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62025TJ0493
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
4 November 2026 (*)
In Case T‑493/25,
EM Microelectronic-Marin SA, established in Laténa (Switzerland), represented by P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by R. Raponi and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
O2 Worldwide Ltd, established in Cambridge (United Kingdom), represented by P. Neuwald, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),
composed of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, I. Nõmm and R. Pezzuto (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 15 June 2026,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, EM Microelectronic-Marin SA, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 23 May 2025 (Case R 2438/2024‑4) (‘the contested decision’).
I. Background to the dispute
2 On 3 July 2023, the applicant designated the European Union in its international registration No 1747693, published most recently on 1 September 2023, of the word sign EM | BLEU.
3 The mark applied for covered goods in Class 9 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Electronic components; electronic circuits, particularly integrated circuits; microcontrollers; electronic identification devices, particularly electronic devices for radio frequency identification (RFID); access control devices; electronic engine immobilizer devices for vehicles; near field communication (NFC) devices; electronic labels; optical devices; locating devices; sensors (measurement apparatus) other than for medical use; motion detection devices; electronic memory devices; radio transmitters and receivers; radio transceivers; wireless communication devices; voltage regulators; real-time clocks; oscillators; resonators; touch screens; display screens, particularly liquid crystal display (LCD) screens; components for the aforesaid goods, included in this class; software; microchips; microchips (computer hardware); semi-conductor chips; chips (integrated circuits); silicon chips; computer chips; electronic chips for manufacturing integrated circuits; computer chips’.
4 On 18 December 2023, the intervener, O2 Worldwide Ltd, filed a notice of opposition to the international registration of the mark applied for in the European Union in respect of all the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5 The opposition was based on the following earlier national marks:
– the earlier German word mark BLUE, registered on 5 April 2022 under No 302 022 102 920, covering goods in Classes 9, 38 and 42 corresponding, inter alia, in particular as regards Class 9, to the following description: ‘Optical, measuring, signalling, checking apparatus and instruments; computer software; parts and accessories of any of the foregoing [data processing hardware; computers]; security control devices; security surveillance apparatus; telecommunications apparatus; security tags, electronic for goods; digital data carriers; apparatus and instruments for regulating electricity; digital display panels’;
– the earlier German word mark BLUE 1, registered on 12 March 2020 under No 302 019 115 709, covering, inter alia, goods in Classes 9, 35, 38 and 42;
– the earlier German word mark BLUE ONE, registered on 8 July 2020 under No 302 019 116 199, covering, inter alia, goods in Classes 9, 35, 38 and 42.
6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7 On 12 December 2024, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition, in particular with regard to the earlier German word mark BLUE, finding that the marks at issue were visually similar at most to a below-average degree, phonetically similar to a low degree and conceptually dissimilar, and therefore concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public.
8 On 18 December 2024, the intervener filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal brought by the intervener, finding, with regard to the earlier German word mark BLUE, that the marks at issue were visually and phonetically similar at least to a below-average degree and, contrary to the Opposition Division’s findings, conceptually similar at least to an average degree. It therefore annulled the Opposition Division’s decision, upheld the opposition in its entirety and refused protection of the international registration of the mark applied for in the European Union in respect of all the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
II. Forms of order sought
10 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– principally, annul the contested decision and alter that decision so as to find that there is no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue;
– in the alternative, annul the contested decision and remit the case to EUIPO for reconsideration;
– order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.
11 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
12 The intervener contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal.
III. Law
A. The Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the second part of the second head of claim
13 As regards the second part of the applicant’s second head of claim, it must be noted that that head of claim requests that the Court remit the case to EUIPO. In that regard, suffice it to recall that, according to settled case-law, in an action before the EU judicature against the decision of a Board of Appeal of EUIPO, EUIPO is required, under Article 72(6) of Regulation 2017/1001, to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the EU judicature. Accordingly, it is not for the Court to issue directions to EUIPO, but for EUIPO to draw the appropriate inferences from the operative part and grounds of the judgments of the EU judicature (see judgment of 11 July 2007, El Corte Inglés v OHIM – Bolaños Sabri (PiraÑAM diseño original Juan Bolaños), T‑443/05, EU:T:2007:219, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and order of 25 June 2019, Eaglestone v EUIPO – Eaglestone (EAGLESTONE), T‑82/19, not published, EU:T:2019:484, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). It follows that the second part of the applicant’s second head of claim must be rejected on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, as EUIPO contends.
B. Admissibility of the evidence adduced for the first time before the Court
14 By means of two hyperlinks provided in the footnotes to the application, the applicant refers to two websites setting out statistical figures regarding the level of proficiency in the French language among the German population. During the hearing, the applicant stated that those items of evidence had to be regarded as admissible in so far as they did not alter the substance of the proceedings. EUIPO disputes the admissibility of those items of evidence on the ground that they were submitted for the first time before the Court. It added, at the hearing, that the issue relating to knowledge of the French term ‘bleu’ had been raised before the Board of Appeal and, therefore, that the submission to the Court of new evidence pertaining to that issue was out of time.
15 It should be recalled that the purpose of actions before the Court under Article 72(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 is to review the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal. Pursuant to Article 95 of Regulation 2017/1001, that review must be carried out in the light of the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Board of Appeal (see judgment of 1 February 2005, SPAG v OHIM – Dann and Backer (HOOLIGAN), T‑57/03, EU:T:2005:29, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). It follows that the Court may not annul or alter a decision against which an action has been brought on grounds which come into existence subsequent to its adoption (judgments of 11 May 2006, Sunrider v OHIM, C‑416/04 P, EU:C:2006:310, paragraph 55, and of 13 March 2007, OHIM v Kaul, C‑29/05 P, EU:C:2007:162, paragraph 53).
