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62025TJ0275
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)
4 November 2026 (*)
In Case T‑275/25,
IZ, represented by L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), represented by C. Carroll and R.-A. Popa, acting as Agents, and M. Troncoso Ferrer and L. Lence de Frutos, lawyers
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),
composed of S.L. Kalėda, President, H. Kanninen (Rapporteur) and S. Verschuur, Judges,
Registrar: T Henze, Acting Registrar,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By his action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, IZ, seeks, first, the annulment of his appraisal report for the year 2023 (‘the appraisal report for 2023’) and, if necessary, the annulment of the decision of the Deputy Executive Director for Administration and Information Management of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) of 14 January 2025 rejecting the applicant’s complaint (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’) and, secondly, compensation for the non-material damage he claims to have suffered as a result of Frontex’s conduct and that appraisal report.
Background to the dispute
2 On 1 June 2021, the applicant was recruited by Frontex as a member of the temporary staff under Article 2(f) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union and placed in Grade AST 4, step 1. His contract of employment specified his place of employment to be at Frontex headquarters in Warsaw (Poland).
3 On 1 February 2022, in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Poseidon 2022’, Frontex adopted a first deployment decision [confidential], (1) by which the applicant was deployed to Kos (Greece) as an information officer for the period from 26 January 2022 to 24 January 2023. His duties were to assist in the collection of information relevant to situation monitoring and risk analysis.
4 On 3 February 2023, in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Canary Islands’, Frontex adopted a second deployment decision [confidential], by which the applicant was deployed to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) as a debriefing officer for the period from 27 January 2023 to 23 January 2024.
5 During his deployment in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, the applicant was part of a team of screeners (officers responsible for screening) and debriefers (officers responsible for debriefing) that was managed and organised by A, as Shift Leader.
6 Higher up in the hierarchy were, first of all, B, a Field Tactical Support Officer (‘FTSO’) and, secondly, C, a Senior Officer Team Leader and Field Coordinating Officer, and, thirdly, the members of the Operational team in charge of the operational activity ‘JO Canary Islands’.
7 Among the applicant’s duties was the drafting of monthly administrative reports. Those reports had to be sent to B, who, in turn, would communicate them to the hierarchy.
8 In his monthly administrative report of May 2023, the applicant stated, inter alia, that, in his view, his colleague D should have been replaced, because he was unfit for the role of debriefing officer and had affected the work environment. The applicant also stated that ‘this situation should have been managed before, by the people managing the office’.
9 In the same monthly administrative report, the applicant mentioned an incident that had occurred while he was driving a car.
10 On 5 July 2023, in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Albania Land 2023’, Frontex adopted a third deployment decision [confidential], by which the applicant was deployed to Kapshticë (Albania) as a border guard officer for the period from 12 July 2023 to 23 January 2024.
11 On 8 July 2023, Frontex adopted a fourth deployment decision [confidential], by which the applicant’s deployment to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Canary Islands’ was extended until 8 August 2023.
12 Also on 8 July 2023, in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Albania Land 2023’, Frontex adopted a fifth deployment decision [confidential], by which the applicant was deployed to Kapshticë as a border guard officer for the period from 9 August 2023 to 23 January 2024.
13 On 11 July 2023, Frontex adopted a sixth deployment decision [confidential], by which the applicant was deployed to Warsaw (Poland) as a border guard officer for the period from 12 July 2023 to 23 January 2024.
14 On 30 July 2023, the applicant travelled to Warsaw to take up his new duties there on 31 July 2023.
15 On 3 August 2023, the applicant asked B for clarification about his redeployment from the island of Gran Canaria (Spain). That request remained unanswered.
16 On 16 August 2023, Frontex adopted two new deployment decisions. First, it adopted decision [confidential], by which the applicant was deployed to Warsaw as a border guard officer for the period from 12 July to 22 August 2023. Secondly, Frontex adopted decision [confidential], by which the applicant was deployed to Kapshticë as a border guard officer for the period from 23 August 2023 to 23 January 2024.
17 From 27 September 2023 to 24 February 2024, the applicant was on sick leave.
18 On 3 October 2023, the applicant filed a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) taking issue, inter alia, with the deployment decisions mentioned in paragraphs 10 to 13 and 16 above. That complaint, which also included a claim for compensation, was rejected by decision of 26 March 2024 of the Deputy Executive Director for Standing Corps Management of Frontex.
19 On 18 February 2024, the applicant submitted his self-assessment for the 2023 appraisal exercise. On 30 April 2024, he had a meeting with his reporting officer, namely the FTSO at Kapshticë, who had recently been appointed to that role by the Director of the Deployment Management Division.
20 On 6 May 2024, the reporting officer delivered the applicant’s appraisal report for the year 2023. As regards the assessment of efficiency, ability and conduct, the reporting officer could choose between ‘satisfactory’ and ‘not satisfactory’. A ‘satisfactory’ rating could be accompanied by one of the following additional comments: ‘jobholder met performance expectations with development needs’, ‘jobholder fully met performance expectations’, ‘jobholder exceeded performance expectations’ or ‘jobholder significantly exceeded performance expectations’.
21 The appraisal report of 6 May 2024 gave ‘satisfactory’ for the applicant’s efficiency and ability and ‘not satisfactory’ for his conduct.
22 It is apparent from the appraisal report of 6 May 2024 that, under the heading ‘Efficiency’, the reporting officer noted, in particular, that the applicant had ‘effectively carried out his responsibilities as a debriefing officer in a professional manner’ and that he had ‘contributed to [supporting] the screening activities, consistently being available for work’. The reporting officer also noted that ‘[the applicant’s] colleagues [had] expressed concerns about his lack of information sharing, hindering collaborative teamwork and impacting overall results’.
