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62025TO0650
ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
6 October 2026 (*)
In Case T‑650/25,
Vacu Activ Marcin Leśniak, established in Łosino (Poland), represented by J. Dudzik and E. Stec-Dobroczyńska, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, interveners before the General Court, being
Nick Lakhomoff, residing in West Hollywood, California (United States),
AR Group Roman Tchir, established in Przemyśl (Poland),
represented by K. Gajek, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),
composed of M. Sampol Pucurull, President, J. Laitenberger and M. Brkan (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
makes the following
Order
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Vacu Activ Marcin Leśniak, seeks annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 July 2025 (Case R 1648/2024‑1) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2 The applicant is the proprietor of a Polish word mark, filed on 3 October 2008 for the sign Vacu Activ, and of the EU figurative mark reproduced below, filed on 4 December 2018:
3 On 24 January 2013, Mr Marcin Leśniak, in his capacity as the director of the applicant, signed a contract with a third-party company, Slim Wellness Studio LLC, for an initial period of five years. Under that contract, the applicant was the producer of fitness machines (‘the Vacu Activ machines’) and Slim Wellness Studio was the exclusive distributor of those machines for the United States, Canada and Mexico. That contract was amended to extend its geographical scope to Oceania and its duration until 31 May 2022.
4 On 15 April 2019, the intervener Mr Nick Lakhomoff filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) an application for a trade mark in respect of the figurative sign reproduced below, which was registered on 29 October 2019 for goods in Classes 10 and 28 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended:
5 On 24 January 2023, Mr Lakhomoff and the other intervener, AR Group Roman Tchir, filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark that had been registered on 1 September 2022 following an application filed by the applicant on 10 May 2022 for the following figurative sign:
6 The goods covered by the contested mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Classes 10 and 28 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded, for each of those classes, to the following description:
– Class 10: ‘Computer controlled training apparatus for therapeutic use; Apparatus for use in toning muscles for medical rehabilitation; Apparatus for use in exercising muscles for medical use; Weight training apparatus adapted for medical use; Physical exercise apparatus for medical purposes; Physical exercise apparatus for therapeutic use; Exercising apparatus for medical rehabilitative purposes; Apparatus for the therapeutic stimulation of the muscles; Apparatus for achieving physical fitness [for medical use]’;
– Class 28: ‘Exercise pulleys; Sports equipment; Indoor fitness apparatus; Body training apparatus [exercise]; Body toner apparatus [exercise]; Body-building apparatus [exercise]’.
7 The ground relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity was that set out in Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
8 On 25 June 2024, the Cancellation Division upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity.
9 On 16 August 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Cancellation Division’s decision.
10 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the contested mark had been filed in bad faith. It found, in essence, that the applicant – which was aware of the interveners’ use in the United States of the mark VACUACTIVUS, registered in that territory, and of their intention to obtain protection in respect of that mark within the European Union – had expressly admitted that it had filed the contested mark for purely defensive purposes, with the sole aim of preventing the interveners from applying to register that trade mark and of undermining their commercial activities, without ever having intended to use that mark on the European market and without any objective justification.
Forms of order sought
11 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order EUIPO and the interveners to pay the costs.
12 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
13 The interveners contend that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal.
Law
14 Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
15 In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking any further steps in the proceedings, notwithstanding that one of the parties has requested a hearing (order of 6 October 2015, GEA Group v OHIM (engineering for a better world), T‑545/14, EU:T:2015:789, paragraph 13).
Admissibility of Annex A.7 to the application
16 EUIPO argues that Annex A.7 to the application, which consists of a blank standard ‘Name Reservation Request’ form, is inadmissible on the ground that it was produced for the first time before the Court. While the interveners do not dispute the admissibility of that annex, they observe that it was produced before the Court in order to substantiate claims which are new.
17 According to the applicant, Annex A.7 to the application seeks to demonstrate that the form originally produced by the interveners was fabricated.
18 In the present case, as EUIPO correctly submits, Annex A.7 to the application was produced for the first time before the Court. The purpose of actions before the Court is to review the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO for the purposes of Article 72 of Regulation 2017/1001, so it is not the Court’s function to review the facts in the light of documents produced for the first time before it. Accordingly, the abovementioned document must be excluded, without it being necessary to assess its probative value (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 November 2005, Sadas v OHIM – LTJ Diffusion (ARTHUR ET FELICIE), T‑346/04, EU:T:2005:420, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
The pleas raised in the action
19 In support of the action, the applicant formally raises two pleas in law.
20 The first plea alleges infringement of Article 20 and Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal infringed the principles of equal treatment, good administration and the obligation to state reasons.