16 Therefore, it is not the Court’s function to review the facts in the light of documents adduced for the first time before it. To allow the examination of such evidence would be contrary to Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, according to which the parties’ pleadings may not change the subject matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, the evidence submitted for the first time before the Court must be declared inadmissible and there is no need to examine it (see judgment of 14 May 2009, Fiorucci v OHIM – Edwin (ELIO FIORUCCI), T‑165/06, EU:T:2009:157, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
17 It is apparent from an examination of the file that the applicant produced the items of evidence at issue for the first time before the Court in support of a line of argument alleging the German-speaking public’s lack of knowledge of the term ‘bleu’, which it had also put forward before the Board of Appeal. They must therefore be rejected as inadmissible. Consequently, the applicant’s arguments as to the substance will be examined below only in so far as they are not based on those items of evidence.
C. Substance
18 The applicant puts forward two pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and, second, that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is inadequate, in breach of Article 94(1) of that regulation.
19 Since the second plea constitutes a procedural plea, whereas the first plea constitutes a substantive plea, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the second plea first.
1. The second plea in law, alleging that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is inadequate
20 The applicant submits that the contested decision is vitiated by inconsistencies and an inadequate statement of reasons, in breach of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001. It complains that no rationale is provided for disregarding the impact of the element ‘em’ on the overall impression produced by the mark applied for. It submits that the Board of Appeal’s finding relating to the understanding of the term ‘bleu’ by a non-negligible part of the relevant German public is not substantiated, and that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in that respect as regards the existence of a likelihood of confusion. Lastly, it claims, in essence, that its arguments and the evidence relating to the common use of the colour blue in the electronics sector were not examined.
21 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
22 Under the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, decisions of EUIPO must state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation to state reasons has the same scope as that under Article 296 TFEU, according to which the reasoning of the author of the act must be shown clearly and unequivocally. Its purpose is twofold: first, to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure taken in order to defend their rights and, secondly, to enable the EU judicature to exercise its power to review the legality of the decision. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 14 December 2022, Pierre Lannier v EUIPO – Pierre Lang Trading (PL), T‑530/21, EU:T:2022:818, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
23 In particular, the obligation to state reasons does not require the Boards of Appeal to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the lines of reasoning articulated by the parties before them. It is sufficient for them to set out the facts and the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see judgment of 15 January 2015, MEM v OHIM (MONACO), T‑197/13, EU:T:2015:16, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
24 The obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested measure. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 6 November 2024, ZB v EUIPO – Muhsinoglu (X ENERGY DRINK), T‑507/23, not published, EU:T:2024:769, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
25 In the present case, first of all, the Board of Appeal noted, in the contested decision, that the assessment of the similarity of the marks at issue had to be based on the overall impression given by those marks, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant elements. It stated that the element ‘blue’ of the earlier mark referred to the colour blue and, since it was not descriptive of the goods at issue, had a normal degree of distinctiveness. It added that the element ‘bleu’ of the mark applied for was likely to be understood by a non-negligible part of the relevant German public as being a reference to that same colour. It concluded, in essence, that it was irrelevant whether the element ‘em’ was regarded as descriptive or meaningless and therefore distinctive, since the element ‘bleu’ was twice as long and played an independent distinctive role. Thus, according to the Board of Appeal, the marks at issue still exhibit, inter alia, a degree of conceptual similarity which is at least average, as they overlap in the elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’, both referring to the same colour.
26 In the light of those reasons, and as EUIPO and the intervener correctly contend, the applicant cannot claim that no rationale is provided in the contested decision as regards the impact of the element ‘em’ on the overall impression produced by the mark applied for. Accordingly, such a line of argument must be rejected.
27 Next, the Board of Appeal referred, in the contested decision, to its previous practice, to the German dictionary Duden and to case-law in order to explain that the term ‘bleu’ was likely to be understood by the relevant German public as a reference to the colour blue, in so far as it was a word in the German language meaning ‘pale blue’ and a basic word in the French language denoting the colour blue, and was very similar to the equivalent terms ‘blue’ in English and ‘blau’ in German, which are known to German consumers.
28 It follows that, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the contested decision sets out in a substantiated, clear and unequivocal manner the Board of Appeal’s reasoning and the grounds on which it concluded that the relevant German public would understand the term ‘bleu’ as a reference to the colour blue.
29 Moreover, as regards the applicant’s line of argument alleging that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in that respect and with regard to the consequent existence of a likelihood of confusion, such a line of argument seeks, in reality, to challenge the merits of the grounds for the contested decision and is therefore irrelevant in the context of a plea alleging that the statement of reasons is inadequate, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 24 above. Accordingly, that line of argument will be addressed as part of the examination of the first plea, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see paragraphs 72 to 75 below).
30 Lastly, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal also addressed the applicant’s argument based on the allegedly common use of the colour blue in the electronics sector. It pointed out that, according to the case-law, the fact that certain goods may be available in a given colour was not relevant in itself. It stated that the earlier mark consisted of the colour name ‘blue’ and not the colour blue as such. It added that, although the examples provided by the applicant included signs with elements represented in a blue colour, by contrast, the word ‘blue’ did not appear in any of them, with the result that they did not prove that that word was a generic term for the goods at issue in that sector. It also noted, in essence, that, according to the case-law, that word, referring to that colour, had no direct meaning in respect of goods in Class 9.
31 In the light of those considerations, it must be held, as EUIPO and the intervener contend, that the applicant is not justified in claiming that the Board of Appeal failed to address the arguments and evidence relating to the common use of the colour blue in the electronics sector.
32 In view of the foregoing, it has not been established that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is inadequate, as alleged by the applicant. The second plea in law must therefore be rejected.
