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62024CC0358

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

RANTOS

delivered on 22 October 2026 (1)

Case C‑358/24

Varo Energy Belgium NV,

EG Retail (Belgium) BV,

Gilops Group NV,

Van Raak Trading NV,

Kuwait Petroleum (Belgium) NV

v

Ministerraad (Eerste Minister)

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court, Belgium))

I. Introduction

1 Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 (2) established an emergency intervention which was intended to address high energy prices resulting, in particular, from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, by means of exceptional, targeted and time limited measures. Adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, that regulation provided, in Article 14 thereof, for the introduction of a temporary solidarity contribution applicable to certain undertakings in the energy sector, unless Member States had enacted ‘equivalent national measures’.

2 In that context, the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court, Belgium), before which several actions for annulment have been brought by companies operating in the oil sector in Belgium against a national measure establishing a contribution payable by that sector in order to implement Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854, seeks guidance, in essence, on the validity of that chapter, in the light of the legal basis on which it was adopted, and Article 14 thereof, in the light of Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and on the interpretation of several provisions of EU law. (3)

3 In accordance with the Court’s request, this Opinion will focus on the examination of the first to sixth questions referred for a preliminary ruling. They essentially concern the validity of the provisions of Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854, in that those provisions were adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, and the validity of Article 14 of that regulation in the light of the principles of equality and non-discrimination guaranteed in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter. They also raise several questions of interpretation seeking to ascertain, first, whether such a national measure constitutes an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14 of that regulation and, second, whether it complies with the requirements arising from Articles 30 and 110 TFEU and from the rules on State aid.

4 This reference for a preliminary ruling, which follows on from a number of recent cases brought before the Court, (4) including Acea Produzione and Others (Case C‑153/25) and Vermilion Energy Ireland and Others (Case C‑533/24), in which my Opinions are also being delivered today, (5) offers the Court an opportunity to clarify further its case-law concerning the interpretation of Regulation 2022/1854, which was designed as an exceptional, temporary instrument in the context of an unprecedented energy crisis, and, in particular, to rule on the validity of Chapter III thereof and on the novel question of the criteria for classifying a national measure as an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14 of that regulation.

II. Legal framework

A. European Union law

5 According to recitals 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 51, 54, 55, 57, 63 and 64 of Regulation 2022/1854:

‘(6) A rapid and coordinated response is therefore needed at Union level. The establishment of an emergency intervention would allow for a temporary mitigation of the risk that electricity prices and the cost of electricity for final customers reach even less sustainable levels and that Member States adopt uncoordinated national measures, which could endanger security of supply at Union level and put an additional burden on the Union’s industry and consumers. In a spirit of solidarity between Member States, a coordinated effort by Member States during the winter season 2022-23 is required to mitigate the impact of high energy prices and ensure that the current crisis does not lead to lasting harm for consumers and the economy, while preserving the sustainability of public finances.

(7) The current disruptions of gas supplies, reduced availability of certain power generating plants, and the resulting impacts on gas and electricity prices, constitute a severe difficulty in the supply of gas and electricity energy products within the meaning of Article 122(1) [TFEU]. …

…

(9) A united and well-coordinated Union-wide response is needed to tackle the stark increase of electricity prices and their impact on households and industry. Uncoordinated national measures could affect the functioning of the internal energy market, endangering security of supply and leading to further price increases in the Member States most affected by the crisis. Safeguarding the integrity of the internal electricity market is therefore crucial to preserve and enhance the necessary solidarity between Member States.

…

(13) It appears appropriate in the current situation to take action at Union level by introducing a solidarity contribution for Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors in order to mitigate the direct economic effects of the soaring energy prices for public authorities’ budgets, final customers and companies across the Union. Such solidarity contribution should be exceptional and strictly temporary.

(14) The solidarity contribution is an appropriate means to tackle surplus profits, in the event of unforeseen circumstances. Those profits do not correspond to any regular profit that Union companies or permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors would or could have expected to obtain under normal circumstances, had the unpredictable events in the energy markets not have taken place. Therefore, the introduction of a solidarity contribution constitutes a joint and coordinated measure which makes possible, in a spirit of solidarity, the generation of additional proceeds for national authorities to provide financial support to households and companies heavily affected by the soaring energy prices, while ensuring a level playing field across the Union. It should be applied in parallel to the regular corporate taxes levied by each Member State on the companies concerned.

…

(51) The temporary solidarity contribution should act as a redistributing measure to ensure that the companies concerned which have earned surplus profits as a result of the unexpected circumstances, contribute in proportion to the improvement of the energy crisis in the internal market.

…

(54) This approach would ensure that part of the profit margin, which is not due to the unpredictable developments in the energy markets following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine could be used by Union companies and permanent establishments concerned for future investment or for ensuring their financial stability during the ongoing energy crisis including for the energy intense industry. …

(55) Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure the full application of the solidarity contribution provided for in this Regulation and should arrange for the necessary adjustments in national law, in particular in order to ensure the timely collection of the solidarity contribution …

…

(57) The use of the proceeds for those purposes reflects the solidarity contribution’s exceptional and temporary nature as a measure that intends to reduce and mitigate the harmful effects of the energy crisis for households and companies across the Union with the objective of protecting the internal market and preventing the risk of further fragmentation. …

(63) Member States should apply the solidarity contribution set by this Regulation in their respective territories unless they have enacted equivalent national measures. The objective of the national measure should be deemed similar to the overall objective of the solidarity contribution set by this Regulation when it consists of contributing to the affordability of energy. A national measure should be deemed subject to similar rules as the solidarity contribution where it covers activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, determines a base, provides for a rate, and ensures that the proceeds of the national measure are used for purposes that are comparable to those of the solidarity contribution.

(64) … The application of the solidarity contribution to the full fiscal year should allow the use of surplus profits for the relevant period, in the public interest of mitigating the consequences of the energy crisis, while leaving an appropriate measure of profits to the companies concerned.’

6 Article 1 of that regulation, entitled ‘Subject matter and scope’, provided:

‘This Regulation establishes an emergency intervention to mitigate the effects of high energy prices through exceptional, targeted and time limited measures. Those measures aim to … establish rules for a mandatory temporary solidarity contribution from Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors to contribute to the affordability of energy for households and companies.’

7 Article 2 of that regulation, entitled ‘Definitions’, provided, in points 17 to 19 and 21 thereof:

‘For the purposes of this Regulation … the following definitions also apply:

…

(17) “Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors” means Union companies or permanent establishments generating at least 75% of their turnover from economic activities in the field of the extraction, mining, refining of petroleum or manufacture of coke oven products, as referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council; [(6)]

(18) “surplus profits” means taxable profits, as determined under national tax rules in the fiscal year 2022 and/or the fiscal year 2023 and for their full duration, accrued from activities carried out at the level of Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors which are above a 20% increase of the average of the taxable profits in the four fiscal years starting on or after 1 January 2018;

(19) “solidarity contribution” means a temporary measure intended to address surplus profits of Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors to mitigate exceptional price developments in the energy markets for Member States, consumers and companies;

…

(21) “enacted equivalent national measure” means a legislative, regulatory or administrative measure adopted and published by a Member State by 31 December 2022 which contributes to the affordability of energy.’

8 Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854, entitled ‘Measure concerning the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors’, comprised Articles 14 to 18. In accordance with Article 14 thereof, entitled ‘Support to final energy customers through a temporary solidarity contribution’:

‘1. Surplus profits generated by Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors shall be subject to a mandatory temporary solidarity contribution, unless Member States have enacted equivalent national measures.

2. Member States shall ensure that enacted equivalent national measures share similar objectives and are subject to similar rules as the temporary solidarity contribution under this Regulation and generate comparable or higher proceeds to the estimated proceeds from the solidarity contribution.

3. Member States shall adopt and publish measures implementing the mandatory temporary solidarity contribution referred to in paragraph 1 by 31 December 2022.’

9 Article 15 of that regulation, entitled ‘Base for calculating the temporary solidarity contribution’, provided:

‘The temporary solidarity contribution for Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, including those that are part of a consolidated group merely for tax purposes, shall be calculated on the taxable profits, as determined under national tax rules, in the fiscal year 2022 and/or the fiscal year 2023 and for their full duration, which are above a 20% increase of the average of the taxable profits, as determined under national tax rules, in the four fiscal years starting on or after 1 January 2018. If the average of the taxable profits in those four fiscal years is negative, the average taxable profits shall be zero for the purpose of calculating the temporary solidarity contribution.’

10 Article 16(1) of that regulation, entitled ‘Rate for calculating the temporary solidarity contribution’, was worded as follows:

‘The rate applicable for calculating the temporary solidarity contribution shall be at least 33% of the base referred to in Article 15.’

11 Article 17 of that regulation, entitled ‘Use of proceeds from the temporary solidarity contribution’, provided, in paragraph 1(a) thereof:

‘1. Member States shall use the proceeds from the temporary solidarity contribution with sufficiently timely impact for any of the following purposes:

(a) financial support measures for final energy customers, and in particular vulnerable households, to mitigate the effects of high energy prices, in a targeted manner.’

12 Under Article 18 of Regulation 2022/1854, entitled ‘Temporary nature of the solidarity contribution’:

‘The solidarity contribution applied by Member States in accordance with this Regulation shall be of a temporary nature. It shall only apply to surplus profits generated in the fiscal years referred to in Article 15.’

13 Article 22 of that regulation, entitled ‘Entry into force and application’, was worded as follows, in paragraph 2 thereof:

‘… this Regulation shall apply until 31 December 2023 …’

B. Belgian law

14 Article 2 of the loi instaurant une contribution de solidarité temporaire à charge du secteur pétrolier (Law establishing a temporary solidarity contribution payable by the oil sector of 16 December 2022), (7) applicable to the main proceedings (‘the Law of 16 December 2022’), stated that that law was intended to ‘implement in part [Regulation 2022/1854]’.