21 In that regard, in the first place, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal arbitrarily and insufficiently justified its assessment of the probative value attributed to the evidence submitted before it by adopting a selective approach. It is of the view that the assessment of the evidence was carried out in breach of the principle of equality of the parties to the proceedings. In the second place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal failed to explain why the similarity of the signs Vacu Activ and VACUACTIVUS, which was not the result of a coincidence, had no bearing on the analysis of bad faith.
22 The second plea is based on an infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
23 It must be held that the applicant raises, in essence, three pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to state reasons, for the purposes of the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, second, infringement of the principle of good administration, set out in the second sentence of Article 94(1) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 41(1) of the Charter, and, third, infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
24 The Court considers it appropriate to examine, first of all, the first plea in law, then the third and, finally, the second.
The first plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons for the purposes of the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001
25 The applicant complains that the Board of Appeal failed to state to the requisite legal standard the reasons for its assessment of the probative value attributed to the evidence submitted by the parties and failed to explain why the degree of similarity between the signs Vacu Activ and VACUACTIVUS had no bearing on the analysis of bad faith.
26 EUIPO and the interveners dispute the applicant’s arguments.
27 It must be borne in mind, at the outset, that, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, decisions of EUIPO must state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation has the same scope as that which derives from the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU which requires that the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question, without it being necessary for that reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets those requirements must, nonetheless, be assessed with regard, not only to its wording, but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 28 June 2018, EUIPO v Puma, C‑564/16 P, EU:C:2018:509, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
28 Furthermore, the obligation to state reasons does not require the Boards of Appeal to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the lines of reasoning articulated by the parties before them. It is sufficient for them to set out the facts and the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see judgment of 12 November 2008, Shaker v OHIM – Limiñana y Botella (Limoncello della Costiera Amalfitana shaker), T‑7/04, EU:T:2008:481, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
29 It must also be borne in mind that a claim that there is no, or only an inadequate, statement of reasons constitutes a plea alleging infringement of an essential procedural requirement, which is distinct, as such, from the plea alleging inaccuracy of the reasons given for the decision, the review of which falls within the scope of the examination of the merits of that decision. The fact that the grounds given may be incorrect does not mean that no grounds were given (see judgment of 4 May 2022, Deichmann v EUIPO – Munich (Representation of two crossed stripes on the side of a shoe), T‑117/21, not published, EU:T:2022:271, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
30 Lastly, when the Board of Appeal confirms a decision of the Cancellation Division in its entirety, and given the continuity in terms of function between the Cancellation Divisions and the Boards of Appeal, to which Article 71(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 attests, that decision, together with its statement of reasons, forms part of the context in which the Board of Appeal’s decision was adopted, a context which is known to the parties and enables the Court to carry out fully its review as to whether the Board of Appeal’s assessment was well founded (see judgment of 8 July 2020, Euroapotheca v EUIPO – General Nutrition Investment (GNC LIVE WELL), T‑686/19, not published, EU:T:2020:320, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
31 In the present case, first, the Board of Appeal found, as regards the evidence produced for the first time before it, that, in the reply, the applicant had gone far beyond the four grounds justifying its submission. Consequently, the Board of Appeal declared that it would take into consideration only the parts of that reply directly linked to those grounds, and reject the remainder as inadmissible. Furthermore, although no reasons had been put forward by the parties to explain why certain items of evidence had not been submitted during the proceedings at first instance, the Board of Appeal admitted that evidence in dubio pro reo and stated that it would take it into consideration.
32 Second, the Board of Appeal examined the claims relating to bad faith on the part of the interveners in the light of the relevant circumstances and the evidence produced by the parties.
33 In that connection, as regards, in the first place, the parties’ contradictory assertions concerning the origin of the sign, the argument that the Board of Appeal found more convincing was the one put forward by the interveners, namely that the sign of the contested mark had been created in 2000 in the name and on behalf of Mr Lakhomoff by graphic designer A, according to a statement by the latter dated 30 December 2022, which the Board of Appeal considered to be correct. It added that the fact that that sign displayed certain similarities with other signs was not such as to call into question the accuracy of that statement, since there was nothing in the file to suggest that the author of that statement was aware of other signs with a similar structure.