2. The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001
33 The applicant complains that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there existed a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. It alleges errors in the comparison of the marks at issue and in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion due, in particular, to the failure to give proper weight to the distinctive and dominant elements of the mark applied for, to the linguistic reality in Germany, which is different from that considered, and to the high level of attention of the relevant public.
34 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
35 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
36 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors that characterise the particular case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).
37 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
38 In the present case, for reasons of procedural economy, the Court considers it appropriate to assess the legality of the contested decision by first examining whether the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that there existed a likelihood of confusion between the mark applied for and the earlier German word mark BLUE, without referring to the other earlier marks listed in paragraph 5 above.
(a) The relevant public, its level of attention and the relevant territory
39 Like the Opposition Division, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory was Germany. It also considered that the goods at issue were mostly aimed at a professional public, whose level of attention was high, and, in part, at the general public, whose level of attention could vary from average to high depending on the nature of the goods.
40 In its application, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment that some of the goods at issue are, to some extent, aimed at the general public, whose level of attention may vary from average to high depending on the nature of those goods. It submits that those goods, namely electronic components, semiconductors and technical devices in Class 9, are not ordinary consumer goods and that they are acquired by professionals or technically informed users acting on behalf of companies or institutions, often in the context of industrial or high-precision applications. It maintains – as it also emphasised, in essence, at the hearing – that, having regard to the manner in which the goods at issue are purchased and the financial investment that they involve, as well as the long-term implications of such purchases, the relevant German public consists of professionals or highly attentive consumers, whose level of attention is closer to high than to average.
41 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
42 In the first place, as regards the definition of the relevant territory, it must be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal found, for the purpose of analysing the likelihood of confusion, that that territory was Germany. Since the earlier mark is a German mark, there is no need to call into question that assessment of the Board of Appeal, which, moreover, has not been disputed by the parties.
43 In the second place, as regards the definition of the relevant public, it must be recalled that the relevant public for the purposes of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion is composed of users likely to use both the goods or services covered by the earlier mark and those covered by the mark applied for (see judgment of 24 May 2011, ancotel v OHIM – Acotel (ancotel.), T‑408/09, not published, EU:T:2011:241, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
44 In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the goods or services concerned, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR), T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). The part of the relevant public with the lowest level of attention must be taken into account unless that part of the public must be regarded as insignificant (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2015, CareAbout v OHIM – Florido Rodríquez (Kerashot), T‑356/14, not published, EU:T:2015:978, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). Similarly, where the services covered by the two marks at issue are intended for the same relevant public, which comprises both the general public and professionals, the public with the lowest level of attention must be taken into consideration (judgment of 11 December 2024, Blue Underwriting Agency v EUIPO – Blue Assistance (blue is underwriting), T‑447/23, not published, EU:T:2024:894, paragraph 21).
45 Furthermore, as regards some of the goods at issue in Class 9, it is clear from the case-law that, within the European Union, computer hardware (computers, tablets, smartphones, and so on) and computer products (software and so on) correspond, for the most part, to standardised goods that are easy to use, are not highly technical and are widely distributed in all types of stores at affordable prices. To that extent, they are everyday consumer goods intended for the general public (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Construlink v EUIPO – Wit-Software (GATEWIT), T‑351/14, not published, EU:T:2017:101, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). As regards computers, computer hardware, tablets, and electrical, electronic and electronic communication instruments and apparatus, it has been confirmed that the relevant public was the general public whose level of attention varied from average to high, in particular according to the price of the goods (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2014, Galileo International Technology v OHIM – ESA and Commission (GALILEO), T‑450/11, not published, EU:T:2014:771, paragraph 65, and of 20 November 2024, Domator24 v EUIPO – ACER (PREDATOR), T‑33/23, not published, EU:T:2024:845, paragraphs 30 and 31).
46 As regards software or software products, it has been held that such products were intended both for the general public and for business consumers with specific knowledge or expertise, demonstrating a level of attention varying from average to high (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2025, Abacus Research v EUIPO – American Bar Association (Aba), T‑553/24, not published, EU:T:2025:726, paragraphs 21 and 22; of 28 January 2026, Montepelayo v EUIPO – TRON (TELOTRÓN), T‑203/25, not published, EU:T:2026:50, paragraphs 25 and 27; and of 11 February 2026, Athom v EUIPO – Chuhaiya E-Commerce (Shenzhen) (athom Smart Home), T‑618/24, not published, EU:T:2026:119, paragraphs 31 and 32). The same conclusion has been reached, in essence, with regard to screens (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2022, the airscreen company v EUIPO – Moviescreens Rental (airframe), T‑539/21, not published, EU:T:2022:597, paragraph 29) and in relation to measuring, signalling and checking apparatus (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2019, MAN Truck & Bus v EUIPO – Halla Holdings (MANDO), T‑698/17, not published, EU:T:2019:524, paragraphs 109 and 113).
47 In the present case, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 43 to 46 above, and since several of the goods at issue relate to computer hardware and measuring, signalling and checking apparatus and instruments as well as computer software and screens, and as the public with the lowest level of attention must be taken into account when assessing the likelihood of confusion, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal did not err in its assessment in stating that those goods were to some extent aimed at the general public, whose level of attention could vary from average to high depending on the nature of those goods, even though some of those goods were in fact aimed at a specialised public with a higher than average level of attention.