15 According to Article 4 of that law:

‘§ 1. A temporary solidarity contribution shall be established, payable by registered oil companies operating in the refinery sector and having refining capacity in Belgium and by registered oil companies designated as primary participants in 2022, pursuant to the arrêté royal du 5 février 2019 pour le diesel, le gasoil et les essences (Royal Decree of 5 February 2019, for diesel, gas oil and petrol).

§ 2. The amount of the contribution payable by registered oil companies operating in the refinery sector and having refining capacity in Belgium is set at EUR 6.9 per tonne of crude petroleum processed between 1 January 2022 and 31 December 2023.

The amount of the contribution payable by registered oil companies designated as primary participants in 2022, pursuant to the Royal Decree of 5 February 2019, is set at EUR 7.8 per cubic metre of products released for consumption between 1 January 2022 and 31 December 2023.

Those amounts shall be calculated and payable by a company separately for 2022 and for 2023.

§ 3. When submitting the annual accounts for the preceding tax year, the contribution shall be calculated in accordance with Articles 15 and 16 of [Regulation 2022/1854]. If the amount exceeds that obtained in accordance with the calculation of the contribution established by this law, the registered oil companies referred to in paragraph 1 must pay the difference.

…

§ 4. The purpose of this contribution is to support households and companies which are suffering the consequences of the energy crisis and are having to deal with exceptionally high prices.’

III. The disputes in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court

16 By applications received on 2 March and 21 to 23 June 2023 at the Registry of the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court), the referring court, the applicants in the main proceedings, (8) registered oil companies designated as primary participants for diesel, gas oil and petrol products in 2022 (‘the oil companies designated as primary participants’), each brought an action for annulment against the Law of 16 December 2022. Those actions were joined by that court, since they related, in essence, to the same national provisions and raised issues that largely overlap.

17 More specifically, that law seeks to implement in part the provisions of Regulation 2022/1854. It establishes a contribution payable by the oil sector that is intended to make undertakings in the energy sector which have made surplus profits as a result of the energy crisis and price increases since the beginning of 2022 contribute to supporting affected households. That contribution covers two categories of oil companies: first, registered oil companies operating in the refinery sector and, second, oil companies designated as primary participants. That contribution is determined, in the case of the former, on the basis of the quantity of crude petroleum processed and, in the case of the latter, on the basis of the number of cubic metres of products released for consumption (‘the measure at issue in the main proceedings’).

18 First, some of the applicants in the main proceedings submit that the Law of 16 December 2022 infringes Article 122(1) TFEU and Regulation 2022/1854 in that the latter was adopted on an incorrect legal basis. Although Article 122(1) TFEU empowers the Council of the European Union to decide upon ‘the measures appropriate to the economic situation’, the measure at issue in the main proceedings, as a direct tax, should have been adopted on the basis of Article 115 TFEU. According to those parties, it follows that, since that regulation lacks a valid legal basis, the law adopted to ensure its implementation in part also lacks a valid legal basis. In that regard, the referring court raises the question of whether Article 122(1) TFEU constituted an appropriate legal basis for adopting that regulation.

19 Second, the applicants in the main proceedings submit, in essence, that the Law of 16 December 2022 is not consistent with Regulation 2022/1854, in so far as it departs both from the personal scope and from the tax base of the temporary solidarity contribution provided for by that regulation. They take the view that those differences in treatment are discriminatory and that, accordingly, the measure at issue in the main proceedings cannot be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14(2) of that regulation. According to the referring court, whilst that regulation allows Member States to implement the temporary solidarity contribution by means of other measures on the basis of the sectors referred to in Article 14(1) thereof, such a sectoral approach must not result in the exemption of certain undertakings or certain Union permanent establishments operating in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal or refinery sectors, since this might otherwise favour certain sectors and, consequently, distort competition in the energy market. That court is also uncertain whether the discretion available to Member States is such as to justify the adoption of a levy mechanism the method of calculation of which departs considerably from that of the mechanism established by the EU legislature. Thus, it has doubts as to the classification of the measure at issue in the main proceedings as an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854.

20 Third, the applicants submit that Article 4 of the Law of 16 December 2022 establishes an unjustified difference in treatment between various categories of undertakings operating in the petroleum products sector, as well as between those undertakings and undertakings operating in the coal and natural gas sectors. In that context, the referring court considers that, if Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 were to be interpreted as permitting the adoption of the measure at issue in the main proceedings, the question would then arise as to the compatibility of that provision with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter.

21 Fourth, the referring court raises the question of whether the Law of 16 December 2022 is compatible with Articles 30 and 110 TFEU, in particular whether the temporary solidarity contribution established by that law must be classified as a ‘charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty’, for the purposes of Article 30 TFEU, or as ‘internal taxation’ within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU. In that second situation, that court raises the question of whether the measure at issue in the main proceedings is discriminatory, since it applies only to petroleum, which is necessarily imported into Belgium, whereas other energy products extracted on Belgian territory are not subject to a comparable levy.

22 Fifth, some of the applicants in the main proceedings allege an infringement of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, on the ground that the limitation of the temporary solidarity contribution solely to the oil sector, to the exclusion of the natural gas and coal sectors, which are nevertheless also covered by Regulation 2022/1854, means that the measure at issue in the main proceedings confers a selective advantage, which constitutes State aid that should have been notified in advance to the European Commission. The referring court notes, in that regard, that the assessment of the selective nature of that measure, pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, is closely linked to the assessment of the difference in treatment pursuant to Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter. In particular, it raises the question of the justification for that difference and, consequently, whether that measure must be classified as ‘new aid’ which should have been notified in advance to the Commission.

23 In those circumstances, the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer nine questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, of which only the first six are the subject of this targeted Opinion:

‘(1) Are the provisions of [Regulation 2022/1854] which relate to the temporary solidarity contribution valid to the extent that those provisions were adopted under Article 122(1) [TFEU]?

(2) If the first question is answered in the affirmative, should Article 14 of [Regulation 2022/1854] be interpreted as meaning that a contribution such as that introduced by the Law of 16 December 2022 … constitutes an “equivalent national measure”?

(3) If the first and second questions are answered in the affirmative, does Article 14 of [Regulation 2022/1854], under the interpretation given in the second question, violate Articles 20 and 21 of the [Charter] in so far as it permits the adoption of a national measure which is applicable both to registered oil companies operating in the crude oil and refining sectors and to registered oil companies operating in the distribution sector, and in so far as it permits the adoption of a national measure which is applicable to registered petroleum companies that were designated in 2022 as primary participants for diesel, gas oil and petrol products, when that measure does not apply to registered petroleum companies that were not designated in 2022 as primary participants for diesel, gas oil and petrol products, to the primary participants for other product categories, such as lamp oil and paraffin, or to companies operating in the coal and natural gas sectors?

(4) Should Article 30 [TFEU] be interpreted as meaning that a measure such as that contained in the … Law of 16 December 2022 at the expense of registered oil companies that were designated in 2022 as primary participants for diesel, gas oil and petrol products constitutes a prohibited charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty?

(5) Should Article 110 [TFEU] be interpreted as meaning that a measure such as that contained in the … Law of 16 December 2022 at the expense of registered oil companies that were designated in 2022 as primary participants for diesel, gas oil and petrol products constitutes a discriminatory domestic tax?

(6) Should [Article] 107(1) and [Article] 108(3) [TFEU] be interpreted as meaning that a measure such as that contained in the … Law of 16 December 2022 constitutes new State aid that had to be notified to the [Commission]?’

24 Written observations were submitted to the Court by the applicants in the main proceedings, the Belgian, Spanish and Italian Governments, Ireland, the Council and the Commission. Those parties, and the German and Finnish Governments, also presented oral argument at the hearing, held jointly with that in Acea Produzione and Others (C‑153/25) and Vermilion Energy Ireland and Others (C‑533/24) on 9 June 2026.

IV. Analysis

A. The first question referred for a preliminary ruling

1. Admissibility

25 Before examining the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, it is necessary to rule on the pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Spanish and Italian Governments, which maintain that that question is irrelevant to the resolution of the disputes in the main proceedings. According to those governments, the possible invalidity of Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854 has no bearing on those proceedings, since the Kingdom of Belgium is, in any event, competent, under its national law, to adopt a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

26 In the present case, the applicants in the main proceedings are specifically challenging the validity of Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854, which establishes the temporary solidarity contribution and on the basis of which the Law of 16 December 2022 was adopted in order to implement, in the Belgian legal system, the resulting obligations. The question of the validity of that chapter, as raised by the referring court, cannot therefore be considered clearly to bear no relation to the purpose of the dispute in the main proceedings within the meaning of the Court’s case-law on the admissibility of requests for a preliminary ruling. (9) On the contrary, since the very purpose of that law is to implement the provisions of that chapter, the assessment of its validity has a direct bearing on the dispute before the referring court. (10) Moreover, the fact that the Kingdom of Belgium has its own powers of taxation enabling it to adopt, under its national law, measures such as the contribution in question is irrelevant.

27 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the question referred concerns the validity of provisions of EU law and is not hypothetical, and that its examination is capable of providing the referring court with the information necessary to give judgment. Accordingly, I am of the view that the first question referred is admissible.

2. Substance

28 The first question referred seeks, in essence, to determine whether Article 122(1) TFEU constitutes a valid legal basis for the adoption of the provisions of Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854. More specifically, the referring court is uncertain whether those provisions may be vitiated by invalidity on the ground of (i) the choice of an inappropriate legal basis; (ii) their incompatibility with the requirements arising from Article 122 TFEU; (iii) an infringement of the principle of conferral of powers; or (iv) a failure to comply with the requirement of a unanimous vote within the Council for the adoption of measures concerning direct taxation and/or fiscal measures.

(a) The choice of legal basis and compliance with the requirements of Article 122(1) TFEU

29 I note at the outset that it is settled case-law that the choice of legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial review; these include the aim and content of that measure. (11) Moreover, where the Treaties contain a more specific provision that is capable of constituting the legal basis for the EU measure, the measure must be founded on that provision. Finally, where examination of such a measure reveals that it pursues several purposes or that it comprises several components and if one of those purposes or components is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the others are merely incidental or are only extremely limited in scope, the legal basis for adopting that measure must be determined in accordance with that main purpose or component. (12)

30 Under Article 122(1) TFEU, ‘without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the Treaties, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy’.