34 By contrast, the Board of Appeal found that the argument put forward by the applicant was implausible. It noted, in that regard, that the applicant had initially confined itself to challenging the credibility of the statement produced by the interveners on the grounds of the time that had elapsed since the events described, but had subsequently altered its line of argument during the proceedings, submitting a statement from another graphic designer, B, from which it appeared that the applicant itself had commissioned the creation of the sign. In particular, the Board of Appeal found that, in accordance with the statement of that graphic designer, no invoice had been issued, even if ‘all graphic designs, creative concepts and implementations carried out by the advertising agency … for Vacu Activ [were] original works of [B] and his team’. In addition, the Board of Appeal found that the statement of the graphic designer at issue could not be regarded as coming from an independent third party, since that designer had been the applicant’s chief design officer since 2020, a fact which, moreover, had not been disputed by the applicant or mentioned in that statement. The Board of Appeal considered that, for those reasons, it was unlikely that that statement reflected the reality of the events, and noted that it was rather surprising that it had not been filed during the proceedings at first instance, given the close relationship between the author thereof and the applicant.
35 In the second place, the Board of Appeal noted that, although the figurative sign used by the applicant and the sign VACUACTIVUS were very similar and that such similarity could not be a coincidence, that similarity nevertheless had no impact on the present case, since the signs were not identical. It stated, in that regard, that the signs in question could not be regarded as similar overall, having regard to the different colour combinations, the use of a single word in one of them and two words in the other and the addition of the suffix ‘us’ in the sign of the contested mark, all of which altered the distinctive character of that mark. In addition, the Board of Appeal observed that, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, consumers would not tend to analyse the sign VACUACTIVUS in detail and to consider that it could represent the top level internet domain ‘vacuactiv.us’ despite that sign being – in the applicant’s view – exactly the same as the sign Vacu Activ, with the sole difference that it contains an indication that it is used in the United States.
36 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s intention when the contested mark was filed, the Board of Appeal found that the applicant had expressly stated that it had filed that mark for defensive purposes, without any intention of using it, which was indicative of prima facie dishonest behaviour. Furthermore, it noted that it was clear from the established facts that the applicant was aware of the interveners’ use of the sign in the United States and of its registration as a trade mark in that territory, as well as of the interveners’ intention to obtain protection for that mark within the European Union by designating the European Union and other territories in its international registration. The Board of Appeal therefore found that the sole purpose of the contested trade mark application was to undermine the interveners’ activities by preventing them from registering the same sign in the European Union.
37 In the fourth place, the Board of Appeal stated that it had carefully assessed the messenger chat between the applicant’s representative and Mr Lakhomoff, the content of which the parties disagreed on. That assessment led it to the conclusion that, in accordance with the version put forward by the interveners – which it considered the most plausible – the parties had agreed that the applicant could continue to use its mark Vacu Activ, while the interveners would use only the mark VACUACTIV/MEDSTARCOM – World leading manufacture. It stated that that also explained why Mr Lakhomoff had not defended his international registration designating the European Union, based on the mark referred to in paragraph 4 above.
38 Lastly, the Board of Appeal noted that the other documents produced by the applicant did not add anything new to the facts, were not capable of undermining the probative value of the other evidence and did not allow conclusions to be drawn as to whether the registration of the mark VACUACTIVUS in the United States by the interveners had been made in bad faith, nor did they establish that the use of that sign had been made solely with the applicant’s permission.
39 It follows that, without prejudice to the merits of the Board of Appeal’s assessment as to whether the applicant acted in bad faith, the Board of Appeal set out, clearly and unequivocally, in accordance with the requirements of the case-law cited in paragraphs 27 and 28 above, the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the contested decision, underpinning its reasoning and enabling the parties to defend themselves and the Court to exercise its power of review on the merits.
40 In particular, as is apparent from paragraphs 33 to 38 above, the Board of Appeal, like the Cancellation Division, examined the arguments of the parties in the light of the facts and evidence produced before it in order to determine, on the basis of an overall analysis of the relevant factors, whether the conditions for the application of Article 59(1)(b) were met. Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, in so doing the Board of Appeal was not required to explain the probative value of each element of the body of evidence on which it based its decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 November 2013, Recaro v OHIM – Certino Mode (RECARO), T‑524/12, not published, EU:T:2013:604, paragraph 71).