48 That conclusion cannot validly be called into question by the applicant’s line of argument as to the likelihood of the average consumer’s level of attention varying according to the goods at issue, having regard, in particular, to the manner in which they are purchased and their price. It must be pointed out that, although the purchase price of some of the goods in Class 9 may be relatively high and those goods may be subject to a period of use spanning several years, the majority of those goods are electronics aimed at the general public which, nowadays, are relatively inexpensive, have a relatively short lifespan, and do not require any particular technical knowledge (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 December 2017, Xiaomi v EUIPO – Apple (MI PAD), T‑893/16, not published, EU:T:2017:868, paragraph 25, and of 8 May 2024, Ofree v EUIPO – gamigo (gamindo), T‑91/23, not published, EU:T:2024:298, paragraph 26). In particular, some of the goods at issue, such as the software and screens referred to by the intervener, are generally used on a daily basis by the end consumer, their price is not relatively high and they do not require any particular technical knowledge (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2020, LG Electronics v EUIPO – Staszewski (K7), T‑21/20, not published, EU:T:2020:550, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
49 In any event, it must be held, as the intervener contends, that the Board of Appeal did not fail to take account of a higher level of attention in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.
50 There is therefore no basis for calling into question, in the light of the applicant’s complaints, the Board of Appeal’s assessments in the contested decision concerning the relevant public and its level of attention.
(b) The comparison of the goods at issue
51 The Board of Appeal found, in line with the Opposition Division and on the same grounds, that the goods at issue covered by the marks at issue were identical in respect of Class 9. It also noted that that finding of the Opposition Division was not disputed by the parties.
52 There is no reason to call into question that assessment of the Board of Appeal, which, moreover, has not been disputed by the parties.
(c) The comparison of the marks at issue
53 Two marks are similar where, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least partially identical as regards one or more relevant aspects, namely the visual, phonetic and conceptual aspects (see judgment of 17 February 2011, Annco v OHIM – Freche et fils (ANN TAYLOR LOFT), T‑385/09, EU:T:2011:49, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
54 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
55 In the present case, before examining the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, it is necessary to assess the applicant’s arguments relating to the distinctive and dominant elements of those marks.
(1) The distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue
56 The Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark consisted of the word element ‘blue’, which is a term forming part of basic English vocabulary, known to the relevant German public as denoting the colour blue. It added that that colour and the colour name ‘blue’ were not likely to be perceived by that public as one of the characteristics of the goods at issue or as having, in the context of those goods, a direct meaning, with the result that the element ‘blue’ had a normal degree of distinctiveness in relation to those goods. It noted that the mark applied for consisted of the word elements ‘em’ and ‘bleu’, separated by a vertical bar ‘|’, which is of little significance from a trade mark perspective. As regards the element ‘bleu’, the Board of Appeal found that, like the element ‘blue’, it was likely to be understood by that public as a reference to the colour blue, and that it therefore was distinctive. It emphasised that the element ‘bleu’ differed in its length and played an independent distinctive role in relation to the element ‘em’. In those circumstances, it was, in its view, irrelevant whether the element ‘em’ would be perceived as meaningless or descriptive.
57 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal broke down the marks at issue into their various elements and failed to assess them as a whole, in the light of their distinctive elements. It maintains that the colour blue is commonly used in the field of electronics and that the earlier mark, which consists of the term ‘blue’ in reference to that colour, is semi-descriptive and weakly distinctive. It claims that the element ‘em’ of the mark applied for is dominant and non-negligible and that it confers on that mark the greater part of its distinctive character in view of its lack of meaning. The applicant stated at the hearing that the intervener could not argue that that element means ‘electromagnetic’, when it was originally an abbreviation of the words ‘Ebauche Microelectronic’, which is no longer known to the relevant German public. It points out that that element makes up the initial part of the sign and maintains that its combination with the vertical bar ‘|’ produces a highly distinctive overall impression in the mind of the consumer. Furthermore, it submits that that bar is not negligible since it reinforces the distinctiveness of that mark when considered as a whole. The applicant asserts that the average German consumer does not know the meaning in French of the term ‘bleu’, that knowledge of a foreign language may not be presumed and that French is not used in the field of electronics. It states that that term has no meaning in German and that a translation as ‘pale blue’ is neither common nor familiar to such a consumer, who will perceive it as fanciful and will not translate it as the term ‘blau’. It submits that the element ‘bleu’ therefore has intrinsic distinctiveness for the relevant public.
58 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
59 In the first place, as regards possible dominant elements in the marks at issue, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, word marks consist entirely of letters, words or associations of words which are written in printed characters in a normal font without any specific graphic element. Such marks therefore do not have a dominant element since, by their nature, none of the constituent elements has a particular graphic or stylistic aspect which is capable of giving it such a character (see judgment of 2 March 2022, UGA Nutraceuticals v EUIPO – Vitae Health Innovation (VITADHA), T‑149/21, not published, EU:T:2022:103, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). The same applies to word marks combining words and ordinary typographical signs.
60 In the present case, the marks at issue are word marks as defined in paragraph 59 above, as the Opposition Division classified them and as is apparent from paragraph 6 of the contested decision; moreover, this was not disputed by the applicant before the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 59 above, none of those word marks contains dominant elements.
61 In the second place, according to the case-law, for the purposes of assessing the distinctive character of an element of a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 28 January 2026, TELOTRÓN, T‑203/25, not published, EU:T:2026:50, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
62 Moreover, although the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, that consumer will break it down into word elements which, for him or her, suggest a concrete meaning or which resemble words known to him or her (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 2004, Vitakraft-Werke Wührmann v OHIM – Krafft (VITAKRAFT), T‑356/02, EU:T:2004:292, paragraph 51, and of 13 February 2007, RESPICUR, T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 57). Furthermore, the relevant consumer will break down the word sign even if only one of its elements is familiar to him or her (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2012, TeamBank v OHIM – Fercredit Servizi Finanziari (f@ir Credit), T‑220/11, not published, EU:T:2012:444, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
63 In the present case, first, as regards the term ‘blue’, which is the sole element constituting the earlier mark, it should be noted that it is not in dispute between the parties that that term is defined in English as denoting the colour blue, that it forms part of the basic English vocabulary known to the relevant public, which is composed of professionals and the general public of the European Union, and that it therefore has a concrete meaning for the average consumer (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 2008, ecoblue v OHIM – Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Ecoblue), T‑281/07, not published, EU:T:2008:489, paragraph 30).