31 It is clear from the wording of that article that recourse to it as the legal basis for an act of EU law is subject to the satisfaction of several conditions. It is in the light of all those conditions, which will be examined below, that it is necessary to determine, in the present case, whether Article 122(1) TFEU could constitute an appropriate legal basis for the adoption of Regulation 2022/1854 as a whole and Chapter III thereof in particular, having regard, inter alia, to its purpose and content.

32 In the first place, it follows from the wording and the scheme of Article 122(1) TFEU that that provision is intended to apply to specific economic situations which are emergencies or exceptional. Measures adopted on the basis of that provision, which is in Chapter 1 of Title VIII of the FEU Treaty, must be intended to remedy a situation of an economic nature. Moreover, although that provision expressly refers to ‘severe difficulties’ in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy, the use of the words ‘in particular’ indicates that this is illustrative and not the only emergency situation capable of falling within its scope. (13)

33 In the present case, that condition appears to me, on the face of it, to be satisfied. On the one hand, as is clear from Article 1 of Regulation 2022/1854, read in the light, in particular, of recital 6 thereof, the purpose of the Regulation is to ‘establish … an emergency intervention to mitigate the effects of high energy prices through exceptional, targeted and time limited measures’, including by means of the temporary solidarity contribution provided for in Article 14 of that regulation. (14) That regulation thus aims to address a situation which, at the time of its adoption, was both an emergency and exceptional, in the light of the existence of ‘severe difficulties … in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy’. Accordingly, this is precisely the situation expressly envisaged in Article 122(1) TFEU. Difficulties in supply cannot, by their very nature, be restricted to the direct supply of Member States, but also include the supply of energy products to consumers, undertakings and individuals. If supply capacity were to concern only Member States, while consumers were unable to gain widespread access to those products on account of excessively high prices resulting from exceptional circumstances, that provision would be devoid of any substantive content.

34 On the other hand, the aforementioned objectives highlight the essentially economic nature of Regulation 2022/1854, namely to ensure security of supply of electricity, to mitigate the increase in energy prices adversely affecting the economy and to contribute to the affordability of energy for the Member States as a whole. (15) In that context, the solidarity contribution, provided for in Chapter III of that regulation, also pursues an economic objective, namely to ‘mitigate the direct economic effects of the soaring energy prices for public authorities’ budgets, final customers and companies across the Union’.

35 In the second place, even though the wording of Article 122(1) TFEU does not expressly lay down this condition, measures adopted on the basis of that provision must be of a temporary nature. That requirement derives from the very purpose of that provision, which enables the Council to adopt the measures necessary to deal with an emergency situation. Such measures are therefore intended to apply not on a lasting basis, but only for the duration of the crisis situation which they are intended to remedy, at the very least until it has come to an end. Otherwise, that provision could encroach upon the substantive legal bases provided for by the Treaties and therefore be contrary to the very introductory wording of the provision, which makes its application subject to compliance with ‘any other procedures provided for in the Treaties’. Recourse to Article 122(1) TFEU cannot therefore either undermine or permit the circumvention of recourse to the other legal bases provided for by the Treaties for situations which arise in ‘normal circumstances’. (16)

36 In the present case, that condition is also satisfied. On the one hand, the measures established by Regulation 2022/1854 are, pursuant to Article 1 thereof, ‘time limited’, since Article 22(2) of that regulation provided that that regulation was to apply until 31 December 2023. On the other hand, as regards the temporary solidarity contribution, its temporary nature is apparent from the very title of Article 14 of that regulation, which uses the adjective ‘temporary’. Article 18 of that regulation further states that it is ‘of a temporary nature’ and applies only to surplus profits generated during the fiscal years referred to in Article 15, namely those of 2022 and 2023.

37 In the third place, it is apparent from Article 122(1) TFEU that measures adopted on the basis of that provision must be ‘appropriate to the economic situation’. That requirement is an expression of the principle of proportionality, which requires that acts of the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them. Accordingly, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous. In that regard, I would point out that the Court accepts that the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas, such as that in the present case, which involve, on its part, political, economic and social choices, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. In such a context, judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality is limited to determining whether the measure in question is manifestly inappropriate in the light of the objective pursued, since only if it is may the lawfulness of such a measure be affected. (17)

38 In the present case, with regard in particular to the temporary solidarity contribution, that contribution appears to me, on the one hand, to be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued by the EU legislature, which is to mitigate the effects of the energy crisis. Contrary to what the applicants in the main proceedings claim, that contribution is not intended solely to generate additional budgetary revenues for Member States, but seeks also to finance measures to mitigate the effects of that energy crisis, by requiring a contribution from undertakings in the sector which have, as a result of that crisis, made what are described as ‘surplus’ profits, that is to say profits which would not have been made under ‘normal circumstances’. (18) I note, in that regard, that Article 17 of Regulation 2022/1854 provides that, while Member States have a wide margin of discretion as to the detailed rules for the implementation of that contribution, they must ‘use’ the proceeds for one of the purposes listed in that article, which are directly linked to the effects of the energy crisis.

39 On the other hand, it seems to me possible to regard the temporary solidarity contribution as necessary to attain the objective pursued – consisting in mitigating the negative effects of the energy crisis on households and undertakings throughout the European Union, while preserving the integrity and smooth functioning of the internal energy market – in the light of the broad discretion enjoyed, in this case, by the EU legislature, as set out in point 37 of this Opinion. Moreover, the characteristics of that contribution, defined in Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 2022/1854, suggest that it does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective. That contribution relates only to a part of the ‘surplus’ profits of the undertakings concerned, thereby ensuring that a part of the profit margin which does not result from market developments following the war may remain available to the Union companies and permanent establishments concerned, in order to enable them to make future investments or ensure their ongoing financial stability. (19)

40 In the fourth and last place, Article 122(1) TFEU provides that the Council must decide on the measures to be taken ‘in a spirit of solidarity between Member States’. That requirement constitutes a specific expression of the principle of solidarity, which is one of the fundamental principles of EU law, to which several provisions of the FEU Treaty refer and which underpins the entire legal system of the European Union. (20) It is clear from the Court’s case-law that that principle constitutes a criterion for reviewing the legality of measures adopted by the EU institutions and that it entails rights and obligations both for the European Union and for the Member States. Accordingly, the European Union is subject to an obligation of solidarity towards the Member States, while the Member States are bound by an obligation of solidarity between themselves and with regard to the common interest of the European Union and the policies pursued by it. Observance of that principle therefore requires an analysis of the interests involved, taking into account the particular interests both of the Member States and of the European Union as a whole. (21)

41 I am of the view that those principles, established by the Court in the context of EU energy policy, (22) may be applied to the requirement of solidarity laid down in Article 122(1) TFEU. (23) In the present case, several factors lead me to consider that the measures adopted under Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854 indeed comply with that requirement. The ‘spirit of solidarity’ is referred to on several occasions in that regulation to justify the coordinated effort of all Member States to mitigate the effects of high energy prices and ensure that the current crisis does not lead to lasting harm for consumers (24) and the economy, while avoiding a worsening of imbalances and further fragmentation in the internal market and preserving the sustainability of public finances. (25)

42 It follows that Regulation 2022/1854, and Chapter III thereof in particular, was clearly adopted in a spirit of solidarity between Member States.

43 In the light of the foregoing, I consider that Regulation 2022/1854 as a whole, and Chapter III thereof in particular, was validly adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, in compliance with the conditions laid down therein for the adoption of measures on the basis of that provision.

(b) Compliance with the principle of conferral of powers and the requirement of a unanimous vote within the Council

44 The applicants in the main proceedings argue that the temporary solidarity contribution cannot, in any event, be validly adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, on account of its fiscal nature. They submit, first, that such a measure constitutes a direct tax, with the result that its adoption by the EU legislature infringed the principle of conferral of powers of the European Union, and, second, that, even if the European Union had the power to introduce such a tax, it could be based only on one of the specific legal bases provided for by the FEU Treaty in the field of taxation, which require a unanimous vote within the Council.

45 In that regard, since it has been established that Regulation 2022/1854 satisfies the conditions for the application of Article 122(1) TFEU, it does not seem to me relevant to examine whether that regulation or any of the measures which it provides for could also have been adopted on the basis of another legal basis subject to different voting rules. Article 122(1) TFEU constitutes a specific legal basis the use of which cannot be excluded solely on the ground that other legal bases, which are more general in scope, may also be applicable. (26)

46 For the sake of completeness, I would note, however, that it appears to me difficult to dispute that the temporary solidarity contribution provided for by Regulation 2022/1854, which consists in levying a contribution on the ‘surplus’ profits of the undertakings concerned, is of a ‘fiscal nature’. Nevertheless, I see no reason to doubt that such a measure may be adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU.

47 First, that provision does not provide that fiscal measures are to be excluded from its scope. Neither the wording nor purpose of Article 122(1) TFEU justifies a general exclusion of such measures from its scope. Where the Treaties are intended to exclude fiscal measures from the scope of a legal basis, they expressly provide for this. (27)

48 Second, it is common ground that the EU legislature may adopt measures of a fiscal nature without infringing the principle of conferral of powers, enshrined in particular in Article 5(1) TEU. The European Union has powers in the field of taxation and has already exercised them, in particular on the basis of Article 115 TFEU, (28) but also on the basis of point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) and Article 194(3) TFEU. It follows that, although direct taxation falls primarily within the competence of the Member States, the European Union is nevertheless not deprived of all competence in that area, provided that it acts within the limits of a legal basis provided for by the Treaties.