41 Furthermore, as the interveners argue, the applicant proceeds on the basis of an incorrect premiss in asserting that the contested decision is vitiated by a failure to state reasons in that the Board of Appeal did not explain why the similarity of the signs Vacu Activ and VACUACTIVUS was irrelevant to the present dispute and could not, in any event, lead to its annulment. As noted in paragraphs 35 and 36 above, it is apparent from paragraphs 88 to 91 of the contested decision that, while acknowledging the visual resemblance between the signs Vacu Activ and VACUACTIVUS, the Board of Appeal concluded that this was not, in the present case, a decisive factor in the assessment of bad faith on the part of the applicant, since the signs were not identical – contrary to the applicant’s contention – and the suffix ‘us’ in VACUACTIVUS could not be interpreted as referring to the United States. The Board of Appeal noted, moreover, that that aspect was important in order to determine the applicant’s subjective intention at the time of filing the sign, an act which, according to the applicant’s statements, had a defensive purpose.
42 In the light of all of the foregoing, the contested decision, which, moreover, upholds the Cancellation Division’s decision, is reasoned to the requisite legal standard.
43 Therefore, the first plea in law must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001
44 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal did not examine all the relevant factual circumstances in order to determine whether there was bad faith, since it failed to take into account, first, the origin of the sign VACUACTIVUS and its similarity with the Vacu Activ marks on the basis of which it was, according to the applicant, created and, second, the nature of the business relationship between the parties and the circumstances which brought that relationship to an end. In that context, the applicant also claims that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account the allegedly unfair and dishonest acts of the interveners, which it claims preclude its bad faith, given the previous commercial cooperation between the interveners and the applicant.
45 EUIPO and the interveners dispute the applicant’s arguments.
46 It should be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that, under Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, an EU trade mark is to be declared invalid on application to EUIPO or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings where the applicant was acting in bad faith when it filed the application for registration of that trade mark.
47 In that regard, it should be noted that the concept of ‘bad faith’ referred to in Article 59(l)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 is not defined, delimited or even described in any way in the legislation (see judgment of 9 July 2025, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health v EUIPO – Multi Access (Representation of three Chinese characters), T‑121/24 to T‑127/24 and T‑129/24, not published, EU:T:2025:683, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
48 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice and the General Court have provided a number of clarifications as to how the concept of ‘bad faith’ as referred to in Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 should be interpreted and the existence of that concept assessed.
49 In the first place, in accordance with its usual meaning in everyday language, the concept of ‘bad faith’ presupposes the presence of a dishonest state of mind or intention. The concept of bad faith must, moreover, be understood in the context of trade mark law, which is that of the course of trade. In that regard, the rules on the EU trade mark are aimed, in particular, at contributing to the system of undistorted competition in the European Union, in which each undertaking must, in order to attract and retain customers by the quality of its goods or services, be able to have registered as trade marks signs which enable the consumer, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish those goods or services from others which have a different origin (judgments of 12 September 2019, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, C‑104/18 P, EU:C:2019:724, paragraph 45, and of 29 January 2020, Sky and Others, C‑371/18, EU:C:2020:45, paragraph 74).
50 Consequently, the absolute ground for invalidity referred to in Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 applies where it is apparent from relevant and consistent indicia that the proprietor of an EU trade mark has filed the application for registration of that mark not with the aim of engaging fairly in competition but with the intention of undermining, in a manner inconsistent with honest practices, the interests of third parties, or with the intention of obtaining, without even targeting a specific third party, an exclusive right for purposes other than those falling within the functions of a trade mark, in particular the essential function of indicating origin (judgment of 12 September 2019, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, C‑104/18 P, EU:C:2019:724, paragraph 46).