23 Under the heading ‘Ability’, the reporting officer noted that ‘during his deployment in the framework of [the operational activity] JO Canary Islands 2023, in [the island of] Gran Canaria operational area, [the applicant] [had] always shown high commitment, delivering high value debriefing reports’, that he had ‘conducted about 32% of the interviews performed by the team deployed [on the island of] Gran Canaria, which [consisted] of five debriefing officers, this [making] him the most productive … among his colleagues’, that ‘his monthly information reports were always provided [in due time]’, that ‘his reports were extremely focused and contained relevant information which [had] contributed to [identifying] new modus operandi and to [tackling] irregular migration’, that ‘he [was] always willing to volunteer for work[,] not having any time constraints in relation to working matters’, that ‘during his deployment[,] he [had] fulfilled his duties in a professional way[,] overcoming problems by providing solutions’, that ‘he [had] always kept a high [level of] professionalism on duty and off duty during our field visits’, that ‘during the bi-weekly video conferences, [the applicant had] always been recognised by all the participants as an added value and always praised for his proactive approach by all participants’ and that, ‘moreover, due to the lack of personnel[,] he [had] also performed screening activities during [his] deployment[,] showing his willingness to volunteer for work[,] not having any time constraints in relation to working matters’.
24 Under the heading ‘Conduct’, the reporting officer noted that, during his deployment in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Canary Islands 2023’, the applicant ‘[had not demonstrated] the appropriate team work … and this [had been] proved mainly [by] the fact that he was rarely sharing important (general) [information], obtained by interviews, with his other debriefing officer colleagues’, that ‘also, he [had not contributed] positively to Frontex[’s] image and reputation … ( … reported accordingly)’ and that ‘last, regarding discipline, there [had been] many cases when he [had not respected] the chain of command/coordination, while at the same time, he [had not followed] clear [work] instructions and [did not] respect deadlines set’. The reporting officer also specified that he had placed reliance on the opinions expressed by B and C, which were attached to the appraisal report.
25 Under the heading ‘General comments – Assessment of general performance’, the reporting officer noted that, ‘due to the fact that [the applicant had] fully met performance expectations in the fields of efficiency and ability[,] but his conduct [had not been] satisfactory, the final conclusion on [his] general performance [was] that he [had] met performance expectations with development needs’. As a recommendation for the following year, the reporting officer suggested that ‘[the applicant adhere to] the chain of coordination, [meet] deadlines punctually and actively [engage] with team work’.
26 On 11 May 2024, the applicant refused to accept the appraisal report of 6 May 2024 and submitted his counter arguments.
27 By decision of 25 June 2024, the appeal assessor, in the person of the Director of the Deployment Management Division, adopted the appraisal report for 2023, which confirmed the appraisal report of 6 May 2024. The appeal assessor noted in particular that, ‘as a follow up to the rejection by [the applicant] of his annual appraisal report, consultations [had been] held with his line managers’, that, ‘from these consultations, it [had] emerged that, as far as efficiency and ability [were] concerned, [the applicant had] performed as expected[,] which [was] also reflected in the annual appraisal [report]’, that, ‘however, there [was] room for improvement as far as the interaction with others, including with Frontex colleagues, [was] concerned’, and that ‘[the applicant] [was] invited to [engage in] self-reflection on this element and on how he might be perceived by others’.
28 On 24 September 2024, the applicant filed a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the appraisal report for 2023. On 14 January 2025, the Deputy Executive Director for Administration and Information Management of Frontex adopted the decision rejecting the complaint.
Forms of order sought
29 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the appraisal report for 2023;
– annul, if necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint;
– order Frontex to pay compensation for the non-material damage he has suffered, assessed at EUR 30 000;
– order Frontex to pay the costs.
30 Frontex contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action as unfounded;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The subject matter of the application for annulment
31 The applicant seeks the annulment both of the appraisal report for 2023 and, ‘if necessary’, of the decision rejecting the complaint.
32 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, a claim for annulment formally directed against the decision rejecting a complaint has the effect of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted, where that claim, as such, lacks any independent content (see judgment of 14 September 2022, QN v Commission, T‑179/21, not published, EU:T:2022:557, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
33 In the present case, the decision rejecting the complaint confirmed the appraisal report for 2023.
34 Consequently, the claim for annulment directed against the decision rejecting the complaint lacks any independent content and there is, therefore, no need to give a specific ruling on it. However, in the examination of the lawfulness of the appraisal report for 2023, it will be necessary to take into consideration the reasoning contained in the decision rejecting the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2022, QN v Commission, T‑179/21, not published, EU:T:2022:557, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
The claim for annulment
35 In support of his claim for annulment of the appraisal report for 2023, the applicant puts forward three pleas in law, alleging (i) breach of the right to be heard and infringement of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 of the Management Board of Frontex of 20 November 2015 laying down general provisions for implementing Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and implementing the first paragraph of Article 44 of the Staff Regulations (‘Decision No 46/2015’), (ii) manifest errors of assessment, and (iii) misuse of powers, breach of the principle of impartiality and infringement of Articles 22a and 22b of the Staff Regulations.
Preliminary remarks on the scope of the judicial review
36 According to the case-law, appraisal reports contain assessments which can give rise to judicial review only in order to ensure that the procedure is conducted in a regular manner, the facts are materially correct, and there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers by persons who are required to draw up those documents. In other words, reporting officers have the widest discretion when judging the work of people whom they are responsible for appraising and it is not for the Court to review the merits of that appraisal, which contains complex value judgements which, by their nature, are not amenable to objective verification, except in the event of manifest error (see judgment of 18 December 2024, TT v Frontex, T‑787/22, not published, EU:T:2024:909, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
37 Nevertheless, the particularly wide discretion enjoyed by reporting officers for the purpose of the appraisal of a member of the temporary staff must be counterbalanced by especially strict compliance with the rules governing the organisation of the appraisal and the conduct of the procedure laid down to that end (see judgment of 18 December 2024, TT v Frontex, T‑787/22, not published, EU:T:2024:909, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
The first plea in law, alleging breach of the right to be heard and infringement of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015
38 The applicant argues that, by failing to invite him to a dialogue, the appeal assessor breached his right to be heard and infringed Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015.
39 First, the applicant submits that the wording of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 lacks clarity and can be interpreted in several ways, in so far as concerns the nature of the jobholder’s request to have a dialogue with the appeal assessor. While admitting that the wording of that provision might ‘suggest’ that an express request ‘is a prerequisite for an exchange to take place with the appeal assessor’, the applicant asserts that that provision must be interpreted as meaning that the request for a dialogue is implicit and stems from the reasoned refusal of the appraisal report, unless the person concerned expressly waives that right.