64 As regards the applicant’s claim that the colour blue is commonly used in the field of electronics and of the goods at issue, such that the earlier mark is only weakly distinctive, it must, moreover, be pointed out that, first of all, the Board of Appeal correctly recalled in the contested decision that, according to the case-law, the term ‘blue’, which refers to a colour, has no direct meaning in the context of goods in Class 9 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 October 2023, Deutsche Glasfaser Wholesale v EUIPO – O2 Worldwide (brightblue), T‑516/22, not published, EU:T:2023:619, paragraph 33).
65 Next, the Board of Appeal properly found that the term ‘blue’ was not included in the evidence produced by the applicant and that it had therefore not been demonstrated that that colour name had become a generic term in relation to the goods at issue, even though trade marks in the same field contain elements represented in blue.
66 Lastly and above all, the Board of Appeal correctly recalled that the mere fact that the goods at issue may be available in the colour blue, just as they may be available in other colours, was irrelevant, since it was not reasonable to believe that, for that reason alone, that colour would immediately and directly be recognised by the relevant public as descriptive of an intrinsic characteristic which is inherent to the nature of the goods at issue (see judgment of 11 October 2023, brightblue, T‑516/22, not published, EU:T:2023:619, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). In addition, it must be stated that the alleged use of the term ‘blue’ or the colour blue by other undertakings operating in the field to which the goods at issue belong is not decisive in assessing the distinctiveness of that term. Simply listing a relatively limited number of trade marks containing that term or colour does not support the conclusion that the relevant public makes an association between that term or colour and those goods (see, to the effect, judgment of 11 December 2024, blue is underwriting, T‑447/23, not published, EU:T:2024:894, paragraph 63).
67 It follows that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding, in the contested decision, following the Opposition Division, that the relevant German public was able to understand the term ‘blue’ as denoting the colour blue, which had no direct meaning in the context of the goods at issue, with the result that the element ‘blue’, constituting the earlier mark, had a normal degree of distinctiveness in relation to those goods.
68 Second, as regards the vertical bar ‘|’ of the mark applied for, it is true, assuming that that bar is comparable to a punctuation mark, as the applicant in essence claims, that, although certain punctuation marks are not distinctive, since they are not perceived immediately as an indication of the commercial origin of the goods and do not enable the consumer to distinguish, without any possibility of confusion, the goods in question from others which have another origin, that finding does not preclude their being recognised as possessing a certain distinctive character having regard to the particularities of each case (judgment of 30 March 2022, L’Oréal v EUIPO – Debonair Trading Internacional (SO COUTURE), T‑30/21, not published, EU:T:2022:190, paragraph 45).
69 However, in the present case, first, the vertical bar ‘|’ cannot be recognised as possessing a certain distinctive character, in so far as that bar is an ordinary typographical sign, consisting of a line perpendicular to the lines of text, the function of which is to separate into two independent parts the other word elements in the mark applied for, namely ‘em’ and ‘bleu’, and inasmuch as it will be perceived as such by the relevant German public, as is apparent inter alia from the applicant’s line of argument.
70 On the latter point, it must be borne in mind that, with regard to a hyphen – that is to say, a punctuation mark consisting of a line running parallel to the lines of text and therefore very similar to the vertical bar ‘|’ – it has been held that such a sign was devoid of any distinctive character, since it was perceived as a mere punctuation mark used to separate two elements and, furthermore, its presence was not in itself capable of making the first element dominant in a mark applied for (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 December 2025, Cin Valentine v EUIPO – Daw (VAL - - - ACRYL), T‑518/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1097, paragraph 31).
71 Thus, like a hyphen, the vertical bar ‘|’ may be regarded as a negligible element for the relevant German public, which, moreover, does not, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, mean that the significance of the first element ‘em’ is enhanced by virtue of an alleged distinctive combination ‘em |’. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment when it found, in the contested decision, that that bar was an element which was of little significance from a trade mark perspective, before breaking down the mark applied for into the two word elements ‘bleu’ and ‘em’ and thereby taking into account, in relation to the overall impression conveyed by that mark to that public, the fact that that bar separated the mark into two distinct and independent parts.
72 Third, as regards the word element ‘bleu’ in the mark applied for, it must be observed, as EUIPO contends, that the French term ‘bleu’ is associated with the English term ‘blue’ and with the German term ‘blau’, which are known to a public comprising average consumers in the European Union, and that it resembles the term ‘blu’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2014, Adler Modemärkte v OHIM – Blufin (MARINE BLEU), T‑160/12, not published, EU:T:2014:252, paragraph 48). A non-negligible proportion of European consumers will establish a connection between the element ‘bleu’ or ‘blue’ and the word which designates the colour blue in their native languages if that word is identical to that element or is very similar to it visually or phonetically. That is, in particular, the case for German consumers, who designate that colour in their native language by the term ‘blau’, which is visually or phonetically similar to the terms ‘bleu’ or ‘blue’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 April 2016, Gervais Danone v EUIPO – Mahou (B’lue), T‑803/14, not published, EU:T:2016:251, paragraph 27).