51 In the second place, the intention of an applicant for a trade mark is a subjective factor which must, however, be determined objectively by the competent administrative or judicial authorities. Consequently, any claim of bad faith must be the subject of an overall assessment, taking into account all the factual circumstances relevant to the particular case. It is only in that manner that a claim of bad faith can be assessed objectively (see judgment of 12 September 2019, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, C‑104/18 P, EU:C:2019:724, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
52 The factors taken into account by the case-law in the context of the overall analysis undertaken pursuant to Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 include, in particular: the fact that the applicant knows or must know that a third party is using, in at least one Member State, an identical or similar sign for an identical or similar product or service capable of being confused with the sign for which registration is sought; the applicant’s intention to prevent that third party from continuing to use such a sign; the degree of legal protection enjoyed by the signs at issue; the applicant’s intention to prevent that third party from marketing a product; the origin of the contested sign and its use since its creation; the commercial logic underlying the filing of the application for registration of the sign as an EU trade mark and the chronology of events relating to that filing (see judgment of 14 May 2025, Techtex v EUIPO – Alberts (Dr.Albert), T‑327/24, not published, EU:T:2025:490, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
53 In the third place, it must be borne in mind that it is for the applicant for a declaration of invalidity to prove the circumstances which substantiate a finding that the proprietor of an EU trade mark was acting in bad faith when it filed the application for registration of that mark (see judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca Europe v OHIM – PSA Peugeot Citroën (Simca), T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited), good faith being presumed until proven otherwise (see judgment of 21 April 2021, Hasbro v EUIPO – Kreativni Dogadaji (MONOPOLY), T‑663/19, EU:T:2021:211, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
54 Lastly, it should be noted that the registration of a trade mark by an applicant without any intention to use it in relation to the goods and services covered by that registration may constitute bad faith, where there is no rationale for the application for registration in the light of the aims referred to in Regulation 2017/1001. Such bad faith may, however, be established only if there is objective, relevant and consistent indicia tending to show that, when the application for a trade mark was filed, the trade mark applicant had the intention either of undermining, in a manner inconsistent with honest practices, the interests of third parties, or of obtaining, without even targeting a specific third party, an exclusive right for purposes other than those falling within the functions of a trade mark (see judgment of 29 January 2020, Sky and Others, C‑371/18, EU:C:2020:45, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
55 It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that the lawfulness of the contested decision must be examined, inasmuch as the Board of Appeal found that the applicant acted in bad faith, in accordance with Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
56 In the present case, it is apparent from the objective, relevant and consistent indicia, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 54 above, on which the Board of Appeal relied in the contested decision, that the applicant, when it filed the application for registration of the contested mark, did not intend to make use of that mark in a manner falling within the functions of a trade mark, but to prevent the interveners from using a mark similar to its own, an intention which it expressly acknowledged during the proceedings before the two adjudicating bodies of EUIPO. In its observations of 15 June 2023 on the application for a declaration of invalidity, the applicant explained that it had filed the application for registration of the contested mark, in view of the similarity between the sign VACUACTIVUS and its earlier marks Vacu Activ, in order to prevent any infringement of those earlier marks. Furthermore, as was noted by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision, the applicant was aware of the use made of the sign VACUACTIVUS by the interveners in the United States as well as of the registration of that sign as a trade mark in that territory and of the interveners’ intention to obtain protection of that sign within the European Union, as it also admits. Moreover, the applicant filed an opposition to that application on the basis of its earlier figurative trade mark, which led to the refusal, on formal grounds, of protection within the European Union in respect of the international registration.
57 It follows that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that, in so far as the contested mark had been filed with the sole aim of harming the interests of the interveners, in order to prevent them from registering the sign VACUACTIVUS as a trade mark within the European Union, there was no commercial logic underlying the filing of the contested mark.
58 None of the arguments submitted by the applicant is capable of calling that finding into question.
59 First, the applicant claims that the logo or figurative sign VACUACTIVUS used by the interveners was created on the basis of the similar signs and marks Vacu Activ, which it had been using since 2003 or had owned since 2010, that is to say, prior to the conclusion of the contract referred to in paragraph 3 above. Even if it were established, such a circumstance does not permit the inference that the applicant was not acting in bad faith at the time of filing the contested mark.
