Prehliadač alebo jeho nastavenia nie sú podporované.

Praktik.ai používa moderné webové technológie kvôli bezpečnosti, rýchlosti a spoľahlivému prihlasovaniu. Tento prehliadač ich nepodporuje alebo blokuje JavaScript, preto sa aplikácia nemusí správne načítať.

Aktualizujte prosím Chrome, Edge, Firefox alebo Safari na najnovšiu verziu a stránku potom obnovte.

Ak používate Windows 7, Windows 8 alebo Windows 8.1, Chrome a Edge už nemusia ponúkať novú verziu. V takom prípade použite novšie zariadenie alebo kontaktujte podporu Praktik.ai.

Prohlížeč nebo jeho nastavení nejsou podporované.

Praktik.ai používá moderní webové technologie kvůli bezpečnosti, rychlosti a spolehlivému přihlašování. Tento prohlížeč je nepodporuje nebo blokuje JavaScript, proto se aplikace nemusí správně načíst.

Aktualizujte prosím Chrome, Edge, Firefox nebo Safari na nejnovější verzi a stránku potom obnovte.

Pokud používáte Windows 7, Windows 8 nebo Windows 8.1, Chrome a Edge už nemusí nabízet novou verzi. V takovém případě použijte novější zařízení nebo kontaktujte podporu Praktik.ai.

Your browser or its settings are not supported.

Praktik.ai uses modern web technologies for security, speed, and reliable sign-in. This browser does not support them, or JavaScript is blocked, so the app may not load correctly.

Please update Chrome, Edge, Firefox, or Safari to the latest version and then reload this page.

If you use Windows 7, Windows 8, or Windows 8.1, Chrome and Edge may no longer offer a newer version. In that case, use a newer device or contact Praktik.ai support.

62025TJ0474

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

4 November 2026 (*)

In Case T‑474/25,

BP, represented by E. Lazar, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by J.-F. Brakeland, A. Sauka and O. Dani, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

Council of the European Union, represented by M. Bauer and I. Demoulin, acting as Agents,

intervener,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of G. De Baere (Rapporteur), President, J. Svenningsen and C. Mac Eochaidh, Judges,

Registrar: T. Henze, Acting Registrar,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, BP, seeks, first, the annulment of the decision of the Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) of the European Commission, as reflected in the letter of recovery sent to her on 11 December 2024 and in her salary slips from January 2025 onwards, to apply the new correction coefficient for Hungary of 75.5% to her remuneration and, second, compensation for the material and non-material damage she claims to have suffered as a result of that decision.

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is a member of the contract staff at the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), located in Budapest (Hungary).

3 On 11 December 2024, the ‘2024 annual update of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ C, C/2024/7388; ‘the 2024 update’). Following that update, the correction coefficient for Hungary, applicable to the remuneration of officials and other servants of the European Union, decreased from 86.2% to 75.5% with effect from 1 July 2024 (‘the updated correction coefficient’).

4 On the same day, the PMO of the Commission sent an individual administrative decision to the applicant, which (i) informed her that her salary slip for December 2024 included amounts unduly paid following the update of her remuneration and economic parity at her place of employment based on the 2024 update published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union, and (ii) set out the timetable for repayment of those amounts which were to be deducted from her salary from February to May 2025 (‘the recovery decision’).

5 On 16 December 2024, the applicant sent a complaint to the Commission, pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 15) (‘the Staff Regulations’) and which applies by analogy to temporary and contract staff in accordance with Articles 20 and 92 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, in relation to the retrospective salary recovery because of the reduction in the correction coefficient for Hungary.

6 On 5 January 2025, the applicant submitted evidence to the Commission to supplement her complaint.

7 By decision of 15 April 2025, the Commission rejected the applicant’s complaint (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).

8 On 5 May 2025, the applicant sent a letter to the Commission in order to raise a procedural irregularity arising from the change, in the decision rejecting the complaint, of the legal basis of the recovery decision, which was capable of invalidating that latter decision.

9 On 8 May 2025, the Commission replied to the applicant stating that the decision rejecting the complaint was final and that she could challenge it before the General Court.

10 On 26 June 2025, the applicant sent a letter to the Commission in which, inter alia, she contested the new legal basis of the recovery decision.

Forms of order sought

11 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the decision of the PMO of the Commission, as reflected in the recovery letter sent to the applicant on 11 December 2024 and in her salary slips from January 2025, to apply the updated correction coefficient to her remuneration;

– order the Commission to compensate her for the material and non-material damage that she suffered as a result of that decision;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

12 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

13 The Council of the European Union contends that the Court should dismiss the action.

Law

The application for annulment

14 As a preliminary point, as regards the scope of the applicant’s first head of claim, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, a payslip, by its nature and purpose, does not have the characteristics of an act adversely affecting an official, since it merely expresses in financial terms the effect of earlier administrative decisions concerning the official’s legal and personal situation (see judgment of 12 December 2019, Tàpias v Council, T‑527/16, EU:T:2019:856, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

15 In the present case, the decision to apply the updated correction coefficient, set out in the 2024 update, to the applicant’s remuneration is apparent from the recovery decision. That decision states that reimbursement of the overpayment will be deducted from the salaries for February to May 2025. Thus, the applicant’s salary slips from January 2025, referred to in the applicant’s first head of claim, merely reflect that decision.