49 Third, as regards whether a tax measure could be adopted only on the basis of one of the specific legal bases provided for by the FEU Treaty in the field of taxation and subject to the rule requiring a unanimous vote within the Council, I would note at the outset that the Court has held, in relation to the former Article 103 EEC, that that provision could allow derogation from the rules of the Treaty which, in normal circumstances, would have constituted the relevant legal bases. (29) That case-law may, in my view, be readily transposed to Article 122(1) TFEU, which enables the Council, in exceptional economic crises, to adopt the appropriate and temporary measures necessary to address such crises. In the present case, the main objective of Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854 is not to harmonise or provide a framework for the Member States’ tax policy, but to help, in particular through the temporary solidarity contribution, to remedy the effects of the energy crisis. Therefore, and in accordance with the Court’s case-law cited in point 29 of this Opinion, it is in the light of that objective that the appropriate legal basis for the adoption of those measures must be determined. In that regard, the temporary solidarity contribution is markedly different from an ordinary tax measure intended, for example, to harmonise the rules on the taxation of profits on a permanent basis.

50 The fact that that contribution is of a fiscal nature cannot, therefore, be assessed in isolation, but must be examined in the broader context of the body of emergency intervention measures established by Regulation 2022/1854 to address a specific and temporary crisis. In any event, even if that contribution pursues, in addition to the objective of remedying the effects of the energy crisis, a specific fiscal objective, that objective is incidental to the objective pursued by the regulation. (30)

51 Fourth, and in that connection, I would observe that the need to preserve the effectiveness of Article 122(1) TFEU also supports that analysis. Even though that provision applies ‘without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the Treaties’, that does not preclude recourse to that provision where, in normal circumstances, another legal basis would allow the proposed measure to be adopted. Such an interpretation would effectively deprive Article 122(1) TFEU of a substantial part of its effectiveness. (31)

52 Fifth, with regard to voting requirements, I note that measures adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU are subject to the rule of a qualified majority within the Council. In that regard, the Court has already held that it is not procedures that define the legal basis of a measure but the legal basis of a measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure. (32) It follows that, even though the temporary solidarity contribution, considered in isolation, can be classified as a measure of a fiscal nature, that fact cannot call into question the conclusion that Article 122(1) TFEU constitutes an appropriate legal basis for Regulation 2022/1854, including the temporary solidarity contribution. The Court has already held that the question whether a purely incidental element – considered in isolation – was subject to a requirement of unanimity is irrelevant for the purpose of the assessment. (33) Moreover, Article 122(1) TFEU is specifically intended to allow the Council to act quickly when emergency situations so require, which is not consistent with a requirement for a unanimous vote.

53 In the light of those considerations, I propose that the Court find that, since Regulation 2022/1854 was validly adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, it was also adopted within the limits of the powers conferred on the European Union and in accordance with the procedure laid down by that provision, which does not require unanimity.

54 In the light of the foregoing, I consider that the answer to the first question should be that Regulation 2022/1854, including Chapter III thereof, was validly adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, in compliance with the conditions to which that provision makes the adoption of measures on that basis subject and, therefore, within the limits of the powers conferred on the European Union and in accordance with the procedure laid down by that provision.

B. The second question referred for a preliminary ruling

1. Admissibility

55 Before examining the second question referred for a preliminary ruling, it is necessary to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Spanish Government. That Government has, in particular, argued that the Court’s answer to that question is not necessary for the resolution of the disputes in the main proceedings, because the possible invalidity of Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 has no bearing on those proceedings, since the Kingdom of Belgium has, in any event, the competence to adopt a tax measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

56 In that regard, I would point out that it follows from the Court’s case-law that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance and that the refusal of the Court to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court is possible only where it is quite obvious that the ruling sought on the interpretation or validity of a rule of EU law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose.

57 It must, however, be noted that, in the present case, the applicants in the main proceedings challenge the compatibility of the measure at issue with Regulation 2022/1854. Therefore, the interpretation of that regulation cannot be considered to bear no relation to the purpose of the disputes in the main proceedings. Moreover, I note that the Spanish Government relies on the premiss that that regulation does not preclude a national measure adopted by a Member State to implement the provisions of Chapter III thereof solely on the ground that that measure does not satisfy all the conditions for classification as a ‘temporary solidarity contribution’ or an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14 of that regulation. However, that premiss itself depends, in fact, on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of that regulation relating to that contribution and therefore amounts to prejudging the answer to the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling.

58 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the question referred concerns the interpretation of EU law and that the reply to that question appears necessary in order for the referring court to be able to deliver its judgment. Accordingly, I am of the view that the second question referred is admissible.

2. Substance

59 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 should be interpreted as meaning that a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an equivalent national measure for the purposes of that provision.

60 As a preliminary point, I would recall that Article 14(1) of that regulation provides that surplus profits generated by Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors are to be subject to a mandatory temporary solidarity contribution, unless Member States have enacted ‘equivalent national measures’. Pursuant to Article 14(2) of that regulation, those measures must share objectives similar to those of the temporary solidarity contribution and subject the taxable persons concerned to rules similar to those governing that contribution, in order to generate proceeds comparable to the estimated proceeds from that contribution, whilst not excluding the possibility of generating higher proceeds. (34)

61 I would point out from the outset that, since the three conditions set out in Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854 are cumulative, I shall examine each of them in turn in the following analysis. (35)

(a) The criterion of similarity between the rules governing the temporary solidarity contribution and those governing the equivalent national measures

62 The first requirement arising from Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854 is that operators concerned by an equivalent national measure must be subject to ‘similar rules’ to those governing the temporary solidarity contribution provided for in paragraph 1 of that article. The referring court is unsure as to the scope of that requirement, with regard to both the personal scope of the equivalent national measure and the rules for calculating that contribution where it is implemented by means of such a measure.

(i) The personal scope of the ‘equivalent national measure’

63 I note, as a preliminary point, that the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution is defined in Article 14(1) and in Article 15 of Regulation 2022/1854, which state that it applies to Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors. Moreover, Chapter III of that regulation, entitled ‘Measure concerning the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors’, of which those two articles form part, refers only to those four sectors. (36)

64 It is therefore apparent from the very wording of the aforementioned provisions that the EU legislature intended to limit the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution to Union companies and permanent establishments carrying out activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors.

65 That interpretation is, moreover, supported both by the main objective pursued by Regulation 2022/1854, which is to redistribute a part of the surplus profits earned by certain market participants to consumers in order to address the energy crisis, (37) and by the specific context of its adoption, characterised by the need to adopt common and coordinated measures at EU level to address the exceptional circumstances in the energy market. (38)

66 In my view, the same applies to the equivalent national measures which Member States may adopt pursuant to Article 14(2) of that regulation.

67 Although, unlike Article 14(1) of that regulation, paragraph 2 of that article does not expressly refer to the sectors of activity to which the equivalent national measures must apply, it nevertheless does require that those measures subject the taxable persons concerned to ‘similar rules as the temporary solidarity contribution’. In that regard, recital 63 of that regulation states that an equivalent national measure is deemed subject to similar rules as the temporary solidarity contribution where it covers activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors.

68 Interpreting the concept of ‘equivalent national measure’ as allowing Member States themselves to define the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution and, consequently, to make sectors other than those referred to in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854 subject to it would, in my view, run the risk of undermining both the effectiveness of that provision and the objective of minimum coordination of the measures adopted by Member States in the context of the energy crisis. Indeed, Member States directly applying the temporary solidarity contribution would remain obliged to respect the personal scope and other parameters defined by that provision, whereas Member States which opted for an equivalent national measure would have significantly broader discretion, enabling them, in particular, to define the sectors to which it applies.

69 Such a difference would be difficult to reconcile with the ratio legis of Article 14(2) of that regulation, which is not intended to allow Member States to depart from the harmonised framework established by the EU legislature, but merely intended to allow them to replace the temporary solidarity contribution with a national measure producing equivalent effects. (39) I therefore consider that such an interpretation would largely render meaningless both that contribution, designed as an instrument to respond to the energy crisis, and the EU legislature’s choice to limit the contribution to the sectors referred to in Article 14(1) of that regulation. (40)

70 It follows from all the foregoing that, in order to be classified as ‘equivalent’ within the meaning of Article 14(2) of that regulation, a national measure must, in principle, have a scope ratione personae corresponding to that of the temporary solidarity contribution, as defined by that provision, and therefore cover the same sectors of activity as those referred to in Article 14(1) thereof.

71 It is not disputed, in the present case, that the scope of the solidarity contribution introduced by the Law of 16 December 2022 differs, at least in two respects, from that provided for by Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854. On the one hand, that contribution does not apply to all the sectors referred to in Article 14(1) of that regulation, but applies only to registered oil companies operating in the refinery sector that have refining capacity in Belgium. (41) On the other hand, that contribution extends to sectors which are not covered by those referred to in that provision, in so far as the contribution also applies to oil companies designated as primary participants.

72 In that context, the referring court seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether the measure at issue in the main proceedings may be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14(2) of that regulation and, if so, whether that regulation precludes such a measure.

73 Two points must be clarified in that regard.

74 I note, in the first place, that, although Member States are, in principle, required to apply the temporary solidarity contribution to all undertakings operating in the sectors identified in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854, that obligation necessarily presupposes that such undertakings are actually present on their territory. A Member State cannot therefore be criticised for establishing, by means of an equivalent national measure, a temporary solidarity contribution whose scope is narrower than that provided for in that provision, since the exclusion of certain sectors referred to therein is justified by objective considerations, such as the absence of those sectors on its national territory or their marginal importance.

75 It follows that the limitation of the scope of the temporary solidarity contribution to only one of the sectors referred to in Article 14(1) of that regulation, that is to say, in the present case, the petroleum products refinery sector, cannot, in itself, prevent the measure at issue in the main proceedings from being classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of paragraph 2 of that article.

76 In the second place, as regards oil companies designated as primary participants, I consider that the extension of the category of persons liable to pay beyond the sectors referred to in Article 14 of that regulation is not, in itself, such as to call into question the measure’s compliance with that regulation.