60 Indeed, the concept of ‘bad faith’ relates to a subjective motivation on the part of the trade mark applicant, namely a dishonest intention or other sinister motive. As is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 50 above, that concept involves conduct which departs from accepted principles of ethical behaviour or honest commercial and business practices (see judgment of 4 September 2024, Bela Vizago Nature v EUIPO – Bidah (bidah chaumel ingredientes naturales), T‑452/23, not published, EU:T:2024:581, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
61 In the present case, as the Board of Appeal correctly found in the contested decision, the applicant expressly acknowledged that its intention at the time of filing the contested mark was to prevent any application for registration, in the European Union, of a mark similar to the Vacu Activ marks of which it was already the proprietor, rather than to use the contested mark. Consequently, the origin of the contested mark showed a clear intention on the part of the applicant to obtain an exclusive right for purposes other than those pertaining to the functions of a mark, which led the Board of Appeal to conclude that there was bad faith on its part, and not the fact that the creation of the VACUACTIVUS logo preceded the existence of its earlier marks. Similarly, the fact that the interveners began to use the sign VACUACTIVUS only after the conclusion of the contract referred to in paragraph 3 above, on a date which is difficult for the applicant to determine, does not call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the applicant was aware of that use at the time of filing the contested mark. It follows that the argument that the Board of Appeal wrongly concluded, in disregard of the evidence produced by the applicant, that the VACUACTIVUS logo had been created by the interveners prior to the Vacu Activ marks must be rejected as ineffective.
62 Second, the applicant cannot validly criticise the Board of Appeal for failing to take into account the nature of the business relationship between the parties as defined in the contract referred to in paragraph 3 above. According to the applicant, that contract provided that Mr Lakhomoff, in his capacity as a ‘licensed’ distributor, could not use the sign Vacu Activ other than for resale of the machines produced by the applicant or for uses to which the applicant had expressly consented. However, even if it is assumed that Mr Lakhomoff did not strictly comply with the terms of that agreement – which is not the subject matter of the present action – and regardless of its legal classification as a contract for the distribution of goods or as a licence agreement, it must be noted that, as the interveners assert and as is apparent from Clause 1.1 of the contract in question, that contract did not concern the use of the sign VACUACTIVUS, but the export of the Vacu Activ machines produced by the applicant, under any name the latter might use. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant, while acknowledging that the signs forming the subject matter of that contract were not listed directly therein, considers it certain that they included, inter alia, the sign Vacu Activ, used to designate the producer.
63 In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments that the sign VACUACTIVUS – of which it claims it was the rightful owner following the expansion of the distribution of its goods, namely the Vacu Activ machines, to the American market – had been used with its authorisation, as is apparent from the contract referred to in paragraph 3 above, cannot succeed. Such arguments are not, moreover, capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding, in paragraph 96 of the contested decision, that the applicant has not adduced any evidence in support of that claim. Similarly, the applicant’s line of argument, which is in any event unsubstantiated, that during their cooperation the parties had agreed that, for the purposes of distributing Vacu Activ machines on the United States market, the distributor would use the mark Vacu Activ followed by the suffix ‘us’, even if it were established, does not call into question the conclusion that the filing of the contested mark did not have any underlying commercial logic. Accordingly, those arguments must be rejected as ineffective.
64 For the same reasons, the arguments relating to the termination of the contractual relationship and to the reasons why the applicant terminated that relationship – namely the fact that the interveners allegedly began to use a sign identical to the contested mark, which differed from the earlier marks it owned and which were covered by the contract concluded between the parties, for goods from other manufacturers – are not relevant for the purpose of determining whether the Board of Appeal was right to find that the contested mark had been filed in bad faith.
65 Third, the fact that the applicant did in fact use another sign has no bearing on the Board of Appeal’s finding, which, moreover, is not disputed, that the applicant did not intend to use the contested mark. As the interveners state, the long-standing use of the sign Vacu Activ is not such as to confer rights on the applicant over the use of a separate, albeit similar, sign. By contrast, it is important to note that the applicant was aware of the interveners’ use of the sign VACUACTIVUS at the time of filing the contested mark and that it acted with the intention of appropriating that sign within the European Union. In that regard, irrespective of whether the Board of Appeal was wrong to interpret the messenger chat, referred to in paragraph 37 above, as confirming Mr Lakhomoff’s version according to which an agreement was in place for the coexistence of the marks on the market, such an error of assessment, even if it were established, would have no bearing on the legality of the contested decision. The findings (i) that the marks had in fact coexisted without the applicant objecting to such a circumstance and (ii) that the applicant acted in bad faith in filing the contested mark are based on a body of consistent evidence and indicia. In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments relating to the use of another sign and those relating to the absence of an agreement on the coexistence of the marks on the market must be rejected as ineffective.