16 Accordingly, the recovery decision must be regarded as the contested decision.

17 In support of her application for annulment, the applicant raises five pleas in law. The first plea in law alleges a manifest error of assessment, procedural errors and infringement of Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. The second plea in law alleges breach of the principles of equal treatment and transparency. The third plea in law alleges infringement of Article 8 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. The fourth plea in law alleges infringement of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, unlawful recovery of overpayments, unlawful change of legal basis for the recovery of overpayments from Article 85 of the Staff Regulations to Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, without implementing provisions. The fifth plea in law alleges that ‘Council Regulation of 11 December 2024’ is unlawful in so far as it establishes the updated correction coefficient for Hungary.

The fifth plea in law, alleging that ‘Council Regulation of 11 December 2024’ is unlawful in so far as it establishes the updated correction coefficient

18 The applicant raises a plea of illegality, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, in respect of the ‘Council Regulation of 11 December 2024’, published in the Official Journal under reference C/2024/7388, in so far as it establishes the updated correction coefficient, which was applied to her remuneration.

19 The Commission and the Council contend that the fifth plea in law is inadmissible.

20 Under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.

21 According to the Court’s settled case-law, Article 277 TFEU gives expression to a general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge incidentally, with a view to obtaining the annulment of a decision addressed to that party, the validity of acts of general application which form the legal basis of that decision (see judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others, C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

22 Thus, in an action for annulment brought against individual decisions, the Court has accepted that the provisions of an act of general application that constitute the basis of those decisions or that have a direct legal connection with such decisions may legitimately form the subject matter of a plea of illegality (see judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others, C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

23 In accordance with the case-law, an act of general application within the meaning of Article 277 TFEU is an act that applies to objectively determined situations and produces legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in the abstract (see judgments of 29 January 2026, Commission v Zippo Manufacturing and Zippo, C‑811/23 P, EU:C:2026:48, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 12 May 2021, Alba Aguilera and Others v EEAS, T‑119/17 RENV, EU:T:2021:254, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).

24 It must be stated, as the Council and the Commission noted, that the plea of illegality raised by the applicant is based on an error given that the 2024 update is not a Council regulation.

25 Regulation No 1023/2013 amended the mechanism for the annual update of the remuneration of officials and other staff. Although, before that amendment, the correction coefficients were set by the Council, Regulation No 1023/2013 introduced an automatic annual update of remuneration.

26 According to the second paragraph of Article 64 of the Staff Regulations, the ‘correction coefficients shall be created or withdrawn as well as annually updated in accordance with Annex XI [to the Staff Regulations]’ and ‘the Commission shall publish the updated values within two weeks after the update in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union for information purposes.’

27 In addition, Article 65 of the Staff Regulations provides as follows:

‘1. The remuneration of the officials and other servants of the European Union shall be updated every year, taking into account the economic and social policy of the Union. Particular account shall be taken of any salary increases in the civil service of the Member States and of recruitment needs. The update of the remuneration shall be implemented in accordance with Annex XI. That update shall take place before the end of each year in the light of a report by the Commission based on statistical data prepared by the Statistical Office of the European Union in agreement with the national statistical offices of the Member States; the statistical data shall reflect the situation as at 1 July in each of the Member States. That report shall contain data pertaining to the budgetary impact of remuneration and pensions of Union officials. It shall be transmitted to the European Parliament and to the Council.

…

2. In the event of a substantial change in the cost of living, the amounts referred to in paragraph 1 and the weightings referred to in Article 64 shall be updated in accordance with Annex XI. The Commission shall publish the updated amounts and weightings within two weeks after the update in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union for information purposes.

3. The amounts referred to in paragraph 1 and the weightings referred to in Article 64 shall be understood as amounts and weightings the actual value of which at a given point in time is subject to update without intervention of another legal act.

…’

28 Under Article 1 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, concerning the rules for implementing Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations, ‘Eurostat shall draw up every year before the end of October a report on changes in the cost of living in Belgium and Luxembourg, the economic parities between Brussels [(Belgium)] and certain places in the Member States’.

29 The 2024 update sets out the results of the automatic annual update of remuneration and the correction coefficients carried out by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, under Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations and according to the rules set out in Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. The data that it contains are the result of a Eurostat report, with reference Ares(2024) 7737647, of 31 October 2024 on the 2024 annual update of remuneration and pensions of EU officials in accordance with Articles 64 and 65 and [Annex XI] to the Staff Regulations, adjusting with effect from 1 July 2024 the remuneration of active staff and the pensions of retired staff, and updating with effect from 1 July 2024 the correction coefficients applied to the remuneration of active staff serving in Intra-EU and Extra-EU duty stations, to the pensions of retired staff according to their country of residence, and for pension transfers (‘the Eurostat report’).

30 The sole purpose of the publication of the 2024 update is to communicate the amounts of remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applicable from 1 July 2024, as calculated by Eurostat on the basis of statistical data which it prepared in agreement with the national statistical offices of the Member States.

31 Accordingly, it must be found that the 2024 update, which is the subject of the plea of illegality raised by the applicant, is a document published by the Commission in the C series of the Official Journal for information purposes only and which does not produce legal effects.

32 Contrary to what the applicant claims, that finding does not lead to an ‘institutional vacuum’ in the sense that no binding act for the purposes of Article 297 TFEU was adopted.