40 According to the applicant, the purpose of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 is to ensure that the appeal assessor is under an obligation to hold a dialogue with the jobholder before taking any decision confirming or amending an appraisal report that has been refused. In the applicant’s opinion, the request for a dialogue is deemed to be made the moment a reasoned refusal of an appraisal report is submitted, and any requirement for an express request to be made would be contrary to that purpose.
41 The applicant submits that that interpretation of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 is borne out by an internal Frontex document that sets out a diagram of the appraisal procedure and mentions the dialogue between the jobholder and the appeal assessor.
42 Secondly, the applicant argues that he was not given the opportunity to have a dialogue with the appeal assessor even though his hierarchical superiors were heard and even though the seriousness of the matters reported in his reasoned refusal of the appraisal report of 6 May 2024 should have prompted the appeal assessor to initiate a dialogue with him.
43 Thirdly, the applicant asserts that a person working at Frontex’s Inspection and Control Office asked him whether he had had any meeting in person with the appeal assessor. According to the applicant, the fact that such a question was put to him by that individual demonstrates that a dialogue between the appeal assessor and the jobholder is regarded as the procedural norm within Frontex and not as an exceptional step.
44 Fourthly, the applicant maintains, in essence, that the ‘extraordinary and disorienting’ sequence of rapid redeployments he endured was such that he was unable to parse procedural nuances or notice the absence of a formal request for a dialogue with the appeal assessor.
45 Fifthly, in the reply, the applicant submits that the appeal assessor deliberately chose not to have any dialogue with him, despite his knowledge of his case and, in particular, his complaint of 3 October 2023.
46 Frontex disputes the applicant’s arguments.
47 It is appropriate to examine, first, whether Frontex infringed the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 and, then, whether the applicant’s right to be heard was breached.
48 At the outset, it should be recalled that the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 is drafted in the following terms:
‘Upon a request by the jobholder expressed in his or her reasoned refusal to accept the report, the appeal assessor shall hold a dialogue with the jobholder within ten working days of the date of the reasoned refusal’.
49 First of all, it should be noted that the words ‘upon a request by the jobholder’ appearing in the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 indicate quite clearly that it is for the jobholder to submit a request for a dialogue with the appeal assessor.
50 Next, the words ‘expressed in his or her reasoned refusal to accept the report’ appearing in the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 indicate, with no possible ambiguity, that the request for a dialogue must be made in writing in the document stating the reasons for refusing to accept the appraisal report.
51 It follows that the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 stipulates in unequivocal terms that the appeal assessor is required to hold a dialogue with the jobholder before giving his decision only when the latter has expressly requested a dialogue in the document setting out the reasoned refusal of the appraisal report.
52 Moreover, according to settled case-law, the interpretation of a provision of EU law cannot have the result of depriving the clear and precise wording of that provision of all effectiveness. Thus, where the meaning of a provision of EU law is absolutely plain from its very wording, the Court cannot depart from that interpretation (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 July 2023, Mensing, C‑180/22, EU:C:2023:565, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and of 16 June 2021, Lucaccioni v Commission, T‑316/19, EU:T:2021:367, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited).
53 In that regard, contrary to the applicant’s argument, it is in no way apparent from the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 that its purpose is to establish an obligation to hold a dialogue prior to any decision confirming or amending an appraisal report that has been refused.
54 Lastly, the internal Frontex document to which the applicant refers, which sets out a diagram of the appraisal procedure and refers to the dialogue with the appeal assessor, cannot undermine the clear and precise wording of the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015.
55 It follows from those considerations that, by choosing not to invite the applicant to a dialogue because the act setting out the reasoned refusal of the appraisal report of 6 May 2024 did not include an express request for a dialogue, a point which the applicant does not dispute, the appeal assessor did not infringe the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015.
56 As regards the applicant’s argument that the fact that no dialogue was held also results in a breach of his right to be heard, given, in particular, that the appeal assessor had communicated with his hierarchical superiors, it must be borne in mind that the right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely (see judgment of 4 June 2020, EEAS v De Loecker, C‑187/19 P, EU:C:2020:444, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
57 The right to be heard pursues a dual objective: first, to enable the case to be examined and the facts to be established in as precise and correct a manner as possible, and, secondly, to ensure that the person concerned is in fact protected. The right to be heard is intended, inter alia, to guarantee that any decision adversely affecting a person is adopted in full knowledge of the facts, and its purpose is to enable the competent authority to correct an error or to enable the person concerned to submit such information relating to his personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the adoption or non-adoption of the decision, or in favour of its having a specific content (see judgment of 4 June 2020, EEAS v De Loecker, C‑187/19 P, EU:C:2020:444, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
58 In the present case, it should be pointed out that the objective sought by the right to be heard has been transposed in the third subparagraph of Article 7(3) of Decision No 46/2015, in accordance with which the decision of the appeal assessor may not be based on facts upon which the jobholder has not yet had an opportunity to comment in the course of the appraisal or the appeal procedure, unless the jobholder is given an opportunity to do so by the appeal assessor in good time.
59 Moreover, it is clear from the case-law that the principle of observance of the rights of the defence, of which the right to be heard is an integral part, does not imply that there should be a limit on the consultations which an appeal assessor might find necessary in order to carry out his task diligently. Accordingly, an appeal assessor might find it necessary to consult the hierarchical superiors of the staff member being appraised, without that necessarily leading to an exchange of views with that staff member (see judgment of 18 June 2008, Sundholm v Commission, T‑164/07 P, EU:T:2008:213, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
60 Only if the information obtained from the hierarchical superiors of the staff member being appraised differs from that on which the assessments previously made by the reporting officer were based, and only if the appeal assessor intends to use that information against that staff member in the context of his or her own assessment must the appeal assessor, in observance of the rights of defence of the staff member concerned, give the latter an opportunity to put forward his or her own observations on that information (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2008, Sundholm v Commission, T‑164/07 P, EU:T:2008:213, paragraph 29).