77 I note, first of all, that Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854, which contains Article 14, provides only for the introduction of the temporary solidarity contribution, without, however, prohibiting Member States from extending its personal scope to operators active in economic sectors other than those referred to in that provision. It must also be noted that no other provision of that regulation appears to prevent such an extension. (42)

78 I would next point out that, in the light of the legal basis on which Regulation 2022/1854 was adopted, namely Article 122(1) TFEU, the purpose of that regulation is neither to bring about an exhaustive harmonisation in taxation matters nor to establish permanent mechanisms in the energy market. (43) Since it was not the EU legislature’s intention to regulate exhaustively the tax aspects of the energy market or aspects relating to its proper functioning, Member States retain their competence, in particular in the field of taxation, in relation to situations which fall outside the scope of that regulation. They therefore remain, in principle, free to draw inspiration from EU law in regulating those situations and to extend rules or concepts derived from EU law to purely internal situations. (44)

79 Finally, it does not seem unreasonable for a Member State, when drawing up an equivalent national measure, to take into account the specific characteristics of its national market, in particular the sectors actually present there, in order to determine the scope of the temporary solidarity contribution. Where a sector referred to in Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 is absent from the national market or occupies only a marginal position there, such as natural gas and coal extraction activities in Belgium, the Member State concerned cannot be criticised for seeking to preserve the effectiveness of that measure by extending it to undertakings active in the distribution of certain petroleum products, in particular where those undertakings may have made exceptionally high profits as a result of the energy crisis and where that extension makes it possible to generate revenues comparable to, or even greater than, those which would have resulted from a strict application of Article 14 of that regulation. (45)

(ii) The calculation rules applicable to the ‘equivalent national measures’

80 I would point out that Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 2022/1854 provide that the temporary solidarity contribution is to be calculated on the ‘surplus’ profits of the companies concerned, at a rate of at least 33%.

81 As regards equivalent national measures, I note that Article 14(2) of that regulation does not lay down any method for calculating the contribution in question, but merely requires that those measures make taxable persons subject to similar rules to those governing that contribution. In that regard, recital 63 of that regulation states that a national measure should be deemed subject to similar rules as the temporary solidarity contribution where it determines a tax base and provides for a rate.

82 In the present case, it is common ground that the measure at issue in the main proceedings is based on a method of calculation different from that provided for in Articles 15 and 16 of that regulation for the temporary solidarity contribution, and that that method varies, moreover, according to the category of companies concerned. Rather than introducing a tax on profits in the strict sense, the amount of which would have been determined on the basis of taxable profits, the Belgian legislature adopted a contribution calculated, for registered oil companies operating in the refinery sector and having refining capacity in Belgium, on the basis of the quantity of crude petroleum processed in Belgium and, for oil companies designated as primary participants, on the basis of the quantity of petroleum products released for consumption in Belgium.

83 The question therefore arises whether Member States are required, when adopting equivalent national measures, to follow the method of calculation laid down in Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 2022/1854 or whether they may, where appropriate, use a different method to determine the amount of the contribution.

84 In my view, subject to compliance with the conditions set out below, the latter interpretation is that which should be adopted.

85 It is clear, as stated in point 81 of this Opinion, that Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854 does not, in itself, require an equivalent national measure to be based on the same method of calculating the taxable profits which are subject to the temporary solidarity contribution. Although, as regards the personal scope, recital 63 of that regulation expressly provides that the equivalent national measure must cover the same sectors as the temporary solidarity contribution, no comparable requirement is laid down as regards the method of calculating the contribution. Consequently, the tax base for an equivalent national measure need not necessarily consist of the taxable profits of the undertakings concerned, as is the case for the temporary solidarity contribution provided for in that regulation, but may be based on other elements.

86 Moreover, although the EU legislature has indeed granted Member States the option of having recourse to ‘equivalent national measures’, this is precisely in order to allow them some discretion in implementing the temporary solidarity contribution. By their very nature, recourse to such measures implies that they may differ from that contribution in certain technical aspects, in particular as regards the method of calculation adopted, provided that they make it possible to attain an objective similar to that pursued by that contribution. Otherwise, if Member States were required to reproduce, in an identical way, all the characteristics of that contribution, the very possibility of recourse to an ‘equivalent national measure’ would be deprived of any autonomous meaning.

87 Consequently, I consider that, since the method of calculating the contribution established by the measure at issue in the main proceedings allows the surplus profits of oil companies operating in the refinery sector to be made subject to a charge of a level comparable to that resulting from the application of the rate provided for in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854, which it is for the referring court to verify, that measure should be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Article 14(2) of that regulation, even though the method of calculation adopted differs from that laid down for the temporary solidarity contribution.

88 In so far as is relevant, I would add that, since the measures covering oil companies designated as primary participants in 2022 do not fall within the scope of that regulation, those companies are not subject, as regards those measures, to the requirements arising from Article 14(2) of that regulation concerning the method of calculating the temporary solidarity contribution. As I noted in point 78 of this Opinion, Member States remain free, within the framework of the powers they retain, in particular in the field of taxation, to determine the method which they deem appropriate for sectors of activity falling outside the scope of Regulation 2022/1854, subject, however, to compliance with EU law. (46)

(b) The criterion of the pursuit of similar objectives

89 I note that the second criterion which a national measure establishing a solidarity contribution must satisfy in order to be classified as ‘equivalent’ within the meaning of Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854 is that that measure must pursue objectives similar to those of the temporary solidarity contribution provided for in paragraph 1 of that article and that the proceeds which it generates must be used for purposes that are comparable to those pursued by that contribution.

90 More specifically, as regards the question whether a national measure pursues objectives similar to those of the temporary solidarity contribution, for the purposes of Article 14(2) of that regulation, recital 63 of that regulation specifies that the objective of such a measure must be deemed similar to the ‘overall objective’ of the temporary solidarity contribution set by that regulation ‘when it consists of contributing to the affordability of energy’.

91 In the present case, the Belgian Government maintains, in its observations, that that condition is satisfied since, in accordance with Article 4(4) of the Law of 16 December 2022, the measure at issue in the main proceedings is expressly intended to support households (47) and companies which are suffering the consequences of the energy crisis and are having to deal with exceptionally high prices. (48)

92 It would therefore appear that, subject to the verifications which it is for the referring court to carry out, that requirement is satisfied in the present case.

(c) The criterion relating to the generation of an amount comparable to or higher than the estimated proceeds from the temporary solidarity contribution

93 I would recall that, in accordance with Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854, equivalent national measures must generate proceeds comparable to or greater than the estimated proceeds from the temporary solidarity contribution.

94 In that regard, the Belgian Government argues, in its observations, that, irrespective of the proceeds actually generated by the contribution established by the measure at issue in the main proceedings, Article 4(3) of the Law of 16 December 2022 provides for a compensation mechanism which permits the amount thus obtained to be adjusted in order to bring it up to at least the amount which would have been collected had the levy been calculated in accordance with the method laid down in Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 2022/1854 for the temporary solidarity contribution.

95 Although it is for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to carry out the necessary factual checks, to ascertain whether that mechanism does in fact ensure such a level, it is important to recall that the estimated proceeds from the temporary solidarity contribution cannot be less than those resulting from the application of a rate of at least 33% to the ‘surplus profits’.

(d) Conclusion

96 It follows from the foregoing analysis that, subject to the checks which it is for the referring court to carry out, a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings appears to meet the various requirements laid down in Regulation 2022/1854 for it to be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’, within the meaning of Article 14(2) of that regulation, in that it applies to oil companies operating in the refinery sector.

97 That regulation does not preclude such a measure from extending its scope to sectors other than those exhaustively listed in Article 14(1) thereof. Accordingly, the extension of the scope of the measure to include oil companies designated as primary participants is not, in itself, such as to call into question that measure’s compliance with that regulation, or its classification as an ‘equivalent national measure’ in that it applies to oil companies operating in the refinery sector. However, such a classification cannot be applied to oil companies designated as primary participants which do not fall within the personal scope of that Article 14(1).

98 In the light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the answer to the second question must be that Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 does not preclude national legislation establishing a national measure equivalent to the temporary solidarity contribution which, whilst applying to some of the Union companies and some permanent establishments referred to in Article 2(17) of that regulation and subject to that contribution pursuant to Article 14(1) thereof, also extends its scope to other categories of economic operators not covered by those provisions, provided that that extension does not call into question the equivalence of that measure as regards undertakings falling within the scope of that provision and that, so far as concerns Union companies and permanent establishments referred to in that Article 14(1), that measure satisfies the requirements laid down by that regulation for classification as an ‘equivalent national measure’.

C. The third question referred for a preliminary ruling

99 By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, if the first and second questions are answered in the affirmative, Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 is invalid on the ground that it infringes Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter in allowing, by means of a national measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the separate treatment of, first, the various categories of undertakings operating in the petroleum products sector and, second, those undertakings and those operating in the coal and natural gas sectors.

100 As a preliminary point, I would observe that that question is raised only if the first two questions referred are answered in the affirmative. As is apparent from the analysis set out above, although I propose that the first question should be answered in the affirmative, to the effect that Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854 was validly adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, I recommend, however, that the second question should be answered in the affirmative only in part. As is apparent from point 97 of this Opinion, a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14(2) of that regulation, so far as concerns oil companies designated as primary participants in 2022, since those companies do not fall within the scope ratione personae of that regulation. Consequently, as regards those companies, the measure at issue in the main proceedings does not implement Article 14 of that regulation, with the result that the Charter is not applicable to that measure.

101 I would like to add, for the sake of completeness, that, in view of the explicit information provided by the referring court concerning the subject matter of the actions before it, it does not appear necessary to examine whether Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, in that it allows the application of the measure at issue in the main proceedings to oil companies operating in the refinery sector, is compatible with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter. (49)

102 In the light of the foregoing, I am of the view that it is not necessary to answer the third question. (50)

D. The fourth and fifth questions referred for a preliminary ruling

103 By its fourth and fifth questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 30 and 110 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is applicable to oil companies designated as primary participants, constitutes either a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, prohibited by Article 30 TFEU, or discriminatory internal taxation, prohibited by Article 110 TFEU.

104 As a preliminary point, I would point out that the FEU Treaty provisions relating to charges having equivalent effect and those relating to discriminatory internal taxation cannot be applied together, with the result that a measure covered by Article 110 TFEU cannot, within the system of that Treaty, be classified as a ‘charge having equivalent effect’. (51) It is therefore appropriate to examine, initially, whether the solidarity contribution established by the Law of 16 December 2022 can be classified as a charge having equivalent effect to customs duties on importation within the meaning of Article 30 TFEU. If it cannot, it will be necessary to ascertain, subsequently, whether that contribution constitutes discriminatory internal taxation prohibited by Article 110 TFEU.