33 Articles 64 and 65 of, and Annex XI to, the Staff Regulations constitute the legal basis for the update of the correction coefficient for Hungary in 2024 as applied in the recovery decision.

34 In that regard, it is apparent from Article 65(3) of the Staff Regulations, cited in paragraph 27 above, that the application of the updated correction coefficient in the recovery decision is carried out on the basis of the Staff Regulations without the adoption of an intermediate measure.

35 Thus, the plea of illegality may be raised only in respect of Articles 64 and 65 of, or Annex XI to, the Staff Regulations, which constitute the legal basis for the application of the updated correction coefficient in the recovery decision.

36 In her observations on the Council’s statement in intervention, the applicant stated that she was not challenging the legality of Articles 64 and 65 of, or Annex XI to, the Staff Regulations, but the fact that the Commission had departed from them.

37 Thus, in support of her plea of illegality, the applicant does not put forward any argument challenging the legal basis or the procedure on the basis of which the updated correction coefficient, applied in the recovery decision, was established.

38 It follows from the foregoing that the plea of illegality must be rejected as inadmissible.

39 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.

40 First, the applicant submits, in the reply, that Report COM(2024) 563 final from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council of 26 November 2024 on data pertaining to the budgetary impact of the 2024 annual update of remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto (‘the report on the budgetary impact of the 2024 annual update’), in so far as it sets out the method, data and calculations underpinning the correction coefficients, and the 2024 update, which contains the resulting correction coefficients, produce binding legal effects and, taken together, constitute the legal basis for the recovery decision.

41 However, since the report on the budgetary impact of the 2024 annual update is not referred to in support of the plea of illegality in the application, that argument, raised for the first time in the reply, does not comply with the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and must be rejected as inadmissible.

42 In any event, the objective of that report is to provide data on the budgetary impact of the update of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto in 2024. In that report, the Commission notes, first of all, the legal provisions on that update and, in that context, describes, inter alia, the method for the update of correction coefficients set out in Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. Next, it ‘takes note of the various updates of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the EU, which are being implemented in accordance with Annex XI to the [Staff Regulations] during the reference period of twelve months to 1 July 2024 and which take place before the end of 2024’. The Commission sets out, in particular, how, in the Eurostat report, the correction coefficients for 2024 have been calculated, in accordance with the provisions of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

43 Therefore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the report on the budgetary impact of the 2024 annual update does not determine the method for calculating the correction coefficients and cannot be regarded as constituting, together with the 2024 update, the legal basis of the recovery decision.

44 Second, the applicant claims, in the reply, that the inadmissibility of the fifth plea would be a breach of the principle of effective judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and would deprive her of the opportunity to challenge the legality of the act determining her remuneration.

45 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant disputes the update of the correction coefficient for Hungary in 2024 in her action against the individual decision applying the updated correction coefficient to her, namely the recovery decision.

46 Furthermore, it should be noted that the arguments raised by the applicant in the context of the present plea are the same as those raised in the other pleas seeking to challenge the updated correction coefficient applied in the recovery decision. First, as in the first plea, she claims that the updated correction coefficient does not take into account the real cost of living trends and inflation in Hungary. Second, as in the fourth plea, the applicant challenges the Commission’s application of Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations in the decision rejecting the complaint and the retroactive nature of the recovery.

47 The applicant has not therefore established that the inadmissibility of the plea of illegality would deprive her of the opportunity to challenge the update of the correction coefficient for Hungary in 2024 implemented in the recovery decision and would infringe her right to effective judicial protection.

48 Consequently, the fifth plea in law must be rejected as inadmissible.

The first plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment, procedural errors and infringement of Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations

49 In the first place, the applicant claims that the Commission relied on outdated data to determine the updated correction coefficient, in particular by failing to conduct a direct survey, which must be carried out at least once every five years in accordance with Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. Those surveys are essential to reflect actual consumption patterns and cost of living for staff stationed in each place of employment. The applicant claims that the fact that there has not been any direct survey in respect of Hungary since 2017 constitutes a breach of the maximum period of five years set out in Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, invalidating the calculation on which the updated correction coefficient is based.

50 The applicant submits that, in the absence of a timely direct survey, Eurostat’s update of the correction coefficient for Budapest in 2024 relied on statistical data which no longer corresponded to the actual economic situation in Hungary. Given the high inflation in Hungary, the reliance on obsolete data led to a result that underestimated the real cost of living and led to a disproportionate and unjustified decrease in salaries for EU staff posted in Budapest.