61 In the present case, however, the applicant does not raise any argument and has not submitted any evidence such as to show that the appeal assessor based his decision on information on which he had not yet had an opportunity to put forward his observations.
62 Consequently, in giving his decision without holding a dialogue with the applicant, the appeal assessor neither breached the applicant’s right to be heard nor infringed the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015.
63 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.
64 In the first place, the applicant’s arguments (i) that a person working at Frontex’s Inspection and Control Office had asked him whether he had had any meeting in person with the appeal assessor and (ii) concerning the allegedly disorienting effect he suffered as a result of the rapid redeployments must be rejected as ineffective.
65 Indeed, even supposing such a question had been put to the applicant and that the rapid redeployments had had such consequences, those factual matters are not capable of demonstrating that the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Decision No 46/2015 or the right to be heard made it necessary for the appeal assessor to hold a dialogue with the applicant. Therefore, those arguments cannot lead to the annulment of the appraisal report for 2023.
66 In the second place, as regards the argument that the appeal assessor deliberately chose not to have any dialogue, despite his knowledge of the applicant’s professional antecedents, it must be observed that that argument is not supported by evidence and can only be regarded as merely speculative. It must, therefore, be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on the objection of inadmissibility raised by Frontex in the rejoinder and based on Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
67 Consequently, the first plea in law must be dismissed as partly unfounded and partly ineffective.
The second plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment
68 The applicant takes issue, in essence, with the assessments contained in the appraisal report for 2023 which relate to his conduct as well as those which relate to his efficiency, in so far as they concern the lack of information sharing. According to the applicant, those assessments replicate errors contained in the opinions expressed by his former hierarchical superiors B and C and relating to the period during which he was deployed on the island of Gran Canaria.
69 In addition, the applicant submits that the assessments given under the heading ‘Efficiency’ ought to have led the reporting officer to award him the rating ‘exceeded performance expectations’ rather than ‘satisfactory’, which merely means that he ‘fully met performance expectations’.
70 Frontex disputes the arguments put forward by the applicant.
71 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union have a special obligation of transparency in regard to the appraisal and reporting of their staff, compliance with which is ensured by the formal procedure laid down in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
72 In this respect, the appraisal report is an essential document in the appraisal of staff employed by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, since it enables an assessment to be made of the ability, efficiency and conduct of an official or other member of staff, as referred to in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
73 In addition, the appraisal report is a value judgement by the hierarchical superiors of the official or staff member being appraised on the manner in which he or she has performed the duties conferred on him or her and on his or her conduct in the service during the relevant period (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
74 It should be observed that, irrespective of its future usefulness, the appraisal report constitutes written, formal evidence of the quality of the work carried out by the official or staff member being appraised. Such an appraisal does not merely describe the tasks performed during the relevant period, but also includes an assessment of the personal qualities shown by the individual assessed in the conduct of his or her professional life (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
75 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that an appraisal report must set out the salient points of the performance of the official or other member of staff in terms, in particular, of his or her efficiency, ability and conduct in the service, and appraise them. Subject to the obligation to state reasons, and provided that the appraisal is clearly individualised and not impersonal, a reporting officer is not obliged to give details of the grounds for his or her appraisal by providing specific examples to substantiate his or her value judgments (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
76 In particular, the appraisal report is designed not to build an exhaustive picture of the performance of an official or other member of staff in carrying out the tasks associated with his or her post, but to highlight, on the basis of conclusive evidence, the ability, efficiency and conduct in the service of each official or member of staff (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
77 Nevertheless, according to the case-law, the improvement of the conduct in the service of the official or staff member under appraisal is indeed an objective which the appraisal report is intended to meet (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
78 Thus, the assessment of the qualities of the person being appraised is, in principle, a matter for the administrative authorities and it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment for that of the persons responsible for appraising the work of the person under assessment. Reporting officers enjoy a broad discretion when appraising the work of persons upon whom they must report. Consequently, judicial review by the Courts of the European Union of the content of appraisal reports is limited to ensuring that the procedure is conducted in a regular manner, that the facts are materially correct and that there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
79 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that an error may be said to be manifest only where it may easily be detected in the light of the criteria to which the legislature intended the exercise of decision-making powers to be subject. Thus, in order to establish that the administration made a manifest error in assessing the facts such as to justify the annulment of an appraisal report, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to render implausible the assessments made by the administration. In other words, a plea alleging a manifest error must be rejected if, despite the evidence adduced by the applicant, the contested assessment may still be accepted as true or valid (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
80 The existence of that broad discretion with regard to appraisal presupposes that reporting officers are not obliged to include in the appraisal report all the relevant factual and legal elements supporting their assessment, or to consider and reply to all the points disputed by the person under appraisal (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
81 As regards more particularly the judicial review of assessments in appraisal reports, it should be added that there is all the more reason to restrict that review to manifest error since the General Court is not directly familiar with the situation of the officials or staff members appraised, whereas the appraisal procedure includes administrative safeguards, in particular the appeal procedure (see judgment of 5 February 2025, UG v ERCEA, T‑45/23, not published, EU:T:2025:137, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).
82 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine the applicant’s arguments in support of the second plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment in the appraisal report for 2023.
– Harm to the image and reputation of Frontex
83 The applicant disputes that he harmed the image and reputation of Frontex. Although the applicant does not specify which part of the appraisal report for 2023 he takes issue with in that regard, it may be understood that he criticises the passage under the heading ‘Conduct’ which states that ‘[the applicant] didn’t contribute positively to Frontex’s image and reputation … (… reported accordingly)’.
84 In that regard, first, the applicant asserts that he has always received extremely positive feedback from all Spanish police team leaders and he produces some examples of that in Annex A.35 to the application.
85 Secondly, while he supposes that the criticism regarding harm to Frontex’s reputation arose from his having reported in his monthly administrative reports his concerns about the conduct of a colleague, D, the applicant maintains that he communicated those concerns legitimately and in order to preserve Frontex’s image.