105 As regards, in the first place, Article 30 TFEU, I note that, according to settled case-law of the Court, any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty. By contrast, pecuniary charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within Article 110 TFEU, which prohibits discriminatory internal taxation. (52)

106 Thus, the essential feature of a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty which allows it to be distinguished from an internal tax is that the former is borne solely by a product which crosses a frontier, as such, whilst the latter is borne by imported, exported and domestic products. (53)

107 However, it is clear that, in the present case, the chargeable event triggering the contribution established by the measure at issue in the main proceedings is neither the crossing of a border nor importation, but the quantity of petroleum products processed and/or released for consumption. (54) More specifically, as regards the oil companies designated as primary participants in 2022, the measure at issue in the main proceedings provides for a levy of EUR 7.8 per cubic metre of product ‘released for consumption’ during the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023. Moreover, that contribution applies, in accordance with the same criteria, to imported and domestic products irrespective of their origin or destination.

108 The fact noted by the referring court that, since no crude petroleum is extracted in Belgium, that levy applies, in practice, only to imported petroleum does not call that finding into question.

109 It follows from the Court’s case-law, referred to in point 105 of this Opinion, that even a charge imposed on a product imported from another Member State, when there is no identical or similar domestic product, constitutes not a charge having equivalent effect, but rather internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU, if it forms part of a general system of internal charges applied systematically to categories of products in accordance with objective criteria applied irrespective of the origin of the products. (55) In that connection, in order to relate to a general system of internal taxation, the tax charge in question must impose the same duty on both domestic products and identical exported products at the same marketing stage and the chargeable event triggering the duty must also be identical in the case of both products. (56)

110 In the present case, and subject to the verifications which it is for the referring court to carry out, the measure at issue in the main proceedings forms part of such a system and must, therefore, be assessed in the light of Article 110 TFEU.

111 As regards, in the second place, Article 110 TFEU, the first paragraph of that provision prohibits Member States from imposing, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products. Pursuant to the second paragraph thereof, Member States are also prohibited from imposing on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.

112 I would also point out that that provision supplements the provisions on the abolition of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect, in that it aims to ensure free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection which may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. That provision is intended, in particular, to guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between products already on the domestic market and imported products. (57)

113 Accordingly, the Court has held that a system of taxation may be considered compatible with Article 110 TFEU only if it is so established and arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than similar domestic products, so that it cannot, in any event, have discriminatory effect. (58) In that context, the Court has stated that the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU is infringed where the tax charged on the imported product and that charged on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. (59) Thus, the total prohibition laid down in the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU applies whenever a fiscal charge is liable to discourage imports of goods originating in other Member States in favour of similar domestic goods. (60)

114 By contrast, as it now stands, EU law does not restrict the freedom of each Member State to establish a tax system which differentiates between certain products, even products which are similar within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU, on the basis of objective criteria, such as the nature of the raw materials used or the production processes applied, though such differentiation is compatible with EU law only if it pursues objectives which are themselves compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and its secondary legislation, and if the detailed rules are such as to avoid any form of discrimination, direct or indirect, against imports from other Member States or any form of protection of competing domestic products. (61) Moreover, in the absence of similarity, it is also necessary to ascertain whether the measure under examination complies with the second paragraph of Article 110 TFEU, which has the function of covering all forms of indirect protection through taxation in the case of products which, without being similar within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU, are nevertheless in competition, even partial, indirect or potential. (62)

115 For the reasons which I shall set out in the following points of this Opinion, I consider that the measure at issue in the main proceedings cannot be classified as discriminatory internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU.

116 On the one hand, it is apparent from the characteristics of the measure at issue in the main proceedings, recalled in point 107 of this Opinion, that it is based on objective criteria, namely the quantity of crude petroleum or petroleum products processed or released for consumption, without drawing a distinction according to the origin of the products concerned. That measure does not therefore appear, at first sight, to be capable of giving rise to discrimination in the light of the Court’s case-law referred to in points 111 to 114 of this Opinion.

117 On the other hand, I would recall that the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU prohibits any discriminatory measure which establishes a difference in tax treatment to the detriment of imported products as compared with similar domestic products, whereas the second paragraph of that article concerns taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other domestic products. Accordingly, in order to find that there has been a difference in the tax treatment of, or any other form of discrimination against, products from other Member States, it is necessary to identify similar domestic products or competing domestic products capable of being protected by the measure at issue, which naturally presupposes the existence of such products within the national territory.

118 In the present case, although the referring court raises the question of possible discrimination on the ground that the measure at issue in the main proceedings affects, in practice, only imported petroleum, since no petroleum is extracted in Belgium, to the exclusion of other energy products extracted in that Member State, it fails to identify those products and provides no details in relation to them. (63) In any event, as regards the application of that measure to oil companies designated as primary participants, it cannot, in my view, be regarded as constituting discrimination within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU. The different treatment of the various petroleum products is based on objective considerations, within the meaning of the Court’s case-law referred to in points 113 and 114 of this Opinion. That is, inter alia, the case with paraffin (64) or lamp oil, (65) both of which are indicated by the referring court in its fourth and fifth questions referred for a preliminary ruling.

119 In the light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the answer to the fourth and fifth questions must be that Articles 30 and 110 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a national measure imposing a temporary solidarity contribution on registered oil companies which have been designated as primary participants for diesel, gas oil and petrol products, calculated on the basis of the quantities of those products released for consumption, provided that that contribution applies irrespective of the origin of the products concerned and does not, directly or indirectly, make products from other Member States subject to a level of taxation higher than that imposed on similar domestic products or to internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other domestic products.

E. The sixth question referred for a preliminary ruling

120 By its sixth question, the referring court seeks to ascertain, in essence, whether Article 107(1) and Article 108(3) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the temporary solidarity contribution, in so far as it applies only to certain companies operating in the oil sector and not to the natural gas and coal sectors, constitutes unlawful State aid.

121 As a preliminary point, I would recall that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, a measure may be classified as ‘State aid’ for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU only in so far as all the following conditions are satisfied. First, there must be an intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, that intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer a selective advantage on the beneficiary. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition. (66)

122 I note, at the outset, that the uncertainties raised by the referring court relate primarily to the selective nature of the measure at issue in the main proceedings.

123 In that regard, it follows from the Court’s case-law that, in order to determine whether a national measure is capable of conferring a selective advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, it is necessary to examine whether, under a particular legal regime, that measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ over other undertakings which, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, are in a comparable factual and legal situation and which accordingly suffer different treatment that can, in essence, be classified as discriminatory. (67)

124 More specifically, in order to classify a tax measure such as the one at issue in the main proceedings as ‘selective’, it is necessary to identify, initially, the reference framework, that is to say, the ‘normal’ tax regime applicable in the Member State concerned, and to demonstrate, thereafter, that the tax measure at issue is a derogation from that reference framework, in so far as it differentiates between operators who, in the light of the objective pursued by that reference framework, are in a comparable factual and legal situation. The concept of ‘State aid’ does not, however, cover measures that differentiate between undertakings which, in the light of the objective pursued by the legal regime concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation, and that are, therefore, a priori selective, where the Member State concerned is able to demonstrate, subsequently, that that differentiation is justified, in the sense that it flows from the nature or general structure of the system of which those measures form part. (68)

125 In that context, the determination of the reference framework is of particular importance in the case of tax measures, because the existence of an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation. (69) In that regard, it must be emphasised that the determination of the reference framework must follow from an objective examination of the content, the structure and the specific effects of the applicable rules under the law of that State (70) and, in addition, that, outside the spheres in which EU tax law has been harmonised, it is the Member State concerned which determines, by exercising its own competence in the matter of direct taxation and with due regard for its fiscal autonomy, the characteristics constituting the tax, which define, in principle, the reference framework or the ‘normal’ tax regime, on the basis of which it is necessary to analyse the condition relating to selectivity. That determination of the characteristics constituting the tax includes the basis of assessment and the taxable event, but also any exemptions to which that tax is subject. (71)

126 Consequently, where the tax measure in question is inseparable from the general tax system of the Member State concerned, reference must be made to that system. On the other hand, where it appears that such a measure is clearly severable from that system, it cannot be ruled out that the reference framework to be taken into account may be more limited than the general system concerned, or even that it may equate to the measure itself, where the latter appears as a rule having its own legal logic and it is not possible to identify a consistent body of rules external to that measure. (72)

127 In the present case, the Law of 16 December 2022 does not introduce an exemption in the strict sense, but limits the scope of the temporary solidarity contribution to certain companies operating in the oil sector, to the exclusion of other companies and those carrying out activities in the natural gas and coal sectors. The latter are thus excluded from that contribution and could, in principle, benefit from a selective advantage over companies which are subject to it. (73)

128 In that connection, as regards the definition of the reference framework, under the first step of the analysis, I note that the temporary solidarity contribution imposed on certain companies in the oil sector is an exceptional levy that – like Regulation 2022/1854, by which it was inspired – was adopted in the context of a crisis situation and pursues a specific objective, namely to mitigate the consequences of the energy crisis for individuals and undertakings. (74) It therefore has its own legal logic, clearly severable from the general tax system. Accordingly, I consider that the reference framework consists of the Law of 16 December 2022 establishing that contribution.

129 It must therefore be determined, in the second step of the analysis, whether that contribution introduces differences in treatment between operators which, in light of the objective pursued by the reference system, are in a comparable factual and legal situation. To that end, a comparison must be made between, on the one hand, the situation of operators subject to the temporary solidarity contribution and, on the other hand, the situation of the various categories of operators which, although they are, according to the applicants in the main proceedings, in a comparable factual and legal situation, are not subject to that contribution.