51 It is settled case-law that the wording of Articles 64 and 65 of, and Annex XI to, the Staff Regulations and the degree of complexity of the subject imply that the institutions have a broad discretion as regards the factors and elements to be taken into consideration when adjusting the remuneration of officials and servants of the European Union (see judgments of 9 June 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑699/19, not published, EU:T:2021:338, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited, and of 15 December 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑224/20, not published, EU:T:2021:898, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

52 Accordingly, the assessment of the Courts of the European Union, as regards the definition and choice of the basic data and statistical methods used by Eurostat to draw up proposals for the correction coefficients, must be confined to verifying that the principles laid down by the Staff Regulations have been complied with and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts on which the correction coefficients are based and that there has been no misuse of powers (see judgments of 9 June 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑699/19, not published, EU:T:2021:338, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited, and of 15 December 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑224/20, not published, EU:T:2021:898, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

53 In addition, it must be pointed out that it is for the parties who wish to challenge the factors and the method used to establish the correction coefficients to provide the information that could demonstrate that a manifest error has been committed (see judgments of 9 June 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑699/19, not published, EU:T:2021:338, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited, and of 15 December 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑224/20, not published, EU:T:2021:898, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

54 Further, it must be borne in mind that the principle of purchasing power equivalence between officials – which follows, in particular, from the provisions of Article 64 of the Staff Regulations – implies that the financial entitlements of officials and other staff secure, in equivalent professional and family situations, identical purchasing power irrespective of the place of employment. That principle is implemented by applying to remuneration correction coefficients expressing the ratio of the cost of living in Brussels, the reference city, to that of the different places of employment (see judgments of 9 June 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑699/19, not published, EU:T:2021:338, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and of 15 December 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑224/20, not published, EU:T:2021:898, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

55 Under Article 1(3) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, Eurostat, in agreement with the national statistical institutions of the Member States, is to calculate the economic parities which refer to the month of June each year. Under Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations:

‘The economic parities shall be calculated in such a way that each basic component can be updated twice per year and checked by a direct survey at least once every five years. Eurostat shall update the economic parities using the change in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices of the Member States and the most appropriate indices as defined by the Working Group on Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations referred to in Article 13.’

56 In that regard, the Eurostat report contains the statistical data prepared by Eurostat, in agreement with the national statistical offices of the Member States, which reflect the situation as at 1 July in 2024 in the Member States. Eurostat relied on those data to determine the update of remuneration and pensions in 2024 and, inter alia, to calculate the applicable correction coefficients.

57 The supplement to the Eurostat report, with reference Ares(2024) 7908796, of 7 November 2024, presenting explanations and statistical analyses, inter alia, on correction coefficients, contains information on the calculation of the economic parities referred to in Article 1(3) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. The document explains the following:

‘The object of the economic parities is to compare the relative cost of living of European officials in Brussels (reference city) and in each of the capitals and other places of employment for which a correction coefficient has been set. The method used is to compare the price of a “basket” of goods and services purchased by the average official in Brussels with the price of the same basket in each of the other places of employment. The average of all the price ratios is the “economic parity”.

The system works as follows: the total range of goods and services constituting the consumption of the average European institution official is divided into 80 basic headings (such as meat, footwear, electricity supply, motor cars, telephone communications, books). A price ratio between the place of employment and Brussels is established for each of these headings; this is called the basic parity. Price surveys are conducted on goods and services which are selected to represent the basic heading and specified in the necessary detail to enable prices in a sufficiently narrow range to be collected for internationally comparable items.

The Staff Regulations require each basic parity to be checked by direct survey at least once every five years. In practice checks are carried out at shorter intervals as part of the European Comparison Programme (ECP). … At each annual salary review around one third of the basic price parities are replaced by new parities produced by the latest price surveys.

The 80 basic parities are then updated using the ratio between the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the country in which the place of employment is located and the Joint Belgium-Luxembourg Index of consumer prices (JBLI).

…

In order to calculate the overall economic parities weights have to be applied to each basic heading according to its relative importance in the consumption basket. These weights are calculated directly from the results of the special family budget surveys conducted among European and international civil servants every five to seven years. The resulting structure reflects the consumption of the average international civil servant in Brussels and in each country or place of employment.’

58 Furthermore, the same distinction between two types of surveys, namely direct price surveys and family budget surveys, is also apparent from Eurostat’s methodology manual entitled ‘Calculation of Intra-EU correction coefficients in accordance with the EU Staff Regulations’, in the February 2022 version, drawn up by the ‘Working Group on Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations’, referred to in Article 13 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. That manual states, inter alia, that family budget surveys are carried out every five to seven years.

59 It should be noted that, in support of her argument alleging infringement of Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, the applicant, first, relies on a Commission presentation document of 10 July 2023, entitled ‘Overview of EU salary method – role of correction coefficients’, annexed to her complaint, showing that the last family budget survey in Hungary was carried out in 2017 and that the next was planned for 2025. Second, the applicant refers to the part of the supplement to the Eurostat report, with reference Ares(2024) 7908796, entitled ‘Impact of changes in the expenditure weights’, annexed to the complementary complaint, which also states that the last direct family budget survey in Hungary was carried out in 2017.

60 It follows that the applicant’s argument stems from a confusion between, on the one hand, the direct price surveys concerning basic headings which, under Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, must be carried out at least every five years and, on the other hand, the family budget surveys which are not referred to in that annex.

61 In that regard, contrary to what the applicant claims in the reply, the fact that the Commission stated that the last family budget survey in Hungary had been carried out in 2017 and that the cycle of those surveys had been postponed because of COVID-19 does not constitute acceptance by the Commission of an infringement of Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

62 The Commission merely noted that the last cycle of family budget surveys started in 2016 and ended in 2023, with an interruption between 2019 and 2021 due to COVID-19. It added that a new survey cycle started in 2025, which represented an interval of seven years – excluding the interruption due to force majeure caused by COVID-19, which is within the authorised limits.