86 Thirdly, the applicant argues that his conduct during an incident involving a vehicle that he was driving was not detrimental to Frontex’s reputation. The applicant acknowledges that, in the course of that incident, he called the police and presented his Frontex officer’s badge. However, he refutes the allegation that he panicked and caused unnecessary stress by the manner in which he handled the incident. The applicant maintains, in essence, that he handled the incident calmly, following security protocols and exercising due diligence in safeguarding both colleagues and members of the public. In support of those assertions, the applicant produces a brief report sent to his hierarchy by the work colleague who was present in the vehicle at the time of the incident.
87 Frontex disputes the applicant’s arguments.
88 First, it must be observed that the examples of the feedback which the applicant has put forward are messages which, with one exception, fail to indicate either the duties performed by the author of the message or the hierarchical relationship between the latter and the applicant or the professional context in which the latter knew the applicant. Furthermore, those messages appear to have been sent in the context of the applicant’s departure to a new post and are confined to a few very short sentences in which the authors express their satisfaction at having worked with the applicant, recognise his professionalism and wish him well in his future career.
89 Therefore, despite the generally positive impression they give of the applicant, those messages are not capable of demonstrating the existence of a manifest error of assessment in the appraisal report for 2023.
90 Secondly, the applicant’s assertion that the criticism regarding harm to Frontex’s reputation arose from his reporting of the conduct of his colleague D in his monthly administrative reports, as recounted in paragraph 8 above, must be rejected as purely hypothetical and speculative. Indeed, that assertion is not corroborated either by the terms of the appraisal report for 2023 or by other written material from Frontex, which asserts – without its being disputed by the applicant – that that criticism relates to the incident referred to in paragraph 9 above, which occurred when the applicant was driving a car.
91 Thirdly, as regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the incident referred to in paragraph 9 above, it is apparent from the report from the applicant’s colleague who was present at the time of the incident that, as it occurred, the applicant and he heard a loud noise on the roof of the car, as if someone were throwing stones or something else, and that they had noticed marks on the roof. The same colleague also explained that, having tried find out what had happened and who was responsible, the applicant immediately called the police, who promised to inform him of the result of their investigations.
92 Admittedly, the description of the facts given in the report of the colleague who was present during the incident referred to in paragraph 9 above contains nothing to suggest that, during the incident, the applicant’s conduct was detrimental to Frontex’s image or reputation.
93 However, Frontex refers to a message which the applicant sent to his superior late in the evening of the incident mentioned in paragraph 9 above. In that message, the applicant reported that three rounds had been fired on the roof of the car and that he had called the Spanish police, to whom he had presented his Frontex badge.
94 In the defence, Frontex argues that, in fact, no rounds were fired on the car driven by the applicant and that his reaction, which needlessly caused alarm to the Spanish police and Frontex personnel, was therefore excessive and disproportionate, given the nature of the incident. In his reply, the applicant, for his part, emphasises that he merely followed security protocols and that he had exercised due diligence in safeguarding both colleagues and third parties.
95 In that regard, it must be observed that it follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 79 above that a plea alleging a manifest error of assessment must be dismissed if, despite the evidence adduced by the applicant, the assessment called into question may still be regarded as plausible.
96 In the present case, Frontex justifies the assessment, set out in the appraisal report for 2023, that the applicant had not contributed positively to Frontex’s image and reputation in the course of the incident referred to in paragraph 9 above and the involvement of the Spanish police that ensued. While the parties agree upon the facts of the incident, their assessments of the applicant’s conduct during the incident diverge, Frontex finding it excessive and disproportionate and the applicant considering it to be in line with the guidelines which apply in such situations.
97 Given that divergence in the assessments of the facts, and in the absence of countervailing evidence from the applicant, the reporting officer’s view, confirmed by the appeal assessor, does not appear to be inconsistent or manifestly unjustified in light of the relevant facts and, therefore, lacking plausibility.
98 Since the applicant’s arguments concerning harm to Frontex’s image and reputation are not such as to demonstrate a manifest error of assessment, they must be rejected as unfounded.
– The applicant’s psychological state
99 The applicant disputes the allegation that he had psychological issues.
100 In that regard, it is sufficient to observe that, as Frontex rightly points out, no aspects relating to the applicant’s psychological state were relied upon in the appraisal report for 2023.
101 Therefore, the arguments which the applicant puts forward in relation to his psychological state must be rejected as ineffective.
– Compliance with work instructions and observance of deadlines
102 The applicant takes issue with the assertion, made under the heading ‘Conduct’ in the appraisal report for 2023, that on numerous occasions he failed to follow clear work instructions and to observe deadlines set.
103 As regards compliance with work instructions, the applicant disagrees with B’s opinion that he failed to follow such instructions when interviewing migrants. In that regard, the applicant admits that he ‘simply’ closed the doors of debriefing offices during such interviews to ensure confidentiality, but denies that he ‘locked’ them. The applicant also disputes that there was any incident when he yelled at a migrant and the intervention of a colleague was necessary. According to the applicant, he would not have ‘received so many detailed messages of appreciation from the Spanish Police Team Leaders if [those] allegations were true’.
104 As regards the observance of deadlines, the applicant asserts that he always sent his monthly administrative reports in good time and that it is difficult to reconcile the negative opinion expressed by C with the positive statements emphasising the quality of those reports. In that regard, he refers to a remark appearing in the appraisal report for 2023 under the heading ‘Ability’.
105 Similarly, the applicant maintains that, with the exception of one meeting of lesser importance, the context of which he describes in detail, he was systematically punctual in attending all meetings and training sessions. He submits that, in the absence of objective time logs or complaints, any tardiness levelled against him does not meet the threshold of plausibility to warrant an adverse assessment.
106 In this context, the applicant appears also to take issue with the remark, again appearing under the heading ‘Conduct’, that he ‘was rarely sharing important (general) [information], obtained by interviews, with his other debriefing [officer] colleagues’. The applicant points out that, under the heading ‘Ability’ in the appraisal report for 2023, the reporting officer mentioned his high professionalism, the recognition he was given by his colleagues and his productivity.