73 In that regard, it is true that the average consumer’s knowledge of a foreign language cannot, in general, be assumed (see judgment of 14 July 2021, Cole Haan v EUIPO – Samsøe & Samsøe Holding (Ø), T‑399/20, EU:T:2021:442, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). However, where an English term has an equivalent in the language of a non-English-speaking public, which would be able to establish a link between those terms and their translation into the language in question, that public must be held to understand their meaning (see judgment of 26 March 2025, Unite Network v EUIPO – Unión Detallistas Españoles (unite mercateo), T‑1186/23, not published, EU:T:2025:335, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
74 Although those considerations relate to the English language and not to the French language, in the present case, it is reasonable to take the view that a non-negligible part of the relevant German public will be able to establish a link between the French term ‘bleu’ and the German term ‘blau’ and, therefore, to understand that the first of those terms likewise refers to the colour blue. As the Board of Appeal stated in a sufficiently substantiated and convincing manner in the contested decision, the term ‘bleu’ is a basic word in the French language, which is commonly used and very similar to the equivalent English term ‘blue’ and the equivalent German term ‘blau’, which are understood by that public; moreover, the close relationship between those three terms is recognised by the case-law (see paragraph 72 above). Furthermore, such reasons are in themselves sufficient for that conclusion not to be called into question by the applicant’s claim that a German translation of the term ‘bleu’ as ‘pale blue’ is uncommon.
75 Thus, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find in the contested decision, in essence, that, in line with the conclusions reached in relation to the term ‘blue’ (see paragraphs 63 to 67 above), the term ‘bleu’ – which is a basic word in the French language designating the colour blue – was likely to be understood by a non-negligible part of the relevant German public in the same sense, namely as a reference to that colour, that it therefore had no direct meaning in the context of goods in Class 9, and that, as a result, it had a normal degree of distinctiveness in relation to those goods. Accordingly, while the applicant correctly acknowledges that the term ‘bleu’ has inherent distinctiveness for the relevant German public, it cannot validly claim that that term has no meaning for that public and that it must therefore be understood differently from the term ‘blue’.
76 Moreover, it must be recalled that the structure of the mark applied for makes it possible to establish that that mark consists of two independent elements separated by the vertical bar ‘|’ (see paragraph 71 above). Furthermore, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 62 above, the relevant German public will break that mark down by isolating the term ‘em’ from the term ‘bleu’, which, for that public, suggests a concrete meaning – referring to the colour blue – and resembles the term ‘blau’ which is known to it (see paragraph 75 above).
77 For all those reasons, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in stating, in essence, in the contested decision, that the element ‘bleu’ had a normal degree of distinctiveness and that it played an independent distinctive role in relation to the element ‘em’ in terms of the overall impression given by the mark applied for.
78 Fourth, as regards the word element ‘em’ of the mark applied for, it is true, as the applicant submits, that that element constitutes the first part of that mark, which, according to the case-law, is more likely to catch the consumer’s attention than the following parts (judgment of 17 March 2004, El Corte Inglés v OHIM – González Cabello and Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España (MUNDICOR), T‑183/02 and T‑184/02, EU:T:2004:79, paragraph 81).
79 However, it must be recalled that that consideration cannot apply in all cases and cannot, in any event, undermine the principle that the examination of the similarity between the signs must take account of the overall impression given by them (see judgment of 10 October 2006, Armacell v OHIM – nmc (ARMAFOAM), T‑172/05, EU:T:2006:300, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, there is no basis for the proposition that the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect will systematically disregard the second part of the word element of a sign to the point of remembering only the first part (judgment of 18 December 2008, Torres v OHIM – Bodegas Peñalba López (Torre Albéniz), T‑287/06, EU:T:2008:602, paragraph 56).
80 In that regard, as EUIPO correctly contends, it should also be borne in mind that, while the element ‘em’ occupies the first part of the mark applied for, the structure of that mark makes it possible to establish that it consists of two independent elements. Furthermore, since it is a word mark, nothing makes the first element more prominent than the second. Moreover, as EUIPO and the intervener correctly maintain, the element ‘bleu’ plays an independent distinctive role and comprises a greater number of letters; as is apparent from the contested decision, it is twice as long as the element ‘em’.
81 In those circumstances, and since the vertical bar ‘|’ does not form a specific combination with the element ‘em’ (see paragraph 70 above), the applicant is not justified in claiming that that element, by virtue of its presence at the beginning of the sign and combined with that bar, is more distinctive and predominates over the element ‘bleu’ in terms of the overall impression given by the mark applied for.
82 In addition, although the findings in the contested decision stating that it was irrelevant whether the relevant German public would perceive the element ‘em’ as meaningless or descriptive are not a priori substantiated, the fact remains that those findings are subsequently justified by the comparative analysis of that public’s perception of the word elements ‘em’ and ‘bleu’ of the mark applied for from a visual, phonetic and conceptual point of view, which the Board of Appeal carried out in paragraphs 35 to 40 of the contested decision. In that regard, the Board of Appeal correctly stated, in essence, that the element ‘bleu’ comprised a greater number of letters than the element ‘em’ and that it played an independent distinctive role within that mark, with the result that, even if the element ‘em’ were to be recognised as having a certain distinctive character, the comparison of the marks at issue would nevertheless continue to depend on the presence of the element ‘bleu’ in that mark.
83 It follows that the element ‘em’ is not capable of predominating over the element ‘bleu’ in terms of the overall impression given by the mark applied for and that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment or fail to take that element into account in that respect.
84 In the light of the foregoing, there is no need to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment concerning the distinctive character of the various elements of the marks at issue and the overall impression given by each of those marks.
(2) The visual and phonetic comparison of the signs at issue
85 The Board of Appeal found that the marks at issue were visually and phonetically similar at least to a below-average degree, despite their differences resulting from the presence of the element ‘em’ in the mark applied for. In that regard, it emphasised the lack of visual and phonetic significance of the vertical bar ‘|’ and found that those marks partially overlapped in respect of the distinctive elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’. It observed that those elements were visually similar, as they consisted of the same letters – albeit the final two letters were in reverse order – and phonetically similar, since the sound of those elements partially coincided and the letters ‘bl’ produced the same initial sound. It added that, in the mark applied for, the element ‘bleu’ played an independent distinctive role and was twice as long as the element ‘em’, with the result that, in essence, the fact that that element constituted the first part of that mark was not sufficient to rule out visual similarity between the marks at issue in respect of the elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’.