63 It is apparent from the foregoing that, since the family budget surveys are not covered by the obligation to carry out a survey at least once every five years laid down in Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, the fact that the last family budget survey in Hungary was carried out only in 2017 does not constitute an infringement of that provision.

64 In the second place, the applicant claims that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment since, in the absence of a recent direct survey, the 2024 update does not take into account inflation and the increase in the cost of living in Hungary.

65 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the correction coefficients reflect the difference between the purchasing power of EU staff in Brussels and that of staff in another place of employment and do not merely follow changes in the cost of living in that other place. It follows that the mere reduction in the correction coefficient, even if it is significant and does not reflect a reduction in the cost of living in the place of employment, is not a factor which points to the existence of a manifest error in the choice of the methods to assess equivalence of purchasing power (see judgments of 9 June 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑699/19, not published, EU:T:2021:338, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 15 December 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑224/20, not published, EU:T:2021:898, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

66 The applicant has not produced any concrete evidence that could call into question the finding that the updated correction coefficient correctly reflects the calculation of the equivalence of the purchasing power between Budapest and Brussels, carried out in accordance with the method provided for in Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

67 Furthermore, the applicant merely refers in general terms to inflation in Hungary, without producing any concrete evidence to establish that such inflation actually occurred during the relevant period, namely between 1 July 2023 and 1 July 2024.

68 In addition, it should be recalled that the survey which the applicant claims was not carried out recently is the family budget survey and not a survey on the cost of living in Budapest. In that regard, the supplement to the Eurostat report, with reference Ares(2024) 7908796, referred to in paragraph 57 above, states that, for the 2024 annual exercise, new parities obtained from the ECP consumer prices surveys have been integrated for services (survey conducted in spring 2023) and furniture and health (survey conducted in autumn 2023).

69 Lastly, the applicant submits, in her reply, that the family budget survey carried out in Hungary in 2017 was based on a sample of only 54 households, which infringes the requirement of representativeness and the obligation that the reference data reflect comparable living conditions for officials in each place of employment, laid down in Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

70 First, it should be noted that that argument stems from a confusion between the direct price surveys and the family budget surveys, which are not referred to in Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

71 Second, it is apparent from Eurostat’s methodology manual, referred to in paragraph 58 above, that ‘to estimate expenditure patterns for the EU officials, every five to seven years Eurostat carries out a Family Budget Survey (FBS) in the different duty stations among the staff serving at that time; the average result is established as the consumption pattern of the duty station until the next survey.’

72 However, the applicant does not explain how the size of that sample, which, according to the Commission, represented a 39.7% response rate from the staff serving in Hungary, is such as to distort the calculation of the updated correction coefficient. Since, contrary to what the applicant claims, there was no provision requiring a family budget survey to be carried out every five years, the results of the survey carried out in Hungary in 2017 must be regarded as still statistically representative in 2024.

73 Furthermore, it should be noted that the applicant does not rely on any figures capable of establishing a manifest error of assessment in the choice of data and statistical methods used by Eurostat to determine the updated correction coefficient.

74 In that regard, the alternative method for calculating the correction coefficient for Hungary, produced by the applicant in annex to the reply, is not such as to call into question the plausibility of the calculation of the updated correction coefficient carried out by Eurostat, all the more so because, as the Commission observes, that alternative method overlooks certain parameters and relies on incorrect data.

75 Accordingly, the applicant has not established that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment.

76 In the third place, the applicant claims that the inclusion of narcotics in the representative consumption basket used for cost of living calculations and the updated correction coefficient constitutes a legal and methodological error, since those substances are prohibited by Hungarian law. The use of a uniform basket of goods across all Member States creates a disproportionate and unjustified disadvantage given Hungary’s specific legal context and undermines the principles of substantive equality and economic parity set out in Article 1 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

77 The applicant’s assertion that narcotics were taken into account by Eurostat to calculate the updated correction coefficient is based on the privacy statement which she had to sign in the context of her application for access to documents submitted to Eurostat, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), and which contains a list of categories of products and services included in the database of the purchasing power parity programme common to Eurostat and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and referring to ‘alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics’.

78 Similarly, in the reply, the applicant also relies on the response from the Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (KSH; the Central Statistical Office, Hungary) of 14 August 2025 to a request for access to documents, in which that office stated that the purchasing power parities were calculated by Eurostat and that Eurostat should be contacted concerning the methodology and the categories used in the calculation. The KSH stated that ‘in [gross domestic product (GDP)] statistics, you can find the Hungarian households consumption expenditure for “02.4 Narcotics” category’.

79 It should be noted that the documents referred to in paragraphs 77 and 78 above relate to statistical calculations that differ from those used by Eurostat to update the correction coefficients. The applicant cannot therefore validly infer from this that the narcotics category is taken into account by Eurostat in calculating economic parities and correction coefficients.

80 In that regard, it should be noted that Annex 1 to Eurostat’s methodology manual, referred to in paragraph 58 above, contains the list of 80 basic headings, referred to in Article 1(3)(c) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, used to calculate economic parities. It is sufficient to note that narcotics are not included in that list.

81 It should also be noted that narcotics are not included in the list of products referred to in the questionnaire for the family budget survey in Hungary in 2017, which is annexed to the reply.

82 Accordingly, the applicant is incorrect to claim that narcotics were taken into account in the calculation of the updated correction coefficient.