107 Frontex disputes the applicant’s arguments.
108 It must be observed that, generally, the applicant confines himself to expressing his disagreement with the reporting officer’s remarks, without, however, adducing evidence to support his statements. Nevertheless, as Frontex rightly asserts, the applicant could have refuted the remarks contained in the opinions expressed by his hierarchical superiors B and C on which the reporting officer placed reliance by producing, in particular, witness statements confirming his punctuality in attending meetings and training sessions as well as his conduct in the interviewing of migrants.
109 It must also be observed that neither the quality of his monthly administrative reports nor the observance of the deadlines set for sending them in demonstrate that the applicant consistently observed all the deadlines he had been given. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute Frontex’s assertions that he submitted reporting elements and supporting documents late or that that delay caused disruption in the workflow.
110 As regards the argument which the applicant purports to draw from the divergence between the assessment of his ability and that of his conduct, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law cited in paragraphs 73 to 76 above, the appraisal report is a value judgement on the manner in which the official or staff member being appraised has performed the duties conferred on him or her and on his or her conduct in the service during the relevant period. The appraisal report highlights the decisive facts which define the qualities of the person being appraised, in particular, in terms of efficiency, ability and conduct in the service.
111 Having regard to the differing nature of the qualities that must be assessed in order to appraise the performance level of the official or staff member being appraised, respectively efficiency, ability and conduct in the service, it is plausible that a reporting officer might arrive at the conclusion that, during the relevant period, the official or staff member performed at a satisfactory level in some areas, but still needed to improve in others.
112 In the present case, it has been noted, in paragraph 23 above, that, in the appraisal of the applicant’s ability, the reporting officer emphasised the applicant’s numerous qualities, including his professionalism, the recognition he enjoyed among his colleagues and the quality of his monthly administrative reports, which he submitted on time.
113 Nevertheless, that appraisal, which is generally positive, of the applicant’s ability is not incompatible with the fact that the appraisal of his efficiency or his conduct in the service should point to difficulties or shortcomings, such as a lack of information sharing with his colleagues or the non-observance of deadlines, or to the consequences that such difficulties or shortcomings might have for teamwork or, more generally, Frontex’s achievements.
114 The Court must therefore reject the applicant’s arguments relating to compliance with work instructions and the observance of the deadlines as unfounded.
– The opinions taken for the purpose of drawing up the appraisal report of 25 June 2024
115 The applicant asserts that his appraisal ought to have been based not only on the opinions expressed by B and C, but also on the opinion of his hierarchical superior during his deployment to Albania, where he worked from 23 August to 27 September 2023, when he went on sick leave. However, the reporting officer did not ascertain that individual’s opinion.
116 Frontex disputes the applicant’s argument.
117 In the appraisal report for 2023, under the heading ‘Conduct’, the reporting officer noted, in connection with the applicant’s deployment to Albania, that he had been absent from 27 September 2023 until the end of the year and that, for that reason, his conduct during that deployment had not been appraised.
118 It must be held that, given the brevity of the applicant’s period of employment in Albania, the fact that that period was not taken into account does not vitiate the appraisal report for 2023 with any manifest error of assessment. Indeed, even supposing that the applicant’s conduct during his deployment to Albania, had it been assessed, would have been assessed favourably, that appraisal would not have been capable of altering the appraisal of his conduct for the period when he was deployed to the island of Gran Canaria.
119 The present argument must, therefore, be rejected.
– The comparison with the appraisal reports for 2022 and 2024
120 By the reference the applicant makes to his appraisal report for 2022, the applicant seems to wish to call into question the unfavourable assessments, particularly in the area of conduct, in his appraisal report for 2023. In the reply, the applicant also refers to his appraisal report for 2024.
121 Frontex disputes the applicant’s arguments.
122 In this connection, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 73 above, the appraisal report is an assessment of the efficiency, ability and conduct of the person being appraised during the relevant period. It cannot, therefore, be ruled out that the qualities of the person being appraised should improve or regress from year to year.
123 Furthermore, it is clear from the case-law that particular attention must be paid to the statement of reasons in an appraisal report containing assessments which are less favourable than those in a previous appraisal report. Indeed, it is important that the reason be stated for a finding by the reporting officer of a deterioration in performance so as to enable the official or member of staff to determine whether it is well founded and, where appropriate, to enable the Court to carry out its review (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 September 2004, Ferrer de Moncada v Commission, T‑16/03, EU:T:2004:283, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
124 In the present case, it is not disputed that the applicant’s appraisal for 2023, confirmed by the appeal assessor, shows, in so far as concerns the appraisal of his conduct, a regression from that of the previous year.
125 Nevertheless, the applicant was able to dispute the merits of all of the points taken into account by the reporting officer and the appeal assessor for the purposes, inter alia, of their appraisal of his conduct and does not argue that that appraisal is vitiated by a failure to state reasons or that he was not able to understand the statement of reasons.
126 Lastly, it is settled case-law that the legality of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when the measure was adopted. It follows that matters post-dating the adoption of the EU measure cannot be taken into account in assessing the legality of that measure (see judgment of 17 May 2023, IR v Commission, T‑685/21, not published, EU:T:2023:267, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited). It follows that the applicant’s appraisal report for 2024, which addresses facts post-dating the period covered by the appraisal report for 2023, is not relevant to the assessment of the legality of the latter report.
127 Accordingly, the applicant’s argument drawn from the appraisal reports for 2022 and 2024 must be rejected as unfounded.
– The assessment of the applicant’s efficiency
128 The applicant argues that the matters taken into account under the heading ‘Ability’ in the appraisal report for 2023 ought to have led the reporting officer to award him the rating ‘exceeded performance expectations’ rather than ‘satisfactory’.