130 As regards operators subject to the temporary solidarity contribution, I note, on the one hand, that registered oil companies operating in the refinery sector are among the undertakings subject to that contribution under Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, on the ground that they have earned surplus profits in the context of the energy crisis. On the other hand, I note that, as is apparent from the order for reference and as stated by the Belgian Government and the Commission, oil companies designated as primary participants account for at least 90% of the total volume of petroleum products released for consumption in Belgium. That fact is an important indication of the scale of their economic activities and their fiscal capacity. In that context, the national legislature appears to have ensured that the burden of the solidarity contribution provided for by the national legislation falls exclusively on oil companies holding a significant market share in the trade in fuels.

131 By contrast, the companies excluded from the temporary solidarity contribution appear to be in a different situation. In the first place, oil companies which do not have the status of primary participants account for only around 10% of the market for the petroleum products covered by the Belgian measure at issue in the main proceedings. (75) In the second place, primary participants for other product categories, such as paraffin and lamp oil, are also in a different situation, in view of, on the one hand, the very limited quantities of lamp oil distributed on the Belgian market and, on the other hand, the specific characteristics of the paraffin market, which does not directly concern final customers. (76) In the third and last place, companies operating in the coal and natural gas sectors are also different in character, since coal is only marginally present on the Belgian market, no extraction of natural gas takes place there and the market for the distribution of natural gas differs from that for the release for consumption of the petroleum products covered by the measure. (77)

132 In those circumstances, and without prejudice to the factual assessments to be carried out by the referring court, I consider that the temporary solidarity contribution does not establish a difference in treatment between operators which are, in the light of the objective pursued by the reference system, in a comparable factual and legal situation.

133 If that conclusion were to be confirmed by the Court, it would not be necessary, in the third step of the analysis, to examine the possible existence of a justification based on the basic or guiding principles of the tax system, (78) the request for a preliminary ruling containing no relevant information in that regard. (79)

134 In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the answer to the sixth question should be that Article 107(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that national legislation establishing a temporary solidarity contribution does not constitute State aid provided that it does not establish a difference in treatment between operators which are, in the light of the objective pursued by that legislation, in a comparable factual and legal situation.

V. Conclusion

135 In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice answer the first to sixth questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court, Belgium) as follows:

(1) Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices, including Chapter III thereof, was validly adopted on the basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, in compliance with the requirements of that provision and, therefore, within the limits of the powers conferred on the European Union and in accordance with the procedure that that provision lays down.

(2) Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation establishing a national measure equivalent to the temporary solidarity contribution which, whilst applying to some of the companies and some of the permanent establishments of the Union referred to in Article 2(17) of that regulation and subject to that contribution pursuant to Article 14(1) thereof, also extends its scope to other categories of economic operators not covered by those provisions, provided that that extension does not call into question the equivalence of that measure as regards undertakings falling within the scope of that provision and that, so far as concerns Union companies and permanent establishments referred to in that Article 14(1), that measure satisfies the requirements laid down by that regulation for classification as an ‘equivalent national measure’.

(3) Articles 30 and 110 TFEU

must be interpreted as not precluding a national measure imposing a temporary solidarity contribution on registered oil companies which have been designated as primary participants for diesel, gas oil and petrol products, calculated on the basis of the quantities of those products released for consumption, provided that that contribution applies irrespective of the origin of the products concerned and does not, directly or indirectly, make products from other Member States subject to a level of taxation higher than that imposed on similar domestic products or to internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other domestic products.

(4) Article 107(1) TFEU

must be interpreted as meaning that national legislation establishing a temporary solidarity contribution does not constitute State aid provided that it does not establish a difference in treatment between operators which are, in the light of the objective pursued by that legislation, in a comparable factual and legal situation.

1 Original language: French.

2 Council Regulation of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (OJ 2022 L 261 I, p. 1).

3 Namely Articles 30 and 110, Article 107(1) and Article 108(3) TFEU, as well as Article 14 of that regulation.

4 See, in that regard, judgments of 18 December 2025, Electrabel and Others (C‑633/23, EU:C:2025:991), and of 22 January 2026, Secab (C‑423/23, EU:C:2026:32), cases in which I drafted the Opinion. See, also, my Opinions in Axpo Energy Romania and PPC Renewables Romania (C‑251/24 and C‑392/24, EU:C:2026:521), and in 2Valorise Ham and Others (C‑467/24, EU:C:2026:608). Moreover, a number of actions for annulment currently pending before the General Court have been brought against Regulation 2022/1854. See, in that regard, Electrawinds Shabla South v Council (T‑759/22), Vermilion Energy Netherlands and Others v Council (T‑775/22), Vermilion Exploration and Production Ireland and Vermilion Energy Ireland v Council (T‑795/22), ExxonMobil Producing Netherlands and Mobil Erdgas Erdöl v Council (T‑802/22) and Petrogas E&P Netherlands v Council (T‑803/22).

5 Those two cases raise, in part, questions which are identical or similar to those raised in the present case, in that they concern the provisions of Regulation 2022/1854 relating to the temporary solidarity contribution and to equivalent national measures. Moreover, like Vermilion Energy Ireland and Others (C‑533/24), the present case also concerns the validity of the legal basis on which that regulation was adopted, in particular as regards recourse to Article 122(1) TFEU for the adoption of Chapter III thereof.

6 Regulation of 20 December 2006 establishing the statistical classification of economic activities NACE Revision 2 and amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3037/90 as well as certain EC Regulations on specific statistical domains (OJ 2006 L 393, p. 1).

7 Moniteur belge of 22 December 2022, p. 98815.

8 They are, more specifically, Varo Energy Belgium NV, EG Retail (Belgium) BV, Gilops Group NV, Van Raak Trading NV and Kuwait Petroleum (Belgium) NV.

9 See judgment of 11 June 2026, Centro Petroli Roma (C‑386/24, EU:C:2026:471, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

10 The answer to be given to that question is capable of calling into question the legal basis of that law and, consequently, of having a bearing on the applicants’ obligation to pay that contribution.

11 The legal framework within which new rules are situated may help to shed light on the purpose of those rules. See, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council (C‑157/21, EU:C:2022:98, paragraphs 121 and 122 and the case-law cited).

12 See, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2024, Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden (C‑61/22, EU:C:2024:251, paragraphs 45 to 47 and the case-law cited).

13 Article 122(1) TFEU has also served as the legal basis for the adoption of several other EU acts in response to crisis situations outside the area of energy, in particular during the migration crisis (see Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 of 15 March 2016 on the provision of emergency support within the Union (OJ 2016 L 70, p. 1)) and during the COVID-19 pandemic (see, in particular, Council Regulation (EU) 2020/521 of 14 April 2020 activating the emergency support under Regulation (EU) 2016/369, and amending its provisions taking into account the COVID‐19 outbreak (OJ 2020 L 117, p. 3)).

14 See, in particular, recitals 13 and 14 of Regulation 2022/1854.

15 See recitals 6, 7 and 9 and Article 1 of Regulation 2022/1854.

16 See, by analogy, judgment of 24 October 1973, Rewe Zentral (10/73, EU:C:1973:111, paragraph 15).

17 See, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council (C‑157/21, EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 354 and the case-law cited). See also my Opinions in 2Valorise Ham and Others (C‑467/24, EU:C:2026:608, point 60) and Vermilion Energy Ireland and Others (C‑533/24, point 77).

18 See recitals 14, 51 and 57 of Regulation 2022/1854.

19 See recital 54 of Regulation 2022/1854.

20 See, in particular, Article 3(3) TEU. See, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2021, Germany v Poland (C‑848/19 P, EU:C:2021:598, paragraphs 38 and 41).

21 It also follows from the Court’s case-law that the application of the principle of solidarity does not mean that EU policy must never, under any circumstances, have negative impacts for the particular interests of a Member State in the field concerned. See, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2021, Germany v Poland (C‑848/19 P, EU:C:2021:598, paragraphs 44, 49, 53 and 73).

22 See Article 194(1) TFEU.

23 See, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2017, Anagnostakis v Commission (C‑589/15 P, EU:C:2017:663, paragraph 71).

24 The very concept of ‘solidarity’ must be understood as encompassing both Member States and final customers. It would, in fact, be difficult to conceive of the ‘spirit of solidarity’ as something that can be separated from the interests of national consumers, who must ultimately also benefit from that solidarity.

25 See, in particular, recitals 6, 14 and 57 and Article 17 of Regulation 2022/1854.

26 See, in that regard, point 28 of this Opinion.

27 See, in that regard, Article 114(2) TFEU, and Article 194(3) TFEU, which introduces a different procedure for measures in the area of energy which are ‘primarily of a fiscal nature’ (emphasis added).

28 See judgment of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom (C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 97), from which it follows that, whilst direct taxation falls primarily within the competence of the Member States, that fact does not prevent the European Union from exercising competence in that area, which has, moreover, been subject to harmonisation measures in certain sectors (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2022, Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission, C‑885/19 P and C‑898/19 P, EU:C:2022:859, paragraph 73). Moreover, several directives relating to direct taxation have been adopted on the basis of Article 115 TFEU (see, in particular, Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523 of 14 December 2022 on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational enterprise groups and large-scale domestic groups in the Union (OJ 2022 L 328, p. 1)).

29 See, in particular, judgment of 24 October 1973, Balkan-Import-Export (5/73, EU:C:1973:109, paragraphs 14 and 15).

30 It follows from the case-law recalled in point 29 of this Opinion that where an EU act has a twofold purpose or twofold component and one of these is identifiable as main or predominant, whereas the other is merely incidental, that act must be founded on a sole legal basis, that is, the one required by the main or predominant purpose or component.

31 See, by analogy, judgments of 24 October 1973, Balkan-Import-Export (5/73, EU:C:1973:109, paragraph 15), and of 24 October 1973, Rewe Zentral (10/73, EU:C:1973:111, paragraph 15). However, that reservation could be regarded as relating to the other provisions of the FEU Treaty specifically intended to address emergency situations, such as Article 66, Article 78(3), Article 143(2), and Articles 213 and 222 TFEU.

32 See judgment of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council (C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 80).

33 See judgment of 4 September 2018, Commission v Council (Agreement with Kazakhstan) (C‑244/17, EU:C:2018:662, paragraph 38).