83 In the fourth place, the applicant claims, in the reply, that the Commission applied an incorrect exchange rate, which artificially decreased the updated correction coefficient. The Commission did not apply the exchange rate of 394.25 forint (HUF) for EUR 1 applicable on 1 July 2024, as fixed in accordance with Article 63 of the Staff Regulations and published in the Official Journal (OJ C, C/2024/4113).

84 Under the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Staff Regulations, remuneration paid in a currency other than euros is to be calculated on the basis of the exchange rates used for the implementation of the general budget of the European Union on 1 July of that year.

85 First, it should be noted that, for the implementation of the budget, the Commission uses the exchange rates provided by the official currency converter InforEuro. As the Commission states, the exchange rate of HUF 397.70 for EUR 1 applied for the purposes of the 2024 update corresponds to the applicable rate on 1 July 2024, as set out on the InforEuro page accessible via its website.

86 Second, the exchange rate published in the Official Journal (OJ C, C/2024/4113), to which the applicant refers, concerns the interest rate applied by the European Central Bank (ECB) to its principal refinancing operations and is irrelevant.

87 Consequently, the applicant cannot validly claim that the Commission used an incorrect exchange rate.

88 It follows from all of the foregoing that the first plea in law must be rejected.

The second plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of equal treatment and transparency

89 In the first place, the applicant claims that the reduction in the correction coefficient for Hungary from 86.2% to 75.5% lacks transparency and fails to acknowledge the cost of living trends in that country. Although the official inflation data show a sharp increase in prices between mid-2022 and mid-2023, the Commission applied that reduction without justification, resulting in unequal treatment of EU officials and staff serving in Hungary and those posted in other Member States.

90 It should be noted that the correction coefficient for Hungary of 86.2% was established by the ‘2024 intermediate update of the remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto’, published in the Official Journal on 25 June 2024 (OJ C, C/2024/4112), corresponding to the period from July 2023 to January 2024 and applicable from 1 January 2024. The correction coefficient of 75.5%, the application of which the applicant objects to, corresponds to the annual update for the period from July 2023 to July 2024 with effect from 1 July 2024.

91 Thus, it is sufficient to note that, since the period taken into account for the update of the correction coefficient in 2024 ran from July 2023 to July 2024, the price trend in Hungary from mid-2022 to mid-2023 is not relevant to the 2024 update.

92 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 65 above, the correction coefficients reflect the difference between the purchasing power of EU staff in Brussels and that of staff in another place of employment and do not merely follow changes in the cost of living in that other place.

93 In addition, in so far as the applicant relies on a comparison with the salary increases received by national civil servants in Hungary, it is sufficient to note that the mechanism of correction coefficients affecting the remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union is intended to ensure purchasing power equivalence between EU staff members, irrespective of their place of employment, and not between them and national civil servants.

94 Consequently, the applicant’s argument must be rejected.

95 In the second place, by an argument also raised in the first plea in law, the applicant claims that the EU officials and other staff serving in Hungary were subject to a significant salary reduction, without the benefit of an updated and direct cost of living survey, resulting in unequal treatment with EU staff serving in other Member States, contrary to Article 1d(1) of the Staff Regulations and Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Comparable duty stations in the European Union benefited from recent direct surveys for the calculation of their correction coefficients, whilst the updated correction coefficient was based on outdated purchasing power parities from 2017.

96 The applicant claims that it is apparent from the Eurostat report, with reference Ares(2024) 7908796, referred to in paragraph 59 above, that the family budget surveys were carried out in France and Germany in 2022 and 2023 and in Hungary in 2017. In the reply, the applicant submits that the Commission’s confirmatory decision of 24 September 2025, concerning the request for access to documents submitted to Eurostat pursuant to Regulation No 1049/2001 (‘the confirmatory decision’), supports her argument.

97 According to settled case-law, the purpose of correction coefficients is to ensure that equivalent purchasing power is maintained for all officials, whatever their place of employment, in accordance with the principle of equal treatment (see judgments of 29 April 2020, CV and Others v Commission, T‑496/19, not published, EU:T:2020:163, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 5 December 2012, Lebedef and Others v Commission, F‑110/11, EU:F:2012:174, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

98 It should be noted that it is apparent from the extract from the supplement to the Eurostat report, with reference Ares(2024) 7908796, which is annexed to the application, that the family budget surveys were carried out in Belgium and Hungary in 2017, in France and Luxembourg in 2022, and in Germany and the Netherlands in 2023.

99 Further, in its confirmatory decision, the Commission provided the applicant, inter alia, with the questionnaires for the family budget surveys from 2017 for Belgium and Hungary, from 2022 for France, and from 2023 for Germany.

100 First, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is apparent both from the supplement to the Eurostat report, with reference Ares(2024) 7908796, and from the confirmatory decision that the last family budget survey was carried out in Belgium in 2017 and not on a more recent date.

101 Second, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 64 and Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, to determine the correction coefficients affecting the remuneration of the officials and other servants of the European Union, the equivalence of purchasing power in the various places of employment is to be calculated with reference to Brussels.

102 As the Commission states, the calculation of correction coefficients is based on objective data concerning the cost of living in each place of employment.

103 It must be noted that the applicant does not claim that Eurostat applied a different method to calculate, with reference to Brussels, the correction coefficients in all the Member States, according to the data specific to each place of employment.