129 In its defence, Frontex argues that this claim is inadmissible because it was not put forward in the complaint.
130 In that regard, it must be remembered that, according to the case-law, the rule of correspondence between the complaint and the application requires that, for a plea before the Courts of the European Union to be admissible, it must have already been raised in the pre-litigation procedure, enabling the administration to know the criticisms made by the person concerned in respect of the contested decision. Thus, in civil service actions, the form of order sought before the Courts of the European Union can contain only heads of claim based on the same matters as those forming the basis of the heads of claim put forward in the complaint, although those heads of claim may be developed before the Courts of the European Union by pleas and arguments which, whilst not necessarily appearing in the complaint, are closely linked to it. In addition, it should also be noted, first, that, since the pre-litigation procedure is informal in character and those concerned are generally acting without the assistance of a lawyer at that stage, the administration must not interpret complaints restrictively but must, on the contrary, examine them with an open mind and, secondly, that it is not the purpose of Article 91 of the Staff Regulations to bind strictly and absolutely any contentious stage of the proceedings (see judgment of 29 October 2025, FU v Parliament, T‑530/24, EU:T:2025:993, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
131 In the present case, it must be observed that the applicant specifically confined the subject matter of his complaint to a challenge of his appraisal report for 2023 in so far as his conduct was appraised as not satisfactory. Moreover, the applicant did not put forward any claim in his complaint that can be interpreted as being closely linked to a challenge to the appraisal of his efficiency.
132 In those circumstances, the Court must reject as inadmissible the applicant’s argument concerning the assessment of his efficiency.
133 Consequently, the second plea in law must be dismissed as partly inadmissible, partly ineffective and partly unfounded.
The third plea in law, alleging misuse of powers, breach of the principle of impartiality and infringements of Articles 22a and 22b of the Staff Regulations
134 The applicant argues that the appraisal report for 2023 is vitiated by a misuse of powers in that the appraisal of his conduct was entirely based on the opinions of B and C, which lacked impartiality.
135 According to the applicant, the fact that, in his monthly administrative reports for May and July 2023, the applicant reported the inaction of B and C in the face of the allegedly inappropriate conduct of the applicant’s colleague D caused them to retaliate, adopting slanderous or offensive opinions concerning his conduct. The applicant also points out that, following his reporting of that inaction, he received successive deployment decisions, which he challenged by means of a complaint alleging misuse of powers. Those deployment decisions were part of that retaliation.
136 The applicant argues, relying on an email of 21 December 2023, that B and C took steps to harm him in the context of his redeployments, inter alia, by contacting the Field Coordinating Officer for the ‘JO Indalo 2024’ operational activity with the aim of preventing his redeployment to Motril (Spain).
137 In the reply, the applicant maintains that the fact that his appeal assessor, when in the post he held prior to the adoption of the appraisal report for 2023, ordered his removal from the island of Gran Canaria on the basis of the opinions of B and C, and then changed the applicant’s reporting officer, creates ‘an appearance of bias’.
138 Lastly, the applicant submits that the fact that he is now the victim of retaliation for having divulged information as defined in Article 22a of the Staff Regulations constitutes an infringement of Article 22b(1) of those regulations.
139 Frontex disputes the applicant’s arguments.
140 It must be held that, by the present plea, the applicant maintains, in essence, that his former hierarchical superiors B and C used the appraisal procedure for purely personal ends.
141 According to settled case-law, a decision is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken for ends other than those stated. In that regard, it must be recalled that it is not sufficient for an applicant to rely on certain facts in support of his or her claims; he or she must also adduce sufficiently precise, objective and consistent evidence of their truth or, at the very least, their probability, failing which the material accuracy of the statements of reporting officers cannot be challenged (see judgment of 12 July 2018, PA v Parliament, T‑608/16, not published, EU:T:2018:440, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
142 In the present case, the only circumstance put forward by the applicant to substantiate his claims is the possibility that B and C might have felt resentment toward him on account of certain remarks he made regarding them in his monthly administrative reports in 2023.
143 Admittedly, it must be noted that it is indeed clear from the file that, in his monthly administrative reports for May and July 2023, the applicant reproached B and C for certain matters.
144 Nevertheless, according to the case-law, even though the possibility cannot be excluded that differences between an official or member of staff and his or her hierarchical superior may cause a degree of irritation on the part of the latter, that possibility does not, as such, imply that the hierarchical superior is no longer in a position to assess objectively the merits of the person concerned (see judgment of 12 July 2018, PA v Parliament, T‑608/16, not published, EU:T:2018:440, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
145 The applicant has not, however, adduced sufficiently objective, relevant and consistent evidence to substantiate his allegations that B and C deliberately intended to harm him by giving negative opinions of his conduct. Indeed, those allegations rest upon the subjective assessment of the relationship that the applicant establishes between his criticisms of B and C and the opinions B and C gave of his conduct.
146 As regards his allegation that B and C acted to prevent his deployment to Spain in 2024, the applicant produces, in this connection, as Annex A.43 to the application, an email of 21 December 2023. That email concerns a decision to deploy the applicant that had been planned in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Indalo 2024’. Its author expressed his concerns regarding that decision, which had arisen from reports and feedback received from FTSOs and team members received in June 2023, while the applicant was deployed in the context of the operational activity ‘JO Canary Islands’.
147 However, it must be observed that Annex A.43 identifies neither the author of the email of 21 December 2023 nor its addressees. Nor are the contents or the authors of the reports and feedback referred to in the email apparent from that annex. It cannot therefore, as such, constitute evidence that B and C acted in retaliation against the applicant by attempting to harm him in the context of his deployments.
148 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that B and C were not the authors of the appraisal report for 2023. Also, the applicant does not argue that, in 2023, he was at odds with his reporting officer or appeal assessor or that they displayed a lack of objectivity and impartiality in his regard, nor does the applicant put forward any evidence to show a misuse of powers on their part.
149 Admittedly, in the reply the applicant argues that the fact that his appeal assessor ordered his removal from the island of Gran Canaria on the basis of the opinions of B and C and then changed his reporting officer in September 2023 created ‘an appearance of bias’. Nevertheless, the applicant has not demonstrated that the decisions of his appeal assessor, who was also Director of the Deployment Management Division, to remove the applicant from the island of Gran Canaria and to appoint a new FTSO in Kapshticë, who, in that post, then became the applicant’s new reporting officer, were motivated by any resentment or hostility he felt toward the applicant. Moreover, the fact that an appeal assessor, acting in his capacity as hierarchical superior of a person being appraised, takes decisions concerning that person which fall within his sphere of competence cannot, in itself, create an ‘appearance of bias’. The applicant’s argument must therefore be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on the objection of inadmissibility raised by Frontex in the rejoinder.