66 Fourth, the applicant cannot criticise the Board of Appeal for having failed to take account of its claim that the interveners’ actions, such as the filing of the mark referred to in paragraph 4 above, should be treated in the same way as the conduct of a disloyal agent, within the meaning of Article 6septies of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, as revised and amended, as it had argued during the administrative proceedings. Admittedly, such arguments might have been relevant in the context of potential proceedings before the competent United States authorities, which it would have been open to the applicant to bring, if appropriate. Indeed, Article 6septies of that convention allows the proprietor of an earlier trade mark registered in any State which is a party to that convention, such as the United States of America, to claim protection for his or her trade mark in the event that his or her agent or representative misuses it by applying for the registration of a similar trade mark without his or her consent.
67 Similarly, as regards the mark VACUACTIVUS, the applicant could have raised the complaint relating to a potential dishonest intention on the part of the interveners at the time that mark was filed with the USPTO or at the time the international registration designating, inter alia, the European Union, was filed with the competent authorities and by following the appropriate procedure. As the Board of Appeal correctly found in paragraph 99 of the contested decision, notwithstanding the applicant’s alleged intention to ensure the protection of its earlier rights over the Vacu Activ marks, the fact remains that, by filing the contested mark with the sole objective of preventing the interveners from registering their mark within the European Union, the applicant infringed Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. It follows that that line of argument put forward by the applicant must be rejected as ineffective.
68 Furthermore, the Board of Appeal also noted, in paragraph 100 of the contested decision, that Article 9(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 allows the proprietor of an EU trade mark to prevent third parties from using, in the course of trade and without the proprietor’s consent, a trade mark which, inter alia, bears similarities to its registered trade mark to the extent of causing confusion.
69 Indeed, under Article 9(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the proprietor of an EU trade mark is entitled to prevent all third parties from using, in the course of trade, without his consent, a sign identical or similar to the mark in relation to goods or services which are identical or similar to those for which it has been registered or a sign in relation to which, by reason of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and by reason of the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark. The exercise of that right must, however, be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects, or is liable to affect, the functions of the trade mark, which include not only the essential function of the mark, which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the product or service, but also the other functions of the mark, such as, in particular, that of guaranteeing the quality of the product or service, or those of communication, investment or advertising (see judgment of 25 July 2018, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha and Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Europe, C‑129/17, EU:C:2018:594, paragraphs 33 and 34 and the case-law cited). Although effective measures, available to any EU trade mark proprietor to combat infringement, based, for example, on Article 9(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation 2017/1001, could have been taken by the applicant in that regard, they cannot justify the filing of the contested mark by the applicant and thus rule out its bad faith on the basis of Article 59(1)(b) of that regulation.
70 Accordingly, the third plea in law must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of good administration, set out in the second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 41(1) of the Charter
71 In the first place, the applicant disputes the evidence taken into account by the Board of Appeal since, according to the applicant, some of it was partly manipulated by the interveners, a point which the applicant raised during the administrative procedure and which the Board of Appeal expressly noted in paragraph 37 of the contested decision. The applicant makes reference, in that regard, first, to the messenger chat referred to in paragraphs 37 and 65 above, extracts from which had been submitted by the interveners, as compared with extracts from that same conversation submitted by the applicant, and, second, to the name reservation request form produced by the interveners, as compared to the blank form submitted as Annex A.7 to the application. In the second place, the applicant asserts that certain items of evidence, such as the form at issue and the statement of graphic designer A on the origin of the VACUACTIVUS logo, submitted by the interveners, were taken into account by the Board of Appeal despite the objections which the applicant had raised as to its probative value. It thus submits that, by not attributing the same weight to evidence of an equivalent nature and comparable probative value produced by the parties, the Board of Appeal failed to fulfil its obligation to carry out a fair and impartial examination of the case.
72 EUIPO and the interveners dispute those arguments.
73 First of all, it should be borne in mind that the prevailing principle of EU law is that the evaluation of evidence should be unfettered, with the result that any party may, in principle, rely on evidence of any kind, which does not negate the requirement emanating from the case-law that the evidence must be sufficiently cogent, consistent, reliable and factually accurate (judgment of 29 April 2026, Doors Bulgaria v EUIPO – Top Ten (Portes), T‑580/25, not published, EU:T:2026:302, paragraph 26).