104 Therefore, the fact that the family budget surveys were carried out in other Member States more recently than in Hungary has no bearing on the calculation of the updated correction coefficient. Since the calculation of the updated correction coefficient does not involve a comparison with the situation in those Member States, the applicant cannot validly claim a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

105 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that, in 2024, the reduction in the correction coefficient was higher in Hungary than in other Member States does not establish that the method used by Eurostat discriminates against EU staff members posted in Hungary. The purpose of the updated correction coefficient is to maintain equivalent purchasing power between Hungary and Brussels and reflects changes in the ratio of the cost of living in Brussels and that in Budapest. The fact that that ratio differs from the ratio between the cost of living in Brussels and that in other places of employment is not sufficient to establish discrimination.

106 As regards a breach of the principle of transparency, the arguments raised by the applicant in the reply seek, in essence, to challenge the Commission’s refusal, in the confirmatory decision, to grant her access to aggregated data.

107 Since those arguments do not concern the recovery decision, they must be rejected as inadmissible.

108 Accordingly, the second plea in law must be rejected.

The third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations

109 The applicant claims that the Commission infringed Article 8 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations by failing to recognise that Hungary had fulfilled the condition for an intermediate update of the correction coefficient, which is mandatory where the cost of living index in a Member State rises by 6% or more between two annual updates. She submits that, between July 2022 and July 2023, according to the KSH, the Consumer Price Index in Hungary increased from 113.7 to 117.6, amounting to cumulative inflation of approximately 17.6%. However, the Commission did not trigger the intermediate update mechanism in infringement of Article 8 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

110 Chapter 3 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, entitled ‘Date on which a correction coefficient comes into effect (places of employment with a high cost-of-living increase)’, includes Article 8 which provides:

‘1. For places with a high cost-of-living increase (as measured by the change in the implicit indices), the correction coefficient shall come into effect before 1 January in the case of the intermediate update, or 1 July in the case of the annual update. This is so as to bring the loss in purchasing power into line with what it would be in a place of employment where the change in the cost of living corresponded to the sensitivity threshold.

2. The effective dates for the annual update shall be as follows:

(a) 16 May for places of employment having an inflation rate higher than 6%, and

(b) 1 May for places of employment having an inflation rate higher than 10%.

3. The effective dates for the intermediate update shall be as follows:

(a) 16 November for places of employment having an inflation rate higher than 6%, and

(b) 1 November for places of employment having an inflation rate higher than 10%.’

111 It must be stated, as the Commission noted, that the third plea in law is based on an incorrect understanding by the applicant of Article 8 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. That article concerns only the date on which the annual and intermediate updates take effect in the event of a significant increase in the cost of living in the place of employment.

112 That article provides for a derogation from the date of effect of the annual update set at 1 July by Article 3(1) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations and that of the intermediate update set at 1 January by Article 4(1) of that annex.

113 The applicant cannot therefore rely on Article 8 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations to claim an infringement of the Commission’s obligation to carry out an intermediate update.

114 In any event, it must be noted that the Consumer Price Index in Hungary between July 2022 and July 2023 referred to by the applicant is not relevant to the 2024 update, the reference period for which runs from 1 July 2023 to 1 July 2024.

115 Consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected.

The fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, unlawful recovery of overpayments, unlawful change of legal basis for the recovery of overpayments from Article 85 of the Staff Regulations to Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, without implementing provisions

116 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, in the decision rejecting the complaint, the Commission found that the recovery of the overpayment following the annual update of remuneration should have been based on Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations and not on Article 85 of the Staff Regulations as stated in the recovery decision.

117 In the first place, the applicant challenges the Commission’s reliance on Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations as the basis for the recovery of the overpayment which provides that ‘if the application of this Article results in a negative adjustment of remuneration, the amount overpaid shall be recovered in accordance with detailed rules to be laid down by the institutions’. Since the Commission did not adopt detailed rules for the application of that provision, it does not provide the procedural safeguards necessary for the lawful enforcement of individual recoveries and cannot be applied directly.

118 It must be stated, as the Commission noted, that the applicant’s argument is based on a misquotation of Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

119 Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations provides:

‘The institutions shall make the corresponding positive or negative update to the remuneration and pensions of the officials, former officials and other persons concerned with retroactive effect for the period between the effective date and the date of entry into force of the next update.

If that retroactive update necessitates the recovery of sums overpaid, such recovery may be spread over a period of not more than 12 months from the date of entry into force of the next annual update.’

120 It follows that, where the annual update of remuneration, carried out before the end of each year with retroactive effect from 1 July in accordance with Article 3(1) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, reveals an overpayment, Article 3(6) of that annex permits the recovery of that overpayment from the remuneration paid for a maximum of one year after the annual update.

121 The applicant is therefore incorrect to claim that Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations requires implementing provisions and cannot serve as a basis for an individual recovery decision.

122 In the second place, the applicant submits that the retroactive application of the 2024 update to the updated correction coefficient with effect from 1 July 2024 infringes the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations. She claims that she received her remuneration in good faith on the basis of the correction coefficient in force at the time when that remuneration was paid and had no indication that a downward revision of the correction coefficient would be applied retroactively.