150 As regards the argument alleging infringement of Articles 22a and 22b of the Staff Regulations, it should be noted that, under Article 22a of the Staff Regulations:
‘1. Any official who, in the course of or in connection with the performance of his duties, becomes aware of facts which give rise to a presumption of the existence of possible illegal activity, including fraud or corruption, detrimental to the interests of the Union, or of conduct relating to the discharge of professional duties which may constitute a serious failure to comply with the obligations of officials of the Union, shall without delay inform either his immediate superior or his Director-General or, if he considers it useful, the Secretary-General, or the persons in equivalent positions, or the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) direct.
Information mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be given in writing.
…
2. Any official receiving the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall without delay transmit to OLAF any evidence of which he is aware from which the existence of the irregularities referred to in paragraph 1 may be presumed.
3. An official shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution as a result of having communicated the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, provided that he acted reasonably and honestly.
…’
151 It should also be noted that, under Article 22b(1) of the Staff Regulations:
‘An official who further discloses information as defined in Article 22a to the President of the Commission or of the Court of Auditors or of the Council or of the European Parliament, or to the European Ombudsman, shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution to which he belongs provided that both of the following conditions are met:
(a) the official honestly and reasonably believes that the information disclosed, and any allegation contained in it, are substantially true; and
(b) the official has previously disclosed the same information to OLAF or to his own institution and has allowed OLAF or that institution the period of time set by the Office or the institution, given the complexity of the case, to take appropriate action. The official shall be duly informed of that period of time within 60 days.’
152 In the present case, it must be held that, as Frontex rightly argues, the applicant has failed to establish either that the disclosures made in his monthly administrative reports were what led to the assessments set out in the appraisal report for 2023 or that the conditions laid down in Article 22a and Article 22b(1) of the Staff Regulations were satisfied. In particular, the applicant has failed to show that the facts disclosed in his monthly administrative reports could give rise to a presumption of the existence of possible illegal activity on the part of B and C or a serious failure to comply with their professional obligations.
153 Consequently, the third plea in law must be dismissed as unfounded.
154 It follows from all the foregoing that the claim for the annulment of the appraisal report for 2023 must be dismissed.
The claim for compensation
155 In support of his claim for compensation, the applicant submits that, on account of the disclosures he made reasonably and honestly to his hierarchy about B’s and C’s inaction in the face of the inappropriate conduct of his colleague D, he has suffered retaliatory measures in the form of arbitrary redeployment decisions and a biased appraisal report based solely on the opinions of B and C.
156 The applicant submits that he now finds himself professionally in a precarious position and isolated. He asserts that his current deployment to Bulgaria is the absolute opposite of what the interests of the service require, given his experience, knowledge and linguistic skills, and, moreover, he is burdened with a defamatory appraisal report that is damaging to his reputation and his prospects for career advancement.
157 The applicant considers that his non-material damage stands, ex æquo et bono, at EUR 30 000.
158 Frontex disputes the applicant’s arguments.
159 It should be noted that the applicant argues, in essence, that the non-material damage he claims to have suffered arose, first, from the unlawfulness of the appraisal report for 2023 and, secondly, from the unlawfulness of the deployment decisions concerning him that were adopted after he made certain disclosures in his monthly administrative reports in 2023.
160 In the first place, as regards the claim seeking compensation for the non-material damage arising from the alleged unlawfulness of the appraisal report for 2023, it is clear from the case-law that, in civil service issues, a claim for compensation for material or non-material damage must be rejected in so far as it is closely linked to the claim for annulment, which itself was dismissed as unfounded (see judgment of 19 December 2019, HK v Commission, C‑460/18 P, EU:C:2019:1119, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited). It must be held that there is a close link between the claim for annulment and the claim for compensation, in so far as it is based on the unlawfulness of the appraisal report for 2023. Since the claim for annulment has been dismissed, this part of the claim for compensation must also be dismissed.
161 In the second place, as regards the claim seeking compensation for the non-material damage arising from the alleged unlawfulness of the deployment decisions, according to settled case-law in the field of the civil service, where a direct link exists between an action for annulment and an action for damages, the latter action is admissible as being ancillary to the action for annulment, without its necessarily having to be preceded by a request made to the administration for compensation for the damage allegedly suffered and by a complaint challenging the validity of the implied or express rejection of the request (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2025, DF v Commission, T‑153/24, not published, EU:T:2025:829, paragraph 154 and the case-law cited).
162 In the present case, the conduct on the part of Frontex of which the applicant complains, namely the adoption of deployment decisions, did not result directly from the appraisal report for 2023 and is separable from that report. It follows that, in so far as the claim for compensation is based on that conduct on the part of Frontex, it does not have any direct link with the claim for annulment.
163 Moreover, it must be observed that the claim seeking compensation for the non-material damage arising from the alleged unlawfulness of the deployment decisions does have a link with the applicant’s complaint of 3 October 2023. Indeed, as was noted in paragraph 18 above, by that complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, the applicant had challenged the deployment decisions and made a claim for compensation.
164 It is apparent from the file that the complaint of 3 October 2023 reached Frontex that same day. The absence of any response from Frontex for a period of four months from the date of that complaint gave rise, under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, to an implied decision rejecting it, on 3 February 2024. On 26 March 2024, Frontex expressly rejected the complaint. In accordance with Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations, read in conjunction with Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant was required to bring an action before the General Court within a period of three months plus a single period of 10 days on account of distance. The present action was, however, brought on 23 April 2025, after the expiry of that time limit.
165 Consequently, it must be held that, in so far as it seeks compensation for the non-material damage caused by the allegedly unlawful conduct of Frontex resulting from the adoption of deployment decisions, the claim for compensation must be dismissed as inadmissible.
166 It follows from the foregoing that the claim for compensation must be dismissed and the action dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
167 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
168 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful in the present case, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought Frontex.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders IZ to pay the costs.
Kalėda
Kanninen
Verschuur
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 November 2026.
T. Henze
M. J. Costeira
Acting Registrar
President
* Language of the case: English.
1 Confidential information redacted.