34 It should be noted, in that regard, that it is for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret national law, to determine whether the measure at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an ‘equivalent national measure’ for the purposes of Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 and, in particular, whether it is compatible with that regulation. The Court of Justice nevertheless does have jurisdiction to provide the referring court with the elements of interpretation of EU law which are necessary for that purpose.

35 I note also that point 21 of Article 2 of Regulation 2022/1854 defines an ‘equivalent national measure’ as a legislative, regulatory or administrative measure adopted and published by a Member State by 31 December 2022. That temporal condition appears to have been satisfied, since the measure at issue in the main proceedings was adopted by the Law of 16 December 2022, which entered into force on 22 December 2022.

36 In addition, those sectors are referred to on several occasions in Regulation 2022/1854, in particular in points 17 to 19 of Article 2 thereof, which defines, respectively, the concepts of ‘Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors’, ‘surplus profits’ and ‘solidarity contribution’.

37 See recital 51 of Regulation 2022/1854.

38 See recitals 6, 9 and 14 of Regulation 2022/1854.

39 The equivalent national measure constitutes an alternative means of achieving the objectives pursued by the temporary solidarity contribution and cannot, in the absence of any express indication to that effect, allow Member States to depart from the essential elements of the framework defined by the EU legislature.

40 It would also effectively render meaningless the requirement, set out in Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854, that national measures must be ‘equivalent’ to that contribution (see, in that regard, my Opinion in Acea Produzione and Others (C‑153/25, point 52)).

41 Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the natural gas and coal sectors are thus excluded from the scope of that measure, even though those sectors fall within the scope of Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854.

42 See also my Opinion in Acea Produzione and Others (C‑153/25, point 55).

43 Its objective is to coordinate the actions of Member States in the context of the energy crisis by establishing a basic set of common, exceptional, targeted and time limited rules.

44 See also my Opinion in Acea Produzione and Others (C‑153/25, point 56).

45 See also my Opinion in Acea Produzione and Others (C‑153/25, point 64).

46 See also my Opinion in Acea Produzione and Others (C‑153/25, points 56 and 65).

47 Moreover, that government maintains that the Belgian legislature has enacted several of the measures listed in Article 17(1) of Regulation 2022/1854, in particular measures to extend the social tariff, as well as the introduction of a heating allowance, a heating oil allowance and a federal electricity and gas allowance to support households.

48 The mere fact that national legislation states that it pursues a given objective cannot, in itself, suffice to establish that it actually pursues that objective, which it is for the referring court to verify. However, nothing in the order for reference appears to indicate that the measure at issue in the main proceedings is not capable of achieving the objective thus pursued.

49 The referring court indicated that it had been seised only of actions brought by oil companies designated as primary participants in 2022 and that those companies did not establish an interest in obtaining the annulment of the Law of 16 December 2022, in so far as that law applies to oil companies operating in the refinery sector. Accordingly, the referring court stated that it would not examine that law in that regard, unless it appeared that the relevant provisions should also be annulled on account of their inseparable link with those relating to oil companies designated as primary participants in 2022.

50 In so far as is relevant, I note that the question whether the revenue-capping measure provided for in Article 6 of Regulation 2022/1854 and the national measures transposing that provision are compatible with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter was analysed in detail in the context of my Opinion in 2Valorise Ham and Others (C‑467/24, EU:C:2026:608, points 52 to 54, 104 to 108, 130 and 131).

51 See judgment of 6 December 2018, FENS (C‑305/17, EU:C:2018:986, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

52 See judgment of 14 June 2018, Lubrizol France (C‑39/17, EU:C:2018:438, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

53 See judgment of 2 October 2014, Orgacom (C‑254/13, EU:C:2014:2251, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

54 It is apparent from the order for reference that the term ‘released for consumption’ refers, in national law, to the point in time at which excise duty becomes chargeable and relates to the production, processing or importation of the product. The levy thus becomes chargeable upon release for consumption, irrespective of the subsequent sale to the consumer.

55 See also judgment of 7 March 2024, Fallimento Esperia and GSE (C‑558/22, EU:C:2024:209, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

56 See judgment of 2 October 2014, Orgacom (C‑254/13, EU:C:2014:2251, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

57 See judgment of 22 February 2024, Commission v Malta (Taxation of second-hand vehicles) (C‑694/22, EU:C:2024:158, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

58 See judgment of 22 February 2024, Commission v Malta (Taxation of second-hand vehicles) (C‑694/22, EU:C:2024:158, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

59 See judgment of 22 February 2024, Commission v Malta (Taxation of second-hand vehicles) (C‑694/22, EU:C:2024:158, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

60 See judgment of 22 February 2024, Commission v Malta (Taxation of second-hand vehicles) (C‑694/22, EU:C:2024:158, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is also important to note, in that regard, that goods are classified as similar where they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the point of view of consumers (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 February 1976, Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Großhandels, 45/75, EU:C:1976:22, paragraph 12).

61 See judgment of 8 November 2007, Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten and Gemeindebetriebe Frohnleiten (C‑221/06, EU:C:2007:657, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

62 Judgment of 11 July 2019, Commission v Greece (Tsipouro) (C‑91/18, EU:C:2019:600, paragraph 33).

63 Apart from the fact that it does not specify which energy products are extracted in Belgium, the referring court identifies no domestic product capable of being regarded as similar to or competing with the imported petroleum products, for the purpose of the Court’s case-law referred to in point 113 of this Opinion. As regards other energy products that may be subject to the temporary solidarity contribution, such as coal or natural gas, the Belgian Government submits that their exclusion from the scope of that contribution is justified by objective considerations relating, in the case of the former, to the insignificance of that sector in Belgian energy consumption and to the specific situation of the sole operator active in that sector, and, in the case of the latter, to the absence of natural gas production in that Member State. If those elements are established, a matter which it is for the referring court to verify, the application of the measure at issue in the main proceedings cannot be regarded as falling within the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 110 TFEU, since the different treatment of those sectors compared with that of petroleum products does not result from an intention to favour competing domestic products, but is explained by the specific characteristics of the sectors concerned.

64 Paraffin is primarily used as aircraft fuel and is not, in principle, a petroleum product intended for individuals. The primary market participants for paraffin – namely airport operators – would not have access to the oil markets, or at least not to the same extent, and would therefore not have made windfall profits from the sale of petroleum products directly to final customers.

65 As regards lamp oil, I note that the file before the Court contains very little information regarding its characteristics and its specific use on the Belgian market. In particular, it does not appear from that file that it differs from other petroleum products subject to the temporary solidarity contribution in any sufficiently distinct way in terms of its use, as paraffin does. Rather, in the light of the Belgian Government’s observations, it would appear that its exclusion from the scope of that contribution is justified by the negligible quantity of lamp oil released for consumption on the Belgian market compared with that of other products derived from petroleum, such as diesel, gas oil or petrol. In those circumstances, and subject to the checks which it is for the referring court to carry out as to the reality and extent of that quantitative difference, the exclusion of lamp oil appears to be based on an objective, verifiable criterion, independent of the product’s origin, namely the volume released for consumption, so that it cannot, in itself, be regarded as constituting discrimination within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU. That conclusion is all the more valid given that taking such a criterion into account ensures the effective application of an emergency intervention measure on the energy markets, such as that at issue in the main proceedings. In the present case, given the particularly small quantity of lamp oil released for consumption, the legislature could reasonably consider that making the primary participants concerned by that product subject to the contribution did not bear a sufficiently significant relationship to the objective pursued by that mechanism.

66 See, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2025, Prezydent Miasta Mielca (C‑453/23, ‘the judgment in Prezydent Miasta Mielca’, EU:C:2025:285, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

67 See, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2024, Commission v Ireland and Others (C‑465/20 P, EU:C:2024:724, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

68 See, to that effect, the judgment in Prezydent Miasta Mielca (paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

69 See the judgment in Prezydent Miasta Mielca (paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). Consequently, an error in determining the reference system necessarily vitiates the entire analysis of the condition relating to selectivity (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 March 2021, Commission v Hungary, C‑596/19 P, EU:C:2021:202, paragraph 52).

70 See the judgment in Prezydent Miasta Mielca (paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).

71 See the judgment in Prezydent Miasta Mielca (paragraphs 48 and 49 and the case-law cited). According to Advocate General Kokott, given the discretion enjoyed by Member States when determining the reference framework, the review, by the Commission and the Courts of the European Union, of that framework is limited to a plausibility check, aimed at establishing whether the national legislation is configured in a manifestly inconsistent manner or whether the national authorities are applying that legislation manifestly contra legem (see, in particular, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases Atlas Copco Airpower and Others v Commission, C‑755/23 P and C‑756/23 P, EU:C:2026:264, points 38 to 41).

72 See, also, paragraph 136 of the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) [TFEU] (OJ 2016/C 262, p. 1), which states, in essence, that special-purpose (stand-alone) levies, such as levies on certain products or activities having a negative impact on the environment or health, which do not really form part of a wider taxation system, generally are themselves the reference system.

73 Article 107(1) TFEU defines State interventions on the basis of their effects, independently of the techniques used (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 26 April 2018, ANGED, C‑233/16, EU:C:2018:280, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).

74 I would point out that, according to the Court’s case-law, essentially, in defining the characteristics constituting a tax, Member States may pursue, in addition to a purely fiscal objective, other objectives, which then also form part of the reference framework (see the judgment in Prezydent Miasta Mielca, paragraph 51).

75 Their ability to contribute would therefore be lower, while the administrative burden associated with the collection of Belgian tax could be disproportionate to the revenue likely to be generated. That consideration would be of particular importance given the cost structure of those entities, which could make it more difficult for them to pay that tax.

76 See point 116 of this Opinion.

77 In Belgium, the majority of gas is used for electricity generation, while petroleum products are used for that purpose only to a limited extent.

78 See the Court’s case-law cited in point 124 of this Opinion.

79 Since the temporary solidarity contribution does not, subject to any factual assessments to be made by the referring court, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, there is no need to examine whether it may be classified as unlawful aid under Article 108(3) TFEU.