86 The applicant submits that the marks at issue are not visually similar since the overall composition of the mark applied for creates a complex trade mark with a strong visual impact that differs from the earlier mark, which comprises a single word of four simple characters, without any typographical, figurative or structural element, and with only minimal coincidence in the letters ‘bl’. It disputes the finding that those marks are phonetically similar, on account of differences resulting from the number of syllables and a distinct rhythm and phonetic cadence. It maintains that the earlier mark is a short, fluid monosyllabic term which could be familiar to the relevant German public and contains a closed vowel. By contrast, as it confirmed at the hearing, the mark applied for consists of three syllables, the element ‘em’ being pronounced with an open vowel and the letters ‘eu’ being pronounced differently from the letters ‘ue’ of the element ‘blue’.
87 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
88 As a preliminary point, it must be observed that, both visually and phonetically, the marks at issue differ by virtue of the presence, in the mark applied for, of the word element ‘em’, which is placed at the beginning, and of the separating vertical bar ‘|’, which is placed in the middle. However, they share two similar word elements, namely ‘blue’ or ‘bleu’, which are of identical length, consisting of the same four letters and the same two initial letters, the only difference being that the order of the final two letters is inverted.
89 First, it must be stated, as EUIPO contends, that it cannot be alleged that the Board of Appeal failed to take sufficient account of the vertical bar ‘|’ of the mark applied for when it found, in the contested decision, that that bar was of little significance in the assessment of the visual and phonetic similarity of the marks at issue.
90 Although it is true, as the applicant argues, that the mark applied for must be assessed in its entirety, with due regard for the vertical bar ‘|’, that does not prevent some of its elements from holding less attention than others and from being, consequently, less likely to influence the overall visual impression created by the mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 May 2015, Skype v OHIM – Sky and Sky IP International (skype), T‑423/12, not published, EU:T:2015:260, paragraph 31).
91 That is precisely the case in this instance as regards the vertical bar ‘|’ in relation to the word elements ‘em’ and ‘bleu’. Since that bar will be perceived by the relevant German public as an ordinary typographical sign the sole function of which is to separate into two distinct and independent parts the other word elements of the mark applied for (see paragraphs 69 and 71 above), it will be of little significance in the overall visual perception of that mark for that public, as the Board of Appeal correctly found in paragraph 27 of the contested decision. In that regard, it is clear from the case-law that, where the relevant public identifies a common typographical sign within a word mark, it will interpret the sign as such, attributing to it the typographical function traditionally ascribed to it, rather than as an element with an independent distinctive role (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 7 June 2018, MIP Metro v EUIPO – AFNOR (N & NF TRADING), T‑807/16, not published, EU:T:2018:337, paragraph 42).
92 Those considerations apply even more so from a phonetic perspective, since the vertical bar ‘|’, being unpronounceable (see paragraph 69 above), is not capable of producing a phonetic impression (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 May 2015, skype, T‑423/12, not published, EU:T:2015:260, paragraph 32).
93 In addition, it must be observed that the presence of the vertical bar ‘|’ in the mark applied for influences the visual perception and pronunciation of that mark by the relevant German public only in so far as it divides the mark into two parts, with the elements ‘em’ and ‘bleu’ then being perceived and pronounced separately. It follows that the overall visual and phonetic impression created by that mark and the similarity of the marks at issue in that regard had to be determined exclusively in the light of those two elements.
94 Second, in accordance with the case-law which states that the difference between ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ is not significant, since those two word elements have the same initial ‘bl’ sound (judgment of 14 May 2014, MARINE BLEU, T‑160/12, not published, EU:T:2014:252, paragraph 51), the Board of Appeal correctly found, in the contested decision, that the marks at issue partially overlapped phonetically in the sound of the elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ and that the difference between them in that respect was not significant, given that they shared the same initial ‘bl’ sound. That finding of a partial overlap also applies from a visual perspective, owing to the fact that the four letters of which those two elements consist are identical and to the inversion of the order of their final two letters, which is negligible – as EUIPO correctly contends.
95 Furthermore, where signs contain a different number of syllables, that cannot automatically preclude the finding that there is a certain degree of similarity between them (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2021, Cara Therapeutics v EUIPO – Gebro Holding (KORSUVA), T‑584/20, not published, EU:T:2021:541, paragraph 35). Therefore, although the marks at issue contain a different number of syllables and while it is true that the elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ exhibit some phonetic difference for the relevant German public, it must nevertheless be pointed out, as EUIPO maintains, that those elements coincide in four letters and that the final sounds of those elements are very similar when pronounced in German, with the result that the phonetic differences observed between the elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ are not such as to preclude a finding that there is a certain phonetic similarity between those marks.
96 Third, as regards the applicant’s line of argument based on the initial position and pronunciation of the additional element ‘em’ in the mark applied for, and alleging that the relevant public pays greater attention to the beginning of that mark, it must be held that that element, consisting of only two letters, is smaller in size than the element ‘bleu’, which consists of four letters and is therefore twice as long, and which, moreover, plays an independent distinctive role in terms of the overall impression given by that mark. In those circumstances, the presence of the element ‘em’ at the beginning of the mark applied for cannot be regarded as creating a visual and phonetic difference that is sufficiently striking to counteract the impression of a certain similarity in that regard arising from the coincidence of their elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’.
97 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding, in the contested decision, as part of an assessment carried out on the basis of all the elements of the marks at issue, that those marks were similar to a below-average degree and, therefore, had a low degree of visual and phonetic similarity.