123 According to case-law, the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of European Union law which requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (judgments of 12 February 2014, Beco v Commission, T‑81/12, EU:T:2014:71, paragraph 68, and of 15 December 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑224/20, not published, EU:T:2021:898, paragraph 97).

124 In addition, any individual is entitled to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations where he or she is in a situation in which it is apparent that the competent authorities of the European Union, by giving him or her precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised and reliable sources, have led him or her to entertain justified expectations, and those assurances must also comply with the applicable rules (see judgments of 27 February 2025, OA v Parliament, C‑32/24 P, not published, EU:C:2025:118, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited, and of 19 April 2023, PP and Others v Parliament, T‑39/21, EU:T:2023:204, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).

125 It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, every normally diligent official is deemed to be familiar with the Staff Regulations and, more particularly, with the rules governing his or her remuneration. According to the case-law, the normal diligence to be expected of an official or other servant must be assessed by reference to his or her training, grade and professional experience (see judgments of 12 December 2018, SH v Commission, T‑283/17, EU:T:2018:917, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited; judgment of 15 December 2021, FT and Others v Commission, T‑224/20, not published, EU:T:2021:898, paragraph 98).

126 It should be noted that Annex XI to the Staff Regulations clearly lays down the detailed rules for implementing Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations and, in particular, Article 3 of that annex describes in detail the procedure for the annual update of remuneration.

127 Thus, the applicant, a member of the contract staff in function group IV, cannot claim to be unaware that, pursuant to those provisions, her remuneration was the subject of an annual update at the end of 2024, with retroactive effect from 1 July 2024, capable of giving rise to the recovery of overpayments from her salary slips in the following months. Furthermore, she does not claim to have received assurances from the authorities that that was not the case.

128 Consequently, the applicant cannot validly rely on a breach of the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations in the application of Article 65 of the Staff Regulations in accordance with the procedures laid down in Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

129 In the third place, the applicant claims that Article 85 of the Staff Regulations was the correct legal basis for recovering undue payments. Reliance on Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations deprives the applicant of procedural safeguards equivalent to those provided for in Article 85 of the Staff Regulations. The recovery decision infringes Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, which prohibits the recovery of amounts unduly paid where the recipient was unaware and could not reasonably have been aware that the payment was incorrect. The applicant received her remuneration in good faith and was not aware that the correction coefficient applied in her salary statements was provisional, erroneous or subject to retroactive change.

130 The first paragraph of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations provides that ‘any sum overpaid shall be recovered if the recipient was aware that there was no due reason for the payment or if the fact of the overpayment was patently such that he could not have been unaware of it.’

131 Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations, referred to in paragraph 119 above, sets out the procedure for the recovery of sums overpaid, where such recovery results from a negative retroactive update of remuneration. As the Commission notes, that provision is a lex specialis in relation to Article 85 of the Staff Regulations.

132 The applicant’s argument, raised in the reply, that Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations is not a lex specialis in relation to Article 85 of the Staff Regulations in that it does not include implementing provisions must be rejected since that argument is based on a misquotation of that provision, which is set out in paragraph 117 above.

133 Consequently, since Article 85 of the Staff Regulations does not constitute the legal basis of the recovery decision, the conditions laid down therein were not applicable and the applicant cannot validly rely on an infringement of that provision by the Commission.

134 Lastly, the applicant submits that the change in the legal basis of the recovery decision, at the stage of the decision rejecting the complaint, constitutes a procedural irregularity, in that it deprives her of the opportunity to submit observations.

135 It is sufficient to point out that the applicant challenged the legal basis of the recovery decision in her letters of 5 May and 26 June 2025 and in the present action and that she was therefore indeed able to submit observations in that regard.

136 It follows that the fourth plea in law must be rejected and, therefore, the application for annulment must be dismissed.

The claim for compensation

137 The applicant seeks compensation for the material and non-material damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of the unlawful recovery by the Commission of substantial amounts of her remuneration on an unclear or inapplicable legal basis and using a procedurally deficient process. She submits that the Commission relied on outdated data, did not carry out updated direct surveys and disregarded the procedural rights set out in Article 85 of the Staff Regulations and Article 3(6) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations. The applicant claims that those failures caused her, first, financial damage, corresponding to the amounts unduly recovered from her remuneration, which she estimates at EUR 16 000 and, second, non-material damage, resulting from the recovery decision, which she estimates at EUR 10 000.

138 It should be noted that the illegalities relied on by the applicant were also relied on in support of her application for annulment of the recovery decision and that that decision is the cause of the material and non-material damage allegedly suffered.

139 According to settled case-law, claims for compensation for material or non-material damage must be dismissed where they are closely associated with claims for annulment which have themselves been dismissed as inadmissible or unfounded (see judgments of 5 July 2023, SE v Commission, T‑223/21, EU:T:2023:375, paragraph 185 and the case-law cited, and of 15 November 2023, PL v Commission, T‑790/21, EU:T:2023:724, paragraph 231 and the case-law cited).

140 Since the claim for compensation is closely linked to the application for annulment, it must be dismissed and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

141 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.

142 According to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Council shall bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders BP to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

3. Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs.

De Baere

Svenningsen

Mac Eochaidh

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 November 2026.

T. Henze

M.J. Costeira

Acting Registrar

President

* Language of the case: English.