74 In addition, according to the case-law, in order to assess the evidential value of a document, it is necessary to verify the plausibility and the accuracy of the information which that document contains. It is necessary to take account of, inter alia, the origin of the document, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgment of 27 February 2018, Gramberg v EUIPO – Mahdavi Sabet (Case for a mobile telephone), T‑166/15, EU:T:2018:100, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
75 In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the complaint by which the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having relied on misleading or manipulated evidence, it must be noted, at the outset, that, since the claims concerning the fabrication of the name reservation request form submitted by the interveners were raised for the first time before the Court, they must be rejected as inadmissible. It must be borne in mind, in that regard, that, under Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure, the pleadings of the parties cannot change the subject matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. In addition, it is for the Court, in the context of an action brought before it under Article 72(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, to review the legality of the decision of the Board of Appeal. Therefore the Court’s review cannot go beyond the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Board of Appeal (see judgment of 19 November 2025, Aboca v EUIPO – Azienda Agroalimentare Grignano (ABOCA), T‑543/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1046, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
76 Next, as regards the Board of Appeal’s taking into account of the extracts from the messenger chats submitted by the interveners, referred to in paragraph 37 above, even though certain parts were allegedly deliberately omitted or deleted, it should be noted that, having examined the content of that conversation, on which the parties disagreed, the Board of Appeal considered that the interveners’ interpretation of the conversation appeared more plausible. Thus, without in any way giving preference or treating more favourably the extracts from the conversation submitted by the interveners, the Board of Appeal merely considered that the interveners’ interpretation, which relates to the substance, was more convincing in the light of the facts relied on.
77 As regards, in the second place, the arguments by which the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal infringed the principle of good administration by finding that the evidence produced by the interveners had greater probative value than the evidence produced by the applicant, it must be noted that the Board of Appeal found that the evidence produced by both parties at the appeal stage was admissible in dubio pro reo and then assessed its probative value, in accordance with the principles recalled in paragraph 74 above. Furthermore, as noted in paragraphs 33 and 34 above and as argued by the interveners, the Board of Appeal, whilst noting that the applicant had altered its line of argument during the proceedings, nevertheless compared and contrasted the two contradictory narratives as to the author of the statements, the circumstances in which they were drawn up and their plausibility, which is sufficient to rebut any allegation of biased treatment in the assessment of the evidence.
78 Lastly, it should be noted that the fact that the applicant disagrees with the assessment of the evidence made by the Board of Appeal cannot be relied on in the context of the examination of a plea alleging infringement of Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001 (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 May 2013, DHL International v OHIM – Service Point Solutions (SERVICEPOINT), T‑218/10, not published, EU:T:2013:281, paragraph 66, and of 7 June 2023, Medex v EUIPO – Stein (medex), T‑419/22, not published, EU:T:2023:318, paragraph 22).
79 Accordingly, it was after having duly examined all the evidence submitted by the parties and without infringing the principle of good administration that the Board of Appeal found that the other documents produced by the applicant added nothing new to the facts and were not such as to call into question the probative value of the other evidence, with the result that it had no reason to doubt its authenticity.
80 As a result, the second plea in law must be rejected as manifestly unfounded and the action must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
Costs
81 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs relating to the proceedings before the Court, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the interveners.
82 In addition, the interveners also contended that the applicant should be ordered to reimburse the costs incurred before the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal.
83 In that regard, first, it must be borne in mind that under Article 190(2) of the Rules of Procedure, only costs necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal are to be regarded as recoverable costs. It follows that the costs incurred in respect of the proceedings before the Cancellation Division cannot be regarded as recoverable costs (see judgment of 25 April 2013, Bell & Ross v OHIM – KIN (Wristwatch case), T‑80/10, not published, EU:T:2013:214, paragraph 164 and the case-law cited). Therefore, the interveners’ forms of order must be rejected in so far as they seek to have the applicant bear the costs incurred before the Cancellation Division.
84 Second, in so far as the interveners’ claim concerns the costs of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, it is sufficient to note that, since the present order dismisses the action brought against the contested decision, it is the operative part of that decision which continues to determine the costs in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2017, Intesa Sanpaolo v EUIPO – Intesia Group Holding (INTESA), T‑143/16, not published, EU:T:2017:687, paragraph 74).
85 By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that the parties are summoned to attend a hearing and since no hearing was held in the present case, EUIPO must be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
2. Vacu Activ Marcin Leśniak, in addition to bearing its own costs, shall pay those incurred by Mr Nick Lakhomoff and AR Group Roman Tchir in the present proceedings.
3. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs.
Luxembourg, 6 October 2026.
V. Di Bucci
M. Sampol Pucurull
Registrar
President
* Language of the case: English.