(3) The conceptual comparison of the marks at issue
98 The Board of Appeal concluded that the marks at issue were similar to an average degree, given that the word elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ were likely to be perceived by a non-negligible part of the relevant public, in a consistent manner, as both referring to the colour blue.
99 The applicant disputes the finding that the marks at issue are conceptually similar to an average degree, reiterating that a conceptual equivalence between the terms ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ is linguistically unsupported and has no legal or factual basis. Furthermore, it submits that the presence, at the beginning of the mark applied for, of the element ‘em’ together with the bar ‘|’, neither of which is present in the earlier mark, provides an additional distinctive component that breaks any conceptual link between those marks, with the relevant professional public thus being capable of recognising that the element ‘em | bleu’ and the element ‘blue’ are not equivalent.
100 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
101 According to the case-law, conceptual similarity implies that the signs at issue have analogous semantic content (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 1997, SABEL, C‑251/95, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24).
102 In the present case, since it has been concluded that, first, the vertical bar ‘|’ did not have the effect of forming a distinctive combination with the element ‘em’ (see paragraphs 70 and 81 above) and that, second, that bar would be perceived by the relevant German public as an ordinary typographical sign the sole function of which is to separate into two distinct and independent parts the other word elements of the mark applied for, rather than as an element playing an independent distinctive role (see paragraphs 69 and 91 above), that bar is not, as such, capable of conveying any concept to that public. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument alleging a conceptual break between the marks at issue due to a purported combination of those two elements must be rejected as unfounded.
103 Above all, it must be recalled that, from a conceptual perspective, the reference to the colour blue through the elements ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ will be easily recognisable by speakers of various EU languages, including German (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2014, MARINE BLEU, T‑160/12, not published, EU:T:2014:252, paragraphs 48 and 52), and, in that regard, it cannot be ruled out that the relevant German public might establish a link between the English term ‘blue’, the French term ‘bleu’ and the German term ‘blau’ and, accordingly, that it might understand the terms ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ as a reference to the colour blue and break down the mark applied for by isolating the elements ‘em’ and ‘bleu’ (see paragraphs 72 to 76 above).
104 It follows that, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 101 above, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the marks at issue were conceptually similar, given that a non-negligible part of the relevant German public was likely to perceive the terms ‘blue’ and ‘bleu’ as referring to the same colour, namely blue.
105 In those circumstances, and since, moreover, the element ‘em’ does not predominate in the overall impression given by the mark applied for (see paragraph 83 above), the Board of Appeal’s finding that there was, in essence, an average degree of conceptual similarity between the marks at issue, irrespective of whether or not that element has any meaning in the specific case at hand, is free from any error of assessment.
(4) The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion
106 After having stated that the distinctive character of the earlier mark was to be regarded as normal, the Board of Appeal noted, in the contested decision, that it had previously concluded that there was a below-average degree of visual and phonetic similarity and at least an average degree of conceptual similarity for a non-negligible part of the relevant German public. For those reasons, and in view of the identity between the goods at issue, it concluded that there existed a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
107 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal wrongly minimised the clear visual, phonetic and conceptual differences between the marks at issue and that there is no evidence of overlap or actual confusion in the market. It claims that the fact that the distinctive and dominant elements of the mark applied for were considered in isolation, and insufficiently, led to an error in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. It adds that the weak distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the linguistic reality in Germany – characterised by a lack of knowledge of the meaning of the term ‘bleu’ in French – and the allegedly high level of attention of the relevant public, were disregarded.
108 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
109 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
110 It is also clear from the case-law that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different signs and must place his or her trust in the imperfect picture of them that he or she has kept in his or her mind (see judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM, C‑412/05 P, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). That finding has also been confirmed in relation to a public demonstrating a high level of attention (see judgment of 6 November 2024, CFA Institute v EUIPO – Global Chartered Controller Institute (CCA CHARTERED CONTROLLER ANALYST CERTIFICATE), T‑561/22, not published, EU:T:2024:777, paragraph 176 and the case-law cited).
111 In the present case, first, it must be recalled that the goods at issue covered by the marks at issue are identical in respect of Class 9 (see paragraphs 51 and 52 above).
112 Second, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 53 to 105 above, the marks at issue have a low degree of visual and phonetic similarity and an average degree of conceptual similarity.
113 Third, in view of the normal degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark (see paragraph 67 above), that low degree of visual and phonetic similarity and average degree of conceptual similarity of the marks at issue will be offset by the fact that the goods at issue are identical.
114 Fourth, and in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding in the contested decision that there existed a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue so far as concerned the goods at issue, even in the case of a specialised public and notwithstanding the high level of attention of the relevant German public when purchasing those goods. The fact that the level of attention of that public is high does not mean that it may automatically be concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion, since all the other factors must be taken into account, and the finding that there exists a likelihood of confusion in the context of the goods at issue is all the more compelling for the fact that the relevant public is considered to pay an average level of attention (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2026, TELOTRÓN, T‑203/25, not published, EU:T:2026:50, paragraphs 78 and 79).
115 Thus, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that there existed a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
116 It follows from the foregoing that it is necessary to reject the first plea in law as unfounded and, accordingly, to reject the applicant’s first head of claim and the first part of its second head of claim. Consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
IV. Costs
117 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.
118 Furthermore, as regards the intervener’s claim that the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, it is sufficient to point out that, since the present judgment is dismissing the action brought against the contested decision, it is the operative part in the contested decision which continues to determine the costs in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2017, Intesa Sanpaolo v EUIPO – Intesia Group Holding (INTESA), T‑143/16, not published, EU:T:2017:687, paragraph 74).
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders EM Microelectronic-Marin SA to pay the costs.
Škvařilová-Pelzl
Nõmm
Pezzuto
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 November 2026.
T. Henze
M. J. Costeira
Acting Registrar
President
* Language of the case: English.