and 51 and the case-law cited).
21 See, in particular, Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Wikingerhof (C‑59/19, EU:C:2020:688) and in HRVATSKE ŠUME (C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:728).
22 It is clear from the request for a preliminary ruling that this rule, which derives from Law No 96-588 of 1 July 1996 on fairness and balance in commercial relationships – which amended Article 36 of Order No 86-1243 of 1 December 1986 on freedom of pricing and competition, previously codified as Article L. 442-6(I)(5) of the Commercial Code at issue in the main proceedings in Granarolo, has – since Order No 2019-359 of 24 April 2019 – been laid down in Article L. 442-1(II) of the Commercial Code, which is at issue in the main proceedings in the present case.
23 See paragraph 28 and the operative part of the judgment in Granarolo.
Furthermore, the Court subsequently delivered a number of judgments on this matter, in which it held that all obligations arising from a contract where non-performance of that contract is relied upon in support of the applicant’s action fall within the scope of matters relating to contract, by recalling the need for there to be a legal obligation freely consented to by one person towards another, upon which the applicant’s action is based, with the result that the rule on special jurisdiction in matters relating to contract is based on the cause of action and not on the identity of the parties (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 2017, Kareda, C‑249/16, EU:C:2017:472, paragraphs 30 and 31; of 7 March 2018, flightright and Others, C‑274/16, C‑447/16 and C‑448/16, EU:C:2018:160, paragraphs 59 to 61 and the case-law cited; and of 4 October 2018, Feniks, C‑337/17, EU:C:2018:805, paragraphs 39 and 48 and the case-law cited, including, in particular, the judgment in ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic cited above).
24 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1) (‘the Brussels I bis Regulation’). In so far as, in accordance with recital 34 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, that regulation repeals and replaces the Brussels I Regulation, which itself replaced the Brussels Convention, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the latter legal instruments also applies to those of the Brussels I bis Regulation whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’. This is the case with regard to provisions connected to matters relating to contract or to matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict for the purposes of determining the competent court within the meaning of those legal instruments (see the judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraph 20).
25 The judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraph 32.
26 The judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraph 33.
27 The judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraph 31.
28 In particular, in subsequent judgments, the Court has continued to interpret matters relating to contract and matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, by attaching importance to identifying a contractual obligation that could arise tacitly, where that results from unequivocal acts expressing the intention of the parties (judgment of 25 March 2021, Obala i lučice, C‑307/19, EU:C:2021:236, paragraph 87 to 90, 98 and the case-law cited). The Court also summarised its reasoning by stating that, in order to determine whether an action falls within the scope of matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict within the meaning of the Brussels I Regulation, it is necessary to ascertain whether two conditions are satisfied, namely, first, that that action does not concern matters relating to a contract within the meaning of that regulation and, second, that it seeks to establish the liability of a defendant. With regard to the first condition, the Court noted that matters relating to a contract, within the meaning of the Brussels I Regulation, cover any claim based on an obligation freely consented to by one person towards another (judgment of 9 December 2021, HRVATSKE ŠUME, C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:985, paragraphs 43 and 44 and the case-law cited). Finally, the Court has also held that the existence of a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, does not permit the automatic application of the law of the contract to the non-contractual liability (judgment of 10 March 2022, BMA Nederland, C‑498/20, EU:C:2022:173, paragraphs 63 and 64, reaffirmed in the judgment of 15 January 2026, Wunner, C‑77/24, EU:C:2026:1, paragraph 55, in the context of the Rome II Regulation).
29 See Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Wikingerhof (C‑59/19, EU:C:2020:688, paragraph 71), and the judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraphs 31 to 33.
30 The judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraph 31.
31 The judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraph 34.
32 The scope of the Rome II Regulation does not, however, cover all non-contractual disputes.
33 See the judgment in Wikingerhof, paragraph 32.
34 Judgment of 15 June 2017, Kareda (C‑249/16, EU:C:2017:472, paragraph 31).
35 Ultimately, the law lays down a number of rules. This does not, however, mean that all obligations based on those rules must be classified as non-contractual.
36 The judgment in ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, paragraphs 47 and 48.
37 See, to that effect, the judgment in ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, paragraph 45.
38 Judgment of 9 December 2021, HRVATSKE ŠUME (C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:985, paragraphs 43 and 44 and the case-law cited).
39 To the best of my knowledge, all legal systems in the Member States of the European Union provide, in one way or another, for restrictions on perpetual contractual obligations, including obligations of excessive duration or obligations that cannot be terminated. National laws regulate such situations by providing for the unilateral termination of open-ended contracts (see Article 6.199 of the Lithuanian Civil Code), or even by expressly prohibiting perpetual contracts (see Article 1210 of the French Civil Code). National case-law protects such a possibility on the grounds of public policy, good faith and freedom of contract.
40 In that regard, Article 10(1) of the Rome Convention sets out various issues which fall within the scope of the law of contract. These include the interpretation of the contract, the performance of the obligations arising from it, the consequences of non-performance of those obligations, the ways in which obligations may be extinguished, and the consequences of the contract being null and void. In other words, these examples cover the entire ‘life cycle’ of the contract. I therefore see no objective reasons why the termination of the contract – the step that brings this cycle to an end – should not be included, particularly as, according to the Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde (OJ 1980 C 282, p. 1; ‘the Giuliano and Lagarde Report’), ‘this list is not exhaustive, as is indicated by the words “in particular”’.
41 This makes all the more sense given that what is at issue here is the relative effect of the contract, which creates obligations and gives rise to liability solely between the contracting parties by virtue of the contract’s existence.
42 Judgment of 6 October 2009, ICF (C‑133/08, EU:C:2009:617, paragraph 23).
43 The Giuliano and Lagarde Report.
44 Let us imagine that the obligation to provide sufficient written notice is deemed to be non-contractual. Such a classification would mean that one of the specific legal stages of the contract – namely, the end of that contract further to a unilateral termination thereof – would be governed by a different law from that governing the rest of the contract. Thus, curiously enough, this would result in that stage in the life cycle of the contract being severed from the rest of it, essentially on the grounds that the law lays down an obligation to provide sufficient written notice when unilaterally terminating an established business relationship, which would transform the contractual nature of such termination into a tortious act, independent of the contract.
45 I would point out that, in her Opinion in that case, Advocate General Kokott proposed that this action be regarded as arising from a tort, delict or quasi-delict. The Court did not share that view.
46 By way of further comment, I would add that that conclusion is all the more true given that Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation specifies the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an act of unfair competition, which suggests that contractual obligations arising from acts of unfair competition may well exist. Indeed, I see no reason to make specific reference to ‘non-contractual obligations’ in the wording of that article if it is only intended to cover such obligations. Furthermore, the case-law of the Court confirms that various practices restricting competition and anti-competitive practices may fall within the scope of both contract law and the law covering tort, delict and quasi-delict (see the judgments in Granarolo and in Wikingerhof).